X v Austria [1992] ECHR 82 (6 October 1992)

APPLICATION/REQUETE N" 9295/81

X. v/AUSTRIA X. c/AUTRICHE

DECISION of 6 October 1982 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 6 octobre 1982 sur la recevabiiite de la requete

Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention : The presumption of innocence is not only obligatory for the criminal courts but also for State-authorities. After acquittal, the civil court can establish the civil responsibility of the person concerned in respect of the same set of facts, but it is bound by the finding of the criminal court that there is no criminal guilt.

Article 6, paragraph* 2, de la Convention : La prisomption d'innocence s'im-pose non seulement au juge penal mais aussi a d'autres autorites de I'Etat. Apres un acquittement, le juge civil peut itablir la responsabilili civile de I'interesse a raison des mimes fails mais il demeure lie par la decision du juge penal quant au caractere non penal de ceux-ci.

Summary of the relevant facts ifrancais : voir p. 229)

A 16 year-old boy had been invited during school holiday by a teacher to come to his flat. Under the influence of drugs, the boy jumped from the balcony situated on the 12th floor and came to death. The teacher had shortly before left the flat. ' /

The teacher (who is the applicant in the present case) was acquitted by the criminal court of charges of providing drugs to a minor and of non-assistance of a person in danger. The Court held that it was established that the applicant had not provided the drugs to the schoolboy but that the latter had consumed some of it and had secretely put some of it in the applicant's coffee.

-227 -

In addition, the applicant was dismissed from his job as a teacher and appealed against this decision to the labour courts. Finally, the Supreme Court, deciding in last ressort, dismissed the applicant's claims.

THE LAW (Extract)

1. The applicant complains that by basing its decision on facts in respect of which he had been acquitted by the competent criminal court, the Supreme Court as Labour Court of last instance violated his right under Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

The Commission accepts that the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the above provision of the Convention is binding not only on the criminal court before which the person concerned is charged with a criminal offence, but also on other State organs (cf. in particular the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No. 7986/77, Krause v. Switzerland, D.R. 13, p. 73). No authority may treat a person as guilty of a criminal offence unless he has been convicted by the competent court and in the case of an acquittal the authorities may not continue to rely on the charges which have been raised before that court but which have been proved to be unfounded. This rule also applies to courts which have to deal with non-criminal consequences of behaviour which has been subject to criminal proceedings. They must be bound by the criminal court's finding according to which there is no criminal responsibility for the acts in question although this naturally does not prevent them to establish e.g..a civil responsibility arising out of the same facts.

The Commission notes that in the present case the factual findings underlying the Labour Court decision of last instance were based on the understanding that the grounds of dismissal stated in the school authority's letter must be construed as a reference 1o the applicant's behaviour as a whole. This behaviour included elements which the criminal court had considered to be irrelevant for its decision on the applicant's criminal responsibility and in relation to which it had therefore refrained from making any finding at all. It was in particular these matters, namely the earlier events leading up to the fatal drug consumption of a boy in the applicant's flat, which were further clarified by the labour courts. It was found that the boy had already on the day preceding his suicide proposed to the applicant to take drugs together, and that the applicant had then made no effort to dissuade the boy from realising his intention. Since the above facts had not been relied on in the criminal judgment acquitting the applicant from the charges raised against him there can be no question of a violation of the presumption of innocence in this respect.

— 228-

It is true that the Supreme Court, by referring also to contacts of the applicant with young drug addicts, to his having made possible the taking of drugs by the boy in his flat, and to his having failed to help the boy in an appropriate way, mentioned facts which had indeed been relevant for the criminal court's decision. However, it must be noted that in relation to these facts (he Supreme Court expressly referred to the result of the criminal proceedings. By coming to a different appreciation of the same facts for the purposes of its own procedure the Supreme Court thus drew a clear distinction between the effects in criminal law and those in civil (labour) law.' The relevant factual statements of the labour courts accordingly cannot be seen as amounting to an even indirect finding of the existence of a criminal offence. It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the presumption of innocence in this respect either. . . .

The applicant's complaint of a violation of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention.

