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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF ERKUŞ v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 30326/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29
September 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Erkuş v.
Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Işıl
Karakaş, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 8 September 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 30326/03) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Ergin Erkuş (“the
applicant”), on 12 August 2003.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr S. Çetinkaya, a lawyer
practising in Izmir. The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent.
- On
20 May 2008 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate to the Government the complaint concerning
the lawfulness and length of the applicant's detention and the
absence of an investigation into his detention. It also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Izmir.
- While
the applicant was in compulsory military service in Kırklareli,
on 19 November 2002 he got ten days' leave and went to Izmir to see
his family. He did not return to his barracks afterwards.
- On
22 February 2003 at 3 p.m., the applicant was arrested by police
officers at the Narlıdere police station during a routine
identity check on suspicion of being an army deserter (asker
kaçağı). At 4 p.m.
he was taken to the Üçkuyular Military Station Command
where the officials determined that he had not returned to his army
command when his leave had ended. He was questioned, inter
alia, about which army command he
belonged to, why he had deserted and whether he had committed a crime
during this time.
- On
the same day at 8 p.m., the applicant was taken to Şirinyer
Military Station Command where he remained in custody. The next day
at 11 a.m., he was transferred to the Military Recruitment
Office.
- On
7 March 2003 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was transferred to his army
command in Kırklareli. The verbatim record of this transfer
noted that the applicant, having committed the offence of army
desertion, was requested to be transferred to his army command. It
further indicated that the applicant had entered the “security
room” on 23 February 2003 and “exited” on 6 March
2003.
- On
the same day at 2 p.m., the applicant was questioned by two army
officials who informed him that he had committed the offence of
exceeding his leave.
- Between
7 March and 11 March 2003, the applicant was held in custody at his
army command.
- On
11 March 2003 he was brought before the Çorlu Military Court,
which remanded him in custody.
- On
12 March 2003 the Çorlu Military Prosecutor filed an
indictment charging the applicant with exceeding his leave (“izin
tecavüzü”) under
Article 66 § 1 of the Military Criminal Code.
- On 14 April 2003 the Çorlu
Military Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him
to ten months' imprisonment. In its decision the court noted that the
applicant had failed to return to his army command at the end of his
leave, that he had been apprehended on 22 February 2003 and that he
had been held in custody between 7 and 11 March. It deducted the
period spent on the road and in custody between 22 February and
11 March 2003 from his prison sentence.
- On
22 April 2003 the judgment of the Çorlu Military Court became
final as neither the military prosecutor nor the applicant appealed.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- Article
72 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Law on Military Service
stipulate that every male citizen of the Republic of Turkey shall
fulfil his military service.
- Pursuant
to section 80 § 1 of the Law on Military Service, those who have
deserted their headquarters or who have exceeded their period of
leave or medical leave shall be searched for, arrested and placed in
the custody of the local military authorities in order to be handed
over to their army commands.
- Section
66 of the Military Criminal Code is entitled “desertion”.
Paragraph 1 (b) of this provision makes it a criminal
offence to exceed one's period of leave by six days without
authorisation.
- Under
section 80 § 3 of the Law on the Constitution of Military Courts
and Criminal Procedure applicable at the time of the events, the
period a person can spend in custody shall not exceed forty-eight
hours, excluding the time necessary to transfer the detainee to the
nearest military court. Under section 80 § 5, if the arrestee
cannot be brought before a military court within the time-limit
specified in section 80 § 3, he or she shall be taken to the
nearest magistrates' court. No one shall be deprived of his or her
liberty beyond this time-limit.
- On
29 June 2006 section 80 § 3 of the Law on the Constitution of
Military Courts and Criminal Procedure was amended by Law no. 5530,
which provided that time in custody shall not exceed twenty-four
hours, excluding the time necessary to transfer the detainee to the
nearest military court, and that the time necessary for transfer
could not be more than twelve hours.
THE LAW
I. ADMISSIBILITY
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 §§ 1, 3 AND
13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful and
excessively long and that the authorities had failed to initiate an
investigation into the matter. He relied on Articles 5 §§ 1
and 3 and 13 of the Convention.
