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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> PALAORO v. AUSTRIA - 16718/90 [1995] ECHR 37 (23 October 1995) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1995/37.html Cite as: [1995] ECHR 37, (2001) 32 EHRR 10, 32 EHRR 10

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In the case of Palaoro v. Austria (1),

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with

Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant

provisions of Rules of Court A (2), as a Chamber composed of the

following judges:

Mr R. Ryssdal, President,

Mr F. Matscher,

Mr L.-E. Pettiti,

Mr R. Macdonald,

Mr S.K. Martens,

Mr I. Foighel,

Mr J.M. Morenilla,

Sir John Freeland,

Mr J. Makarczyk,

and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 28 April and

28 September 1995,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the

last-mentioned date:

_______________

Notes by the Registrar

1. The case is numbered 36/1994/483/565. The first number is the

case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the

relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the

case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its

creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications

to the Commission.

2. Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry

into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) and thereafter only to cases

concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They correspond to

the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several

times subsequently.

_______________

PROCEDURE

1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of

Human Rights ("the Commission") on 9 September 1994, within the

three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47

(art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an

application (no. 16718/90) against the Republic of Austria lodged with

the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by an Austrian national,

Mr Peter Palaoro, on 28 May 1990.

The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44,

art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Austria recognised the

compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The

object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts

of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its

obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33

para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he wished

to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would

represent him (Rule 30).

3. On 24 September 1994, the President of the Court decided, under

Rule 21 para. 6 and in the interests of the proper administration of

justice, that a single Chamber should be constituted to hear the

instant case and the cases of Schmautzer, Umlauft, Gradinger,

Pramstaller and Pfarrmeier v. Austria (1).

_______________

1. Cases nos. 31/1994/478/560, 32/1994/479/561, 33/1994/480/562,

35/1994/482/564 and 37/1994/484/566.

_______________

4. The Chamber to be constituted for this purpose included ex

officio Mr F. Matscher, the elected judge of Austrian nationality

(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the

President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On the same day, in the

presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the

other seven members, namely Mr L.-E. Pettiti, Mr R. Macdonald,

Mr S.K. Martens, Mr I. Foighel, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Sir John Freeland

and Mr J. Makarczyk (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21

para. 4) (art. 43).

5. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal, acting

through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Austrian Government

("the Government"), the applicant and the Delegate of the Commission

on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38).

Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the

Government's memorial on 24 January 1995 and the applicant's memorial

on 30 January 1995.

6. On 3 February 1995 the Commission produced the documents in the

proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President's

instructions.

7. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took

place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on

26 April 1995. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr F. Cede, Ambassador, Head of the International

Law Department, Federal Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Agent,

Ms I. Sieß, Constitutional Department,

Federal Chancellery,

Ms E. Bertagnoli, International Law Department,

Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisers;

(b) for the Commission

Mr A. Weitzel, Delegate;

(c) for the applicant

Mr W.L. Weh, Rechtsanwalt, Counsel.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Weitzel, Mr Weh and Mr Cede.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. Circumstances of the case

8. Mr Peter Palaoro lives at Höchst in Vorarlberg.

9. On 7 November 1987 a police car observed the applicant driving

on the motorway at speeds considerably in excess of the maximum speed

limits. At 14.28 hours and 53 seconds he was recorded travelling at

150 kilometres per hour on a stretch of road where a sign indicated the

limit to be 100 k.p.h. Thirty-one seconds later he was recorded

travelling at 67 k.p.h. over the general 130 k.p.h. limit for

motorways. The applicant alleged that as the vehicle he was driving

was an extremely powerful one, it was difficult for the driver to

realise at what speed it was actually travelling.

On 6 December 1987 the Tyrol regional police authority

(Landesgendarmeriekommando) drew up a report and imposed two separate

fines on the applicant for speeding.

10. On 16 November 1988, after administrative proceedings which

involved an examination of the reporting police officers

(Meldungsleger) in the absence of the applicant, the Imst district

authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) found the applicant guilty of two

speeding offences under the Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsordnung -

see paragraph 17 below). Pursuant to section 99(3) of that Act (see

paragraph 18 below) the applicant was fined 4,000 and 6,000 Austrian

schillings (ATS), with imprisonment of eight and ten days respectively

in default of payment.

