BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF AKIMOVA v. AZERBAIJAN
(Application
no. 19853/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27
September 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Akimova v. Azerbaijan,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K.
Hajiyev,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 19853/03) against the Republic
of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national,
Mrs Valentina Akimova (“the applicant”), on 25 April
2003.
- The
applicant was represented by Mrs N. Huseynova, a lawyer practising in
Baku. The Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr C. Asgarov.
- The
applicant alleged that the postponement of the court order on
eviction of internally displaced persons illegally occupying her
apartment violated her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and her right to
a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.
- By
a decision of 12 January 2006 the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Baku.
- By
an order of the Narimanov District Executive Authority (“NDEA”)
of 2 June 1993, the applicant was issued, under the state housing
policy, an occupancy voucher (yaşayış
orderi) to a three-room apartment in a state-owned
residential building in Baku. The applicant did not move into her new
apartment at that time, because the construction of the building had
not been completely finished and the tenants had to undertake the
repair works in their respective apartments at their own expense.
- In
1997, pursuant to an oral agreement, the applicant allowed R., an
acquaintance of hers, to use the apartment temporarily, free of
charge. Under the arrangement reached by the parties, R. was to use
the apartment in exchange for certain repair works that he would
perform using the materials provided by the applicant. In addition,
R. agreed to vacate the apartment whenever the applicant made such a
demand.
- Some
unspecified time later, in breach of the existing oral agreement, R.
allowed his relative H. and his family (hereinafter to be
collectively referred to as “H.”) to move into and live
in the apartment. H. were internally displaced persons (“IDP”)
from Agdam, a region under control of Armenian military forces
following the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
- When
the applicant found out that her apartment was occupied by people
unknown to her, she requested that they vacate it. However,
H. refused to do so, stating that they had no other place to
live. The applicant filed a lawsuit, requesting the court to evict H.
from the apartment.
- On
29 March 2000 the Nizami District Court granted the applicant's
request. The court found that, prior to moving into the disputed
apartment, H. had been living in the Barda Region and in the Khatai
District of Baku where they had been registered as IDPs. They did not
dispute the fact that they had settled in the apartment in 1997. The
court further found that the applicant was the lawful tenant of the
apartment and, as such, had a right to demand H. to vacate it. The
court ordered that H. be evicted. H. appealed.
- On
30 September 2002 the Court of Appeal quashed the district court's
judgment. The court held that NDEA's order to issue an occupancy
voucher to a partly constructed building had been in breach of the
requirements of the domestic law. The court further held that the
applicant had not concluded a social tenancy agreement concerning the
apartment and, therefore, she could not have a valid claim to it. The
court therefore quashed the first-instance court's order to evict H.
from the apartment.
- The
applicant filed an appeal in cassation. On 13 December 2002 the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment and partially
upheld the applicant's request. The Supreme Court found that the
Court of Appeal erred in judging on the validity of the applicant's
occupancy voucher. It held that the applicant's tenancy rights were
undisputed and that the proceedings only concerned H.'s right to
remain in the applicant's apartment. The Supreme Court quashed the
Court of Appeal's decision in this part.
- The
Supreme Court further ruled that H. should vacate the applicant's
apartment. However, taking into account the fact that H. could not
return to their permanent place of residence in Agdam and, in the
meantime, had no other place in which to reside, the Court held that
the execution of its decision should be postponed until they could
return to Agdam.
- Thereafter,
based on the applicant's additional cassation appeal, the proceedings
were reopened and on 27 January 2005 the Plenum of the Supreme Court
quashed the Supreme Court's decision of 13 December 2002. The Plenum
noted that, having found errors in the Court of Appeal's judgment,
the Supreme Court had no competence under civil procedure law to
deliver a new judgment on the merits and, instead, was obliged to
quash the Court of Appeal's judgment and refer the case for
re-examination by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the Plenum found
that, although the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court were
essentially correct, it had breached the procedural rules by
delivering a new judgment on the merits. The Plenum remitted the case
to the Court of Appeal.