- The
Court considers that these complaints should be examined solely from
the standpoint of Article 5 §§ 1 (b), (c) and 3, which
provide as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law: ...
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in
order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. The parties' submissions
- The
Government maintained that the applicant had not been deprived of his
liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. In this
connection, they submitted that he had been kept under surveillance
in the Izmir Military Recruitment Office for the sole purpose of
ensuring his transfer back to his army command and that he was not
subjected to any proceedings or investigation until he was taken to
his military unit. They further claimed that this administrative
measure had been taken to prevent his escape, since he was a
deserter, and that he had immediately been sent to his unit upon the
completion of necessary procedures such as the provision of a
vehicle, personnel, travel expenses and monetary matters concerning
his transfer. Moreover, the Government claimed that the applicant had
actually been in military service during that time. The Government
admitted that the applicant had been held in custody between 7 and
11 March 2003 for the proper administration of military
discipline. They submitted that he had been brought before a judge on
the very day the Military Prosecutor filed an indictment.
- The
applicant maintained that he had been held in custody from
22 February 2003 until 11 March 2003, first in Izmir and
afterwards in Kırklareli. He further
disputed the qualification given by the Government to his detention,
noting that it had deprived him of his liberty and restricted his
rights to see his lawyer and family. He claimed that the conditions
of his detention had been inhuman as he had been threatened, beaten
and given food only once a day. Finally, the applicant repeated that,
despite the unlawfulness of his detention, the authorities had failed
to investigate the matter.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Whether there was deprivation of applicant's liberty
- The
Court observes that there is no dispute between the parties as
regards the applicant's detention between 7 March and 11 March 2003
in Kırklareli. However, the Government argued that the applicant
was not deprived of his liberty between 22 February 2003 and 7 March
2003 in Izmir.
- The
Court reiterates that military service, as encountered in the
Contracting States, does not of itself constitute a deprivation of
liberty under the Convention, since it is expressly sanctioned in
Article 4 § 3 (b). In addition, rather wide limitations upon the
freedom of movement of members of the armed forces ensue by reason of
the specific demands of military service, so that the normal
restrictions accompanying it do not come within the ambit of Article
5 either (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June
1976, § 59, Series A no. 22). However, the forms of restriction
which clearly deviate from the normal conditions of life in the armed
forces of the Contracting States fall within the scope of Article 5.
In order to establish whether this is so, account should be taken of
a whole range of factors such as the nature, duration, effects and
manner of execution of the penalty or measure in question (ibid).
- In
the instant case, the Court observes that on 22 February 2003 the
applicant was detained in custody at the Şirinyer
Military Station Command. Between 23 February 2003 and 6 March 2003
the applicant was kept in a “security room” at the Izmir
Military Recruitment Office. The Court further observes that these
periods were subsequently deducted from the applicant's prison
sentence (see paragraph 13 above). Moreover, the Government have not
provided any explanation or details as regards what security or other
measures were applicable to the applicant and, apart from the
statement that he was in military service, no evidence has been
adduced to demonstrate that he remained, more or less, within
the ordinary framework of his army life during that time. In view of
the above, the Court considers that the applicant was also deprived
of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention when he was held in Izmir between 22
February 2003 and 6 March 2003.
2. Whether the deprivation in issue was “lawful”
- The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention contains a list of permissible grounds of deprivation of
liberty which is exhaustive. The applicability of one ground does not
necessarily preclude that of another; a detention may, depending on
the circumstances, be justified under more than one sub-paragraph
(see, for example, Erkalo v. the Netherlands, 2 September
1998, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI).
However, only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is
consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no
one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see, inter
alia, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, §
25, Reports 1997 IV).
- The
Court reiterates that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to
falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs
(a)-(f), be “lawful” and comply with “a procedure
prescribed by law”. By the use of these terms the Convention
essentially refers back to national law and an obligation to conform
to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. Compliance with
national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1
requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in
keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from
arbitrariness (see, for example, Elci and Others v. Turkey,
nos. 23145/93 and 25091/94, § 667, 13 November 2003).