11. The applicant appealed to the Tyrol regional government (Amt der

Landesregierung), questioning the precision of the police methods for

measuring vehicle speed. He further contended that, having admitted

driving at a high speed on a given stretch of road, he should not have

been punished under two different provisions, which had resulted in an

excessively high fine. He therefore requested that the incident be

treated as a single offence and the fine reduced accordingly.

12. On 22 December 1988 the Tyrol regional government reduced the

fines to ATS 2,000 and 4,000 respectively, and the penalties in default

to four and seven days' imprisonment. The appellate authority

accepted, among other considerations, that speed-measuring techniques

could not achieve total accuracy. The submission that only one offence

had been committed was dismissed on the ground that two different

provisions had been infringed at two different moments in time.

13. Mr Palaoro then applied to the Constitutional Court

(Verfassungsgerichtshof). Relying on Article 6 (art. 6) of the

Convention, he complained that the administrative criminal procedure

did not guarantee a fair trial. He argued that he should have been

given an oral hearing and the opportunity to examine the witnesses -

that is to say the police officers - in person. This would have

allowed him to establish that the measuring methods used by the police

were often defective. He further criticised the "principle of

cumulative imposition of penalties" (Kumulationsprinzip), by virtue of

which the same criminal behaviour could be punished under different

provisions. In this context he referred to Article 4 of

Protocol No. 7 ((P7-4) to the Convention.

14. On 10 March 1989 the Constitutional Court declared the

applicant's complaint partly inadmissible as raising questions

concerning the application of ordinary law; in so far as the complaint

did raise issues of constitutional law, the Constitutional Court,

referring to its own case-law on the Convention, found that the

application did not have sufficient prospects of success. Among other

provisions, Article 144 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution was applied

(see paragraph 20 below).

15. On 19 April 1989 Mr Palaoro requested the Constitutional Court

to send his file to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof)

and on 15 June 1989 he submitted his grounds of appeal to the latter.

He stressed that he should have had the opportunity to examine the

witnesses directly and that he should not have been punished twice for

what he considered to be a single offence.

No public hearing was requested.

16. On 25 October 1989 the applicant's appeal was dismissed by the

Administrative Court pursuant to section 42(1) of the Administrative

Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofsgesetz - see paragraph 24 below).

It noted that a formal confrontation with a witness was to be ordered

only where it was necessary in the special circumstances of a given

case: there was no general right to put questions in person to a

witness (section 47 of the Administrative Criminal Justice Act). The

Administrative Court upheld the respondent authority's grounds for

dismissing the applicant's second complaint (see paragraph 12 above).

II. Relevant domestic law

A. Road traffic legislation

17. Section 20(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1960 sets the maximum speed

limit on motorways at 130 kilometres per hour.

Section 52(A)(10)(a) of the same Act prohibits travelling in

excess of the speed limit indicated on a road sign.

18. Under section 99(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, breaches of its

provisions are punishable with a fine of up to ATS 10,000, with

imprisonment of up to two weeks in default of payment.

B. Procedure

19. Article 90 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution

(Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) provides:

"Hearings by trial courts in civil and criminal cases shall be

oral and public. Exceptions may be prescribed by law."

1. Proceedings in the Constitutional Court

20. By Article 144 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution, the

Constitutional Court, when an application (Beschwerde) is made to it,

has to determine whether an administrative decision (Bescheid) has

infringed a right guaranteed by the Constitution or has applied

regulations (Verordnung) contrary to the law, a law contrary to the

Constitution or an international treaty incompatible with Austrian law.

Article 144 para. 2 provides:

"Up to the time of the hearing the Constitutional Court may by

means of a decision (Beschluß) decline to accept a case for

adjudication if it does not have sufficient prospects of success

or if it cannot be expected that the judgment will clarify an

issue of constitutional law. The court may not decline to accept

for adjudication a case excluded from the jurisdiction of the

Administrative Court by Article 133."

2. Proceedings in the Administrative Court

21. By Article 130 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution, the

Administrative Court has jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, applications

alleging that an administrative decision is unlawful.