Resume del falls pertinents

Un tycien de 16 ans s'itait rendu durant les vacances scolaires dans i'appartement dun enseignant, sur invitation de ce dernier. Sous {'influence de la drogue, le jeune homme sauta du balcon situi au 12° Stage et trouva la mort. L'enseignant avail quitte I'appartement peu avant.

Accuse de fourniture de drogue a un mineur et de non-assistance a une personne en danger, I'enseignant (qui est le requirant) fut acquitte par le juge penal. Ce juge considera comme itabli que le requirant n'avait pas fourni la-drogue au lycien niais que ce dernier en avait pris luimeme et en avail ajouti subrepticement a la tasse de cafe' du requirant.

Par ailleurs, le requirant fut revoqui de ses fonctions d'enseignant 'et recourut contre cette decision aupres des tribunaux du travail. Finalement, la Cour supreme, statuant comme juridiction du travail de derniere instance, debouta le requerant.

— 229-

[TRADUCTION)

■ '1 . ;

EN DROIT (Extrait)

1". Le requerant se plaint qu'en fondant sa decision sur des faits pour lesquels il avait ete, aequitte- par la juridiction penale competente, la Cour supreme; statuant en dernier ressort comme juridiction du travail, a meconnu le droit que lui reconnatt 1'article 6, paragraphs 2, de la Convention, d'etre presume innocent jusqu'a ce que sa culpabilite ait ete legalement etablie.

La Commission admet que la presomption d'innocence, telle que la garantit 'cede disposition de la Convention, lie non seulement la juridiction penale devant laquelle I'interesse est accuse d'une infraction, mais aussi d'autres organes de l'Etat (cf, notamment la decision de la Commission sur la recevabilite de.Ia Requete N° 7986/77, Krause c/Suisse, D.R. 13, p. 73).

Aucune autorite ne peut en effet considerer une personne coupable d'une infraction penale aussi longtemps que cette personne n'a pas ete reconnue coupable par la juridiction penale competente et, en cas d'acquittement, les autorites en question ne peuvent plus faire etat.des accusations portees devant le tribunal et qui se sont revelees sans fondement. Cette regie vaut egalement pour les juridictions qui ont a connaitre des consequences non penales d'un comportement qui a fait 1'objet de poursuites penales. Ces juridictions sont liees par la decision du juge penal concluant a l'absence d'une responsabilite penale pour les faits litigieux, mais cela ne les empeche pas, bien entendu, d'etabllr par exemple une responsabilite civile k raison des memes faits.

La Commission releve qu'en 1'espece les constatations de fait sur les-quelles se fondait la decision prise en dernier ressort par le tribunal du travail decoulaient de l'idee que les motifs de licenciement enonces dans la lettre de I'administration scolaire devaient s'interpreter par reference a 1'ensemble du comportement .du requerant. Or, ce comportement comprenait des elements dont le juge penal avait cstime inutile de tenir compte pour statuer sur la responsabilite penale du requerant et sur lesquels il ne s'est done pas pronon-. ce\ C'est notamment le cas des.evenements qui ont mene a ce que le lyceen absorbe dans 1'appartement du requerant la drogue qui lui a ete fatale et sur lesquels les'juridictions du travail ont donne des eclaircissements. II a ete etabli que la veille'de son suicide, le jeune garcoh avait propose une partie de drogue au requerant qui n'avait rien fait pour le dissuader de mettre son projet a execution. Cependant, le jugement acquittant le requ6rant n'ayant pas fait etat de ces faits, ii ne saurait etre question' d'une violation de la presomption d'innocence a cet egard.

"'' Certes, en sereferant egalement aux relations du requerant avecde jeunes toxicomanes; au fait que le requerant a permis au garden de se droguer dans son appartement et qu'il n'a pas prete a I'interesse l'assistance voulue, la

— 230 —

Cour supreme a evoque des faits qui etaient de ceux dont le juge penal avail a tenir compte dans son jugement. Cependant, il faut relever qu'en liaison avec ces faits, la Cour supreme a expressement mentionne le resultat de la procedure penale. En appreciant differemment les memes faits pour les besoins de sa propre procedure, la Cour supreme a done fait nettement la distinction entre les effets du comportement au regard du droit penal d'une part, du droit civil (droit du travail) de I'autre. On ne saurait done considerer que les constatations pertinentes faites par les juridictions du travail equivalent a conclure, meme indirectement, a ("existence d'une infraction penale. II s'ensuit qu'il n'y a pas non plus a cet egard apparence de violation de la presomption d'innocence.