- On
7 April 2005 the Court of Appeal delivered a judgment identical to
the Supreme Court's decision of 13 December 2002. It ruled that
H. should vacate the applicant's apartment. It further held as
follows:
“... the claim of V.B. Akimova must be upheld;
however, having regard to the fact that the defendants are internally
displaced persons from the Agdam Region and do not have another place
in which to reside, the execution of the judgment shall be postponed
until the Agdam Region is liberated from occupation.”
- At
present, Agdam remains under the control of Armenian forces and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unresolved. At the time of the
latest communication with the parties, H. was still living in the
applicant's apartment.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Housing Code of 1 March 1983
- The
Housing Code provides that Azerbaijani citizens are entitled to
obtain a right of use of apartments owned by the State or other
public bodies, under the terms of a tenancy agreement (Articles 10
and 28).
- A
decision on granting an apartment is to be implemented by way of
issuing the citizen with an occupancy voucher (yaşayış
sahəsi orderi) from the local executive authority (Article
48). The voucher serves as the sole legal basis for taking possession
of the apartment designated therein (Article 48) and for
concluding a tenancy agreement (yaşayış
sahəsini icarə müqaviləsi) between the
tenant and the housing maintenance authority (Article 51).
- The
right of use of apartments is granted for an indefinite term (Article
10). The tenant can terminate the tenancy agreement at any moment,
with the consent of his or her family members (Article 87). The
landlord (the housing maintenance authority) can terminate the
agreement only on the grounds provided for by law and on the basis of
a court decision (Articles 88-89). If the agreement is terminated
because the house is no longer fit for living in, the tenant and
family must be provided with a substitute apartment with full
amenities (Articles 90 and 96). Tenants or members of their family
can be evicted without provision of substitute accommodation only if
they “systematically destroy or damage the apartment”,
“use it for purposes other than residence” or
“systematically breach the [generally accepted rules of
conduct], thus making cohabitation with others impossible”
(Article 97).
B. Law on Privatisation of Housing of 26 January 1993
- Individuals
residing, pursuant to a tenancy agreement, in apartments owned by the
State and other public bodies have a right to transfer these
apartments into their private ownership (Article 1). Such
privatisation is voluntary and free of charge (Article 2). The right
to privatise a State-owned apartment free of charge may be exercised
only once (Article 7).
C. Law on Social Protection of Internally Displaced
Persons and Individuals Equated to Them of 21 May 1999
- Article
2 of the Law provides as follows:
“Persons displaced from the places of their
permanent residence in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan to
other places within the territory of the country as a result of
foreign military aggression, occupation of certain territories or
continuous gunfire, shall be considered as internally displaced
persons subject to the provisions of this Law.”
- Article
5 of the Law provides as follows:
“The relevant executive authority [the Cabinet of
Ministers, State Committee on the Refugees' Affairs and local
executive authorities, within the scope of their respective
competence] shall deal with the housing of internally displaced
persons. Residential, administrative and auxiliary buildings, as well
as other buildings, shall be used for such housing purposes. Where
there is no possibility to house internally displaced persons in such
buildings or where the density of population in a specific settlement
does not allow such a possibility, they shall be settled in camps
specially set up for internally displaced persons. ...
The internally displaced persons may be allowed to
temporarily settle on their own only if the rights and lawful
interests of other persons are not infringed. Otherwise, the relevant
executive authority must ensure re-settlement of the internally
displaced persons to other accommodation...”
D. Regulations on Settlement of Internally Displaced
Persons in Residential, Administrative and Other Buildings Fit for
Residence, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 200
of 24 December 1999 (“IDP Settlement Regulations”)
- Article
4 of the Regulations provides:
“In order to prevent the eviction of the
internally displaced persons from dwellings in which they settled
during the period of 1992-1994, the legal force of the occupancy
vouchers issued by the relevant authorities to individual citizens in
respect of those dwellings shall be temporarily suspended...”
E. Regulations on Re-settlement of Internally Displaced
Persons to Other Accommodation, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers
Resolution No. 200 of 24 December 1999 (“IDP Re-Settlement
Regulations”)
- In
cases where the temporary settling of internally displaced persons
breaches the housing rights of other individuals, the former must be
provided with other suitable accommodation (Article 4).
