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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> AB (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 221 (26 February 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/221.html Cite as: [2008] EWCA Civ 221

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL
[AIT No: AA/01182/2006]

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		26th February 2008

Lord Justice Latham:

1. The applicant is an Iranian national, born on 14 September 1979. He sought asylum here on his arrival in November 2005, having spent some time in Turkey. His claim was refused by the Secretary of State and his appeal was dismissed in March 2006. Reconsideration was sought and ordered but then on the reconsideration his appeal was again dismissed following a hearing on 22 August; and it is against that decision that he seeks permission to appeal.
2. The basis of his claim is, he asserts, that he had in effect joined an organisation called the Constitutional Movement of Iran, which supports the monarchy, of which his brother-in-law, Mr Ali Pishro, was a leading member. Mr Ali Pishro is in fact in this country and has been granted asylum.
3. The applicant, before both immigration judges, asserted that whilst in Iran he had taken an active part in supporting the Constitutional Movement of Iran, in particular by ensuring that there were graffiti on walls in Tehran supporting a call for a referendum and in distributing material to foreign embassies indicating the intentions of the Constitutional Movement of Iran. In addition to those activities he asserted his relationship with Mr Ali Pishro; in particular the fact that after Ali Pishro had fled to the United Kingdom the applicant stated that he had been interrogated by the Etelat, in 2002.
4. The evidence that the applicant put before the relevant immigration judge included obviously the ordinary background material supporting his assertion that, as a supporter of the monarchy and a person calling for a referendum, he would be considered an enemy of the state and therefore subject at the least to arrest and imprisonment. Indeed, subsequent to his leaving the country he submitted that his family had received a warrant and a court attendance notice, which could only mean that he was of interest to the authorities in a way which would result in the likelihood of his being arrested when he returns, if he is made to, to Iran.
5. In addition his case was supported, he said, by two letters, one from the leader of the Constitutional Movement of Iran and one from Mr Ali Pishro, which supported his account of the activities that he had carried out for them. He believes that the reason for the warrant and the court attendance notice was that he had been seen in particular dealing with graffiti, and had left Iran immediately after he had been followed by someone on a motorcycle whom he was convinced was part of the security apparatus in Iran.
6. The immigration judge, having considered all that evidence, came to the conclusion that the applicant was simply not credible. In other words, he did not believe his account. He gave a number of clear reasons for that. Firstly, the account of the activities which he gave in relation to the graffiti in particular was somewhat surprising given the nature of a big city such as Tehran. As far as the handing out of material to foreign embassies was concerned, the immigration judge considered that it was surprising that that was the way such material was distributed; there were other ways which would have been perfectly satisfactory. As far as the court attendance note and the warrant were concerned, having looked at them with the experienced eye of an immigration judge who can be expected to have some knowledge of these matters, he expressed the view that he was not satisfied as to their genuineness. As far as the letters from the leader of the movement was concerned, and the brother in law, what was missing was any oral evidence from either of them or of anyone else who could support the account that he gave. At paragraph 23 he said:

"For the above reasons, I do not find the appellant credible. I do not find the appellant's documents, including his CMI letters, serve to override this conclusion as to his core account for the reasons stated. Further, as the refusal letter states…, even if the appellant's pre election graffiti and embassy deliveries were true, which they are not, they would not be treated as serious breaches of national security with equivalently serious consequences."

7. Mr Nicholson has valiantly sought to challenge that conclusion on the basis that it raises issues of law: he submits that the immigration judge failed to take into account the genuineness of the applicant's views as a monarchist and his assertions that he would not stop giving expression to those views; it is said that the immigration judge looked through English eyes at the evidence that he gave, instead of putting the evidence in the context it should be placed in, that is the country of the applicant's origin, Iran; that he failed to look at the objective evidence, even though the reconsideration which was being carried out had been ordered on the basis that that objective evidence was sufficient to require some explanation from any immigration judge not accepting the applicant's credibility.
8. The difficulty with all those submissions is that the immigration judge clearly firstly did take into account that objective evidence. Paragraph 23 makes it plain that what he was saying was that that did not override his views as to the credibility of the applicant whose evidence that he had heard. He gave reasons why the objective evidence was not sufficient to override the views that he had come to as to the applicant's credibility. Once one gets to that situation, it is plain that the immigration judge was simply saying: I do not believe the applicant. He was entitled to on this material. There is no issue of law which is raised by the decision that he came to and this is, if I may respectfully say so, despite Mr Nicholson's persuasive way, an application doomed to failure. I would refuse this application.

Lord Justice May:

9. I agree that this application should be dismissed for the reasons which Latham LJ has given. Mr Nicholson's well-constructed oral submissions, together with his written submissions, proceed on the basis that the applicant is an Iranian monarchist, a member of an organisation which campaigns for the return of a monarchy in Iran, who will carry on uttering his political views come what may. Part of this is to campaign for a referendum, and reliance is placed on treatment in Iran of those who act in this way. It is said that the immigration judge failed to address the reality of affairs in Iran, but addressed the matter of credibility through domestic United Kingdom eyes and that this is an error of law. As Latham LJ has said, this does not in my judgment address the fact that the immigration judge, upon a finding of credibility, did not accept that the applicant was politically active in Iran. See in particular paragraphs 24 and 25 of the reasons for the determination.
10. In other words, the whole factual basis upon which this submission is based fell away if this credibility decision is one which is sustainable. The question therefore is whether the credibility finding is amenable to an appeal to this court, and that question in my judgment turns on whether the immigration judge gave sufficient and sustainable reasons for rejecting, essentially, the whole of the basis of the factual account that had been given.
11. In my judgment the reasons given are sustainable in this court. There is no point of law and I too would dismiss this application.

Order: Application refused