BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF GOVORUSHKO v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 42940/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Govorushko v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G.
Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 4 October 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 42940/06) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Nikolayevich
Govorushko (“the applicant”), on 26 July 2006.
- The
applicant was represented before the Court by Mr A. Taliadoros,
a lawyer practising in Nicosia, Cyprus, and Sir Francis Jacobs QC and
Mr D. Murray, barristers in London, the United Kingdom. The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially
represented by Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative of
the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and
subsequently by their new Representative, Mrs V. Milinchuk.
- On
7 November 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility. Further to the applicant's
request, the Court granted priority to the application (Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court) and decided that the proceedings in this case
would be conducted simultaneously with those in application no.
38971/06 Korshunov v. Russia (Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).
- The
Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and
merits of the application. Having examined the Government's
objection, the Court dismissed it.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the Moscow Region.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
- On
7 August 2000 a criminal case was opened into smuggling of consumer
goods.
- On
17 January 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of
participation in a criminal enterprise, smuggling, customs duty
evasion and fraud.
- From
April to November 2005 the applicant was granted access to the
materials in the case file.
- On
29 November 2005 the case was referred for trial before the
Avtozavodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod. According to the
Government, the case materials comprised 113 binders; charges had
been brought against five individuals who had acted in conspiracy;
the witnesses' list included seventy-six prosecution witnesses from
several cities in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, China and Italy, as well
as twenty-five witnesses and experts for the defence.
- On
16 December 2005 the Avtozavodskiy District Court held the
preliminary hearing and fixed the opening trial date for 28 December
2005.
- On 23 March 2006 the Avtozavodskiy District Court
ordered that the case be returned to the Prosecutor General's Office
for correcting defects in the indictment against the applicant. That
decision was set aside by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 2
May 2006, which referred the case back to the District Court.
- On
29 May 2006 the trial resumed but it was subsequently stayed from
23 June to 24 July 2006.
- On
31 January 2007 the applicant was released on bail.
- According
to the information provided by the parties and the elements available
in the case-file to date, the criminal proceedings are still pending
before the trial court.
B. Decisions concerning the application of a custodial
measure
- On 19 January 2005 the Lefortovskiy District Court of
Moscow remanded the applicant in custody on the ground that he was
charged with serious and particularly serious offences and could
abscond or interfere with the investigation, without citing specific
reasons for these findings. On 7 February 2005 the Moscow City
Court upheld the decision on appeal.
- On
15 March, 12 May, 12 July and 13 October 2005 the Lefortovskiy
District Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time it
referred, using a summary formula, to the gravity of the charge
against the applicant and to “grounds to believe that he would
abscond or interfere with the criminal proceedings”. On 19
April, 7 June, 22 August and 9 November 2005 the Moscow City
Court upheld the extension orders on appeal.
- In the decisions of 19 April and 7 June 2005 the City
Court found as follows (the same paragraph featured in both
decisions):
“[The applicant] is charged with crimes, including
particularly serious crimes, punishable with more than two years'
imprisonment. The factual circumstances of the offence imputed to
[the applicant] call for the assumption that, once released, he would
flee from the investigation and trial, re-offend or otherwise
interfere with the criminal proceedings. In these circumstances, the
[first-instance] court's finding that any other, non-custodial
preventive measure may not be applied to [the applicant], appears
justified.”
- The City Court's decision of 9 November 2005 also
contained the following passage:
“The argument by the defence that the
[first-instance] court did not take into account absence of any
objective evidence of [the applicant's] involvement in the commission
of the imputed offence, is without substance because, in extending
the applicant's detention, the [first-instance] court did not make
any findings as to the guilt of the accused or as to correctness of
characterisation of the facts in law.”
- On
29 November 2005 the applicant was moved to remand centre no. IZ-52/1
in Nizhniy Novgorod.
- On
16 December 2005 the Avtozavodskiy District Court extended the
applicant's detention, referring to the gravity of the charges and
the risk that he would interfere with the course of the trial because
two other defendants had gone into hiding.
