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FIRST SECTION
CASE OF PRISYAZHNIKOVA AND DOLGOPOLOV v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 24247/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 September 2006
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of Prisyazhnikova and Dolgopolov v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis,
President,
Mr L. Loucaides,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mrs N.
Vajić,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr S.E.
Jebens, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 7 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an application (no. 24247/04)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Ms
Inna Nikolayevna Prisyazhnikova and Mr Nikolay Nikolayevich
Dolgopolov (“the applicants”), on 28 May 2004.
- The second applicant was represented before the Court
by the first applicant, Ms I. Prisyazhnikova. The Russian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev,
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights.
- On 27 September 2004 the Court decided to communicate
the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29
§ 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility. On 30 August 2005
the Court put additional questions to the parties.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicants were born 1966 and 1934 respectively,
and live in Neryungri in the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic of the Russian
Federation.
- The applicants brought a civil action against the
Government, seeking to enforce State promissory notes for purchase of
a Russian-made car or to recover the monetary value thereof.
- On 17 March 2003 the Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the
Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic found for the applicants and awarded
112,441.80 Russian roubles (“RUR”) to the first applicant
and RUR 107,327.82 to the second applicant against the Ministry of
Finance.
- On 23 April 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha
(Yakutiya) Republic (hereinafter – “the Supreme Court”)
rejected an appeal by the Ministry of Finance and upheld the
judgment.
- The enforcement proceedings were opened on 15 May 2003,
but the judgment was not enforced.
- By interim decision of 11 August 2003, Judge R. of the
Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic refused a request by
the Ministry of Finance for obtaining the case file for the purpose
of initiating supervisory-review proceedings. The Ministry had
claimed that the courts had incorrectly applied the substantive law.
- By letter of 20 October 2003, the Supreme Court's
President rejected a renewed request by the Ministry of Finance for
launching the supervisory-review proceedings.
- On 9 June 2004 the Ministry of Finance introduced a
new application for supervisory review of the judgments in the
applicants' favour, founded on the same grounds as before.
- On 30 September 2004 the Supreme Court's President
issued an interim decision on remitting the applicants' cases for
examination on the merits to the Supreme Court's Presidium by way of
supervisory review. In the procedural part, the interim decision of
11 August 2003, but not the letter of 20 October 2003, was mentioned.
- On 14 October 2004 the Presidium of the Supreme Court
of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, in a five-judge formation presided
over by the Supreme Court's President, found that the lower courts
had not taken into account certain provisions relating to
reimbursement of State promissory notes. On that ground, relying on
Articles 388 and 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Presidium
quashed the judgments in the applicants' favour and dismissed their
claim as having no basis in the domestic law.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation
- A judicial decision becomes legally binding after the
appeal court has examined the matter (Article 209 § 1). A
judicial decision must be enforced once it became legally binding,
unless the law provides for its immediate enforcement (Article 210).
- The relevant provisions governing the
supervisory-review proceedings read as follows:
Article 13. Binding force of judicial decisions
“1. Courts may issue judicial decisions
in the form of judicial orders, judgments and interim decisions...”
Article 376. Right to apply to a court exercising
supervisory review
“1. Judicial decisions that have become
legally binding, with the exception for judicial decisions by the
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, may be
appealed against... to a court exercising supervisory review, by
parties to the case and by other persons whose rights or legal
interests have been adversely affected by these judicial decisions.
2. Judicial decisions may be appealed against
to a court exercising supervisory review within one year after they
became legally binding...”
Article 378. Contents of an application
for supervisory review
“An application for supervisory review must
contain:
(1) the name of the court to which it is
addressed;
...
(4) a reference to the first-instance, appeal
or cassation courts that examined the case and a summary of their
decisions;
(5) a reference to the judgment or decision
which is being appealed against...”
Article 381. Examination of an application for
supervisory review
“2. Having examined an application for supervisory
review, the judge issues an interim decision on –
(1) obtaining the case file if there exist
doubts as to the lawfulness of the judicial decision;
(2) refusing to obtain the case file if the
arguments in the application for supervisory review may not, in
accordance with the federal law, result in quashing of the judicial
decision.
...
6. The President of the regional Supreme
Court... may disagree with the judge's decision refusing to obtain
the case file. In such case the President issues his own decision on
obtaining the case file.”
