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FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF ELO v. FINLAND
(Application no. 30742/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 September 2006
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Elo v. Finland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J.
Šikuta, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 13 December 2005 and on
5 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an application (no. 30742/02)
against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish
national, Mr Jani Matti Kalevi Elo (“the applicant”), on
7 August 2002.
- The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was
represented by Mr Jarmo Kinnunen, a lawyer practising in Espoo.
The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs.
- The applicant alleged that his rights under Article 6
of the Convention had been violated on account of the lack of an oral
hearing before the Insurance Court.
- The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of
the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within
that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 §
1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
- By a decision of 13 December 2005, the Court declared
the application admissible.
- The Government, but not the applicant, filed further
written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after
consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required
(Rule 59 § 3 in fine).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Rauma,
Finland.
- The applicant worked as a sheet-iron worker. He had
graduated from secondary school and had received training in
technical design. He had also taken a course in management with the
intention of carrying on his father's sheet-iron business. On
17 October 1996 he was involved in an accident at his place of
work. He sustained injuries to his legs and heels. After the accident
he commenced business studies at a university in 1999.
- An insurance company granted the applicant an allowance
for 100% reduction of his working capacity for the period from 18
October 1996 to 16 October 1997. The same insurance company also
granted the applicant an industrial injury pension for the period
from 17 October 1997 to 31 August 1999.
- On 27 June 2000 the insurance company gave two
decisions regarding the applicant's further insurance claims. It
granted the applicant an allowance for one year for studies which
would upgrade his skills in technical design. He was also granted
funding for a half year's support training for finding a job.
- The insurance company also granted the applicant
inconvenience compensation (haittaraha,
menersättning; ”compensation”) and
found that the injuries sustained to the applicant's right leg and
heel corresponded to the category 3 disability (haittaluokka,
invaliditetsklass;
”category”; see paragraph 24 below).
- The applicant appealed to the Accident Board
(tapaturmalautakunta, olycksfallsnämnden) about the said
decisions. He requested, inter alia, that his compensation be
graded at category 7 (instead of 3). For this purpose, he submitted
two medical opinions written by his doctors, H. and A., in which the
applicant's injuries were assessed as being comparable to category 6
or 7 injuries.
- The applicant requested an oral hearing in order to
present evidence in support of his view on how his injuries should be
graded. In particular, the applicant wanted Drs H. and A. to be heard
concerning the facts on which they based their estimation of the
injuries. The applicant also wanted to give an oral statement about
the handicaps in his everyday life due to his injuries.
- The Accident Board requested further written arguments
from the insurance company, which objected to an oral hearing. The
Accident Board then requested the applicant to present his written
observations on the insurance company's arguments. The applicant
submitted further arguments in support of his view on the grading of
his injuries.
- On 5 April 2001 the Accident Board rejected the
applicant's claim and his request for an oral hearing, reasoning that
the proceedings before it were usually written. It noted that Drs H.
and A. had already submitted their written statements to the Accident
Board and, thus, there was no need for an oral hearing.
- The applicant appealed to the Insurance Court
(vakuutusoikeus, försäkringsdomstolen), again
claiming a higher (category 7) grading of his injuries. He also
requested an oral hearing, repeating his wish to have Drs H. and
A. heard as witnesses concerning his disability in movement and
standing in order to assess the disability category to which he was
entitled. He requested that the latter question be examined from the
wider perspective of the condition of the “lower extremities as
a whole” and not from the more restricted perspective of the
injuries to his heels and ankles.
- The Insurance Court received further observations from
the parties regarding their demands and a new medical opinion. On 19
June 2002 the Insurance Court upheld the decision of the Accident
Board and rejected the applicant's request for an oral hearing,
reasoning that the procedure in the Insurance Court was as a general
rule written and that an oral hearing in the present case was
unnecessary. It found that given the medical opinions submitted, the
applicant's entitlement to compensation had to be based on the
evaluation of the injuries sustained to his heels and ankles, in
which assessment it was satisfied with the written medical evidence.
The Insurance Court maintained that the various medical reports at
its disposal were sufficient evidence without the need to have them
confirmed under oath. It further noted that the hearing of the
applicant in person was not necessary as the decisive factor in the
decision-making was the medical reports.
- There was no appeal against the decision of the
Insurance Court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The procedure in the Accident Board and the Insurance
Court is governed by the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act
(hallintolainkäyttölaki, förvaltningsprocesslag;
Act no. 586/1996), which entered into force on 1 December 1996.
Section 9 of the Insurance Court Act (laki vakuutusoikeudesta, lag
on försäkringsdomstolen; Act no. 14/1958, as amended by
the Act no. 278/1999), as in force at the relevant time, provided
that the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act was to be applied when
examining a matter in the Insurance Court unless otherwise
stipulated.
