BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KORDOS v. POLAND
(Application
no. 26397/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 May
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kordos v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 May 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 26397/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mrs Romana Kordos (“the
applicant”), on 1 July 2002.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Z. Staszczyk, a lawyer practising in
Śrem. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular that she had been deprived of her
right of access to a court, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.
- On
4 November 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Śrem.
- In
1995 the applicant’s husband died on a pedestrian crossing
after being hit by a car. The car was being driven by a certain B.M.
- On
20 July 1998 the applicant filed a claim against B.M. and the “Warta”
Insurance Company with the Poznań Regional Court, seeking
compensation in the amount of 50,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). At
the same time the applicant requested the court to give her a full
exemption from the costs of the proceedings. She submitted that she
received only a small pension and that her health had significantly
deteriorated.
- On
21 June 1998 the Regional Court partly granted the applicant’s
request. It exempted her from the court fee for processing her claim
(wpis od pozwu).
- On
25 November 1999 the Śrem District Court in the course of
criminal proceedings convicted B.M. of having caused a traffic
accident which resulted in a fatality and sentenced him, inter
alia, to a suspended prison term.
- In
January 2001 the applicant filed her amended claim with the Regional
Court. She sought an award of PLN 130,000 in compensation and PLN 500
as a supplementary monthly allowance.
- On
28 December 2001 the Poznań Regional Court awarded the applicant
PLN 20,000 to be paid jointly and severally by the defendants and
dismissed her further claims. The applicant was ordered to pay the
costs of the defendants in the amount of PLN 3,726.10.
- On
18 January 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against the
first instance judgment. On the same day the Regional Court
ordered the applicant to pay PLN 7,100 in court fees for proceeding
with her appeal.
- On
29 January 2002 the applicant asked the Regional Court for an
exemption from the relevant fees. She submitted that her income
consisted only of a monthly pension in the amount of PLN 800 and that
she did not have any property or valuable movables. She also claimed
that her health had significantly deteriorated since her husband’s
death.
- On
5 February 2002 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed her request.
It considered, in so far as relevant:
“(...) It should be underlined that the obligation
to demonstrate the preconditions for an exemption from the costs
rests with the claimant.
Examining the claimant’s request, the court
considers that it cannot be granted. The claimant did not demonstrate
that she was unable to bear the [relevant] costs without entailing a
substantial reduction in her and her family’s standard of
living.
A person requesting exemption from costs should submit a
declaration of means that she is unable to pay the costs, including
detailed information about her family status, her assets and her
income, which have to be supported by relevant documents.
In a case where a person seeking exemption from costs
has a representative who is an advocate, that representative has an
obligation to inform his client about the requirements attached to a
declaration of means and the necessary information which must be
included therein. In that case, the court is not required to summon
the representative of a party seeking exemption from costs to submit
an additional declaration.
For these reasons, considering that the claimant’s
request did not contain the required declaration of means, which
implies that there is no information enabling [the court] to examine
the merits of the request, the court, pursuant to Article 113 §
1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held as in the operative part of
the decision.”
- The
applicant appealed. She relied on the same arguments as before the
Regional Court.
- On
23 April 2002 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed her
interlocutory appeal. It found, in so far as relevant:
“...
The Court of Appeal considers that the grounds of appeal
do not justify a departure from the findings of the first-instance
court in respect of the appellant’s ability to pay the
[relevant] costs.
The Court of Appeal draws attention to the fact that the
claimant received the whole amount of compensation awarded [by the
first-instance court]. Thus, there were no grounds to hold that she
was unable to bear the costs without a reduction in her own necessary
support.
...”
- As
a result, the applicant was prevented from lodging an appeal against
the judgment of the Poznań Regional Court of 28 December 2001.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
legal provisions applicable at the material time and questions of
practice are set out in paragraphs 23-33 of the judgment delivered by
the Court on 19 June 2001 in the case of Kreuz
v. Poland (no.
28249/95, ECHR 2001-VI; see also Jedamski
and Jedamska v. Poland, no.
73547/01), §§ 29-39).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF LACK OF ACCESS TO A COURT.
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that the excessive
court fees required from her for proceeding with her appeal had been
in breach of her right of access to a court for the determination of
her civil rights.
Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal established by law. ...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant firstly maintained that her motion of 29 January 2002
contained all the necessary information including the declaration of
means to demonstrate her financial situation. She stressed that
Article 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not specify any
particular form for such a declaration.
- She
further claimed that the District Court had before it all documents
necessary to assess her difficult financial situation.
