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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Iredale, R v [2006] EWCA Crim 646 (1 March 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2006/646.html Cite as: [2006] EWCA Crim 646

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		Wednesday, 1st March 2006

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT: On 4th May 2000 at Liverpool Crown Court, following a trial before Mr Recorder Turner QC, this appellant was convicted of unlawful wounding on count 2 in the indictment. The jury were unable to reach a verdict on count 1, which alleged wounding with intent and that was ordered to remain on the file. On 2nd June 2000, he was sentenced to a 180 hour community service order and ordered to pay £1,500 in compensation to the complainant. On 23rd October 2001, the Single Judge having previously refused leave to appeal against conviction, the Full Court, differently constituted, refused his renewed application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against conviction. He now appeals on a Reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, in the light of fresh evidence in the form of a police scene of crime photograph, which supports the case, which he presented at trial, of self-defence.
2. The Crown does not oppose this appeal. The evidence now disclosed, it is conceded, ought to have been disclosed to the defence prior to trial and it is conceded by the prosecution that if it had been it might well have affected the decision of the jury.
3. The prosecution, in the event of this Court quashing the conviction, do not seek a retrial, having regard to the lapse of time and, of course, the fact that the appellant has served his sentence.
4. The facts were these. The complainant had agreed to sell a property which he owned to the appellant. The price was £20,000, of which £15,000 was paid in cash, £2,000 by way of a motorcar and the remaining £3,000 was to be paid by instalments of £500. During the period of 12 months after the agreement, the complainant received £1,000 and, in relation to the £2,000 which remained outstanding, the complainant then made a number of demands.
5. The appellant telephoned the police several times about the complainant's behaviour. On 16th March 1999 the complainant called at the appellant's house where he was undoubtedly hit over the head by the appellant, using a wooden pickaxe handle, which had tape round one end for a better grip.
6. When the police arrived, they saw that the appellant was covered in blood and was still bleeding heavily from his head. The complainant was found to have a substantial laceration to the left side of his head.
7. The prosecution case was that, when the complainant called on the appellant, the appellant immediately hit him on the head with the pickaxe handle as he, the complainant, stood on the doorstep. The prosecution said, in these circumstances, there was no question of self-defence, and they relied upon the appellant's acceptance, in the course of his evidence, that there was no blood in his hallway. The significance of that was that it showed, it was said, that the complainant had not entered the appellant's house at all, but had been assaulted, as we have described, upon arrival at the doorstep.
8. The defence case was that, although he had the pickaxe handle, he, the appellant, retreated as far as he could in his hallway, and it was only at that stage that he hit the complainant in self-defence.
9. The first issue for the jury therefore was whether or not the complainant had entered the house at all and, secondly, if he had not entered the house, whether the appellant was, as he claimed, or may have been, acting in self-defence.
10. The details of the evidence do not matter, save to this extent, that, in the course of cross-examination, when he was giving evidence, the appellant agreed that there was no blood on the walls or on the floor. The question was asked of him "presumably there is blood on the walls or the floor." The appellant replied "Well, apparently there wasn't" and he said that he had not himself cleaned up any blood. The absence of blood in the hallway was highlighted in the summing-up by the learned Recorder and was referred to both by the Single Judge, when refusing leave to appeal and by the Full Court when the renewed application for leave to appeal was refused.
11. The fresh evidence amounts to this. There was a police scene of crime photograph, No 13, among a number of other photographs which had been taken by a Scenes of Crime officer on 17th March 1999, that is to say on the same day that the incident had occurred and a little later in the evening. That photograph, on examination in a form which is sufficiently light for the detail to be made out, shows blood on the floor in the hallway. Clearly, the inference is that it got deposited there during the course of this incident.
12. There is also evidence proffered to the Court from the person from the solicitors acting on behalf of the defendant, in the course of the trial. That indicates that the question of whether or not there was blood inside the house had never actually arisen prior to trial and it is conceded, as we have said by the prosecution, that this material photograph was not disclosed to the defence (and it matters not for whatever reason) prior to the trial. It seems it is unlikely that it was disclosed prior to sentence either.
13. What is submitted by Mr Taylor, on behalf of the appellant, is that the fresh evidence to which we have summarily referred should be received by this Court under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended, and having received that evidence, it is such as ought properly to be regarded as rendering the conviction unsafe.
14. We accept that submission. It may well be that had the jury known of the existence of the photograph, their verdict may well have been different, just as indeed, may have been the appellant's evidence on the subject of whether or not there was blood at the scene after the incident. In those circumstances, this appeal is allowed. The conviction is quashed.