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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF HUDÁKOVÁ AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 23083/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 April
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hudakova and Others
v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Giovanni
Bonello,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and Fatoş Aracı,
Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30
March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 23083/05) against the Slovak
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) on 15 June 2005 by three Slovak nationals, Ms
Helena Hudáková, born in 1956 and
residing in Košice, Ms Lea Bessenyeyová, born in 1977
and residing in Malý Ruskov, and Mr Martin Sabó,
born in 1954 and residing in Milhosťov,
(“the applicants”).
- The
applicants were represented before the Court by Mr A. Fuchs, a lawyer
practising in Košice. The Slovak
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
- The
applicants alleged that their right to a fair hearing had been
violated by the failure of the Supreme Court to communicate to them
the plaintiffs' written observations on their appeal. They also
alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 in that they had lost ownership of the real property in issue
as a result of the domestic courts' judgments.
- On
18 March 2007 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicants' relative and another person were sued in the District
Court in Trebišov. The plaintiffs in
the case claimed that real property in respect of which the
defendants were registered as owners belonged to the estate of the
plaintiffs' predecessors.
- On
5 October 1999 the District Court dismissed the action.
- On
26 October 2000 the Regional Court in Košice
quashed the first instance judgment.
- On
9 October 2001 the applicants joined the proceedings as defendants.
- On
18 September 2002 the District Court allowed the plaintiffs' action.
- On
16 September 2003 the Regional Court upheld the decision of the
District Court.
- The
applicants filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on points of law.
They alleged that the Regional Court had not assessed the relevant
facts correctly. In particular, the applicants challenged the
conclusion that the predecessors of the plaintiffs had acquired the
property in question pursuant to a document issued on 6 April 1948.
In any event, they argued that the document was invalid as it
contained incorrect information. Finally, the applicants alleged that
the property in question had not been specified with sufficient
certainty in the document.
- On
27 July 2004 the Supreme Court publicly delivered a judgment
dismissing the applicants' appeal on points of law. The judgment
stated that the Supreme Court had examined the case without a hearing
pursuant to Article 243a § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
indicated that the plaintiffs had submitted observations on the
applicants' appeal on points of law. In their observations the
plaintiffs had alleged that their predecessors had acquired the
property in question by virtue of the document of 6 April 1948
or, in any event, by prescription.
- The
Supreme Court upheld the conclusions reached by the Regional Court.
It held that, despite several inconsistencies in the text of the
administrative document of 6 April 1948, it was evident that the land
in question had been allocated to the plaintiffs' predecessors.
Similar administrative documents were to be presumed correct and
binding to the extent that they had been delivered by a competent
authority and had become final. The ordinary courts could not
subsequently review the merits of such decisions. The fact that,
according to the document, further action had been needed with a view
to completing the allocation of the property to the persons concerned
was irrelevant as regards the acquisition of the property by the
plaintiffs' predecessors by virtue of that document. Such situation
was in conformity with the law in force at that time.
- The
applicants filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court. They
relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. They complained that the Supreme Court had had before
it observations submitted by the plaintiffs which had not been
communicated to the applicants. They further contended that the
Regional Court had not taken into account the fact that the document
in issue did not clearly indicate the persons to whom the land had
been allocated and that the Supreme Court had not remedied that
shortcoming.
- On
2 February 2005 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants'
complaint. It found that the parties had had ample opportunity
to submit their arguments on the relevant issues before the
ordinary courts at two levels. With reference to the judgment of the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court held that the plaintiffs'
observations in those proceedings had contained no new arguments. The
reasons for the Supreme Court's judgment relied on facts and
arguments which had been known to the applicants and on which they
had been able to comment at an earlier stage of the proceedings. The
Supreme Court had taken no evidence. It had addressed the relevant
issues and had given sufficient reasons for the conclusions reached,
which did not appear arbitrary. The fact that the applicants had not
been able to comment on the plaintiffs' submissions to the Supreme
Court, and that the latter had dismissed their appeal on points of
law, was not contrary to the applicants' right to a fair hearing. The
Constitutional Court further held that, in view of its above
conclusions, the applicants' complaint regarding the alleged
violation of their property rights as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision was manifestly ill-founded.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Article
243(a) § 1 permits the court of cassation to dispense with
a hearing, inter alia, where an appeal on points of law
is based on the argument that the lower court had incorrectly
assessed the case. Paragraph 2 of Article 243(a) provides that no
evidence is taken in cassation proceedings.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained that they had not had a fair hearing in that
the plaintiffs' observations to the Supreme Court had not been
communicated to them to allow them an opportunity to comment. They
relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
- The
applicants maintained that the failure to communicate to them the
observations of the plaintiffs in the proceedings before the Supreme
Court rendered the proceedings unfair. The unfairness was all the
greater in light of the fact that the plaintiffs were provided with
all relevant information in the proceedings.
