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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Aina, R (on the application of) v London Borough Of Hackney [2002] EWCA Civ 218 (6 February 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/218.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 218

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(MR JUSTICE MUNBY)

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Wednesday 6 February 2002

Wednesday 6 February 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE LAWS: This is an application for permission to appeal against the decision of Munby J given in the Administrative Court on 19 November 2001 when he refused the applicant's application for permission to seek judicial review. He also made an order for costs against the applicant in favour of the Hackney Borough Council who had attended the hearing.
2. There is a very long history of dispute between the applicant and the council. It relates to property at 89 Listria Park, where the applicant lived. He was attempting to renovate it. The council for its part was becoming concerned at the state of its disrepair.
3. At length in 1993 the applicant applied to the council for a housing renovation grant. The council approved the grant subject to certain conditions which, however, the applicant failed to meet. The council concluded that the property could not be rehabilitated unless they invoked their powers to make a compulsory purchase order.On 10 November 1999, they notified the applicant of their decision to make such an order. The letter advised the applicant that he should lodge any objections with the Secretary of State within 22 days of publication of a notice of the proposed CPO in the Hackney Gazette. The respondent proceeded to make the CPO on 29 February 2000, but under the relevant legislation it required the Secretary of State's confirmation before it became effective.
4. The applicant had lodged objections, first by letter of 6 December 1999 to the Secretary of State, and by further correspondence. A public inquiry was held on 20 June 2000, at which both the applicant and the council made submissions. On 20 July 2000, the inspector reported to the Secretary of State recommending that the CPO should be confirmed. The Secretary of State confirmed it on 31 July 2000. The applicant was sent a notice of confirmation on 10 August 2000. Before this the applicant had sought permission to seek judicial review in relation to the CPO. That was refused by Carnwath J on 24 March 2000 on the basis that the applicant's proper remedy was to object to the Secretary of State. An application for permission to appeal to this court against Carnwath J's ruling was refused by Robert Walker LJ on 24 November 2000.
5. So it was that the applicant made the application which came before Munby J. The copy in the papers is not a sealed copy and does not bear the date of its issue or filing in the Administrative Court, but internal references in the document make it plain beyond argument that these proceedings were launched well into the year 2001.
6. On its face this application sought to challenge: (1) the "withdrawal" of the housing renovation grant; (2) the compulsory purchase order; and (3) the compulsory purchase vesting declaration which had been made on 10 October 2000 pursuant to and in implementation of the CPO. As regards (1) (the housing renovation grant) Munby J held that there had been no withdrawal of the grant. All that had happened was that the applicant had failed to meet the conditions specified for its being given. In any event, as the judge put it, the application was "grotesquely out of time". In my view, the learned judge was obviously right on both fronts. I would refuse permission to appeal in relation to the housing renovation grant.
7. As regards (2) (the compulsory purchase order itself) the judge held that that had been dealt with by Carnwath J and so it was abusive for the applicant to seek to litigate it further. That does not seem to me to be right. Carnwath J only held, as I understand it, that the applicant's remedy was to object to the Secretary of State, which he did.
8. However, there is another and, I fear, fatal objection to this part of the applicant's case. It is that by force of section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 the compulsory purchase order had to be challenged in the High Court by a statutory appeal within six weeks of the publication of the Secretary of State's confirmation of it. That period cannot be extended: there is plain authority to the effect that the period having been fixed by Parliament cannot be shifted by the court which thus has no jurisdiction to extend it. The applicant has not brought a statutory appeal but, even if one were to treat his judicial review as an application for the purposes of section 23 of the 1981 Act, it is incontestable, as I have already explained, that it was brought well into the year 2001 and thus long after the six-week period had expired. The truth is that the court therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the application relating to the CPO.
9. On the third matter (the vesting declaration), there is nothing in that challenge if the CPO cannot itself be assaulted, which it cannot. Accordingly, I would refuse permission to appeal against Munby J's order upon the substantive issue sought to be raised in the judicial review proceedings.
10. Munby J also ordered the applicant to pay 75% of the council's costs to be subject to a detailed assessment. The applicant had relied on the terms of the Practice Direction indicating that costs will not generally be ordered against a claimant who has failed to obtain judicial review permission. However, that is a general rule and it is plain that the Practice Direction may be departed from if circumstances justified that course. Here the judge correctly held in my view that the applicant's application was wholly groundless, though I do not necessary accept, as I have said, that it was an abuse of the process. However, given the hopeless nature of the application, I would not interfere with the judge's exercise of his discretion. He awarded 75% only because he would have wished to make a summary assessment but, as I understand it, a schedule of the council's costs had not been given to the applicant in time for that to be done.
11. In fairness to the applicant I should say a word about a fresh document and other materials which he has put before me this morning. He has addressed me with great courtesy and restraint and in considerable measure has relied on a hand-written document of four sheets which he has produced today. That document refers to such well-known principles of the law as proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectation. It refers also in general terms to provisions of European law, including the procedure for a reference to the Court of Justice, provided for under Article 234 of the EC Treaty. Furthermore, there is reference to provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. He submits that "the case should be referred to the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg for a second opinion. Permission could also be granted for me to make a direct application to Strasbourg".
12. There is no procedure by which this court makes a reference to the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. The reference procedure arises not under the law of the Human Rights Convention, but under the law of the European Union, under Article 234 of the Treaty. The power (or in some cases duty) to make a reference is to the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg, not the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As regards any question of permission to make a direct application to Strasbourg, the applicant needs no such permission from this court. I do not encourage the making of such an application. I consider that his case is a hopeless one for the reasons I have given.
13. He has also put other materials before me. There are a number of newspaper reports dealing variously with allegations of corruption within Hackney Council, and also an initiative reported by The Times to be taken by the Lord Chancellor in relation to the diminution of the costs of civil proceedings. Furthermore, he has made a complaint that letters of his written to the Secretary of State in 1999 were not acknowledged until March 2000. I have looked at all these materials as he has shown them to me, but none of them is capable of shifting the conclusions which I have reached for the reasons which I have given. This application must be refused.