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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF RUBTSOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 22554/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January 2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rubtsova v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and André Wampach,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 December 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 22554/04) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Lyubov Ivanovna Rubtsova
(“the applicant”), on 27 May 2004.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr A. Savenkov, former acting Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and then by Mr G.
Matyushkin.
- On
12 March 2008 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with
Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1960 and lives in St Petersburg.
- Between
1989 and 2001 the applicant initiated several sets of civil
proceedings.
A. Alimony dispute
- By
judgment of 17 January 1989, the Vyborg Town Court ordered the
applicant’s former husband to pay alimony. A writ of execution
was issued.
- In
August 2000 the bailiff service notified the applicant that the writ
had been lost and advised her to obtain a new one.
B. Housing dispute
- On
12 October 1999 the applicant brought proceedings in the Oktyabrskiy
District Court of St Petersburg against her husband R. seeking
judicial recognition of her and her children’s right to use a
room in a certain flat. The case was assigned to judge K.
- The
applicant submitted that hearings had been scheduled for 27 February
2000, which fell on a weekend, and then for an unspecified date in
March 2000 when the respondent had failed to appear.
- The
next hearing scheduled for 19 April 2000 did not take place due to
the parties’ default in appearance. The summons sent to the
respondent whose address had been indicated by the applicant in her
statement of claim had returned to the court upon expiry of the
time-limit for its storage at the post office.
- The
hearing of 16 May 2000 did not take place due to the respondent’s
failure to appear. The summons returned to the court for the same
reason as before.
- The
hearing of 19 September 2000 did not take place as the judge was on
vacation. On account of judge K.’s heavy workload, the case was
transferred to the newly appointed judge Ch.
- The
next hearing scheduled for 15 November 2000 was adjourned at the
applicant’s request to give her time to specify her claims and
obtain legal assistance. On the same date the court granted her
motion for an injunction order.
- At
the hearing of 24 January 2001 the applicant supplemented her claims
by asking the court to declare unlawful an exchange of the contested
room for a house carried out by R. Following involvement of a third
party P., the hearing was adjourned, the parties were summoned
to a new date, and the court sent an inquiry to some State bodies for
evidence.
- The
respondent and the third party did not appear at the next hearing of
17 April 2001. The summons sent to P. returned to the court upon
expiry of the time-limit for its storage at the post office. The
hearing was adjourned. To ensure the correct address of the
summonses, the court suggested that P. be summoned by the housing
authorities of the respective city district, and R. by the town
council of the village where he resided.
- At
the next hearing of 1 August 2001 the applicant supplemented her
claims seeking to declare all of the transactions with the room
unlawful. Three other individuals who had been parties to these
transactions were involved by the court as co-respondents. On the
same day the court stayed the proceedings pending outcome of another
dispute at the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg which
involved the applicant’s claim for annulment of her marriage to
R. The applicant did not challenge this decision.
- The
proceedings were resumed on 12 May 2003, three months after the
Frunzenskiy District Court gave a judgment. The next hearing was
scheduled for 3 February 2004; however it had to be postponed to
15 September 2004 following the request of the applicant and one
of the respondents, as well as the other parties’ default in
appearance. In response to the applicant’s complaint of lengthy
proceedings, on 21 August 2003 the president of the St
Petersburg City Court acknowledged that the workload in the District
Court had considerably exceeded the maximum level, in particular due
to the shortage of judges.
- On
15 September 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s claims.
The reasoned judgment was submitted to the court’s registry on
13 May 2005. On 20 July 2005 the St Petersburg City Court upheld
the judgment on appeal.
C. Marriage annulment dispute
- On
12 July 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy
District Court of St Petersburg for annulment of her marriage to R.
- On
4 April 2002 the judge in charge of her case decided to prepare the
case for examination and required certain evidence from a State body.
A hearing was scheduled for 7 October 2002. However, it did not take
place due to the judge’s illness. At the next hearing of 19
February 2003 the court granted the applicant’s claim.
- On
23 January 2003 the applicant complained to the Higher Judicial
Qualifications Board of the District Court’s procrastination in
dealing with her case. As a result of an internal investigation, on
26 November 2004 the judge who had sat in the applicant’s case
was dismissed.
D. Parental rights dispute
- In
April 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy
District Court of St Petersburg for alimony arrears and sought to
deprive her former husband of his parental rights. On 24 April 2002
the District Court declined jurisdiction in favour of another court.
On 7 August 2002 the St Petersburg City Court set aside this
decision. By judgment of 19 February 2003, the District Court
granted the applicant’s claims.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Federal
Law № 68-ФЗ of 30
April 2010 (in force as of 4 May 2010) provides that in case of
a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time or of the
right to enforcement of a final judgment, the Russian citizens are
entitled to seek compensation of the non-pecuniary damage. Federal
Law № 69-ФЗ
adopted on the same day introduced the pertinent changes in the
Russian legislation.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant relied on Article 7 and 13 of the Convention to complain
that the domestic courts had taken too long to consider her claims in
the disputes concerning housing and marriage annulment. The Court
considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded and
should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the
Convention.
- The
Court notes that this complaint does not appear to be manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- As
to the proceedings concerning a housing dispute, the Government
submitted that the case had been complex due to its nature and the
involvement of third parties, amendments of the applicant’s
claims and her motions, and the parties’ failure to appear in
court. They also pointed out that the applicant had not complained
about the decision to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of
another case. The Government conceded that the Oktyabrskiy District
Court had breached the procedural time-limits twice, after resumption
of the proceedings and when submitting the reasoned judgment to the
registry. However, they argued that this delay had been justified by
the court’s excessive workload per judge.