- The
applicants considered irrelevant the finding of the Constitutional
Court that the written submissions of the plaintiffs were
insignificant as the substance of the submissions was already known
to the applicants.
- The
Government emphasised that two courts had considered the applicants'
case before the matter came before the Supreme Court. They argued
that the Court's approach in Milatová and Others v. the
Czech Republic, no. 61811/00, ECHR 2005 V and Mareš
v. the Czech Republic, no. 1414/03, 26 October 2006, in which
violations of Article 6 § 1 were found, was too absolutist and
formal. They referred to the Court's judgment in Verdú
Verdú v. Spain, no. 43432/02, 15 February 2007, in which
no violation of Article 6 § 1 was found, and argued
that in that case the Court had deviated from its existing case-law.
- In
any event, the Czech cases were distinguished by the Government on
the ground that they involved a failure to communicate the
submissions of State authorities to one of the parties. However, the
plaintiffs in the present case were not State authorities. The
Government argued that if the case-law were extended to cover
submissions by opposing parties, it would result in a never-ending
chain of comments being exchanged. The Government further
distinguished the Czech cases on the basis that they involved a
failure to communicate submissions in the context of proceedings
before the Constitutional Court, in which new complaints of a
constitutional nature were raised. In contrast, the present
application concerned cassation proceedings directly related to the
arguments advanced in the lower courts.
- The
Government concluded that the applicants' right to react to the
comments of the opposing party in the cassation proceedings was not
absolute. A margin of appreciation should be afforded to the domestic
courts in this regard. There was, in the Government's view, no
violation of Article 6 § 1 in the present case.
2. The Court's assessment
a. General principles
- The
Court reiterates that the principle of equality of arms, one of the
elements of the broader concept of a fair trial, requires each party
to be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case under
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage
vis-à-vis his opponent (see, for example,
Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 18 February 1997, § 23,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 I).
- In
addition to this requirement, the concept of a fair hearing implies
the right to adversarial proceedings, according to which the parties
must have the opportunity not only to be made aware of any evidence
needed for their claims to succeed, but also to have knowledge of,
and comment on, all evidence adduced or observations filed, with a
view to influencing the court's decision (see Nideröst-Huber,
cited above, § 24; and Milatová, cited above,
§ 59). However, the right to adversarial proceedings
is not absolute and its scope may vary depending on the specific
features of the case in question (see Asnar v. France (no. 2),
no. 12316/04, § 26, 18 October 2007; and Vokoun v. the Czech
Republic, no. 20728/05, § 26, 3 July 2008).
- Finally,
the Court has indicated that the concrete effect of the observations
in question on the judgment of the domestic court concerned is of
little importance. It is for the parties to the case to judge whether
or not a document calls for their comments (see Nideröst-Huber,
cited above, § 29; Milatová, cited above, §
65; and Gaspari v. Slovenia,
no. 21055/03, § 52, 21 July 2009). What is
particularly at stake here is litigants' confidence in the workings
of justice, which is based on the knowledge that they have had the
opportunity to express their views on every document in the file (see
Nideröst-Huber, cited above, § 29; and Asnar,
cited above, § 25). Accordingly, the Court has found a violation
of Article 6 § 1 even where the unseen observations were
favourable to the applicant (Göç v. Turkey [GC],
no. 36590/97, § 55, ECHR 2002 V). However, the Court has in
the past found that the non-communication of written observations or
documents in the proceedings and the impossibility for the applicant
to comment on them did not constitute a violation of the right to
a fair hearing. In its reasoning, the Court explained that, in
the particular cases in question, granting to the applicant such
rights and opportunities would have had no effect on the outcome of
the proceedings as the legal approach adopted was not open to
discussion (see, for example, Stepinska v. France, no.
