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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF CZEKIEŃ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 25168/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 May
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Czekień v.
Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 April 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 25168/05) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mrs Helena Czekień
(“the applicant”), on 1 July 2005.
- The
applicant was represented by her son, Mr J. Czekień. The Polish
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
in respect of the proceedings before the Polish-German
Reconciliation Foundation.
- On
24 January 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided
to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Orneta.
A. Forced labour of the applicants' husband during the
war
- The
applicant submitted that M.C., her husband, had been deported
(dislocated) from Vilnius to the territories occupied by Germany
(Lithuania and Belarus) and had performed forced labour for a
railways company under German management from July 1941 until July
1944. He constructed railway trucks. In July 1944 he returned home
and continued to work for the same company. In 1945 the
applicant's husband was “repatriated” from the Soviet
Union to Poland. The applicant submitted that all his documents had
been seized by the Soviet military.
B. Proceedings before the Polish-German Reconciliation
Foundation
- M.C.
died on 28 February 2001. On 11 December 2001 the applicant, as an
eligible successor of her late husband, applied to the Polish-German
Reconciliation Foundation (“the Foundation”) for
compensation on account of her husband's forced labour during the
war. That request was made under the scheme for slave and forced
labourers (“the second compensation scheme”) established
under the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000, the German Law of 2 August
2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and
Future” Foundation (“the German Foundation Act”
or “GFA”) and the subsequent Agreement of
16 February 2001 between the Remembrance, Responsibility and
Future Foundation (“the German Foundation”) and the
Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation.
- On
3 March 2003 the Foundation's Verification Commission refused the
request for compensation. It found that in the case of the
applicant's husband the condition of deportation had not been
fulfilled.
- The
applicant appealed against that decision. She submitted that in July
1941 the German work office had assigned her husband to perform
forced labour as a railways track builder. He had been performing
that forced labour in various places in Lithuania, Belarus and in the
General Government (Generalna Gubernia; administrative entity
established by the Nazi government in occupied Poland) until July
1944. The applicant submitted various documents in support of the
claim. One of the documents was a certificate issued by the German
Railways Social Security Office. It attested that M.C. had
worked as a forced labourer for the Lithuanian Railways under German
Administration from July 1939 to May 1945. The second document was a
certificate issued by the Lithuanian Railways. It stated that
the applicant's husband had been employed by the Lithuanian Railways
from 1939 to June 1945.
- On
11 February 2004 the Appeal Commission upheld the impugned decision.
It informed the applicant that under section 11 of the GFA only those
forced labourers who had been deported to the German Reich or to an
area occupied by it had been eligible for compensation. In addition,
under the so-called “openness clause” (klauzula
otwartości) forced labourers who had been relocated (osoby
dyslokowane) outside their province of residence to a province
with a different administrative status had been also eligible for
compensation.
- The
Appeal Commission noted that M.C. had worked on a labour train
(Bauzug) whose home station had been Vilnius (located on the
territory of Poland as its national borders had stood before the
outbreak of the Second World War). Furthermore, the documents
submitted by the applicant did not demonstrate that M.C. had been
deported or relocated to the German Reich or to occupied
territories. Accordingly, no award could have been made as M.C. had
performed forced labour without having satisfied the condition of
deportation or relocation.
- The
applicant strongly disagreed. She claimed that her husband had been
subjected to forced labour from July 1941 to July 1944 in the
occupied territories (Lithuania and Belarus).
- On
6 May 2004, having re-examined the case on the request of an MP,
the Appeal Commission upheld its previous decision. It observed that
the condition of deportation (relocation) was satisfied by the
claimants who had permanently lost their ties with the habitual place
of residence. The Commission noted that M.C. had temporarily stayed
in Belarus or on the territory of the General Government in
connection with his forced labour, but he had been returning to
Vilnius, his home station. Accordingly, he had had permanent contact
with his place of residence. As a result, the applicant could not
have been awarded compensation on account of her husband's forced
labour since he had not satisfied the condition of deportation
or relocation as stipulated in the GFA.
- On
4 February 2005 the Appeal Commission, having re-examined the
documents adduced in the case, informed the applicant that its
previous decision remained valid.
II. RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant law and practice concerning the Polish-German Reconciliation
Foundation are set out in the Court's judgment in the case of
Kadłuczka v. Poland, no. 31438/06, §§ 19-45, 2
February 2010.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that she had been refused compensation following
a flawed assessment of the relevant facts by the Polish Foundation,
in particular regarding the deportation (relocation) requirement. She
claimed that there had been no other authority which could have
examined her claims. She did not invoke any provisions of the
Convention. The Court considers that the applicant's complaint
concerns the lack of access to a court in respect of the claims
raised before the Polish Foundation and falls to be examined under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which
provide:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing
... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”
A. Applicability of Article 6 § 1
- The
Government submitted no observations.
- The
applicant pursued her application but did not offer specific comments
on the issue of applicability of Article 6 § 1.
- The
Court recalls that in the Woś judgment (see, Woś
v. Poland, no. 22860/02, ECHR 2006 VII) it examined a
similar complaint in respect of the first compensation scheme, set up
on the basis of the bilateral Polish German agreement of 16
October 1991 and found Article 6 § 1 applicable to the
proceedings before the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation.
- In
contrast, the present case concerns the second compensation scheme,
which was established following multilateral negotiations with a view
to providing compensation to slave and forced labourers and other
victims of the National Socialist period, primarily from central and
eastern Europe. The agreement reached in the negotiations, in
particular in respect of the categories of persons who were eligible
and the establishment of the German Foundation as a means of
providing funds to victims, was subsequently incorporated in the
German Foundation Act of 2 August 2000. Section 10 of the Act
stipulated that partner organisations, including the Polish
Foundation, were entrusted with evaluation of claims and disbursement
of payment to eligible claimants. The same provision stipulated that
the German Foundation was neither authorised nor obligated in respect
of the approval and disbursement of payments by the partner
organisations. The particular feature of the second compensation
scheme was that the eligibility conditions had been specified in the
GFA, while at the same time the examination of the relevant
applications was to be carried out by the partner organisations,
including the Polish Foundation. The Court considers that for all
practical purposes, decisions to qualify applicants as coming under a
particular eligibility category and to grant payments in respect of
the claimants who resided in Poland were taken by the Polish
Foundation (see Woś v. Poland (dec.), no. 22860/02, §
66, ECHR 2005 IV; Jakowicz v. Poland (dec.),
no. 16778/02, § 76 in fine, 13 October 2009).
- In
the Woś judgment the Court held that the Convention
imposes no general obligation on the Contracting States to
provide redress for wrongs inflicted in the past under the general
cover of State authority (see also, mutatis mutandis,
Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38,
ECHR 2004 IX). This principle applies to the Federal
Republic of Germany in respect of wrongs or damage caused by the
German Reich (see Associazione Nazionale Reduci Dalla
Prigionia dall'Internamento e dalla Guerra di Liberazione
(A.N.R.P.) v. Germany (dec.), no. 45563/04, 4 September
2007; and Ernewein and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 14849/08,
2 May 2009) but it is even more relevant for third States, like
Poland, who bear no responsibility in connection with wrongs
inflicted by a foreign occupying force or another State (see,
mutatis mutandis, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no.
31443/96, § 124, ECHR 2004 V; Maltzan and Others
v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and
10260/02, § 77, ECHR 2005 V).
- The
Court recalls that if a compensation scheme were to be established,
the substantive regulations which determined the eligibility
conditions for any compensation would in principle fall outside the
Court's jurisdiction, unless the relevant conditions were manifestly
arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of the Convention (see Woś v. Poland, cited
above, § 72). In other words, when a State decides to
compensate the past wrongs for which it bore no responsibility,
it enjoys a significant discretion (grand pouvoir d'appréciation)
in determining the beneficiaries and the modalities of any
compensation scheme and, in principle, no challenge to the
eligibility conditions as such may be allowed (see Maltzan and
Others, cited above, § 77; Epstein and Others
v. Belgium (dec.), no. 9717/05, ECHR 2008 ...
(extracts)).
- The
Court observes that the compensation scheme established under the GFA
concerned claims of forced labourers and other victims of Nazi
Germany (see section 2 of the GFA on the purpose of the German
Foundation). As those claims date back essentially to the Second
World War there could be no question of the Polish State's
responsibility for the wrongs committed during that period. It
is clear that the Polish State have no obligations of any kind to
redress the wrongs inflicted by another State as its citizens were
victims and not perpetrators (see Woś v. Poland (dec.),
cited above, § 85).