Le grief tire par le rcquerant de 1'article 6, paragraphic 2, de la Convention, est done manifestement mal (bride et doit etre rejete conformtment a 1'articlc 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention.

— 231 —

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> X v Austria [1992] ECHR 82 (6 October 1992) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1992/82.html Cite as: [1992] ECHR 82

	APPLICATION/REQUETE N" 9295/81 X. v/AUSTRIA X. c/AUTRICHE DECISION of 6 October 1982 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 6 octobre 1982 sur la recevabiiite de la requete

	Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention : The presumption of innocence is not only obligatory for the criminal courts but also for State-authorities. After acquittal, the civil court can establish the civil responsibility of the person concerned in respect of the same set of facts, but it is bound by the finding of the criminal court that there is no criminal guilt.

	*Article 6, paragraph 2, de la Convention** : La prisomption d'innocence s'im-pose non seulement au juge penal mais aussi a d'autres autorites de I'Etat. Apres un acquittement, le juge civil peut itablir la responsabilili civile de I'interesse a raison des mimes fails mais il demeure lie par la decision du juge penal quant au caractere non penal de ceux-ci.

	Summary of the relevant facts ifrancais : voir p. 229) A 16 year-old boy had been invited during school holiday by a teacher to come to his flat. Under the influence of drugs, the boy jumped from the balcony situated on the 12th floor and came to death. The teacher had shortly before left the flat. ' / The teacher (who is the applicant in the present case) was acquitted by the criminal court of charges of providing drugs to a minor and of non-assistance of a person in danger. The Court held that it was established that the applicant had not provided the drugs to the schoolboy but that the latter had consumed some of it and had secretely put some of it in the applicant's coffee. -227 -



	In addition, the applicant was dismissed from his job as a teacher and appealed against this decision to the labour courts. Finally, the Supreme Court, deciding in last ressort, dismissed the applicant's claims.

	THE LAW (Extract) 1. The applicant complains that by basing its decision on facts in respect of which he had been acquitted by the competent criminal court, the Supreme Court as Labour Court of last instance violated his right under Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The Commission accepts that the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the above provision of the Convention is binding not only on the criminal court before which the person concerned is charged with a criminal offence, but also on other State organs (cf. in particular the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No. 7986/77, Krause v. Switzerland, D.R. 13, p. 73). No authority may treat a person as guilty of a criminal offence unless he has been convicted by the competent court and in the case of an acquittal the authorities may not continue to rely on the charges which have been raised before that court but which have been proved to be unfounded. This rule also applies to courts which have to deal with non-criminal consequences of behaviour which has been subject to criminal proceedings. They must be bound by the criminal court's finding according to which there is no criminal responsibility for the acts in question although this naturally does not prevent them to establish e.g..a civil responsibility arising out of the same facts. The Commission notes that in the present case the factual findings underlying the Labour Court decision of last instance were based on the understanding that the grounds of dismissal stated in the school authority's letter must be construed as a reference 1o the applicant's behaviour as a whole. This behaviour included elements which the criminal court had considered to be irrelevant for its decision on the applicant's criminal responsibility and in relation to which it had therefore refrained from making any finding at all. It was in particular these matters, namely the earlier events leading up to the fatal drug consumption of a boy in the applicant's flat, which were further clarified by the labour courts. It was found that the boy had already on the day preceding his suicide proposed to the applicant to take drugs together, and that the applicant had then made no effort to dissuade the boy from realising his intention. Since the above facts had not been relied on in the criminal judgment acquitting the applicant from the charges raised against him there can be no question of a violation of the presumption of innocence in this respect. — 228-



	It is true that the Supreme Court, by referring also to contacts of the applicant with young drug addicts, to his having made possible the taking of drugs by the boy in his flat, and to his having failed to help the boy in an appropriate way, mentioned facts which had indeed been relevant for the criminal court's decision. However, it must be noted that in relation to these facts (he Supreme Court expressly referred to the result of the criminal proceedings. By coming to a different appreciation of the same facts for the purposes of its own procedure the Supreme Court thus drew a clear distinction between the effects in criminal law and those in civil (labour) law.' The relevant factual statements of the labour courts accordingly cannot be seen as amounting to an even indirect finding of the existence of a criminal offence. It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the presumption of innocence in this respect either. . . . The applicant's complaint of a violation of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention.