- On 1 June 2006 the Avtozavodskiy District Court, by
one decision, ordered to extend the applicant's and his
co-defendant's detention until 2 September 2006, holding as
follows:
“In deciding on extending the period of detention,
the court takes into account that the measure of restraint in respect
of [the applicant and his co-defendant] was imposed in accordance
with Articles 97-101 and 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as
there existed sufficient grounds to believe that they would abscond
investigation and trial or interfere with the criminal proceedings.
The grounds justifying the application of the measure of restraint
still persist to date. Positive references of the defendants and
their medical ailments do not remove the grounds to believe that they
can abscond because they are charged with particularly serious
offences”.
- Counsel for the applicant filed an appeal. He
submitted, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to
take into account the facts mitigating for the applicant's release,
such as the absence of a prior criminal record, positive references,
a permanent place of residence, stable family connections with his
wife, children and grandchildren, chronic ailments, and the long
period of detention which had already exceeded fifteen months.
- On 26 June 2006 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court
upheld on appeal the extension order of 1 June 2006, noting that the
initial grounds justifying the holding of the applicant and his
co-defendant in custody still obtained and that the defence had not
put forward any arguments warranting a change in the preventive
measure.
- On 21 August and 16 November 2006 the Avtozavodskiy
District Court granted further extensions of the applicant's and his
co-defendant's detention, invoking two grounds: that they were
charged with particularly serious offences punishable with up to
twelve years' imprisonment, and that the applicant had been initially
arrested because the investigation had received information about his
intention to abscond.
- In
the decision of 21 August 2006 the District Court found that:
“...if the preventive measure is replaced with a
more lenient one, there exists a risk that the defendants would not
appear at trial; thus, only the custodial measure may... ensure the
protection of the interests of the State and society against crime
and the possibility of a fair trial.”
- The
decision of 16 November 2006 employed a somewhat different wording
which read as follows:
“Another, more lenient preventive measure, such as
bail, would not be able to ensure a fair trial in this particular
case. For that reason the need to ensure an effective protection of
the public interests – notwithstanding the presumption of
innocence and long periods of detention of both defendants –
justifies a departure from the principle of individual liberty.”
- On
11 September and 15 December 2006 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court
upheld, in a summary fashion, the above decisions.
- On
30 January 2007 the Avtozavodskiy District Court granted the
applicant's and his co-defendant's application for release on bail.
It found that, although the risk of absconding still existed, with
the passage of time that risk was no longer sufficient to justify a
breach of the principle of individual liberty. The bail was set at
1,500,000 Russian roubles (approximately 44,000 euros). On the
following day the applicant was released.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Provisions governing detention pending trial
- Since
1 July 2002 detention matters have been governed by the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (Law no. 174-FZ of
18 December 2001).
- “Preventive
measures” or “measures of restraint” (меры
пресечения)
include an undertaking not to leave a town or region, personal
surety, bail and detention on remand (Article 98). If necessary, the
suspect or accused may be asked to give an undertaking to appear
(Article 112).
- When
deciding on a preventive measure, the court is required to consider
whether there are “sufficient grounds to believe” that
the accused would abscond during the investigation or trial,
re-offend or interfere with the establishment of the truth (Article
97). It must also take into account the gravity of the charge,
information on the accused's character, his or her profession, age,
state of health, family status and other circumstances (Article 99).
- Detention
may be ordered by a court if the charge carries a sentence of at
least two years' imprisonment, provided that a less restrictive
preventive measure cannot be applied (Article 108 § 1).
- After arrest the suspect is placed in custody “during
the investigation”. The maximum permitted period of detention
“during the investigation” is two months but it can be
extended for up to six months. Further extensions for up to twelve or
eighteen months may be authorised only if the accused is charged with
serious or particularly serious criminal offences (Article 109 §§
1-3).
- From the date the prosecutor forwards the case to the
trial court, the defendant's detention is “during the trial”.
The term of detention “during the trial” is calculated to
the date the judgment is given. It may not normally exceed six
months, but if the case concerns serious or particularly serious
criminal offences, the trial court may approve one or more extensions
of no longer than three months each (Article 255 §§ 2
and 3).