22. Section 39(1) of the Administrative Court Act provides, in

particular, that at the end of the preliminary proceedings

(Vorverfahren) the Administrative Court must hold a hearing where the

applicant makes a request to that effect.

Section 39(2) reads as follows:

"Notwithstanding a party's application under subsection (1), the

Administrative Court may decide not to hold a hearing where

1. the proceedings must be stayed (section 33) or the

application dismissed (section 34);

2. the impugned decision must be quashed as unlawful because

the respondent authority lacked jurisdiction (section 42(2)(2));

3. the impugned decision must be quashed as unlawful on

account of a breach of procedural rules (section 42(2)(3));

4. the impugned decision must be quashed because its content

is unlawful according to the established case-law of the

Administrative Court;

5. neither the respondent authority nor any other party before

the court has filed pleadings in reply and the impugned decision

is to be quashed;

6. it is apparent to the court from the pleadings of the

parties to the proceedings before it and from the files relating

to the earlier administrative proceedings that a hearing is not

likely to clarify the case further."

Sub-paragraphs 1 to 3 of section 39(2) were in force in 1958;

sub-paragraphs 4 and 5 were inserted in 1964 and sub-paragraph 6 in

1982.

23. Section 41(1) of the Administrative Court Act provides:

"In so far as the Administrative Court does not find any

unlawfulness deriving from the respondent authority's lack of

jurisdiction or from breaches of procedural rules

(section 42(2)(2) and (3)) ..., it must examine the impugned

decision on the basis of the facts found by the respondent

authority and with reference to the complaints put forward ...

If it considers that reasons which have not yet been notified to

one of the parties might be decisive for ruling on [one of these

complaints] ..., it must hear the parties on this point and

adjourn the proceedings if necessary."

24. Section 42(1) of the same Act states that, save as otherwise

provided, the Administrative Court must either dismiss an application

as ill-founded or quash the impugned decision.

By section 42(2),

"The Administrative Court shall quash the impugned decision if

it is unlawful

1. by reason of its content, [or]

2. because the respondent authority lacked jurisdiction, [or]

3. on account of a breach of procedural rules, in that

(a) the respondent authority has made findings of fact which are,

in an important respect, contradicted by the case file, or

(b) the facts require further investigation on an important

point, or

(c) procedural rules have been disregarded, compliance with which

could have led to a different decision by the respondent

authority."

25. If the Administrative Court quashes the impugned decision, "the

administrative authorities [are] under a duty ... to take immediate

steps, using the legal means available to them, to bring about in the

specific case the legal situation which corresponds to the

Administrative Court's view of the law (Rechtsanschauung)"

(section 63(1)).

26. In a judgment of 14 October 1987 (G 181/86) the Constitutional

Court held:

"From the fact that it has been necessary to extend the

reservation in respect of Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention

to cover the procedural safeguards of Article 6 (art. 6) of the

Convention, because of the connection between those two

provisions (art. 5, art. 6), it follows that, conversely, the

limited review (die (bloß) nachprüfende Kontrolle) carried out

by the Administrative Court or the Constitutional Court is

insufficient in respect of criminal penalties within the meaning

of the Convention that are not covered by the reservation."

3. The "independent administrative tribunals"

27. Pursuant to Article 129 of the Federal Constitution,

administrative courts called "independent administrative tribunals"

(Unabhängige Verwaltungssenate) were set up in the Länder with effect

from 1 January 1991. The functions of these tribunals include

determining both the factual and the legal issues arising in cases

concerning administrative offences (Verwaltungsübertretungen).

III. Austria's reservation in respect of Article 5 (art. 5) of the

Convention

28. The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the

Austrian Government on 3 September 1958 contains, inter alia, a

reservation worded as follows:

"The provisions of Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention shall be

so applied that there shall be no interference with the measures

for the deprivation of liberty prescribed in the laws on

administrative procedure, BGBl [Federal Official Gazette]

No. 172/1950, subject to review by the Administrative Court or

the Constitutional Court as provided for in the Austrian Federal

Constitution."