- On 1 May 2003 the new Insurance Court Act
(vakuutusoikeuslaki, lag om
försäkringsdomstolen; Act no. 132/2003) entered into
force. Under section 16 of the Act the Insurance Court
shall hold an oral hearing as provided in section 38 of the
Administrative Judicial Procedure Act.
- Under section 37 of the Administrative Judicial
Procedure Act an oral hearing, in which witnesses and experts may be
heard and other evidence obtained, shall be held when necessary for
establishing the facts of the case. Under section 38 an oral hearing
must be held if requested by a private party. An oral hearing may
however be dispensed with if the application is dismissed without
considering its merits or if an oral hearing would be manifestly
unnecessary in view of the nature of the matter or for another
reason.
- Section 5 of the Insurance Court Act, as in force at
the relevant time, provided that a medical doctor participated in the
decision-making in the Insurance Court in cases where a medical
assessment was deemed necessary.
- Section 18a, paragraph 1 of the Accident Insurance Act
(tapaturmavakuutuslaki, lag om olycksfallsförsäkring;
Act no. 608/1948 as amended by Act no. 1642/1992) provides that
inconvenience compensation shall be paid to an employee who, inter
alia, has suffered permanent injuries as a result of an accident.
- The grading of injuries is based on the decision of
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (sosiaali- ja
terveysministeriö, social- och hälsovårdsministeriet;
decision No. 23.12.1986/1012; “Ministry's decision”),
according to which injuries and disabilities are divided into 20
disability categories. The applicable category is determined by
choosing an equivalent or comparable injury on the scale of injuries.
For example, an amputation of instep bones corresponds to category 3
and an amputation of an ankle or an entire foot corresponds to
category 4-5. In cases where the above scale of specific injuries
cannot be applied, a more general title, for example “the lower
extremities as a whole”, may be used. In such a case, minor
insufficiency in movement corresponds to category 0-5 and medium
insufficiency category 6-10.
The quality and extent of the injuries are taken into consideration
in the assessment. On the other hand, personal circumstances, such as
a profession, are not material. The injured person's abilities are
compared with the abilities of a healthy person of the same age.
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
- The applicant complained that the lack of an oral
hearing had constituted a violation of his rights under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal...”
The submissions of the parties
1. The Government
- The Government contended that in the present case
there were circumstances which justified dispensing with a hearing.
The grading of an injury was based solely on the quality of the
injury or disability, not on the personal circumstances of the
injured person. This technical method of qualification of injuries
was aimed at treating similar types of injuries equally. Hence,
hearing the applicant personally was unnecessary. Furthermore, the
applicant was represented by counsel throughout the written
proceedings.
- As to the hearing of Drs H. and A., the Government
observed that they had provided several medical opinions on the
applicant's injuries, which were all available to the Accident Board
and the Insurance Court. It was the responsibility of the doctors to
provide thorough, objective written certificates, including all
relevant findings as well as the results of the treatment given.
These certificates listed the details necessary for reaching a
decision on the grading of the applicant's injuries. Further, it
was the role of the doctor member of the Insurance Court to assess
the legality of the decision based on the medical opinions provided
for the purposes of an appeal. He or she ensured that all applicants
were treated equally in the assessment of the medical opinions.
- The Government considered that the present case could
be distinguished from Salomonsson v. Sweden (no. 38978/97, 12
November 2002) in that the doctors agreed on the applicant's
injuries, the sole question being to determine the disability
category to which the applicant's injuries corresponded. The medical
doctors could state their opinion, but it was for the authorities to
make the actual classification based on the medical statements as
well as on the practice and guidelines on the grading of injuries. In
the present case the assessment was based entirely on the written
evidence.
- Finally, the issue at hand was very technical, being
based on medical certificates. There was nothing to indicate that any
questions of fact or law which might have emerged could not have been
adequately resolved on the basis of the case file and the written
observations of the applicant. In the Government's view, no
additional information could have been gathered by hearing either the
applicant personally or the doctors treating him.
2. The applicant
- The applicant maintained that the main issue in his
application was the substantial disagreement about the determination
of the proper disability category. He was of the opinion that the
specific scale of injuries in the Ministry's decision was not
applicable in his case as it did not include a comparable injury. His
injury could not be compared to an amputation of instep bones or the
entire foot, for example. He argued that his disability meant that he
could not walk long distances. Therefore the disability category
should have been determined by using a title based on a more general
assessment of his injuries, i.e. the functional disability of
“the lower extremities as a whole”.
- For the same reason, in the applicant's view the
assessment of the grading of his injuries could not have been made
solely by reference to written documents. Finally, he noted that his
intention had not been to claim additional compensation for the
disruption to his everyday life, but only to present his arguments
properly before the Insurance Court.