B. Provisions on State liability for damages
- The State or regional treasury is liable –
irrespective of any fault by State officials – for the damage
sustained by an individual on account of, in particular, unlawful
criminal prosecution or unlawful application of a preventive measure
in the form of placement in custody (Article 1070 § 1 of the
Civil Code).
- A court may hold the tortfeasor liable for
non-pecuniary damage incurred by an individual through actions
impairing his or her personal non-property rights, such as the right
to personal integrity and the right to liberty of movement (Articles
150 and 151 of the Civil Code). Non-pecuniary damage must be
compensated for irrespective of the tortfeasor's fault in the event
of, in particular, unlawful conviction or prosecution or unlawful
application of a preventive measure in the form of placement in
custody (Article 1100 § 2).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that
his arrest had not been necessary to prevent him from committing
offences or fleeing after having done so.
- The
Court notes that the applicant's arrest and the appeal proceedings
concerning the arrest warrant predated the lodging of his application
by more than six months. It follows that this complaint has been
introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that
the duration of his pre-trial detention had been in breach of the
reasonable-time requirement. Article 5 § 3 provides as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions by the parties
- The
Government stressed that the facts invoked by the defence in support
of the applicant's petition for release – such as a permanent
place of residence and family connections – had been duly taken
into account by the domestic courts. Extension orders had been
founded on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, as well
as on the operative information about his intention to abscond. The
Government emphasised that in January 2007 the applicant had been
released on bail, although the grounds for holding him in custody had
still obtained.
- The
applicant submitted that the decisions of the Russian courts, by
which his detention had been extended, had not been based on specific
evidence examined in court but rather on assertions made by the
investigating and prosecuting authorities. Thus, in January 2007 the
investigation had intercepted his call to his mother in Belarus, in
which he had said that he would “come and see her soon”.
This comment had only been made to re-assure his mother who had not
known about his being in custody and it had not implied any intention
to abscond. The courts had not reviewed or taken into consideration
the facts that the applicant had been of good character, that he had
never been criminally prosecuted or that he had a permanent place of
residence where he had lived with his wife and two children.
Moreover, the Russian courts had not considered alternative means to
secure his attendance at court, thereby violating Article 108 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The Court's assessment
- Under the Court's case-law, the issue of whether a
period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto.
Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must
be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued
detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific
indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, W.
v. Switzerland, judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A
no. 254-A, p. 15, § 30; Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000-XI).
- The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court
has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3
does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing
an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him
provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused
must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under
consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once
his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (see, among other
authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393/05, § 30,
13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006 ...; Jablonski v.
Poland, no. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and
Neumeister v. Austria, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A
no. 8, § 4).
- The
applicant was held in custody from 17 January 2005 to 31 January
2007 when he was released on bail. Such a length of pre-trial
detention – over two years – is a matter of grave concern
for the Court. It observes that until January 2007 the domestic
authorities never considered whether the length of his detention had
already exceeded a “reasonable time”. The fact that the
maximum time-limits permitted by the domestic law were not exceeded
may not be a decisive element for the Court's assessment. The
calculation of the domestic time-limits depended solely on the
gravity of the charges which was decided upon by the prosecution and
was not subject to a judicial review (see Shcheglyuk v.
Russia, no. 7649/02, § 43, 14 December 2006,
and paragraphs 33 and 34 above). The Court reiterates that the
Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons
for keeping the applicant in detention for such a long time (see
Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 71,
8 June 2006).
- The
Court observes that the applicant was initially arrested at his place
of residence on suspicion of having committed large-scale smuggling
in conspiracy with others. The Russian courts accepted the
investigating authorities' submission that the applicant had had an
intention to abscond but they did not cite any specific facts
confirming the existence of such an intention (see paragraph 15
above). Even if the applicant had indeed had such an intention, with
the passage of time that ground inevitably became less and less
relevant. Nevertheless, over the following two years the
courts' reasoning did not evolve to reflect the developing situation
and to verify whether at the advanced stage of the proceedings the
relevant and sufficient grounds for holding the applicant in custody
still existed.