1814/02, § 18, 15 June 2004; Sale v. France, no.
39765/04, §§ 18 to 19, 21 March 2006; and Verdú
Verdú, cited above, §§ 26 to 28).
b. Application of the general principles to the facts
of the case
- The
Court observes that in the present case, the Supreme Court did not
expressly rely in its decision on the observations of the plaintiffs
which had not been communicated to the applicants. However, the
observations in question constituted the plaintiffs' views on the
applicants' appeal and thus manifestly aimed to influence the
decision of the Supreme Court by calling for the appeal to be
dismissed. The applicants clearly had an interest in receiving a copy
of the written observations of the plaintiffs and, if appropriate,
seeking to make comments on those observations.
- The
Court notes in this regard that the applicants' appeal was not
rejected by the court on the grounds that it failed to meet the
requirements for admissibility of the appeal: the Supreme Court
judgment dismissed the appeal on its merits (cf. Stepinska,
cited above, §§ 8, 10 and 18; and Sale, cited above,
§§ 9 and 17 to 19). Accordingly it cannot be said that the
plaintiffs' observations on the merits of the appeal could have no
impact on the outcome of the litigation. The Court further considers
irrelevant the fact that, in the Government's submission, no new
matters were raised in the plaintiffs' observations to the Supreme
Court. The requirement that parties to court proceedings have the
opportunity to have knowledge of, and to comment on, all
evidence adduced or observations filed in their case applies to
appeal proceedings as well as to proceedings at first instance,
notwithstanding the fact that the appeal may raise no new arguments.
Finally, the Court does not consider that there is any reason to
distinguish between cases where the non-communicated observations are
submitted by a State authority and those where they are submitted by
a private individual. As noted above, the importance of the
requirement that observations be communicated to all parties to the
proceedings lies in the need to ensure that parties have confidence
in the workings of justice and that they have not been denied the
opportunity to comment on matters which may have influenced the
judgment of the court. The onus was on the Supreme Court to afford
the applicants an opportunity to comment on the written observations
prior to its decision.
- The
Court also considers it significant that the observations in question
were submitted by the opposing party in the proceedings, who, unlike
the applicants, had access to all the information in the case file.
In permitting the plaintiffs to submit written observations on the
applicants' appeal and denying the applicants sight of, and the
opportunity to comment on, these observations, the Supreme Court
failed to treat the parties equally.
- In
light of the above, the Court concludes that the failure to forward a
copy of the plaintiffs' written observations to the applicants denied
the applicants the right to a fair hearing before the Supreme Court.
- There
has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that
they had lost ownership of the disputed property and under Article 6
§ 1 that the decisions of the domestic courts were incorrect.
- The applicants have not submitted any detailed
argument in support of their allegation that there has been an
unjustified interference with their property rights. Nor did they
provide any details of any alleged unfairness in the proceedings,
aside from the complaint regarding the Supreme Court's failure to
provide them with a copy of the plaintiffs' observations, in respect
of which the Court has already found a violation of Article 6 §
1. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is not its task
to act as an appeal court of “fourth instance” by calling
into question the outcome of the domestic proceedings in the absence
of any evidence of a violation of the Convention (see, inter alia,
Mehmet Ali Kaçar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 11326/03,
24 June 2008).
- In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds no
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention or its Protocols arising from these complaints. The Court
therefore concludes that the complaints are manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must
be declared inadmissible under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicants claimed the sum of 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government considered the amount claimed to be excessive.
- The
Court, having regard to the technical nature of its finding of a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, considers that
this finding in itself constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in
the present case.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants also claimed EUR 2,000 in legal costs and expenses. No
detailed claim was submitted and, in particular, no receipts or
invoices were provided in support of the sum claimed.
- The
Government highlighted that the applicants had failed to provide any
evidence to support their claim as to legal costs. Accordingly, the
Government invited the Court to grant to the applicants only those
costs and expenses which it considered reasonable and to dismiss the
remainder of the claim.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the absence of any evidence to support
the applicants' claim as to costs and expenses, no award is made
under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the failure to
communicate to the applicants the plaintiffs' written observations to
the Supreme Court admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that the finding of a violation
constitutes sufficient just satisfaction;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 April 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