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

29. Mr Palaoro applied to the Commission on 28 May 1990. He relied

on Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (art. 6-1, art. 6-3) of the Convention and

Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4), complaining (a) that he had been

unable to bring his case before a tribunal, (b) that he had been denied

the right to examine a witness in the administrative proceedings and

(c) that he had been punished twice for the same offence.

30. On 10 May 1993 the Commission declared the application

(no. 16718/90) admissible save as regards the complaint under

Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4).

In its report of 19 May 1994 (Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed

the unanimous opinion that

(a) there had been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the

Convention in that the applicant had not been able to bring his case

before a tribunal; and

(b) the lack of a hearing before the Administrative Court and the

failure by the administrative authorities to allow the witnesses to be

examined by the applicant raised no separate issue under Article 6

(art. 6) of the Convention.

The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the concurring

opinion contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this

judgment (1).

_______________

1. Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear

only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 329-B of

Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the

Commission's report is available from the registry.

_______________

FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT

31. In their memorial the Government asked the Court to hold that

"Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention is not applicable in the

present case; or alternatively, that Article 6 (art. 6) of the

Convention was not violated in the administrative criminal

proceedings underlying the application".

AS TO THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 (art. 6-1) OF THE

CONVENTION

32. The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(art. 6-1) of the Convention, which provides:

"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an

independent and impartial tribunal ..."

He had, he maintained, been denied the right to a "tribunal" and

to a hearing before such a body.

A. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)

1. Whether there was a "criminal charge"

33. In Mr Palaoro's submission, the administrative criminal offence

of which he was accused gave rise to a "criminal charge". This was not

disputed by the Government.

34. In order to determine whether an offence qualifies as "criminal"

for the purposes of the Convention, it is first necessary to ascertain

whether or not the provision (art. 6-1) defining the offence belongs,

in the legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law; next the

"very nature of the offence" and the degree of severity of the penalty

risked must be considered (see, among other authorities, the Öztürk v.

Germany judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73, p. 18, para. 50,

and the Demicoli v. Malta judgment of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 210,

pp. 15-17, paras. 31-34).

35. Like the Commission, the Court notes that, although the offences

in issue and the procedures followed in the case fall within the

administrative sphere, they are nevertheless criminal in nature. This

is moreover reflected in the terminology employed. Thus Austrian law

refers to administrative offences (Verwaltungsstraftaten) and

administrative criminal procedure (Verwaltungsstrafverfahren). In

addition, the fine imposed on the applicant was accompanied by an order

for his committal to prison in the event of his defaulting on payment

(see paragraph 18 above).

These considerations are sufficient to establish that the offence

of which the applicant was accused may be classified as "criminal" for

the purposes of the Convention. It follows that Article 6 (art. 6)

applies.

2. Austria's reservation in respect of Article 5 (art. 5) of

the Convention

36. According to the Government, the procedure in question was

covered by Austria's reservation in respect of Article 5 (art. 5) of

the Convention. There could be no doubt that by the reference in that

reservation to "measures for the deprivation of liberty" the Austrian

Government had meant to include proceedings resulting in such measures.

Any other construction would not only lack coherence; it would also run

counter to the authorities' intention, which had been to remove from

the scope of the Convention the whole administrative system, including

the substantive and procedural provisions of administrative criminal

law. That would be so even in a case where, as in this instance, the

accused was merely fined, in so far as default on payment of that fine

would entail committal to prison.

Admittedly, the Road Traffic Act 1960 was not one of the four

laws designated in the reservation. However, one of those laws, the

Administrative Criminal Justice Act, stated in section 10 that, except

as otherwise provided, the general administrative laws were to

determine the nature and severity of sanctions. It mattered little in

this respect that sections 20 and 52 of the Road Traffic Act, which

were applied in the present case, had been enacted after the

reservation had been deposited, because those provisions merely

clarified the substance of an existing obligation laid down in the

Traffic Police Act 1947.

37. The applicant argued that the reservation could not apply in the

present case. In the first place, it failed to satisfy the

requirements of Article 64 (art. 64) of the Convention, which provides:

"1. Any State may, when signing [the] Convention or when

depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in

respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the

extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in

conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general

character shall not be permitted under this Article (art. 64).

2. Any reservation made under this Article (art. 64) shall

contain a brief statement of the law concerned."