Article 382. Examination of case files obtained
by the supervisory-review court
“2. Having examined the case file
obtained by the supervisory-review court, the judge issues an interim
decision on –
– refusing to remit the case for examination on
the merits by the supervisory-review court;
– remitting the case for examination of the
application for supervisory review on the merits by the
supervisory-review court.”
Article 383. Interim decision refusing to
remit the case for examination on the merits by the
supervisory-review court
“2. The President of the regional
Supreme Court... may disagree with the judge's decision refusing to
remit the case for examination on the merits by the
supervisory-review court. In such case the President issues his own
decision on remitting the case for examination on the merits by the
supervisory-review court.”
Article 384. Decision on remitting the case for
examination on the merits
by a supervisory-review court
“1. A judicial decision on remitting
the case for examination on the merits by a supervisory-review court
must contain:
(7) a reasoned description of the grounds for
remitting the case for examination on the merits...”
Article 390. Competence of the supervisory-review
court
“1. Having examined the case by way of
supervisory review, the court may
...
(5) quash or alter the judicial decision
issued by a court of first, second or supervisory-review instance and
issue a new judicial decision, without remitting the matter for a
fresh examination, if substantive legal provisions have been
erroneously applied or interpreted.”
B. Enforcement Proceedings Act (Law of 21 July 1997)
- Once instituted, enforcement proceedings must be
completed within two months upon receipt of the writ of execution by
the bailiff (Section 13).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF
QUASHING OF THE JUDGMENTS IN THE APPLICANTS' FAVOUR
- The Court will firstly examine the applicants'
complaint concerning the quashing of the judgments in their favour by
way of supervisory-review proceedings. The applicants complained that
the act of quashing had violated their “right to a court”
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and their
right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as
follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time... by [a]... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law...”
A. Admissibility
- The Court considers that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention
(a) Arguments by the parties
- The Government submitted that the Presidium of the
Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic had had lawful grounds
to quash the judgments in the applicants' favour because their claims
had been granted mistakenly. Accordingly, there had been no violation
of the applicants' “right to a court” under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
- The applicants pointed out, firstly, that the
Ministry's application for supervisory review had been lodged on 9
June 2004, that is more than a year after the judgments in their
favour had become legally binding on 23 April 2003, whereas Article
376 of the Code of Civil Procedure established a one-year time-limit
for lodging an application for supervisory review. Secondly, the
interim decisions of 30 September and 14 October 2004 contradicted
each other. Furthermore, the Presidium did not indicate any
compelling reasons for quashing the final judgments in their favour.
The applicants considered that the quashing of final judgments had
irremediably impaired the principle of legal certainty and violated
their right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
(b) The Court's assessment
- The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing
before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the
Convention, which declares, in its relevant part, the rule of law to
be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the
fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal
certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts
have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called
into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania, judgment of 28
October 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VII, §
61).
- This principle insists that no party is entitled to
seek re-opening of the proceedings merely for the purpose of a
rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. Higher courts' power to
quash or alter binding and enforceable judicial decisions should be
exercised for correction of fundamental defects. The mere possibility
of two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination.
Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary
by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see,
mutatis mutandis, Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, §
52, ECHR 2003-X; and Pravednaya v. Russia,
no. 69529/01, § 25, 18 November 2004).
23. The Court reiterates that Article 6
§ 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to
his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.
In this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which
the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings
before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that
right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal
system allowed a final and binding judicial decision to be quashed by
a higher court on an application made by a State official whose power
to lodge such an application is not subject to any time-limit, with
the result that the judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely
(see Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 54-56).
- In the present case the judgments of 17 March 2003, as
upheld on appeal on 23 April 2003, were set aside by way of
supervisory review on the ground that the first-instance and appeal
courts had erred in application of the substantive law. The Court has
to assess whether the power to conduct a supervisory review was
exercised by the authorities so as to strike, to the maximum extent
possible, a fair balance between the interests of the individual and
the need to ensure the proper administration of justice (see, mutatis
mutandis, Nikitin v. Russia, no. 50178/99, §§ 57
and 59, ECHR 2004 ...).