- The
Government did not provide any specific comments as to the length of
the marriage annulment dispute.
- The
applicant maintained her complaints.
- The
Court observes that the proceedings concerning the housing claims
commenced on 12 October 1999 and ended on 20 July 2005, during which
the applicant’s claims were considered at two levels of
jurisdiction. As for the marriage annulment proceedings, they lasted
between 12 July 2001 and 19 February 2003 for one level of
jurisdiction. The two sets of proceedings lasted, respectively, five
years and nine months and one year and seven months.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court deems it best to examine separately the two sets of
proceedings.
-
Insofar as the housing dispute is concerned, it considers that it
bore a certain degree of complexity due to the number of the involved
parties.
- As
to the applicant’s conduct, it observes that the applicant
failed to appear in court once; she also supplemented her claims and
requested adjournment of the proceedings for collection of evidence
on four separate occasions. The overall delay caused by the
applicant’s actions amounted approximately to one year and one
month. However, the Court’s constant approach has been that an
applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources
afforded by the national law in defence of his interests (see,
mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v.
Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A no. 319 A).
- Regarding
the authorities’ behaviour, apart from a two-month delay
resulting from a judge’s vacation, the Court is satisfied that
they had not exhibited any particular negligence or procrastination
until resumption of the proceedings in March 2003. It recalls,
however, that after that moment the trial court was incapable of
handling the case with the same efficiency and allowed delays which
held the proceedings back for approximately one year and five months.
In particular, the Court notes the trial court’s lengthy
failure to hold a hearing after resumption of the proceedings and to
submit a reasoned judgment to the registry to enable the applicant to
lodge her appeal. As to the Government’s argument concerning
the judges’ excessive workload, it reiterates that it is the
States’ duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way
that their courts can meet the requirements of Article 6 §
1 (see Muti v. Italy, 23 March 1994, § 15, Series A
no. 281-C).
- With
regard to the above, it finds that the authorities did not comply
with the “reasonable time” requirement in dealing with
the applicant’s housing claims.
- As
to the marriage annulment proceedings, the Court observes that the
trial court appears to have idled for most of its length, having
conducted one hearing and undertaken one inquiry to collect evidence
in one year and seven months. The fact that the judge sitting in the
applicant’s case was later found to be in breach of time-limits
for examination of cases and dismissed on this ground supports the
conclusion that the length of these proceedings was also excessive.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in respect of both sets of proceedings.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained that her attempts to speed up the
proceedings had been futile. She relied on Article 13, which reads as
follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court takes cognisance of the existence of a new remedy introduced by
the federal laws № 68-ФЗ
and № 69-ФЗ in the
wake of the pilot judgment adopted in the case of Burdov v. Russia
(no. 2) (no. 33509/04, ECHR
2009 ...). These statutes, which entered into force on 4 May
2010, set up a new remedy which enables those concerned to seek
compensation for the damage sustained as a result of unreasonable
length of the proceedings (see para. 23 above).
- The
Court observes that in the present case the parties’
observations in respect of Article 13 arrived before 4 May 2010 and
did not contain any references to the new legislative development.
- The
Court recalls that in the pilot judgment cited above it stated that
it would be unfair to request the applicants whose cases have already
been pending for many years in the domestic system and who have come
to seek relief at the Court, to bring again their claims before
domestic tribunals (Burdov (no. 2), cited above, §
144). In line with this principle, the Court decided to examine the
present application on its merits and found a violation of the
substantive provision of the Convention.
- Finally,
on 23 September 2010 the Court decided that all new cases introduced
after the Burdov pilot judgment and falling within the scope
of the new domestic remedy had to be submitted in the first place to
the national courts (see
Fakhretdinov and
Others v. Russia (dec.),
no. 26716/09, § 32, 23 September 2010). The Court
also stated that its position may be subject to review in the future,
depending in particular on the domestic courts’ capacity to
establish consistent practice under the new law in line with the
Convention requirements (ibid, § 33).
- Having
regard to these special circumstances, the Court does not find it
necessary to continue a separate examination of the complaint under
Article 13 in the present case.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained about the outcome of all sets of
proceedings, the length of the proceedings for deprivation of
parental rights and of the authorities’ failure to compel her
former husband to pay alimony.
- The
Court recalls that it is not its task to act by calling into question
the outcome of the domestic proceedings. The domestic courts are best
placed for assessing the relevance of evidence to the issues in the
case and for interpreting and applying rules of substantive and
procedural law (see Pekinel v. Turkey, no. 9939/02, § 53,
18 March 2008). Therefore, this complaint should be rejected in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
- In
respect of the complaint regarding enforcement of the right to
alimony, the applicant did not complain to court about the bailiffs’
actions or inaction and thus failed to exhaust the available domestic
remedies. As to the complaint about the length of the proceedings for
deprivation of parental rights, it is lodged out of time. It follows
that these complaints should be rejected in accordance with Article
35 § 1 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant requested that the Court award her just satisfaction in
accordance with Article 41 of the Convention and in line with its
case-law, without supplying a specific figure.
- The
Government argued that the applicant had not effectively submitted
her claims for just satisfaction and stated that a finding of a
violation would be sufficient in this respect.
- The
Court accepts that, having waited for years for the domestic courts
to examine her claims, the applicant suffered certain frustration and
distress. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards her 2,900 euros
(EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints about undue length of
the proceedings concerning housing and annulment of marriage and lack
of effective remedies in that respect admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need for separate
examination of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,
EUR 2,900 (two thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Elisabeth Steiner Deputy Registrar President