Secondly, on a strict construction, its wording precluded

extending its scope to the procedural sphere, which was in issue here.

38. The Court points out that in the Chorherr v. Austria judgment of

25 August 1993 it held that Austria's reservation in respect of

Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention was compatible with Article 64

(art. 64) (Series A no. 266-B, p. 35, para. 21). It therefore remains

only to ascertain whether the provisions applied (art. 5, art. 64) in

the present case are covered by that reservation. They differ in

certain essential respects from those in issue in the Chorherr case.

The Court notes that Mr Palaoro based his complaints on

Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, whereas the wording of the

reservation invoked by the Government mentions only Article 5 (art. 5)

and makes express reference solely to measures for the deprivation of

liberty. Moreover, the reservation only comes into play where both

substantive and procedural provisions of one or more of the four

specific laws indicated in it have been applied. Here, however, the

substantive provisions of a different Act, the Road Traffic Act 1960,

were applied.

These considerations are a sufficient basis for concluding that

the reservation in question does not apply in the instant case.

B. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)

1. Access to a tribunal

39. Mr Palaoro contended that none of the bodies that had dealt with

his case in the proceedings in issue could be regarded as a "tribunal"

within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). This was true not

only of the administrative authorities, but also of the Constitutional

Court, whose review was confined to constitutional issues, and above

all of the Administrative Court. The latter was bound by the

administrative authorities' findings of fact, except where there was

a procedural defect within the meaning of section 42(2),

sub-paragraph 3, of the Administrative Court Act (see paragraph 24

above). It was therefore not empowered to take evidence itself, or to

establish the facts, or to take cognisance of new matters. Moreover,

in the event of its quashing an administrative measure, it was not

entitled to substitute its own decision for that of the authority

concerned, but had always to remit the case to that authority. In

short, its review was confined exclusively to questions of law and

therefore could not be regarded as equivalent to that of a body with

full jurisdiction.

40. The Government contested this view, whereas the Commission

accepted it.

41. The Court reiterates that decisions taken by administrative

authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention - as is the case in this

instance with the district authority and the regional government (see

paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 above) - must be subject to subsequent control

by a "judicial body that has full jurisdiction" (see, inter alia and

mutatis mutandis, the following judgments: Albert and Le Compte v.

Belgium of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, para. 29; Öztürk,

previously cited, pp. 21-22, para. 56; and Fischer v. Austria of

26 April 1995, Series A no. 312, p. 17, para. 28).

42. The Constitutional Court is not such a body. In the present case

it could look at the impugned proceedings only from the point of view

of their conformity with the Constitution, and this did not enable it

to examine all the relevant facts. It accordingly lacked the powers

required under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).

43. The powers of the Administrative Court must be assessed in the

light of the fact that the court in this case was sitting in

proceedings that were of a criminal nature for the purposes of the

Convention. It follows that when the compatibility of those powers

with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is being gauged, regard must be had

to the complaints raised in that court by the applicant as well as to

the defining characteristics of a "judicial body that has full

jurisdiction". These include the power to quash in all respects, on

questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below. As the

Administrative Court lacks that power, it cannot be regarded as a

"tribunal" within the meaning of the Convention. Moreover, in a

judgment of 14 October 1987 the Constitutional Court held that in

respect of criminal penalties not covered by the reservation in respect

of Article 5 (art. 5), the limited review carried out by the

Administrative Court or the Constitutional Court was insufficient (see

paragraph 26 above).

44. It follows that the applicant did not have access to a

"tribunal". There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6

para. 1 (art. 6-1) on this point.

2. Lack of a hearing and failure to take evidence from

witnesses

45. Mr Palaoro further criticised the Administrative Court for

failing to hold a hearing or take evidence from witnesses.

46. Having regard to the conclusion in paragraph 44 above, the Court

does not consider it necessary to examine these complaints.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION

47. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention,

"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal

authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is

completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising

from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said

Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the

consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the

Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party."

48. The Delegate of the Commission left the matter of just

satisfaction to the discretion of the Court.

A. Damage

49. In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed repayment

of the fine imposed on him, that is to say ATS 6,600. He also claimed

ATS 6,000 for non-pecuniary damage.