F. Code of Civil Procedure of 1 September 2000 (“CCP”)
- The
judge examining a civil case may, upon a petition by a party to the
case, decide to postpone or suspend the execution of the judgment or
change the manner of execution, due to the parties' property
situation or other circumstances (Article 231).
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
- In
their memorial of 23 March 2006 the Government raised for the first
time the objection that domestic remedies had not been exhausted as
the applicant had not availed herself of the possibility to lodge a
new cassation appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment of 7
April 2005. According to the Government, this remedy became available
to the applicant due to the reopening of the proceedings on 27
January 2007.
- The
Court recalls that, pursuant to Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any
plea of inadmissibility must be made by the respondent Party in its
observations on the admissibility of the application, in so far as
its character and the circumstances permit.
- The
case was communicated to the Government on 1 September 2004 and the
Government were requested to submit their observations as to the
admissibility of the case before 2 December 2004. This deadline was
subsequently extended until 30 December 2004 pursuant to the
Government's request. At the time of communication of the application
and submission of the Government's observations as to the
admissibility of the case, the domestic proceedings had not been
reopened and the Supreme Court's decision of 13 December 2002
remained as the final domestic decision in the present case.
- On
28 January 2005 the Government informed the Court about the reopening
of the proceedings and the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court of 27 January 2005, which information had been accepted to the
case file. However, neither on that occasion nor after the subsequent
delivery by the Court of Appeal of its judgment of 7 April 2005, have
the Government attempted, either expressly or implicitly, to raise
any objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies prior to
the Court's decision on admissibility of the application. The Court
declared the application partly admissible on 12 January 2006.
- Only
following the decision on admissibility and after having been invited
to submit their observations on the merits of the application, did
the Government submit, on 23 March 2006, their objection as to the
non exhaustion of domestic remedies.
- The
Court finds that the Government could have been expected to raise the
issue of non-exhaustion after the domestic proceedings had been
reopened in the present case or at least following the Court of
Appeal's judgment of 7 April 2005, which was delivered well before
the Court's admissibility decision of 12 January 2006. As there are
no particular reasons which would have absolved the Government from
raising their objection in the proceedings on admissibility, they are
stopped from doing so now (see Maurer v. Austria, no.
50110/99, § 16, 17 January 2002).
- Accordingly, the Government's preliminary objection
must be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO
THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that she had been deprived of her property
rights in breach of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention, which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. The parties' submissions
- The
Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the
applicant's property rights, but contended that this interference was
justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The
Government maintained that the interference was of a temporary nature
and was provided by law. Specifically, they argued that the IDP
Settlement Regulations (see paragraph 24 above) authorised the
postponement of eviction of internally displaced persons from
dwellings where they have temporarily settled.
- The
Government further noted that there were more than 700,000 internally
displaced persons in Azerbaijan from the areas under Armenian
occupation. There existed a strong public necessity to provide the
IDPs with housing. The majority of these IDPs were placed in former
administrative buildings, public buildings such as hotels and nursing
homes, as well as refugee camps. A certain number of IDPs settled in
apartments belonging to private individuals. According to the
Government, eviction of IDPs from their temporary places of residence
would, in effect, leave them homeless and could “lead to social
tensions and explosion” and “endanger the public order”.
Therefore, the temporary restriction of the applicant's right to
enjoy her possessions had a legitimate aim of public interest and was
proportionate to this aim.
- The
applicant submitted that the interference with the peaceful enjoyment
of her possessions was not prescribed by domestic law. She argued
that the IDP Settlement Regulations concerned the prevention of
eviction of the IDPs who had settled in places of temporary residence
during the period of 1992-1994. However, in her case, the IDPs
settled in her apartment in 1997 and, therefore, were not entitled to
the protection under the IDP Settlement Regulations. Moreover, the
applicant claimed that these Regulations were in any event
irrelevant, since they did not provide any basis for postponement of
execution of court judgments, but simply provided for a procedure of
suspension of the legal force of occupancy vouchers to residential
premises occupied by IDPs in 1992-1994.
