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FIRST SECTION
CASE OF IRINA FEDOTOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 1752/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 October 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Irina Fedotova v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis,
President,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr D.
Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens, judges,
and Mr S.
Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an application (no. 1752/02)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms
Irina Yuryevna Fedotova (“the applicant”), on 29 December
2000.
- The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On 2 September 2005 the Court decided to give notice of
the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29
§ 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
- The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in the town of
Penza.
- According to the applicant, in December 1997 she lodged
an action against the electricity supplier, seeking to have her home
connected to the electricity supply network and asking for
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
- On 17 July 1998 the Leninskiy District Court of Penza
found for the applicant. That judgment was quashed on appeal on 1
December 1998 and re-examination of the case was ordered.
- On 15 April 1999 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed
the action. The judgment became enforceable on 22 June 1999 when the
Penza Regional Court upheld it on appeal.
- On 28 April 2000 the Presidium of the Penza Regional
Court, acting upon the applicant's request, quashed the judgments of
15 April and 22 June 1999, by way of supervisory-review proceedings,
and remitted the case for a fresh examination.
- On 24 August 2000 the Leninskiy District Court partly
allowed the applicant's action and ordered that the company connect
the applicant's home and pay her 1,000 Russian roubles (RUR,
approximately 40 euros) in compensation. The judgment was upheld on
appeal on 17 October 2000.
- Enforcement proceedings were opened and on 22 January
2001 the applicant received the awarded compensation, but the company
refused to connect her home because it did not meet certain technical
requirements. Thus, the applicant complained to a court that the
bailiffs had failed to enforce the judgment of 24 August 2000, as
upheld on appeal on 17 October 2000.
- On 23 January 2001 the Zheleznodorozhniy District
Court of Penza held that the bailiffs had been inactive in securing
the execution of the judgment in the part concerning provision of
electricity. The District Court furthermore informed the applicant of
the possibility of lodging a separate civil claim for damages against
the local treasury. It appears that the applicant did not lodge such
a claim.
- On 29 December 2001 the company connected the
applicant's home to the electricity network.
- On 21 March 2002 a Deputy President of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation introduced an application for
supervisory review of the judgments of 24 August and 17 October 2000.
- On 26 April 2002 the Presidium of the Penza Regional
Court quashed the judgments of 24 August and 17 October 2000 by
way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for a fresh
examination. The Presidium held that the District and the Regional
courts had incorrectly assessed the facts of the case and
misinterpreted the relevant legal norms.
- On 25 June 2002 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed
the applicant's claims. On 10 September 2002 the Penza Regional Court
upheld the judgment. However, the applicant was not ordered to repay
the compensation of RUR 1,000 and her house was not disconnected from
the electricity network.
- The applicant lodged an application before the
European Court of Human Rights, complaining about a violation of her
rights in the course of the abovementioned domestic proceedings. On
19 December 2002 she received an empty envelope from the Court. The
applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court about unlawful
actions of the Penza post office. On 31 January 2003 the
District Court instructed her to correct certain defects of her
statement of claim by 6 February 2003. That instruction was upheld on
appeal on 18 February 2003. There is no indication that the
applicant fulfilled the courts' instructions and apparently no
further action has been taken.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON
ACCOUNT OF THE QUASHING OF THE JUDGMENTS OF 24 AUGUST AND 17
OCTOBER 2000
- The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention that the act of quashing of the final judgments of 24
August and 17 October 2000 had violated her “right to a court”.
She also complained that she had not been able to effectively
participate at the supervisory-review hearing. The relevant part of
Article 6 of the Convention read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions by the parties
- The Government submitted that the Presidium of the
Penza Regional Court quashed the judgments of 24 August and 17
October 2000 with a view to correcting the “judicial error”
committed by the District and Regional courts. They concluded that
there had been no violation of the applicant's right under Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
- The applicant averred that the quashing of the final
judgments in her case had irremediably impaired the principle of
legal certainty.
2. The Court's assessment
- The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing
before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the
Convention, which declares, in its relevant part, the rule of law to
be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the
fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal
certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts
have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called
into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania, judgment of 28
October 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VII, §
61).
- This principle insists that no party is entitled to
seek re-opening of the proceedings merely for the purpose of a
rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. Higher courts' power to
quash or alter binding and enforceable judicial decisions should be
exercised for correction of fundamental defects. The mere possibility
of two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination.
Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary
by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see,
mutatis mutandis, Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, §
52, ECHR 2003-X; and Pravednaya v. Russia,
no. 69529/01, § 25, 18 November 2004).
23. The Court reiterates that Article 6
§ 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to
his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.
In this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which
the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings
before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that
right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal
system allowed a final and binding judicial decision to be quashed by
a higher court on an application made by a State official whose power
to lodge such an application is not subject to any time-limit, with
the result that the judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely
(see Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 54-56).