	Resume del falls pertinents Un tycien de 16 ans s'itait rendu durant les vacances scolaires dans i'appartement dun enseignant, sur invitation de ce dernier. Sous {'influence de la drogue, le jeune homme sauta du balcon situi au 12° Stage et trouva la mort. L'enseignant avail quitte I'appartement peu avant. Accuse de fourniture de drogue a un mineur et de non-assistance a une personne en danger, I'enseignant (qui est le requirant) fut acquitte par le juge penal. Ce juge considera comme itabli que le requirant n'avait pas fourni la-drogue au lycien niais que ce dernier en avait pris luimeme et en avail ajouti subrepticement a la tasse de cafe' du requirant. Par ailleurs, le requirant fut revoqui de ses fonctions d'enseignant 'et recourut contre cette decision aupres des tribunaux du travail. Finalement, la Cour supreme, statuant comme juridiction du travail de derniere instance, debouta le requerant.

	— 229-



	[TRADUCTION) ■ '1 . ; EN DROIT (Extrait) 1". Le requerant se plaint qu'en fondant sa decision sur des faits pour lesquels il avait ete, aequitte- par la juridiction penale competente, la Cour supreme; statuant en dernier ressort comme juridiction du travail, a meconnu le droit que lui reconnatt 1'article 6, paragraphs 2, de la Convention, d'etre presume innocent jusqu'a ce que sa culpabilite ait ete legalement etablie. La Commission admet que la presomption d'innocence, telle que la garantit 'cede disposition de la Convention, lie non seulement la juridiction penale devant laquelle I'interesse est accuse d'une infraction, mais aussi d'autres organes de l'Etat (cf, notamment la decision de la Commission sur la recevabilite de.Ia Requete N° 7986/77, Krause c/Suisse, D.R. 13, p. 73). Aucune autorite ne peut en effet considerer une personne coupable d'une infraction penale aussi longtemps que cette personne n'a pas ete reconnue coupable par la juridiction penale competente et, en cas d'acquittement, les autorites en question ne peuvent plus faire etat.des accusations portees devant le tribunal et qui se sont revelees sans fondement. Cette regie vaut egalement pour les juridictions qui ont a connaitre des consequences non penales d'un comportement qui a fait 1'objet de poursuites penales. Ces juridictions sont liees par la decision du juge penal concluant a l'absence d'une responsabilite penale pour les faits litigieux, mais cela ne les empeche pas, bien entendu, d'etabllr par exemple une responsabilite civile k raison des memes faits. La Commission releve qu'en 1'espece les constatations de fait sur les-quelles se fondait la decision prise en dernier ressort par le tribunal du travail decoulaient de l'idee que les motifs de licenciement enonces dans la lettre de I'administration scolaire devaient s'interpreter par reference a 1'ensemble du comportement .du requerant. Or, ce comportement comprenait des elements dont le juge penal avait cstime inutile de tenir compte pour statuer sur la responsabilite penale du requerant et sur lesquels il ne s'est done pas pronon-. ce\ C'est notamment le cas des.evenements qui ont mene a ce que le lyceen absorbe dans 1'appartement du requerant la drogue qui lui a ete fatale et sur lesquels les'juridictions du travail ont donne des eclaircissements. II a ete etabli que la veille'de son suicide, le jeune garcoh avait propose une partie de drogue au requerant qui n'avait rien fait pour le dissuader de mettre son projet a execution. Cependant, le jugement acquittant le requ6rant n'ayant pas fait etat de ces faits, ii ne saurait etre question' d'une violation de la presomption d'innocence a cet egard. "'' Certes, en sereferant egalement aux relations du requerant avecde jeunes toxicomanes; au fait que le requerant a permis au garden de se droguer dans son appartement et qu'il n'a pas prete a I'interesse l'assistance voulue, la — 230 —

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