- In
the context of the present case, the Court underlines that the
substantive eligibility conditions under the second scheme were
defined in the GFA and had to be applied as such by the partner
organisations, including the Polish Foundation. It follows that while
processing the applications the Polish Foundation was bound to
follow the substantive criteria as specified in the GFA and had no
power either to review its reasonableness or to unilaterally modify
or extend them. Thus, the Polish Foundation and, a fortiori,
the Polish State cannot bear responsibility in cases where an
applicant, due to the scope of the substantive eligibility conditions
as such, was not included in the group of persons entitled to certain
benefits. The Court emphasises that the Polish Foundation exercised
only a certain measure of discretion when assessing the facts
of individual cases and the evidence submitted by the claimants.
Its assessment of those elements was decisive for the outcome of the
proceedings before the Foundation. The Court considers that
the responsibility of the Polish State may be engaged
exclusively as regards those cases where the dispute concerns the
application of the eligibility conditions to the facts of individual
cases in the area falling within the Foundation's margin
of discretion. Accordingly, in each case it is necessary to
determine whether a claimant challenges the eligibility
conditions or the assessment of facts and evidence by the Polish
Foundation and whether that assessment remained within the Polish
Foundation's margin of discretion.
- Turning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the
applicant claimed before the Foundation that her husband had been
deported (relocated) to German-occupied territories and subjected to
forced labour from July 1941 to July 1944. However, the Polish
Foundation relying on section 11 of the GFA, dismissed those claims,
having found that the condition of deportation or relocation had not
been met. It established that in connection with his work M.C. had
been temporarily staying in Belarus or in the General Government but
he had not lost contact with his habitual place of residence in
Vilnius. The applicant strongly objected to that finding.
- The
essence of the applicant's claim is that the Foundation wrongly
considered that her husband had not been deported (relocated) and
that consequently she was not eligible for benefits after him. In
particular, she disagreed with the finding that her husband had not
lost permanent contact with his abode. In the present case the thrust
of the applicant's complaint is directed against the Polish
Foundation's erroneous assessment of the facts underlying her claims
and the resultant flawed application of the eligibility conditions to
the case (compare and contrast, Jakowicz v. Poland (dec.),
cited above, § 80). In the case of Jakowicz the
Foundation dismissed the applicant's claims which went beyond the
scope of the substantive eligibility conditions and as such were
outside the Foundation's remit. By contrast, in the present
case the Foundation refused the applicant's claims while exercising
its discretion as to the assessment of the relevant facts which had
direct bearing on the determination of the eligibility status of the
applicant's husband. In the present case the Polish Foundation
recognised that the applicant's husband had, at least, temporarily
performed forced labour while having been relocated. In this respect
the Court notes that section 11 of the GFA which was invoked by the
Polish Foundation does not appear to require that the
deportation (relocation) of a forced labourer has to be of a certain
minimum duration. Nor was the Court apprised of by the Government of
any binding regulations issued to that effect by the German
Foundation. Thus, the present case can be distinguished from the
Jakowicz case on the ground that it concerned the dispute
as to the assessment of relevant facts and not a challenge to
the substantive eligibility conditions. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the dispute arose between the applicant and the
Polish Foundation as regards the application of the eligibility
conditions to her case.
- The
Court has next to determine whether the right to receive payment from
the Polish Foundation on account of forced labour or other form of
persecution was recognised, at least on arguable grounds, under
domestic law. The Court recalls that in the case of Associazione
Nazionale Reduci Dalla Prigionia dall'Internamento e dalla Guerra di
Liberazione (cited above), concerning the second compensation
scheme, it examined the complaints of former Italian POWs about the
exclusion of judicial review in respect of decisions rendered by
the International Organization for Migration (one of the partner
organisations). The Court found that as the applicants (former POWs)
had been clearly excluded from benefits under the German Foundation
Act they could not claim to have had a right to compensation. On
that ground, it distinguished the case from Woś and held
that Article 6 was not applicable to the facts of that case.
- The
Court considers that the present case is, in turn, distinguishable
from the Associazione Nazionale Reduci decision, in that it
concerns the arguable claim made by a person subjected to forced
labour whose request was dismissed for failure to duly establish that
he had permanently lost ties with his habitual place of residence. In
contrast, the Associazione Nazionale Reduci case dealt with
persons who had been expressly excluded from the ambit of the second
compensation scheme on account of their undisputed POW status, and
thus no question of a right to compensation could arise.