- During
the entire period of the applicant's detention the District Courts –
first in Moscow and then in Nizhniy Novgorod – ordered the
applicant's continued detention on the basis of the gravity of the
charges against him and the persistent existence of “grounds
that [had] justified the application of the measure of restraint”
(see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). They also mentioned that
the applicant could abscond or interfere with the criminal
proceedings, without explaining the reasons for those findings.
- As
regards the domestic authorities' reliance on the gravity of the
charges as the decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that,
although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in
the assessment of the risk of absconding, the need to continue the
deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract
point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the
offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate
a custodial sentence (see Belevitskiy v. Russia,
no. 72967/01, § 101, 1 March 2007; Ilijkov v.
Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001; and
Letellier v. France, judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no.
207, § 51). This is particularly relevant in the Russian legal
system where the characterisation in law of the facts – and
thus the sentence faced by the applicant – is determined by the
prosecution without judicial review of the issue whether the evidence
that has been obtained supports a reasonable suspicion that the
applicant has committed the alleged offence (see Khudoyorov v.
Russia, no. 6847/02, § 180, 8 November 2005). The domestic
courts explicitly refused to consider the state of evidence or the
characterisation in law of the facts which the prosecution had
attributed to them (see paragraph 18 above).
- Further,
the Court observes that the applicant constantly invoked the facts
mitigating the risk of his absconding after a long time he had spent
in detention (see paragraph 22 above). However, the domestic courts
rejected without further scrutiny the applicant's arguments that he
had no previous criminal record, positive references, that he had to
provide for his family and also that he suffered from his chronic
ailments. The courts assumed that the gravity of the charges carried
such a preponderant weight that no other circumstances could have
obtained the applicant's release (see, for instance, the domestic
courts' decisions cited in paragraphs 17 and 21 above). In this
connection the Court reiterates that any system of mandatory
detention is incompatible per se with Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention, it being incumbent on the domestic authorities to
establish and demonstrate the existence of concrete facts outweighing
the rule of respect for individual liberty. In the present case the
domestic decisions did not mention any such facts.
- The Court has previously found a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention in several Russian cases where the
domestic courts prolonged an applicant's detention relying
essentially on the gravity of the charges and using stereotyped
formula paraphrasing the reasons for detention provided for by the
Code of Criminal Procedure, without explaining how they applied in
the applicant's case or considering alternative preventive measures
(see Belevitskiy, Mamedova and Khudoyorov cases
cited above, and also Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00,
§§ 103 et seq., ECHR 2006 ... (extracts);
Dolgova v. Russia, no. 11886/05, §§ 38
et seq., 2 March 2006; Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071/00,
§§ 63 et seq., 7 April 2005; Panchenko v. Russia,
no. 45100/98, §§ 91 et seq., 8 February 2005; and
Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and
48183/99, §§ 56 et seq., ECHR 2003 IX
(extracts)).
- Having
regard to its case-law on the subject and the above considerations,
the Court concludes that the domestic authorities did not adduce
“relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify the
applicant's detention in excess of a “reasonable time”.
In these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the
proceedings were conducted with “special diligence”.
- There
has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that he did not have an enforceable
right to compensation for a violation of his right to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. He relied on Article 5 §
5 of the Convention which provides as follows:
“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or
detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions by the parties
- In
the Government's view, in the absence of a violation of Article 5 §
3 of the Convention no question of a possible violation of the
applicant's right to compensation could arise. Article 1070 of the
Civil Code provided for the right to compensation for unlawful
detention. Detention could be found unlawful by a judicial decision
if, in particular, an arrest warrant or extension order had not been
based on relevant and sufficient reasons. In the applicant's case,
however, the appeal courts upheld all the extension orders as lawful.
Finally, the Government pointed out that the applicant would have the
right to compensation if he is eventually acquitted of the charges.
- The
applicant maintained his complaint.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court reiterates that Article 5 § 5 is complied with where it is
possible to apply for compensation in respect of a deprivation of
liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4.
The right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 therefore
presupposes that a violation of one of the preceding paragraphs of
Article 5 has been established, either by a domestic authority or by
the Court (see Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, § 83,
25 October 2005, and N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 49,
ECHR 2002 X).
