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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Britton, R. v [2006] EWCA Crim 2082 (17 August 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2006/2082.html Cite as: [2006] EWCA Crim 2082

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		Thursday, 17th August 2006

1. LORD JUSTICE GAGE: On 8th August 2006, at Aylesbury Crown Court, this appellant was found by His Honour Judge Cripps to have committed contempt in the face of the court. She was sentenced on the same day to a term of imprisonment of eight weeks.
2. She appeals against that sentence as of right.
3. The facts are as follows. On 7th August, following a trial of the appellant's son and daughter, each were convicted by a jury of an offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The contempt arises out of what occurred at the time when the foreman of the jury delivered the jury's verdict. We quote from the transcript of the taking of verdict by the clerk of the court on 7th August.

"The Clerk of the Court: Members of the jury, do you find the defendant Adam Robert Britton guilty or not guilty of wounding with intent?

(Outburst/distress from public gallery)

The Appellant: Fucking wanker.

Judge Cripps: Out. Out.

The Appellant: Fuck off, you prick.

Judge Cripps: Out. Out.

The Appellant: Fucking ... [the next word is inaudible].

Judge Cripps: Out, please. Clear the public gallery. Out.

The Appellant: You bastards! I'll get you back."

As the judge found that these remarks by the appellant were directed at the jury.

4. There was then a disturbance outside the court which involved the appellant's estranged husband. He also was found by the judge to be in contempt. However, he immediately apologised, and indeed apologised the following day, and the judge decided that there was no need for him to take any further action against him.
5. The following day, after the incident to which we have referred, the judge considered what should be done. He decided to deal with the matter as a contempt in the face of the court and directed that the appellant be represented. She was represented, and we are told by counsel, who appears before us and appeared before the judge, that on that occasion she offered an apology. The judge said of her that she was in a different position to her estranged husband. She had directed not only abuse towards the jury, but also a direct threat. The judge found that the jurors had been frightened by what had occurred and arrangements had been made for them to leave by an alternative exit.
6. On behalf of the appellant a further apology was offered. It was explained to the judge that her outburst had occurred as a result of her frustration upon learning that her children were to be deprived of their liberty. It was submitted that the appellant was now the carer of a young child, her grand daughter, the child of her daughter. The judge was told that that girl would otherwise have had to be taken into care. The judge was told that the appellant was in work and any further detention would damage the family livelihood. We have been told that the family, that is all except the appellant's husband, lived in a house with a mortgage and that the appellant was in work and paying off the mortgage instalments. Nevertheless, the judge decided that the appropriate penalty in her case was a sentence of eight weeks' imprisonment.
7. Today Mr Waite submits on behalf of this appellant that the sentence was too long. He submits that this court should vary the sentence to such a sentence as would permit this appellant to be released today.
8. In our judgment, the judge was quite right to treat the appellant's conduct as a serious contempt. We entirely understand that in criminal cases the family and friends of victims and defendants will often hold strong views. At the moment when the verdict or verdicts are announced tension will inevitably rise, but outbursts of the sort which occurred on this occasion have become all too common in recent years and cannot be tolerated. In their least serious form they may diminish the respect of the general public for the system of justice. At the other end of the scale they can be very frightening and distressing for the family and friends of those in the other camp and also, as in this case, for the jury. When threats are uttered, particularly to the jury, such conduct must be regarded as serious, even if uttered in the heat of the moment. As we have said, in this case the judge found that the jury were frightened by the threat uttered by this appellant.
9. In our judgment, the appellant's conduct clearly crossed the custody threshold. The question for us on this appeal is whether eight weeks was too long.
10. Mr Waite in his submissions has amplified to some extent the matters which were placed before the judge. We can quite understand why the judge thought it necessary to pass a sentence as long as eight weeks. It was, as he indicated, a serious contempt and it was aimed at the jury. That is the serious aspect of it.
11. Nevertheless, having considered the whole matter afresh, we are satisfied that the sentence passed by the judge was excessive and manifestly excessive in the particular circumstances of this case. We have been told that at present the appellant's eldest son is not working where he otherwise would be. He is looking after the grand daughter, something which the appellant herself undertook when she was at liberty. She is a lady of good character. She apologised to the judge on two separate occasions. Whilst this was a serious matter, we think that justice can best be served by quashing the sentence of eight weeks and for it substituting a sentence of 20 days, which means, as we understand it, she will be released today. She will then be able to go back to her home and to continue to look after her grand daughter and hopefully resume work so that the family home is retained. For those reasons, we the allow the appeal to the extent which we have explained.