- The
Court notes that international public law does not establish
individual claims for compensation for forced labour (see
Associazione Nazionale Reduci decision which referred to the
judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 28 June 2004). Such
claims could be established exclusively through domestic law, and in
such a case the legislator enjoys a wide margin of discretion.
In this respect the Court observes that the conditions and procedures
with which a claimant had to comply before a payment could be
awarded by the Foundation were first agreed in the course of
multilateral negotiations, then laid out in the GFA and subsequently
transposed into the regulations binding on the Foundation via the
Partnership Agreement of 16 February 2001 and any subsequent
agreements concluded in the framework of the so-called openness
clause. The Foundation's statutes were subsequently amended with a
view to implementing the provisions of the GFA and the Agreement
of 16 February 2001. Thus, the Foundation's regulations
stipulated the conditions which had to be fulfilled by a person
seeking benefits. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court
in its Resolution of 27 June 2007 found that the basis of the rights
of a person seeking payment from the Foundation were the Foundation's
statutes, the rules of the Verification Commission and the relevant
provisions of the GFA. The Court is mindful of the particular
character of the legal regime governing the second compensation
scheme which defined the categories of eligible claimants.
Nevertheless, it finds that the Foundation's regulations could be
considered to create a right for a claimant arguably fulfilling
the relevant eligibility conditions to claim compensation from the
Foundation (see, mutatis mutandis, Woś v. Poland
(dec.), cited above, § 83).
- The
Court notes that the payments at issue were voluntary in the sense
that the States were free to establish the scheme and to determine
the scope of its beneficiaries. However, once such general scheme has
been adopted and once a claimant could be reasonably considered to
have complied with the eligibility conditions stipulated in the GFA
and in the Foundation's regulations, he or she had a right to be
awarded payment by the Foundation (see Rolf Gustafson v.
Sweden, 1 July 1997, § 40, Reports 1997 IV
and Woś v. Poland, cited above, § 75). The Court
points out that in the somewhat similar area of social security
and welfare benefits, many domestic legal systems provide for those
benefits to be paid - subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of
eligibility – as of right (see Stec and Others
v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and
65900/01, ECHR 2005 X, § 51). In conclusion, the Court
finds that the Polish Foundation's bodies had thus to determine a
dispute concerning a right asserted by the applicant.
- As
to the “civil” character of the right asserted by the
applicant, the Court reiterates that the concept of “civil
rights and obligations” is not to be interpreted solely by
reference to the respondent State's domestic law. Article 6 § 1
of the Convention applies irrespective of the status of the parties,
the character of the legislation which governs how the dispute is to
be determined and the character of the authority which is invested
with jurisdiction in the matter (see, among other authorities,
Georgiadis v. Greece, 29 May 1997, § 34,
Reports 1997-III).
- The
Court reiterates that in the Woś judgment, which
concerned similar claims under the first compensation scheme, it held
that those claims could be considered “civil” within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Woś v. Poland,
cited above, § 76). In reaching that conclusion, the Court had
regard, inter alia, to the similarities between the
compensation claims asserted before the Foundation and disputes over
entitlement to social security and welfare benefits, which
generally fall within the scope of Article 6 (see Mennitto v.
Italy [GC], no. 33804/96, § 28, ECHR 2000 X; Tsfayo
v. the United Kingdom, no. 60860/00, § 39, 14 November
2006).
- Further,
the Court notes that the Supreme Court in its resolution of 27
June 2007, referring extensively to the Woś judgment,
found that a claim against the Foundation was to be considered a
“civil” claim in a formal sense for the
purposes of establishing court jurisdiction. The Court consequently
finds that the applicant's right to claim compensation from the
Foundation on account of her husband's deportation (relocation) and
forced labour could be considered “civil” for the
purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
For the above reasons the Court finds that the right to compensation
asserted by the applicant under the second compensation scheme is a
civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and that this provision is applicable to the proceedings
before the Foundation in the applicant's case.
B. Conclusion as to admissibility
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
C. Compliance with Article 6 § 1
- The
Government submitted no observations. The applicant maintained her
application.
