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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Bland v Ingram's Estates Ltd & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ 1594 (18 October 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1594.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1594

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
(Mr Peter Leaver QC
(sitting as a deputy High Court judge))

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday 18th October, 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: The present application is to settle the terms of an order arising out of judgments given in this Court -first, on 21 December 2000 (now reported at [2001] 2 WLR 1638); and second, on 11 July 2001 - in proceedings between Davinia Patricia Bland and Ingram's Estates Ltd and others.
2. Put very shortly, the effect of those decisions was that Mrs Bland, as equitable chargee of a lease of premises known as 54/56 The Parade, Bourne End, was held entitled to relief from forfeiture of that lease on 26 April 1996 by the then landlords, Ingram's Estates Ltd, against that company and against Mr Fogir Uddin and his wife, Ripon Chowdhery Fogir, the second and third respondents, who had taken a new lease of the premises three days later on 29 April 1996. Mrs Bland was entitled to relief on terms that she paid to Mr and Mrs Uddin the aggregate sum of £23,000-odd in respect of rent accruing before 29 April 1996, the costs of effecting re-entry, and interest and an amount in respect of the notional costs that would have been incurred on an unopposed application for relief in the County Court, but after deduction from that aggregate sum of the costs which she had been awarded on her successful appeal.
3. Although the second of those judgments was given on 11 July 2001, it has been impossible, so far, for the advisers to Mrs Bland, on the one hand, and Mr and Mrs Uddin, on the other hand, to agree an order to give effect to the decision. In those circumstances, pursuant to the direction given on 11 July, the matter has now been mentioned to me.
4. There are two points at issue between the parties. The first is whether the relief should be stayed pending a decision of the House of Lords on a petition for permission to appeal which (I am told) has been lodged by the first defendant, Ingram's Estates Ltd. There is no petition for permission to appeal yet lodged on behalf of Mr and Mrs Uddin; nor has it been suggested that there will be.
5. It is, I think, common ground that a decision whether or not to stay pending the outcome of that petition (and any subsequent appeal if permission to appeal is granted by the House of Lords), really determines - at least for the present - the related question whether relief should be effected in the immediate future (under some accelerated procedure directed for that purpose); or only effected after the amount of the costs have been assessed. Plainly, if there is going to be a stay so as to enable the outcome of the petition to the House of Lords to be known, there is no purpose in having an accelerated procedure to give immediate effect to the relief granted until the outcome is known.
6. The second question is one which arises only if, and when (after relief has been obtained by the payment of money) the property is then sold under the order which this Court indicated we would make. The question, in that context, is whether the first defendant and the second and third defendants should have liberty to apply in relation to the conduct of the sale.
7. I will address the second of those questions first. I can see no reason why either the first defendant or the second and third defendants should have liberty to apply in relation to - or any interest in - the conduct of the sale; beyond the rights which the second and third defendants undoubtedly do have under the lease to be consulted as to the identity of any purchaser and to give or withhold consent to an assignment to that purchaser - such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. If the purchaser is not unacceptable on grounds which are reasonable under the law of landlord and tenant the second and third defendants can withhold consent; but I can see no additional reason why the second and third defendants should be concerned with the sale. The persons interested in the conduct of the sale are Mrs Bland, on the one hand, and the debtors or chargors - that is to say, Mr and Mrs Beer and their respective trustees in bankruptcy - on the other hand. Plainly the Beers and their trustees should have liberty to apply if they are concerned that Mrs Bland is not conducting the sale in a way which is calculated to produce a maximum price. But Mr and Mrs Uddin have no interest in the price that is obtained. I appreciate, of course, that they have a commercial interest, in practice, either to make it difficult to sell to anyone except themselves, as the persons in actual occupation; or to ensure that they can outbid any other purchaser. But that is not an interest which, as it seems to me, the Court should seek to protect by giving them the opportunity to interfere with conduct of the sale.
8. Accordingly, I do not give liberty to apply to anyone other than the Beers and their respective trustees in bankruptcy.
9. As to the other point, it is self-evident that, if the House of Lords were to make an order setting aside the order for relief on the petition of the first defendant, the Uddins, if affected by that order, would be very seriously prejudiced if relief had been obtained and the property sold in the meantime. The more difficult question, as it seems to me, is whether the Uddins would be persons affected by any order made by the House of Lords on an appeal to which they were not party. I am, however, persuaded that that question is really academic; because, as Mr Althaus points out, it is almost inevitable that if the House of Lords thinks it right to grant permission to appeal to the petitioner, Ingram's Estates, the Uddins will be brought into that appeal as respondents. The need to ensure that any order made by the House of Lords on the appeal is effective and binding as between all parties concerned will require that. If the House of Lords were to grant permission to appeal, it is - at the least - very likely that the Uddins would become persons who would be affected by the outcome of that appeal. In those circumstances, it must be right to stay execution of the order granting relief until, at least, it is known whether or not the House of Lords has granted permission to appeal from this order.
10. If permission to appeal to the House of Lords is not granted, then, of course, it will become necessary to consider whether an expedited procedure for giving effect to the relief to which this Court has held Mrs Bland is entitled is necessary.
11. The order that appears to me appropriate at this stage is this. There should be no stay on the assessment of the costs to which Mrs Bland is entitled; that assessment should proceed, and should be pursued with diligence. When the House of Lords' decision on the petition for permission is known, then the question whether or not an expedited procedure for carrying into effect the order for relief is needed will depend, in part at least, on whether the costs have been assessed by that date; or are likely to be assessed within a short period of that date. I should say now that, if at the time when the House of Lords' decision on permission to appeal is known - and if the House of Lords refuse permission - there is likely to be a further substantial delay while assessment of costs takes place, then the procedure suggested in Mr Denman's minute of order - namely, the payment of a sum into Court - seems to me likely to be the appropriate procedure to adopt. But it is unnecessary to take that decision at this stage because, for at least two reasons, it may never become a real question.
12. Accordingly, I will grant a stay, with liberty to Mrs Bland to apply to me to lift that stay and for further directions if the House of Lords refuses permission to appeal on the petition of Ingram's Estates. Indeed, I think it sensible to go further and give a general liberty to apply in case there is some contingency which cannot be foreseen.
ORDER: Order as per judgment; Counsel to lodge a draft minute of order within seven days. (Order not part of approved judgment)