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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Mansha, R. v [2006] EWCA Crim 2051 (10 July 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2006/2051.html Cite as: [2006] EWCA Crim 2051

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		Monday, 10th July 2006

1. MR JUSTICE FORBES: On 22nd December 2005, at the Southwark Crown Court, this appellant was convicted, following a trial, of an offence of possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, contrary to section 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. On 26th January 2006 he was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. The judge directed that the period the appellant had spent on remand in custody was to count towards his sentence, and made an order for the forfeiture and disposal of a gun under section 52 of the Firearms Act 1968. The appellant now appeals against that sentence by leave of the Single Judge.
2. A brief outline of the facts is as follows. In the early hours of the morning of 24th March 2005, officers from the Anti Terrorist Squad and Firearms Squad raided the flat in Woolwich, South East London, where the appellant was living. The appellant was arrested and the flat was searched. Officers found a number of documents in a bag belonging to the appellant. The first of those documents was a newspaper article about a soldier who had been decorated for gallantry in Iraq. It appeared that someone had researched the basic details contained in the article to the effect that the soldier came from Portsmouth in Hampshire. On a separate sheet of paper found in the same bag the appellant had written down the soldier's name and full address. In fact, the soldier had lived at that address with his partner until June 2002, but had then moved away. At the time of the search of the appellant's flat, therefore, the soldier was no longer resident at the address recorded on the sheet of paper although he had been resident there some time before.
3. How the information concerning the address had been obtained is unknown. But it is obvious that someone had made the relevant research to enable the appellant to write down the address in question. An A4 refill pad was also recovered and forensically examined. From the indentations on the pad it was established that the appellant had written away for information concerning two prominent Jewish men and two prominent Hindu businessmen. The officers also found a number of DVDs containing anti-western propaganda, Islamic propaganda praising martyrdom, others giving details of suicide car bombings against the British and against the Russians in Chechnya and yet others showing the aftermath of a suicide bombing and the like.
4. A dismantled pistol was also recovered. It was a pistol designed for firing blanks modelled on a Beretta self-loading pistol. However it was incapable of discharging a bullet, although examination revealed that an attempt had been made to bore out the dummy barrel and convert it into a working firearm.
5. An eavesdropping device, a scanner and a Balaclava with cut out eyes were also found at the flat.
6. When interviewed the appellant refused to answer questions but made several prepared statements in which he stated that he had nothing to do with terrorism, that he had no strong political views and that he was not a strict practising Muslim. He stated that he had purchased the dismantled pistol at a market stall for £25 to have as a souvenir, that he rented the flat from a friend and that several of his friends had access to the flat. He claimed some of the DVDs were his and that others belonged to his friends.
7. When passing sentence the judge said this (inter alia):

"The maximum sentence for this offence is 10 years' imprisonment. You have never faced a charge of conspiracy to kill or cause harm and I do not sentence you for that, but when that information came into your possession and was recorded by you, you crossed the boundary into terrorism, and the other items found in your flat; the horrific DVDs and the imitation firearm that someone had tried to convert, confirmed that.

Any body who crosses that line and commits a terrorist offence must know that if convicted they will face a substantial sentence. In your case I take into account your limited intelligence and I have no doubt that others must have played a significant part in what took place and, in fact, nothing had yet happened.

The sentence of the court is one of 6 years' imprisonment."

8. The appellant is now aged 22. He has one previous conviction for affray in the Thames Magistrates' Court for which he was conditionally discharged for 12 months on 8th May 2002. There were two psychological reports before the court, the first was from Dr Robert Epstein, dated 12th August 2005. In his report Dr Epstein concluded that the appellant had a learning disability, marked by poor overall intelligence, a directionless and irresponsible life-style and major adaptive behaviour defects. According to Dr Epstein the appellant's self reported history revealed difficulties in school, long periods of truancy, poor employment and conflict with his father, all of which would be consistent with frustration and poor ability to adapt to the necessities and responsibilities of everyday life. The second psychological report and had been prepared by Professor Gisli Gudjonsson and was dated 17th September 2005. Professor Gudjonsson concluded that the appellant's intelligence fell within the borderline range of intellectual disability, ie about the bottom 2 per cent of the population. However, Professor Gudjonsson concluded that the appellant was not unduly suggestible. In the course of his oral evidence before the court, when presented with other documentary material Professor Gudjonsson maintained the conclusions that he had expressed in his report.
9. There was also a pre-sentence report, dated 23rd January 2006. In it the probation officer expressed the opinion that there appeared to be a low risk of the appellant re-offending, but a medium risk of harm to the public.
10. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Carter-Manning QC submitted that the sentence passed was manifestly excessive. He contended that insufficient account had been taken of the appellant's youth, the low level of his educational abilities and intelligence, his role as a follower rather than a leader and the fact that no approach of any kind had been shown to have been made to either the soldier to or to any of the other persons about whom enquiries had apparently been made. Mr Carter-Manning also referred to the case of the notorious cleric Abu Hamza. Mr Carter-Manning submitted that Abu Hamza's case was a very much more serious case involving the commission of offences under the same Act. It was Mr Carter-Manning's submissions that a difference of only one year was insufficient to distinguish between the two cases, having regard to the difference in the level of seriousness of the criminality involved in the two cases.
11. We have considered these submissions with great care. We note that the maximum sentence available for this offence was one of 10 years' imprisonment. However, we are not persuaded that any useful comparison can be made between this case and that involving Abu Hamza. In our view the judge was entirely right to have regard, as he did, to all the relevant facts and circumstances relating to this particular case and to this particular appellant. As the judge observed when passing sentence, the jury's verdict established that the appellant had committed a terrorist offence. We agree with the judge that a person convicted of a terrorist offence must expect a substantial sentence to be imposed by the court. The court must impose such a sentence in order to serve as a deterrent to others and to mark the extreme seriousness of the criminality involved in terrorist activities. In our view, the law abiding public is entitled to expect no less. In this case, the judge took into account all the relevant factors, including the appellant's limited intelligence, and passed a sentence that was, in our judgment, within the range that was appropriate in all the circumstances. In our view, the sentence passed by the judge certainly cannot properly be stigmatised as manifestly excessive. Accordingly for all those reasons this appeal against sentence is dismissed.