50. The Government contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to

quash convictions pronounced by national courts or to order repayment

of fines. Moreover, it could not, in awarding reparation, speculate

as to what the outcome of the proceedings would have been if the

applicant had had access to a tribunal within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

51. The Court agrees. It cannot speculate as to what the outcome of

the proceedings in issue might have been if the violation of the

Convention had not occurred (see the Hauschildt v. Denmark judgment of

24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 24, para. 57; the Saïdi v. France

judgment of 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C, p. 58, para. 49; and

the Fischer judgment, previously cited, p. 21, para. 47). It considers

that, in the circumstances of the case, the present judgment affords

the applicant sufficient reparation.

B. Costs and expenses

52. In addition, Mr Palaoro claimed the sum of ATS 204,039 for the

costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings first in the domestic

courts and then before the Convention institutions.

53. The Government expressed the view that only the proceedings in

the Administrative Court - which had given rise to the alleged

violations - and those in Strasbourg could be taken into account. They

also contested the quantum of the costs, but they were prepared to

reimburse a total of ATS 300,000 in respect of the Umlauft,

Pramstaller, Palaoro and Pfarrmeier cases, the applicants in all these

cases having been represented by the same lawyer.

54. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, having regard to the

information in its possession and its case-law, the Court awards

Mr Palaoro ATS 100,000.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention applies

in this case;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of that Article (art. 6-1)

as regards access to a court;

3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the complaints based

on the lack of a hearing in the Administrative Court and that

court's failure to take evidence from witnesses;

4. Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within

three months, 100,000 (one hundred thousand) Austrian schillings

in respect of costs and expenses;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing

in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 October 1995.

Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL

President

Signed: Herbert PETZOLD

Registrar

In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the

Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the separate

opinion of Mr Martens is annexed to this judgment.

Initialled: R. R.

Initialled: H. P.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MARTENS

1. I concur in the Court's finding that Article 6 (art. 6) has been

violated, but cannot agree with its reasoning.

2. My objections concern paragraph 43 of the judgment, which starts

with the statement:

"The powers of the Administrative Court must be assessed in the

light of the fact that the court in this case was sitting in

proceedings that were of a criminal nature for the purposes of

the Convention."

3. I will refrain from a structural criticism of this paragraph.

I cannot help noting, however, that here again the Court finds it

necessary to remark that when it is being assessed whether or not the

Administrative Court is to be considered a court that affords the

safeguards of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), "regard must be had to the

complaints raised in that court". One looks in vain, however, for

evidence of this methodological principle being put into practice:

there does not follow any analysis of what the applicant argued before

the Administrative Court, nor is there any trace of "regard" to these

arguments in the assessment of the adequacy of the Administrative

Court's jurisdiction. For the rest, I refer to the methodological

objections to this "test" that I raised in paragraph 18 of my separate

opinion in the case of Fischer v. Austria (judgment of 26 April 1995,

Series A no. 312).

4. My main objection to this paragraph is the following. In the

three civil cases discussed in my aforementioned separate opinion, the

Court found that the Austrian Administrative Court met the requirements

of a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). In

the paragraph under discussion, however, it reaches the opposite

conclusion, stressing that in this case the Administrative Court was

sitting in proceedings of a criminal nature. One cannot but infer that

the Court is of the opinion that in a case which under national law is

an "administrative" one but under the Convention is a "criminal" one,

the safeguards afforded by the tribunal that is to review the final

decision of the administrative bodies differ from those required in a

case that under national law is an "administrative" one but under the

Convention is a "civil" one. I cannot see any justification for such

differentiation, which does not find support in the wording or the

purpose of Article 6 (art. 6) (1). Nor does the Court offer one, its

decision on this crucial point being unsupported by any argument. This

is the more to be regretted as this differentiation is contrary to the

Court's case-law (2).

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1. I refer in this context to footnote 62 of my aforementioned

separate opinion in the case of Fischer v. Austria.

2. See, inter alia, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium

judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, pp. 23-24, para. 53; the

Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium judgment of 10 February 1983,

Series A no. 58, p. 17, para. 30; see also the Diennet v. France

judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 325-A, pp. 13-14, para. 28.

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