It is a fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary
can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion of
“arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond a
lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of
liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary
and thus contrary to the Convention (see, for example, Saadi v.
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, §§ 68 71,
ECHR 2008 ... and the cases referred to therein). In particular,
to avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5 §
1 (b) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected
to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and
conditions of detention should be appropriate; and the length of the
detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose
pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, A. and Others v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 164, 19 February 2009,
and, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, cited above, §
74).
- In the instant case, the Government have not expressly
relied on any ground under the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 § 1
to justify the applicant's detention. The applicant did not express
any opinion either.
- Having
regard to the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the
Court considers that the applicant's detention, when he was held in
Izmir, served two different purposes. On the one hand, it had the
purpose of ensuring his return to his army command in order to secure
the fulfilment of his obligation, prescribed by law, to perform
compulsory military service pursuant to section 80 § 1 of Law on
Military Service. On the other hand, it also had the purpose of
bringing him before a competent authority on reasonable suspicion of
having committed the offence of exceeding his leave. On this latter
point, the Court observes that section 66 § 1 (b) of the
Military Criminal Code makes it a criminal offence to exceed one's
period of leave by six days without authorisation. It further
observes that the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being an
army deserter and was questioned within a few hours of his arrest
about the reasons for his desertion (see paragraph 6 above).
Moreover, he was subsequently transferred to his army command in
Kırklareli, where he was once again questioned about his
desertion. The applicant's detention thereafter thus served the
purpose of bringing him before a competent authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence. In this connection, the
Court notes that he was subsequently brought before a judge, who
remanded him in custody. In sum, the Court considers that the
applicant's detention between 22 February 2003 and
6 March 2003 in Izmir falls to be examined under both sub-paragraph
(b) and (c) of Article 5 § 1, whereas his detention in
Kırklareli falls to be examined under sub-paragraph (c)
of Article 5 § 1.
- However,
although the applicant was detained on the basis of section 80 §
1 of the Military Service Law and section 80 § 3 of the Law on
the Constitution of Military Courts and Criminal Procedure, the Court
has serious doubts whether the authorities acted in compliance with
“a procedure prescribed by law”. Nevertheless, it does
not deem it necessary to determine this question because, in any
event, the key issue to be examined is whether the applicant's
detention was free from arbitrariness. In this connection, the Court
notes that the applicant was deprived of his liberty between 22
February and 11 March 2003 for seventeen days. The Court finds no
reason to doubt that the national authorities acted in good faith in
detaining the applicant in conformity with the purpose of the
restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 §
1. In this connection, it takes particular note of the Government's
arguments regarding the necessity of securing the necessary material
provisions for the applicant's transfer. However, in the absence of
any concrete information or documentation, the Court does not find it
convincing that, in order to achieve the aim sought by the
applicant's detention, the authorities needed
twelve days to send the applicant to his army unit or that it was
necessary to detain him for a total of seventeen days before he could
be brought before a judge. Moreover, the Court attaches importance to
the fact that no information has been forthcoming from the Government
to clarify the place and conditions of the applicant's detention and
the security or other measures which were applicable to him
throughout his lengthy detention.
- It
follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1.
- The
Court does not consider it necessary to examine separately the
applicant's complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in
view of its foregoing finding that his detention was not “lawful”
under Article 5 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Emrullah
Karagöz v. Turkey, no. 78027/01, § 63, ECHR
2005 X).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government contested the amount.
- The
Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 6,500
in respect of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed reimbursement of his costs and expenses
incurred both before the domestic courts and before the Court. These
concerned 4,000 Turkish liras (approximately EUR 2,015) for legal
fees, 5.50 (approximately EUR 2.50) Turkish liras for postage and
EUR 30 for photocopies and other expenses. The applicant
submitted documentation as regards his costs and expenses before the
Court.
- The
Government contested the amounts.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,503 for the
proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to
be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR
6,500 (six thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,503 (one thousand five hundred and three euros), plus any tax that
may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 September 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens
Deputy
Registrar President