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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> The County Council of the City and County of Cardiff -v- Scully-Hicks & Ors [2016] EWFC 79 (16 December 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2016/79.html Cite as: [2016] EWFC 79 |
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them and other persons named in this version of the judgment may be identified by name or location. The anonymity of the elder child, referred to a “C” must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court and may be punished by a fine or imprisonment of up to two years.
Neutral Citation Number: [2016] EWFC 79
Case No: CF16C00895
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Cardiff Civil Justice Centre
Date: 16th December 2016
Before :
Mr Justice Moor
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Between :
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The County Council of the City and County of Cardiff Applicant |
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Matthew Scully-Hicks First Respondent -and- Craig Scully-Hicks Second Respondent -and- C Scully-Hicks (by his Children’s Guardian, Lynette Clarke) Third Respondent -and- The Vale of Glamorgan Council Intervenor |
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Mr James Tillyard QC and Mr Owen Thomas for the Applicant
Ms Jane Crowley QC and Mr Colin Douglas for the First Respondent
Ms Ruth Henke QC and Ms Catrin John for the Second Respondent
Mr Ian Williams for the Third Respondent
Mr Christopher Felstead for the Intervenor
Hearing dates: 4th to 16th December 2016
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JUDGMENT
MR JUSTICE MOOR:-
The history of the case
The Medical evidence
The Law
The burden and standard of proof
33. The standard of proof is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. This applies to both the determination of whether Elsie’s injuries were caused non-accidentally but also as to the identity of the perpetrator (see Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35; [2008] 2 FLR 141 and Re S-B (Children) [2010] 1 FLR 1161).
“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a “fact in issue”), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened.”
“I would go further and announce loud and clear that the standard of proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold criteria under section 31(2) or the welfare considerations in section 1 of the 1989 Act is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”
“None of the parties in this case has invited the Supreme Court to depart from those observations, nor have they supported the comment that Re B “was a sweeping departure from other authorities in the House of Lords in relation to child abuse, most obviously the case of Re H”. All are agreed that Re B reaffirmed the principles adopted in Re H while rejecting the nostrum “the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needed to prove it” which had become commonplace but was a misinterpretation of what Lord Nicholls had in fact said.”
“In our legal system, if a judge finds it more likely than not that something did take place, then it is treated as having taken place. If he finds it more likely than not that it did not take place, then it is treated as not having taken place. He is not allowed to sit on the fence. He has to find for one side or the other. Sometimes the burden of proof will come to his rescue: the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But generally speaking a judge is able to make up his mind where the truth lies without needing to rely on the burden of proof.”
(a) To apply the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities;
(b) In so doing, to have regard to the seriousness of the allegations and the strength and quality of the evidence;
(c) To give the evidence “critical and anxious” examination; and
(d) At all times, to apply “good sense and appropriately careful consideration to the evidence”.
41. Findings of fact must be based on evidence. The court must be careful to avoid speculation, particularly in situations where there is a gap in the evidence. As Munby LJ observed in Re A (Fact-finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12:-
“It is an elementary proposition that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation”.
Lies
The position of the Police
Expert evidence
“The expert advises but the judge decides. The judge decides on the evidence. If there is nothing before the court, no facts or no circumstances shown to the court which throw doubt on the expert evidence, then, if that is all with which the court is left, the court must accept it. There is, however, no rule that the judge suspends judicial belief simply because the evidence is given by an expert.”
“An expert is not in any special position and there is no presumption of belief in a doctor however distinguished he or she may be. It is, however, necessary for the judge to give reasons for disagreeing with experts’ conclusions or recommendations…A Judge cannot substitute his own views for the views of the experts without some evidence to support what he concludes.”
(a) The cause of an injury or an episode that cannot be explained scientifically remains equivocal.
(b) Recurrence is not in itself probative.
(c) Particular caution is necessary in any case where the medical experts disagree, one opinion declining to exclude a reasonable possibility of natural cause.
(d) The court must always be on guard against the over-dogmatic expert, the expert whose reputation or amour proper is at stake, or the expert who has developed a scientific prejudice.
(e) The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark”.
48. The expert evidence does not sit in a vacuum nor is it to be interpreted in isolation from the other evidence. Even if an expert says that that there are a number of possible explanations for some occurrence, it is still open to the court to find on the evidence as a whole which is the probable explanation (see, for example, Re B (Non-accidental injury) [2002] EWCA Civ 752; [2002] 2 FLR 1133).
49. The frontiers of medical science are always expanding. In R v Harris & Others [2005] EWCA Crim 1980, Professor Luthert was quoted with approval at Paragraph 135 that “there are areas of ignorance. It is very easy to try and fill those areas of ignorance with what we know but I think that is very important to accept that we do not necessarily have a sufficient understanding to explain every case.” It follows that it is always open to a judge to rule that the cause of an injury remains unknown. Such a finding does not represent either forensic or professional failure. As Hedley J said in Re R (Care Proceedings Causation) [2011] EWHC 1715 (Fam), it simply recognises that we still have much to learn and that it is dangerous and wrong to infer non-accidental injury from the absence of any other understood mechanism.
The “triad”
My conclusions as to the medical evidence
The factual medical witnesses
The other witnesses
The evidence of the parents
My overall conclusions
Alleged failure to protect
Conclusion
Postscript