- Article 6 § 1 requires that in the determination
of civil rights and obligations, decisions taken by administrative or
other authorities which do not themselves satisfy the
requirements of that Article be subject to subsequent control by
a judicial body that has full jurisdiction (see Le Compte,
Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981, § 51,
Series A no. 43; Woś v. Poland, no. 22860/02, § 92,
ECHR 2006 VII). The Court must therefore first ascertain whether
the Foundation's adjudicating bodies – the Verification
Commission and the Appeal Commission – could be considered as
tribunals conforming to the requirements of Article 6 § 1.
- According
to the Court's settled case law, a tribunal within the meaning
of that provision must satisfy a series of requirements –
independence, in particular of the executive, impartiality, duration
of its members' terms of office, and guarantees afforded by its
procedure – several of which appear in the text of Article 6 §
1 itself (see Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988,
§ 64, Series A no. 132; Demicoli v. Malta, 27 August
1991, § 39, Series A no. 210; and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC],
no. 25781/94, § 233, ECHR 2001 IV). In the
present case, as regards structural guarantees, the Court notes that
the members of the Verification Commission and the Appeal Commission
were appointed and dismissed by the Foundation's management board
and, in respect of the latter, in consultation with the Foundation's
supervisory board. The Foundation's statutes also specified that the
rules governing the operation of the Foundation's adjudicating bodies
were to be set out in the regulations drafted by the management board
and adopted by the supervisory board. The Foundation's governing
bodies were in turn appointed and dismissed by the Government
Minister at his or her full discretion. Furthermore, a degree of
control and supervision over the Foundation was exercised
by the Government Minister. Furthermore, it appears that
the members of the Verification Commission and the Appeal
Commission did not have tenure. Thus, the Court considers that the
independence of the Foundation's adjudicating bodies was open to
serious doubt. As regards procedural guarantees, it appears that the
adjudicating commissions had no clear and publicly-available rules of
procedure (see H v. Belgium, 30 November 1987, §
53, Series A no. 127 B) and did not hold public hearings. For
these reasons, they cannot be regarded as tribunals within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1.
- Therefore,
in order for the obtaining situation to be in compliance with Article
6 § 1, the decisions of the Foundation's adjudicating bodies
should have been subject to review by a judicial body having full
jurisdiction. However, the Court notes that until June 2007 the
domestic courts' prevailing position, as confirmed in the Supreme
Court's Resolution of 27 June 2007, was that judicial review by
either administrative or civil courts in respect of the Foundation's
decisions was excluded (see Kadłuczka v. Poland,
cited above, §§ 41-44). At this juncture, the Court
observes that the Government put forward no arguments to the
effect that the Supreme Court's Resolution could have been relied on
by the applicant to assert his claims in civil proceedings, in
particular having regard to the fact that the Foundation determined
his claims long prior to the adoption of the said Resolution.
Accordingly, the Court considers that it has not been established
that the applicant was required to institute civil proceedings in
order to review the Foundation's decisions. In addition, such a
possibility arose only after he had lodged his application with
the Court.
- The
Court observes that the major change in respect of the availability
of judicial review in civil proceedings came with the Supreme Court's
Resolution of 27 June 2007. The Supreme Court revisited the
existing practice and held that claims against the Polish Foundation
in respect of Nazi persecution were civil claims in the formal
sense. Accordingly, the civil courts had jurisdiction to examine such
claims. The Court very much welcomes such a positive development in
the Supreme Court's case-law which, at least in part, was prompted by
its judgment in the Woś case. However, as noted above it
has not been demonstrated that the applicant was obliged to pursue
her claims before civil courts.
- Having
regard to the above considerations, the Court considers that the
exclusion of judicial review in respect of the decisions given by the
Foundation in the applicant's case impaired the very essence of the
right of access to a court within the meaning of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
- It
follows that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed an unspecified amount as just satisfaction for her
husband's suffering related to his deportation and forced labour in
the occupied territories.
- The
Government did not comment.
- The
Court considers that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage
which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation
of the Convention. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the
Court awards the sum of EUR 5,000 to the applicant under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed 347,01 Polish zlotys (approximately 86 euros)
for postage and photocopying.
- The
Government did not comment.
- The
Court, regard being had to the documents produced by the applicant
and the applicable criteria, awards the sum claimed in full.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Polish zloty at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
86 (eighty six euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 May 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza Registrar President