- In
the present case the Court has found a violation of paragraph 3 of
Article 5 in that the applicant's two-year detention exceeded a
“reasonable time” and was not based on “relevant
and sufficient” reasons. It must therefore establish whether or
not the applicant had an enforceable right to compensation for the
breach of Article 5.
- The
Court observes that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the
Russian Civil Code (see paragraphs 35 and 36 above), an award in
respect of pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages may be made against
the State only if the detention is found to have been unlawful in the
domestic proceedings. In the present case, however, the appeal courts
routinely upheld the lawfulness of the detention and extension orders
and the applicant therefore had no grounds to claim compensation.
- Furthermore,
the Court notes that the provisions invoked by the Government do not
provide for State liability for the detention which was not based on
“relevant and sufficient” reasons or which exceeded a
“reasonable time”. This state of Russian law precludes
any legal possibility for the applicant to receive compensation for
the detention which was effected in breach of Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention (compare Cahit Solmaz v. Turkey,
no. 34623/03, § 46, 14 June 2007, and Çiçekler v.
Turkey, no. 14899/03, § 65, 22 December 2005).
- Thus,
the Court finds that the applicant does not have an enforceable right
to compensation for his detention which has been found to be in
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
There
has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the
Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that the length of the criminal
proceedings against him had been in breach of the reasonable-time
requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which reads:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government submitted that the length of the proceedings was accounted
for by the complexity of the case, the amount of case documents (113
binders), and the number of witnesses (seventy-six for the
prosecution and twenty-five for the defence).
- The
applicant pointed out that the proceedings had lasted so far six
years and eight months since the initiation of the criminal case
against the applicant. This period was clearly in excess of a
reasonable time. Substantial delays were attributable to the
authorities. Thus, from 23 March to 29 May 2006 the trial had
been stayed because the court had asked the prosecutor to correct
defects in the bill of indictment. In addition, from 23 June to
24 July 2006 the proceedings had been adjourned because all three
judges had gone on holiday. The applicant had remained in custody
during these periods.
- The
Court reiterates that in criminal matters, the “reasonable
time” referred to in Article 6 § 1 begins to run as soon
as a person is “charged”; this may occur on a date prior
to the case coming before the trial court (see, for example, Deweer
v. Belgium, judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, §
42), such as the date of arrest, the date when the person concerned
was officially notified that he would be prosecuted, or the date when
preliminary investigations were opened (see Wemhoff v. Germany,
judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, § 19; Neumeister v.
Austria, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, § 18; and
Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no.
13, § 110). “Charge”, for the purposes of Article 6
§ 1, may be defined as “the official notification given to
an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has
committed a criminal offence”, a definition that also
corresponds to the test whether “the situation of the [suspect]
has been substantially affected” (see Deweer, cited
above, § 46).
- As
neither party indicated that the applicant had been charged or
otherwise affected by on-going criminal proceedings on a date
preceding his arrest, the Court takes the date of his arrest, 17
January 2005, as the starting date of the proceedings. These
proceedings are now still pending before the trial court. They have
thus lasted to date more than two years and seven months.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case, regard being had to the criteria laid down
in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case,
the applicant's conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities
(see, among many other authorities, Nakhmanovich v. Russia,
no. 55669/00, § 95, 2 March 2006).
- Making
an overall assessment of the complexity of the case, the conduct of
all concerned as well as the total length of the proceedings, the
Court considers that the latter did not go beyond what may be
considered reasonable in this particular case.
- It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- By
letter of 12 March 2007, the Court invited the applicant to submit a
claim for just satisfaction by 23 April 2007. Further to his request,
it exceptionally granted him an extension until 23 May 2007.
Nevertheless, the applicant did not submit a claim for just
satisfaction within the extended time-limit. Accordingly, the Court
considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints concerning the the
length of the applicant's detention and the existence of an
enforceable right to compensation for the excessively long detention
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 5 of the Convention;
- Decides not to make an award under Article 41 of
the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis Registrar President