- The Court takes note, firstly, of an exceptionally
long period of time – more than thirteen months – that
lapsed from the date the judgments in the applicants' favour had
become legally binding to the date the supervisory-review proceedings
were instituted. It observes that the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
set a time-limit of one year for lodging an application for
supervisory review, the starting point being the date on which the
judicial decision became legally binding (Article 376 § 2 of the
CCP). Since the term “judicial decision” encompassed both
judgments and interim decisions (Article 13 § 1 of the CCP), it
appears that each time an interim decision refusing institution of
supervisory-review proceedings – such as the one of 11 August
2003 – was issued, the one-year time-limit started running
anew. The laxity of time-limits for instituting supervisory-review
proceedings permitted the defendant – the Ministry of Finance –
to introduce three consecutive applications for supervisory review,
of which the third one was lodged almost fourteen months after the
judgments in the applicants' favour had become binding and
enforceable.
- The Court further observes that the Ministry's
applications for supervisory review were founded on substantially
similar arguments. The first was rejected by a Supreme Court judge,
the second was dismissed by the Supreme Court President but the third
was granted by the same President. It transpires from Articles 381 §
6 and 383 § 2 of the CCP that the President of a regional
Supreme Court may overrule the decision of any other judge of the
court, whereby that judge refused institution of supervisory-review
proceedings. As the Court has already observed, the President's power
to do so was not subject to any time-limit (see Denisov v. Russia
(dec.), no. 33408/03, 6 May 2004).
- Furthermore, the Court notes that under the Russian
Code of Civil Procedure the President's power to overrule decisions
of other judges is not circumscribed in any way. The President has an
unfettered discretion to initiate supervisory-review proceedings, a
mere “disagreement” with the ordinary judge's decision
being a sufficient ground for doing so (see Articles 381 § 6 and
383 § 2 of the CCP). The President needs no application by a
party to exercise that discretion and may take such initiative at any
time.
- The Court has already found a violation of an
applicant's “right to a court” guaranteed by Article 6 §
1 of the Convention in many cases in which a judicial decision that
had become final and binding, was subsequently quashed on an
application by a State official whose power to intervene was not
subject to any time-limit (see Roseltrans v. Russia,
no. 60974/00, §§ 27-28, 21 July 2005; Volkova
v. Russia, no. 48758/99, §§ 34-36, 5
April 2005; and Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51-56).
The Government did not put forward any arguments which would enable
the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The
Court therefore finds that the quashing of the judgments of 17 March
2003, as upheld on appeal on 23 April 2003, by way of
supervisory-review proceedings initiated by the President of the
Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, infringed the
principle of legal certainty and the applicants' “right to a
court”. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
2. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The Court reiterates that the existence of a debt
confirmed by a binding and enforceable judgment furnishes the
judgment beneficiary with a “legitimate expectation” that
the debt would be paid and constitutes the beneficiary's
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. Quashing of such a judgment amounts to an interference
with his or her right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see,
among other authorities, Brumărescu, cited above, §
74; and Androsov v. Russia, no. 63973/00, § 69, 6
October 2005).
- The Government denied that there had been an
interference with the applicants' rights under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 because they could have applied for redemption of promissory
notes to the Savings Bank of Russia.
- The Court observes that the applicants obtained
binding and enforceable judgments in their favour, by the terms of
which the Ministry of Finance was to pay them substantial amounts of
money. They were prevented from receiving the award through no fault
of their own. The quashing of the enforceable judgments frustrated
the applicants' reliance on binding judicial decisions and deprived
them of an opportunity to receive the money they had legitimately
expected to receive. In these circumstances, even assuming that the
interference was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the Court
considers that the quashing of the enforceable judgments in the
applicants' favour by way of supervisory review placed an excessive
burden on the applicants and was incompatible with Article 1 of the
Protocol No. 1. There has therefore been a violation of that Article.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF LENGTHY
NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENTS
- The applicants complained that continued
non-enforcement of the judgments of 17 March 2003, as upheld on
appeal on 23 April 2003, had violated their rights under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, both cited above.
A. Admissibility
- The Government claimed that the application should be
declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the
Convention because the judgments in the applicants' favour had been
quashed. The Supreme Court's Presidium had dismissed their claims.
