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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Akenzua & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2002] EWCA Civ 1470 (23 October 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1470.html Cite as: [2002] 1 All ER 35, [2002] EWCA Civ 1470, [2003] 1 WLR 741, [2003] WLR 741 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM Central London County Court
His Honour Judge Hornby
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division
LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY
and
LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER
____________________
(1) OSAYANIMO MERCY AKENZUA (2) CAROLINE LIZA COY (Administrators of the Estate of Marcia Zena Laws (Deceased)) | Appellants | |
- and - | ||
(1) SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (2) THE COMISSIONER OF POLICE for the METROPOLIS | Respondents |
____________________
(instructed by Christian Fisher Khan) for the Appellants
Jonathan Crow Esq
(instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the First Respondent
Simon Freeland Esq QC & Jeremy Johnson Esq
(instructed by the Director of Legal Services) for the Second Respondent
Hearing dates: 9th October 2002
____________________
(SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTIONS)
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Sedley:
The history
The proceedings
The law
“Held…that the tort of misfeasance in public office involved an element of bad faith and arose when a public officer exercised his power specifically intending to injure the plaintiff, or when he acted in the knowledge of, or with reckless indifference to, the illegality of his act and in the knowledge of, or with reckless indifference to, the probability of causing injury to the plaintiff or persons of a class of which the plaintiff was a member; that subjective recklessness in the sense of not caring whether the act was illegal or whether the consequences happened was sufficient; …that only losses which had been foreseen by the public officer as a probable consequence of his act were recoverable; and that such a formulation of the tort struck the appropriate balance between providing adequate protection for the public and protecting public officers from unmeritorious claims.”
“The rationale of the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power ‘may be exercised only for the public good’ and not for ulterior and improper purposes…” (1230).
Where the malice is untargeted –
“[t]he basis for the action lies in the defendant taking a decision in the knowledge that it is in excess of the powers granted to him and that it is likely to cause damage to an individual or individuals….[R]eckless indifference to consequences is as blameworthy as deliberately seeking such consequences. It can therefore now be regarded as settled law that an act performed in reckless indifference as to the outcome is sufficient to ground the tort in its second [untargeted] form.” (1231-2)
As to who can sue for an abuse of power by a public officer:
“It would be unwise to make general statements on a subject which may involve many diverse situations. What can be said is that, of course, any plaintiff must have a sufficient interest to found a legal standing to sue. Subject to this qualification, principle does not require the introduction of proximity as a controlling mechanism in this corner of the law. The state of mind required to establish the tort, as already explained, as well as the special rule of remoteness hereafter discussed, keeps the tort within reasonable bounds. There is no reason why such an action cannot be brought by a particular class of persons, such as depositors at a bank, even if their precise identities were not known to the bank….
…[T]he question is raised whether the Bank is capable of being liable for the tort of misfeasance in public office to plaintiffs who were potentially depositors at the time of any relevant act or omission of misfeasance by the Bank. The majority in the Court of Appeal and Auld LJ held that this issue is unsuitable for summary determination. In my view this ruling was correct.” (1233).
Lastly - and crucially for present purposes - in relation to damage and remoteness:
“Enough has been said to demonstrate the special nature of the tort, and the strict requirements governing it. This is a legally sound justification for adopting as a starting point that in both forms of the tort the intent required must be directed at the harm complained of, or at least to harm of the type suffered by the plaintiffs. This results in the rule that the plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant acted in the knowledge that the act was beyond his powers but also in the knowledge that his act would probably injure the plaintiff or persons of a class of which the plaintiff was a member. In presenting a sustained argument for a rule allowing recovery of all foreseeable losses counsel for the plaintiffs argued that such a more liberal rule is necessary in a democracy as a constraint upon abuse of executive and administrative power. The force of this argument, however, is substantially reduced by the recognition that subjective recklessness on the part of a public officer in acting in excess of his powers is sufficient. Recklessness about the consequences of his act, in the sense of not caring whether the consequences happen or not, is therefore sufficient in law.” (1235, italics added).
“…if the public officer knows that his unlawful conduct will probably injure another person, or is reckless as to that consequence, the plaintiff does not need to show, before liability can arise, some other link or relationship between him and the officer. The requirement of foresight of probable harm to the plaintiff, or recklessness as to such harm, is sufficient to ensure that the tort is confined within reasonable bounds.” (1267).
The issues
Discussion
A. A public official corruptly arranges the liberation of a man serving a sentence for attempting to murder his wife, knowing that he will make a further attempt to kill her if allowed to do so. On his release the man finds his wife and kills her.
B. A public official corruptly arranges the liberation of a man serving a sentence of imprisonment for terrorist bombings, knowing that he will resume his activities if allowed to do so. On his release the man places a bomb in a public place and kills several people.
The case against the police
“26. Further or in the alternative, in encouraging/inciting Brian Fotheringham to recommend the temporary release of a known dangerous criminal Delroy Denton in the circumstances set out above so that he could be used as a paid police informer, PC Steve Barker and other Metropolitan Police Officers involved, knowingly and dishonestly acted outside of their powers in that they was aware that in so doing Fotheringham would be acting beyond his powers as an immigration officer in the respects particularised in paragraph 19 above.
27. Further or in the alternative, in thereafter secretly maintaining Denton as a paid police informer, despite his known criminal record, propensity for violence, associations and the circumstances in which he gained entry into the United Kingdom and in which his temporary release had been secured PC Barker and other Metropolitan Police Officers involved knowingly and dishonestly acted beyond their powers as a police officer.”
Conclusion
Lord Justice Scott Baker:
Lord Justice Simon Brown:
“If a public authority were to be held liable in negligence on facts like those pleaded here, with no true nexus shown between claimant and defendant (its absence being supposedly filled by the perceived gravity of the risk involved), the negligence or fault in the case would have to be supplied by proof that the authority had acted unreasonably in the public law sense … But if that were sufficient, without the added element of proximity, the result as it seems to me would be that the court would have in effect created a category of administrative tort sounding in damages. Our law, however, knows no such tort outside the confines of misfeasance in public office …”
“principle does not require the introduction of proximity as a controlling mechanism in this corner of the law.”
I am quite unable to accept Mr Crow’s submission that Lord Steyn’s reference to the need for the plaintiff to have “a sufficient interest to found a legal standing to sue” was intended to limit claims to specified individuals predictably at risk.
“The statutory powers in question were conferred on the Bank of England for the protection of actual and potential depositors, and any member of either class can satisfy the requirement [the requirement of ‘a legally protected interest’]” (p1276)