- The Court observes that on 24 August 2000 the
Leninskiy District Court partly accepted the applicant's claims and
granted her a sum of money. The judgment of 24 August 2000 was upheld
on appeal on 17 October 2000. The judgment thus became binding
and enforceable. On 26 April 2002, that is more than eighteen months
later, the judgments of 24 August and 17 October 2000 were
quashed in the framework of the supervisory-review procedure
initiated by a Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation who was a State official and was not a party to the
proceedings (see paragraph 13 above).
- The Court has found a violation of an applicant's
“right to a court” guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention in many cases in which a judicial decision that had
become final and binding, was subsequently quashed by a higher court
on an application by a State official whose power to intervene was
not subject to any time-limit (see Roseltrans v. Russia,
no. 60974/00, §§ 27-28, 21 July 2005; Volkova
v. Russia, no. 48758/99, §§ 34-36, 5
April 2005; and Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51-56).
- Having examined the materials submitted to it, the
Court observes that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in
the present case. The developments in the proceedings that followed
are of no relevance as there existed no domestic remedies capable of
remedying the impairment of the principle of legal certainty brought
about by the use of the supervisory-review procedure (see Sardin
v. Russia (dec.), no. 69582/01, ECHR 2004 II; Ryabykh
v. Russia (dec.), no. 52854/99, 21 February 2002).
- Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the
quashing of the judgments given in the applicant's case by way of
supervisory-review proceedings.
- As regards the complaint about
the procedural defects of the hearing before the Presidium of the
Penza Regional Court, the Court finds that, having concluded that
there has been an infringement of the applicant's “right to a
court” by the very use of the supervisory review procedure, it
is not necessary to consider whether the procedural guarantees of
Article 6 of the Convention were available in those proceedings (see
Ryabykh, cited above, § 59, and
Volkova v. Russia, no. 48758/99, § 39, 5 April
2005).
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON
ACCOUNT OF AN EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The applicant complained that the proceedings in her
case had been excessively long. The Court considers that this
complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, cited above.
- The Court notes that in December 1997 the applicant
lodged an action before the Leninskiy District Court. The proceedings
finally came to an end on 10 September 2002. Thus, having regard to
the fact that the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia
on 5 May 1998, the total period of time involved was approximately
four years and four months. However, the Court considers it
appropriate to take into account only the periods when the case was
actually pending before the courts, that is the periods when there
was no effective judgment in the determination of the merits of the
applicant's dispute and when the authorities were under an obligation
to pass such a judgment. The periods during which the domestic courts
decided whether or not to re-open the case should be excluded (see
Skorobogatova v. Russia, no. 33914/02, § 39, 1
December 2005).
- Applying these principles to the facts of the present
case, the Court finds that it has competence ratione temporis to
examine a period of approximately three years and two months during
which the proceedings were pending, namely from 5 May 1998 to 22 June
1999, when the Penza Regional Court issued the final judgment; from
28 April 2000, when the Presidium of the Regional Court re-opened the
case, to 29 December 2001, when the judgment of 24 August 2000
was enforced in full; and from 26 April 2002, when the Presidium
of the Regional Court again re-opened the proceedings, to
10 September 2002, when the final judgment was given.
- The Court observes that during the period under
consideration the case was examined by the courts in three instances.
No substantial periods of inactivity can be observed. On the
contrary, the hearings were held and the decisions were taken at
regular intervals by the first instance court and on appeal.
- Thus, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the
Court finds that they did not exceed a “reasonable time”
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Lastly, the applicant complained that the proceedings
leading to the final judgment of 10 September 2002 had been unfair as
the courts had misinterpreted domestic law, had incorrectly assessed
the facts of the case and had not examined her complaints in detail,
that the judgment of 24 August 2000 had not been enforced and
that the Court's letter had been lost in December 2002. However,
having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds
that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation
of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its
Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed 7,500 euros (EUR) in respect of
pecuniary damage, representing the price of a power generator and the
value of the documents allegedly lost by the domestic courts. The
applicant also claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The Government commented that there was no causal link
between the alleged violation and the pecuniary damage alleged. In
any case, the applicant's claims are unsubstantiated, excessive and
unreasonable.
- The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the alleged pecuniary damage; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the
applicant suffered distress because of the authorities' decision to
quash the judgments in her case. However, the particular amount
claimed is excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis,
the Court awards the applicants EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the above amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.
- The Government averred that only RUR 274.15 should be
awarded to the applicant because she did not produce evidence of the
other expenses.
- According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is
entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as
it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above
criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR
10 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on that amount.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the quashing
of the judgments of 24 August and 17 October 2000 admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention on account of the quashing of the judgments of 24
August and 17 October 2000 by way of supervisory review;
- Holds that it is not necessary to consider the
allegation of procedural unfairness in the supervisory-review
proceedings;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian
roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 10 (ten euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
