SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
MÁRTON v. HUNGARY
(Application no.
11005/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 January 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Márton v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as
a Committee composed of:
Peer Lorenzen,
President,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 11005/08) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Ms Dóra Márton (“the applicant”), on 26
February 2008.
The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public
Administration and Justice.
On 5 January 2011 the
application was communicated to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No.
14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Szentendre.
On 21 July 1999 a foundation brought an action
against the applicant before the Szentendre District Court, requesting the
court to establish the invalidity of an agreement. The action was dismissed in
June 2000. This decision was quashed on appeal by the Pest County Regional
Court on 12 March 2002.
In the resumed proceedings the case was
transferred between several courts due to a dispute over competence.
Finally the Dunakeszi District Court dismissed the
plaintiff’s action on 11 June 2007. This judgment was served on the applicant’s
lawyer on 13 July 2007. According to the rules of Code of Civil
Proceedings, the parties had fifteen days from this date to submit an appeal
against the judgment.
In the absence of appeals, the judgment became
final on 18 September 2007.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government contested that argument, arguing
in particular that the application was introduced out of time, the final
domestic decision being served on the applicant’s representative on 13 July
2007, whereas the application was introduced only on 26 February
2008, i.e. more than six months later (cf. Article 35 § 1 of the Convention).
The Court observes that according to the
domestic procedural rules, the parties have fifteen days following the service
of a first-instance judgment to submit an appeal against it. In these
circumstances, the date of 13 July 2007 referred to by the Government is the
service of the judgment which had not yet become final. Therefore the date from
which the six-month time-limit is to be counted begins when the judgment became
final, i.e. on 18 September 2007, which date preceded the date of introduction
by less than six months. The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected.
Moreover, the Court considers that the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
The period to be taken into consideration began
on 21 July 1999 and ended on 18 September 2007. It thus lasted eight years and
two months before two levels of jurisdiction. The Court has frequently found
violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar
to the one in the present application (see Frydlender v. France [GC],
no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material
submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward
any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different
conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the
subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly
been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the
applicant claimed 15,498 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR
5,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested the claim. The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the
pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers
that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards her
the full sum claimed, i.e. EUR 5,500 under this head.
The applicant also claimed EUR 1,998 for the
costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum corresponds to legal
work, translation and postal costs. The Government did not express an opinion
on the matter. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its
case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not
represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 500 in respect of all costs incurred.
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,500 (five thousand five hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Peer Lorenzen
Deputy Registrar President