- The Court observes that the issue to be examined is
whether the judgments in the applicants' favour were enforced within
a “reasonable time”. Accordingly, it is necessary to
ascertain that the judgments were “enforceable”. In the
instant case, once the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal against
the judgments of 17 March 2003, in accordance with the Code of Civil
Procedure the judgments became legally binding and enforceable (see
paragraph 14 above). From that moment on, it was incumbent on the
debtor, a State agency, to comply with them. Enforcement proceedings
were initiated. The launching of the supervisory-review procedure
could not, in itself, extinguish the debtor's obligation to comply
with enforceable judgments which obligation existed until 14 October
2004 when the Supreme Court quashed those judgments.
- It follows that at least from 23 April 2003 to 14
October 2004 the judgments in the applicants' favour were
“enforceable” and it was incumbent on the State agency to
abide by their terms. In any event, the Court reiterates that the
quashing of a judgment in a manner which has been found to have been
incompatible with the principle of legal certainty and the
applicant's “right to a court” cannot be accepted as
justification for the failure to enforce that judgment (see
Sukhobokov v. Russia, no. 75470/01, § 26, 13 April
2006). Accordingly, the Government's objection must be dismissed.
- The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The Government made no comments on the merits of the
non-enforcement complaint.
- The applicants maintained their claims.
- The Court observes that the judgments of 17 March 2003
became enforceable on 23 April 2003. From that day on and at least
until 14 October 2004 when they had been quashed by the
Presidium of the Supreme Court, it was incumbent on the State agency
to comply with them but it failed to execute them. In fact, the
judgments have never been enforced.
- The Court has frequently found violations of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 in cases raising issues similar to the ones in the present case
(see, e.g., Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, ECHR
2002-III; and, more recently, Poznakhirina v. Russia, no.
25964/02, 24 February 2005; Wasserman v. Russia (no. 1), no.
15021/02, 18 November 2004).
- Having examined the material submitted to it, the
Court notes that the Government did not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in
the present case. They did not advance any justification for the
delay in enforcement. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court finds that by failing for a substantial period to comply
with the enforceable judgments in the applicants' favour the domestic
authorities violated their right to a court and prevented them from
receiving the money which they were entitled to receive. Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of
non-enforcement of the judgments of 17 March 2003, as upheld on
23 April 2003.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- In respect of compensation for the pecuniary damage,
the applicants claimed RUR 124,441.80 for Ms Prisyazhnikova and RUR
119,626.82 for Mr Dolgopolov, representing the amounts which, in
their view, should have been paid to them under the promissory notes.
They further claimed jointly 100,000 US dollars in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- The Government considered that no pecuniary damage
should be awarded because the judgments had been quashed. The claim
for non-pecuniary damage was excessive and not justified.
- The Court recalls that in the instant case it found a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1, in that the judgments in the applicants' favour
had remained unenforced for a long period of time and had been
subsequently quashed. The applicants were thereby prevented from
receiving the money they had legitimately expected to receive. There
has been therefore a causal link between the violations found and the
applicants' claim for the pecuniary damage in so far as it covered
the original awards. The applicants' right to receive bigger amounts
was not upheld in the domestic proceedings and they did not claim any
interest for the period that lapsed between the original award and
the Court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court awards RUR 112,442 to
Ms Prisyazhnikova and RUR 107,328 to Mr Dolgopolov in
respect of the pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on those amounts, and dismisses the remainder of their claim for the
pecuniary damage.
- The Court further considers that the applicants
suffered distress because of the State authorities' failure to
enforce the judgments in their favour and their subsequent decision
to quash them. The Court takes into account the amount and nature of
the award in the instant case and the period of the authorities'
inactivity. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards
each applicant the amount of EUR 2,400, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on it.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicants did not claim costs or expenses and
there is accordingly no call to make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the
quashing of the judgments of of 17 March 2003, as upheld on appeal on
23 April 2003, by way of supervisory review;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of
prolonged non-enforcement of the judgments of 17 March 2003, as
upheld on appeal on 23 April 2003;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
the following amounts:
(i) RUR 112,442 (one hundred and twelve thousand four
hundred and forty-two Russian roubles) to Ms Prisyazhnikova and
RUR 107,328 (one hundred and seven thousand three hundred and
twenty-eight Russian roubles) to Mr Dolgopolov in respect of
pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros) to each
of the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 September 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