- The
applicant further argued that, in any event, even assuming that her
property rights had been restricted in accordance with the law and in
pursuit of a legitimate aim, the courts had failed to strike a fair
balance between the general public interest and the requirements of
the protection of an individual's fundamental rights. The applicant
contended that she had been forced to bear “an individual and
excessive burden”, by having her property rights restricted in
favour of the IDPs without any compensation. Accordingly, the means
employed by the courts were not proportionate to the aim pursued.
B. The Court's assessment
- The
Court recalls that the concept of “possessions” in the
first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning
which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is
independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain
other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded
as property rights, and thus as “possessions” for the
purposes of this provision.
- In the present case, the Court notes that on 2 June
1993 the applicant was issued an occupancy voucher in respect of the
apartment in question. The domestic courts subsequently confirmed the
applicant as a rightful holder of the occupancy voucher in respect of
the apartment. On the basis of the voucher, a so-called “social
tenancy agreement” would have been signed between the competent
authority and the applicant. Under the terms of this “social
tenancy agreement”, as established in the Housing Code and the
applicable regulations, the applicant would have had a right to
possess and make use of the apartment and, under certain conditions,
to have ownership transferred to her free of charge in accordance
with the Law on Privatisation of Housing.
- In
these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the applicant's
claims to the apartment were sufficiently established to constitute a
“possession” falling within the ambit of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
- Article
1 of Protocol No. 1, which in substance guarantees the right of
property, comprises three distinct rules: the first rule, set out in
the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and
enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the
second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph,
covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain
conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph,
recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other
things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest. The second and third rules are concerned with particular
instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of
property and should therefore be construed in the light of the
general principle enunciated in the first rule (see James and
Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986,
Series A no. 98, pp. 29-30, § 37).
- The
Court notes that, despite a judgment ordering the eviction of the
IDPs from the applicant's apartment, the applicant cannot regain
possession of the apartment for several years because the execution
of the judgment has been postponed for an indefinite period of time.
In essence, while it was recognised that the applicant was the lawful
tenant of the apartment, the IDPs were allowed to remain in
possession of her apartment despite the fact that such possession was
declared unlawful by the judgment itself. In these circumstances, the
Court finds – and it is undisputed by the parties – that
there has been an interference with the applicant's property rights.
Since the applicant had only tenancy rights to the apartment, this
interference neither amounts to an expropriation nor is an instance
of controlling the use of property, but comes under the first
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public
authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be
lawful. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles
of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the
Convention. It follows that the issue of whether a fair balance has
been struck between the demands of the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights becomes relevant only once it has been established
that the interference in question satisfied the requirement of
lawfulness and was not arbitrary (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC],
no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II, with further references).
The terms “law” and “lawful” in the
Convention essentially refer back to the domestic law and also relate
to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the
rule of law (see James and Others, cited above, p. 41, §
67).
- The
Court observes that the domestic judgments, and in particular the
Court of Appeal's judgment of 7 April 2005, did not rely on any
domestic legal provision which would serve as a basis for postponing
the execution of the eviction order. Thus, the domestic courts failed
to provide any legal substantiation of their decision to allow the
IDPs to continue occupying the apartment belonging to the applicant,
despite having found that such occupation was unlawful.
- Nevertheless,
the Government argued that the interference with the applicant's
rights was based on the IDP Settlement Regulations (see paragraph 24
above). The Court cannot accept the Government's argument.
The IDP Settlement Regulations contain no rules on civil procedure
vesting the domestic courts with the competence to postpone
indefinitely the execution of judicial eviction orders, which is what
happened in the present case. The IDP Settlement Regulations merely
provide for suspension of the legal force of occupancy vouchers
issued in respect of dwellings illegally occupied by IDPs. In the
present case, there is no evidence showing that the legal force of
the applicant's occupancy voucher has ever been suspended. On the
contrary, the domestic courts found that the occupancy voucher issued
to the applicant was valid and that the applicant was the lawful
tenant of the apartment.