- The
applicant concluded that the sum required from her had been unusually
high and disproportionate to her means. She asked the Court to find
that her right of access to a court had been breached.
(b) The Government
- The
Government firstly reiterated the general rules concerning exemption
from court fees.
- They
further stressed that the applicant’s request for exemption
from court fees in the first-instance proceedings had been very well
reasoned and therefore she had been granted the request. However, the
application for exemption in the appeal proceedings had not been
supported by the relevant documents. In particular, the applicant had
not provided documents concerning her financial situation and had
limited herself to a statement that she was not able to bear the
court fees. In addition, she had failed to demonstrate that she was
not able to incur the costs without detriment to her personal
situation.
- Had
she acted with due diligence, she would have been exempted from the
court fees, especially as she had been already granted such leave by
the first-instance court.
- In
sum, the Government invited the Court to find that there had been no
violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Principles deriving from the Court’s
case law
- The
Court reiterates that in its judgment in Kreuz v. Poland
(cited above, § 60) it dealt with the question whether the
requirement to pay substantial fees to civil courts in connection
with claims can be regarded as a restriction on the right of access
to a court.
- In
this connection the Court held that the amount of the fees assessed
in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case,
including the applicant’s ability to pay them, and the phase of
the proceedings at which that restriction has been imposed, are
factors which are material in determining whether or not a person
enjoyed right of access and had “a ... hearing by [a]
tribunal”.
(b) Application of the above principles to
the present case
- The
Court will now determine whether, in the particular circumstances of
the present case, the fee actually required constituted a restriction
that impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of
access to a court.
- The
Court firstly notes that the fee for lodging an appeal in this case
was determined as a fraction of the value of the claim, namely, the
amount of compensation sought.
- It is true that no right to appeal in civil cases can
be inferred from the Convention and that, given the nature of appeal
proceedings and the fact that a person has already had his case heard
before the first-instance court, the State would in principle be
allowed to put even strict limitations on access to a court of
appeal. However, restrictions which are of a purely financial nature
should be subject to particularly rigorous scrutiny from the point of
view of the interests of justice (see Cibicki v. Poland, no.
20482/03, § 30, 3 March 2009).
- The
Court would further underline, that there was much at stake for the
applicant in the proceedings as they concerned her claim for
compensation for her husband’s tragic accident (see Kania v.
Poland, no. 59444/00, § 36, 10 May 2007).
- The
Court observes that the Regional Court refused to accept the
applicant’s argument that she was unable to pay the court fees,
on formal grounds, referring to the fact that her request had not
contained a declaration of means (see paragraph 14 above). On the
other hand the Court of Appeal examined the merits of the applicant’s
request and dismissed it on substantive grounds namely that she could
pay the relevant fee as she had already received the compensation
awarded by the first-instance court. The Court shall therefore
concentrate on the arguments given by the Court of Appeal.
- In
this respect the Court notes that the applicant had received a
monthly pension in the amount of PLN 800 and that she did not have
any property or valuable movables. It is true that she was awarded
PLN 20,000 on 28 December 2001. Nevertheless, she was also
ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in the amount of PLN
3,726.10. Furthermore, the sum awarded was apparently her only asset
and it does not seem reasonable to demand that she spend it on the
payment of the court fees rather than on securing her basic living
needs.
- In
addition, the Court observes that the domestic courts could have and
should have considered at least the possibility of partially
exempting the applicant from the court fees due in the proceedings.
- Under
the circumstances, having regard to the importance of the right to a
court in a democratic society and in particular what was at stake for
the applicant in the proceedings, the Court considers that the
judicial authorities failed to secure a proper balance between the
interest of the State in collecting court fees on the one hand, and
the interest of the applicant in pursuing her civil claim on the
other.
- For
the above reasons, the Court concludes that the refusal to reduce the
fee for lodging the applicant’s appeal constituted a
disproportionate restriction on her right of access to a court. It
accordingly finds that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ABOUT THE LACK OF IMPARTIALITY.
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 about the lack of
impartiality of the Poznan Regional Court. She claimed that the same
judge who had ruled on her compensation claim subsequently refused
her request for exemption from court fees for proceeding with her
appeal. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- The
Court considers that there are no indications to doubt the court’s
subjective or objective impartiality. In the light of all the
material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained
of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention or its Protocols.
- It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed PLN 50,000 Polish zlotys in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
-
The Government submitted that this sum was excessive.
- The
Court finds that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage, which
would not be adequately compensated by the finding of a violation.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not request the reimbursement of any costs and expenses
in connection with the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning lack of access
to a court admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 May 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