B. The Court's assessment
- The Court reiterates at the outset that the
entitlement to a “public hearing” in Article 6 § 1
necessarily implies a right to an “oral hearing”.
However, the obligation under Article 6 § 1 to hold a public
hearing is not an absolute one. Thus, a hearing may be dispensed with
if a party unequivocally waives his or her right thereto and there
are no questions of public interest making a hearing necessary. A
waiver can be done explicitly or tacitly, in the latter case for
example by refraining from submitting or maintaining a request for a
hearing (see, among other authorities, Håkansson and
Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A
no. 171-A, p. 20, § 66; and Schuler-Zgraggen v.
Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263,
pp. 19-20, § 58).
- In the present case, the applicant specifically
requested an oral hearing before the Accident Board and the Insurance
Court. Thus, no question arises as to whether or not the applicant
waived his right thereto. It remains to be examined whether the
circumstances of the applicant's case were such as to justify the
absence of an oral hearing.
- The Court recalls that in proceedings before a court
of first and only instance there is normally a right to a hearing
(see Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, cited
above, p. 20, § 64). However, the absence of a hearing before a
second or third instance may be justified by the special features of
the proceedings at issue, provided a hearing has been held at first
instance (see Helmers v. Sweden, judgment of
29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-A, p. 16, § 36).
Accordingly, unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify
dispensing with a hearing, the right to a public hearing under
Article 6 § 1 implies a right to an oral hearing at least
before one instance.
- A hearing may not be necessary, for example when it
raises no questions of fact or law which cannot be adequately
resolved on the basis of the case-file and the parties' written
observations (see, inter alia, Döry v. Sweden,
no. 28394/95, § 37, 12 November 2002; Lundevall v.
Sweden, no. 38629/97, § 34, 12 November 2002;
Salomonsson v. Sweden, cited above, § 34, 12 November
2002; and mutatis mutandis, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2),
judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 283-A, pp. 10 11,
§§ 21-22; and Fischer v. Austria, judgment of
26 April 1995, Series A no. 312, pp. 20 21, §
44).
- The Court reiterates that the character of the
circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral hearing
essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by
the competent national court not to the frequency with which such
issues come before the courts. This does not mean that refusing to
hold an oral hearing may be justified only in rare cases (see Miller
v. Sweden, no. 55853/00, § 29, 8 February 2005).
Thus, the Court has recognised that disputes concerning benefits
under social-security schemes are generally rather technical and
their outcome usually depends on the written opinions given by
medical doctors. Many such disputes may accordingly be better dealt
with in writing than in oral argument. Moreover, it is understandable
that in this sphere the national authorities should have regard to
the demands of efficiency and economy. Systematically holding
hearings could be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in
social-security cases (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland,
cited above, pp. 19-20, § 58).
- Turning to the particular circumstances of the present
case, the Court observes that the jurisdiction of the Accident Board
and the Insurance Court was not limited to matters of law but also
extended to factual issues. The issue before them was whether the
applicant's injuries attained the category 7 disability on the scale
of injuries and whether his injuries could have been assessed under
the general title “the lower extremities as a whole” as
alleged by the applicant. The question is whether hearing oral
evidence from the applicant and the doctors treating him could have
produced anything relevant and decisive which was not already
encompassed in the written evidence and submissions. The Accident
Board found an oral hearing manifestly unnecessary. Nor did the
Insurance Court find an oral hearing necessary as the decisive factor
for reaching a decision in the applicant's case was the medical
opinions on the applicant's injuries.
- The Court observes that under the Ministry's decision
the personal circumstances of a claimant are not taken into account
when assessing the disability category to be attributed. Thus the
Accident's Board's and Insurance Court's assessments were entirely
based on the medical evidence in the case, presented in the form of
written medical certificates issued by the applicant's doctors. The
medical certificates on which the applicant relied supported his
claim. It does not appear that the doctors' opinions differed (see,
mutatis mutandis, Döry v. Sweden, cited above,
§ 42). The Court sees no reason to differ from the finding
of the Insurance Court that the applicant's entitlement to
compensation had to be based on the evaluation of the injuries
sustained to his heels and ankles, which assessment could be made on
the basis of the written medical evidence. Further, there is no
indication that a hearing was needed in order to hear oral testimony
(see Ringel v. Sweden (dec.), no. 13599/03, 23 March
2004).
- In these circumstances, it must be concluded that the
dispute in the case concerned the correct interpretation of written
medical evidence. The Court considers that the Accident Board and the
Insurance Court could adequately resolve this issue on the basis of
the medical certificates before them and the applicant's written
submissions.
- Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that
there were circumstances which justified dispensing with a hearing in
the applicant's case.
- There has accordingly been no breach of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 September 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