- Moreover,
Article 4 of the IDP Settlement Regulations expressly and
unambiguously specifies that the protection from eviction extends
only to those IDPs who settled, during the years 1992 through 1994,
in various dwellings belonging to other individuals. Without
prejudging the adequacy and proportionality of this measure, the
Court observes that the time period of 1992-1994 corresponds roughly
to the period of intensive military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding areas when hundreds of thousands of people were forced to
flee their permanent places
of residence in the conflict area. In the present
case, it has been conclusively established by the domestic courts
that H. settled in the applicant's apartment in 1997,
i.e. approximately three years after the expiry of the
“protection period” provided for by the IDP Settlement
Regulations and approximately four years after they fled Agdam in
1993. Accordingly, the applicant's case was outside the scope of
Article 4 of the IDP Settlement Regulations.
- The
Court also has regard to the provisions of Article 5 of the Law on
Social Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and Individuals
Equated to Them, as well as Article 4 of the IDP Re-Settlement
Regulations, which require the domestic authorities to re-settle IDPs
to other accommodation if they, by finding accommodation of their own
free will, infringe the housing rights of other individuals (see
paragraphs 23 and 25 above). It would appear that, in the
present case, the decision to postpone the execution of the judicial
eviction order was in breach of these provisions. However, the
Government, like the domestic courts, have failed to provide any
views on the applicability of these provisions in the present case.
- Finally,
the Court notes that Article 231 of CCP provides for a procedure to
postpone the execution of a judgment in certain specific
circumstances and based on a petition by a party to the proceedings
(see paragraph 26 above). However, in the present case, there were no
such petitions filed by the parties and the decision of the domestic
courts was not taken pursuant to the procedure under Article 231 of
CCP.
- In such circumstances, the Court considers that the
interference in question was in breach of Azerbaijani law and
incompatible with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of
her possessions. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to ascertain
whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.
- There
has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention that her right to a fair trial had been violated
because she had not received a reasoned decision from the domestic
courts and because the postponement of execution of the judgment had
rendered her right to a fair trial illusory. Article 6 § 1
provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government submitted that the impugned judicial decision was reasoned
and justified and that the applicant's complaint was unsubstantiated.
- The
applicant argued that the domestic court failed to indicate with
sufficient clarity the grounds on which it based the decision to
postpone the execution of the judgment in her favour and, thus,
breached her right to receive a reasoned judgment. Furthermore, the
applicant claimed that the postponement of the judgment's execution
until an unspecified date was incompatible with the Convention,
because it rendered her right to a fair trial illusory by allowing
the binding judgment to remain inoperative to her detriment.
- The
Court considers that the present case does not raise the issue of
non-enforcement of a binding judgment, as the execution of the
judgment was postponed by the judgment itself and no enforcement
proceedings could be instituted (see, a contrario, among many
other authorities, Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, §§
10 et seq., ECHR 2002-III). As to whether such decision to postpone
the execution, in itself, was reasoned and compatible with the
Convention, the Court considers that the applicant's complaint and
arguments under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention are essentially
the same as those examined above under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1. Therefore, having regard to the conclusions set out in paragraphs
50 and 51 above, the Court does not consider it necessary in the
present case to examine separately the complaint under Article 6 §
1.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant sought pecuniary damage in the principal amount of 51,525
United States dollars (USD) which, according to her, constituted the
price of a similar apartment in the same area of Baku at the date of
submission of her just satisfaction claim, to be increased by 1.3%
(the alleged average monthly rate of increase of real estate prices
in Azerbaijan) for each month from the date of submission of her just
satisfaction claim until the date of the Court's decision on just
satisfaction. She also sought USD 30,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government did not comment on these claims.
- The
Court considers that the question of the application of Article 41 is
not ready for decision. Accordingly, it shall be reserved and the
subsequent procedure fixed having regard to any agreement which might
be reached between the Government and the applicant (Rule 75 § 1
of the Rules of Court).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
- Holds that no separate examination is necessary
of the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
- Holds that the question of the application of
Article 41 is not ready for decision; accordingly,
(a) reserves
the said question in whole;
(b) invites
the Government and the applicant to submit, within three months from
the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter
and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they
may reach;
(c) reserves
the further procedure and delegates to the President of the
Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 September 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
