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	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A County Council v G & Ors [2015] EWFC B53 (02 February 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2015/B53.html Cite as: [2015] EWFC B53

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IN THE WREXHAM FAMILY COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF R (A CHILD)

		2nd February 2015

JUDGMENT 2^nd February 2015

HIS HONOUR JUDGE GARETH JONES:

1. I have before me an application for a Care and a Placement Order in the case of a child I shall identify as "R" in the course of this judgment, born on 1^st July 2014, and he is therefore approximately seven months of age. R is represented by his Guardian, Miss Edwards, and by his solicitor Mr Woodward.
2. The Local Authority who have issued both applications I shall identify as the "Local Authority", and they are represented by Miss Hewitt.
3. R's mother who I shall identify only as the "mother" in the course of this judgement is represented by Mr Sefton.
4. R's father who I shall identify only as the "father" is represented by Mr Dodd.
5. At the IRH on 16^th January 2015 I made an Order under section 20 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 to provide for DNA testing with regard to R's paternity. That has not been complied with as yet. I am told that samples are to be taken from the parents and R in the course of this week. The Order has not been revoked, but the result of the Order will not emerge until after the conclusion of this hearing.
6. However, I proceed today and this week on the basis of R's birth registration; that the father shares parental responsibility for R and that his consent needs to be dispensed with prior to the making of any Placement Order. If it transpires hereafter that the father is not in fact R's birth father, and that he does not validly share parental responsibility, and that any dispensation of his consent was in fact unnecessary, that would not, in my judgment, invalidate any Order made as a result thereof since the mother's consent would also need to be dispensed with before I could proceed.
7. There might of course be a need to correct any certificate of birth, but I would look to the Local Authority to attend to that in due course.
8. In addition to the relevant written material and the documentation and reports in the trial bundles I have considered and heard oral evidence from a number of individuals:

(i) the key social worker, Miss M;

(ii) the mother;

(iii) the father; and

(iv) the Guardian.

9. The hearing began on Monday 2^nd February 2015, it continued on Tuesday and Wednesday 3^rd and 4^th February when I heard submissions, and I deliver judgment today, Thursday 5^th February 2015.

The background to the case

10. The mother and the father's relationship began in or about January 2013, and they separated finally in August 2014. Prior to R's birth (on the mother's account at least) there were occasions of acrimony and violence within the relationship. In particular she told me of an incident on 3^rd November 2013 when she was kicked by the father (see D26), and the mother also told me in her evidence that she had attended AB Hospital [name of hospital given] because of an injury to her right wrist occasioned by the father.
11. As a result of the episode on 3^rd November 2013 the mother said that for a time she and the father had separated but they were reconciled "a few days later" (see D26).
12. To what extent this formed a pattern for their relationship prior to R's birth is difficult for me to say. The father for his part did not accept in his evidence the mother's version of events, however, the parties readily admitted that they would argue by text messages rather than openly by verbal communication, and whether that operated as a safety valve or merely as a pretext for further verbal argument is a matter of conjecture.
13. I am also unclear whether and for how long the parents lived together continuously as a couple during the first part of their relationship (up to R's birth). The mother said that while she and the father lived together as a couple for approximately two months before R's birth in July 2014, before that the pattern was a lot more fragmentary. The mother and the father would be together for a while (for a few weeks or so) then the mother would move back to her parents'. If this was so, the parents' living pattern which existed before R's birth was very largely replicated after his birth also.
14. It follows that their relationship was largely untested before they had the additional responsibility of caring for an infant child. If they did not live together for any length of time, the strength and quality of their relationship would be subjected to the strain of caring for a newborn baby without a proven track record of endurance, joint endeavour and mutual support.
15. The father had a bedsit flat in X [name of street and town given]. The maternal grandparents lived at Y [address given] (or at least the maternal grandfather did). The mother told me in evidence that the maternal grandmother slept several nights a week elsewhere with a friend; I simply do not know whether this was a permanent arrangement or not.
16. The other address of relevance in this case is the address of the mother's sister, A. She lived at Z [address given].
17. I should indicate that I have recently (on 15^th January 2015) completed a finding of fact hearing in other separate Care Proceedings involving A and her young child, T. The important time frame for that hearing was 31^st July 2014 to 2^nd August 2014 which, as will be apparent hereafter, chimes with the timeframe in this case to a significant degree.
18. I made findings (which have been disclosed to the parties in these proceedings) whereby I concluded that A had injured T, with inflicted non-accidental soft-tissue injuries being caused. An outcome/welfare hearing for T is scheduled for May 2015.
19. R was these parents' first child. It is accepted that the mother's pregnancy was a difficult one and there were complications with the birth itself. The mother indicates in her oral evidence that she had previously miscarried. By 2^nd July 2014, however, the mother and R were fit for discharge.
20. On 31^st July 2014 the emergency services were called to the father's flat in [name of street given]. R had sustained multiple soft-tissue and bony injuries. He was taken to AB Hospital [name of hospital given] and the full extent of his injuries were detected thereafter.
21. There followed a joint Section 47 investigation between the Police and Social Services. No action is to be taken by the North Wales Police, although the parents were interviewed on two occasions. The two were interviewed on 1^st August 2014, then the father was interviewed on 12^th September 2014 and the mother on 17^th September 2014. Those interviews have been transcribed (see section I).
22. It is what happened to R during this brief interlude between 2^nd July and 31^st July 2014 which has featured in this case.
23. An Emergency Protection Order followed on 4^th August 2014, and an Interim Care Order was granted from 12^th August 2014. Since 4^th August 2014 R has been accommodated by Local Authority foster carers.
24. The parents' shared contact initially was set at three times per week, and then, following the parents' separation at the end of August 2014, individual weekly contact sessions were afforded for the mother and the father separately. The mother attended assiduously. The father's attendance has been more irregular, but I am told with some recent improvement.
25. The Local Authority's Threshold Document of 9^th January 2015 (see P5) avers that R's injuries were the result of:

(i) a non-accidental inflicted causation; and

(ii) the mother and father were uncertain perpetrators within a closed pool of two potential perpetrators.

26. Furthermore, it is alleged that having regard to the nature of the injuries inflicted, the pattern of parental care/involvement, and the confined nature of the accommodation in the father's bedsit, if one parent was responsible as a perpetrator then the other parent would know what had happened, and by failing to disclose what had happened (or its very obvious aftermath) the Local Authority contends there is a very significant failure to protect.
27. The Local Authority's case is that neither parent can be trusted as a protective parent, and the absence of any explanation limits the evaluation of risk in this case.
28. The inability to identify the perpetrator and the surrounding circumstances, makes it impossible to assess the future risk with regard to R. Accordingly, on the basis firstly of safety, and secondly honesty/openness, the Local Authority avers that the risk cannot be properly and safely managed in this case. R simply cannot be safeguarded.
29. There is no suitable familial carer in the wider family and accordingly a placement outside the family by way of adoption (the Local Authority contends) provides a safe family life for R in the future.
30. Long-term foster care (the only other viable alternative in this case it is said) would not be in the best interests of a child so young as R.
31. The Guardian agrees with the Local Authority's Final Care Plan (see C10) which proposes an adoptive placement for R in a closed adoption, with indirect Agency post box contact only, post placement. The parents' contact would be tapered to a farewell contact to coincide with the matching process anticipated.
32. The mother opposes the Plan and she wants R to be returned to her care as a sole carer with familial support.
33. The father does not put forward a positive and assertive case as R's future sole carer. His participation in contact, and the incomplete Local Authority assessments of him makes his stated desire in the witness box to care for R tokenistic only.
34. The Local Authority has considered a number of potential familial carers, in particular on the maternal side of the family, since there were no proposed candidates on the paternal side. The maternal grandparents for historic reasons, it is said, could not offer an appropriate standard of care in this case. The maternal grandparents' home conditions were raised as an issue in the mother's sister's A's case, and their historic capabilities as parents was also questioned.
35. The mother's own sister, A, is beset with her own difficulties and would probably be well advised to concentrate upon the impending Care Proceedings involving her own child T.
36. The mother's brother (who is about to undergo gender reassignment) has much to contend with and has been rejected in a viability assessment which sets out the relevant factors. On a very basic level, his accommodation circumstances appear to be unsuitable. He lacks any experience of childcare, and in fact has no real relationship with R whatsoever. He lives away from this area and there are a number of personal factors which make his role as a potential familial carer extremely unlikely.
37. No familial member has disputed the Local Authority's conclusions with regard to the prospect of 'good enough', safe, familial care and accordingly the avenue of familial placement appears to be closed.
38. The realistic choices in this case then with regard to placement for R are threefold:

(i) maternal reunification;

(ii) long-term foster care; or

(iii) adoption.

The legal provisions to be applied in relation to the threshold and the care applications

39. The Local Authority's Threshold Document relates to inflicted injuries (which I shall summarise in a moment). The findings are relevant to section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989, and section 1(3)(e) of the Children Act 1989.
40. The standard of proof to be applied by the Court in relation to the threshold is the balance of probabilities, and this applies not only to the identification of harm, but also to the identification of any perpetrator of such harm.
41. In this case there is no real dispute medically with regard to the extent and the likely causation of R's injuries, and I will consider later a schedule of medical concurrence which has been completed in this case.
42. The real issue revolves around the identification of any perpetrator. All relevant factors can be taken into account in relation to this issue, but in this case there are only two potential perpetrators identified. As Lady Hale said in the case of Re B (Children) [2008] 2 FLR 141 at paragraphs 31 and 32:

"Day after day, up and down the country, on issues large and small, judges are making up their minds whom to believe. They are guided by many things, including the inherent probabilities, any contemporaneous documentation or records, any circumstantial evidence tending to support one account rather than the other, and their overall impression of the characters and motivations of the witnesses. The task is a difficult one. It must be performed without prejudice and preconceived ideas. But it is the task which we are paid to perform to the best of our ability.

32. In our legal system, if a judge finds it more likely than not that something did take place, then it is treated as having taken place. If he finds it more likely than not that it did not take place, then it is treated as not having taken place."

43. In assessing the inherent probabilities and improbabilities, in general, it could be argued that the following propositions may be more probable (unless of course there is evidence which lends itself to a different conclusion):

(i) Perpetration by one individual is arguably more probable than perpetration by two individuals in separate episodes. A household where two carers are capable of causing separate episodes of injury to an infant is more improbable than a household where one carer is capable of doing so. However, it is perfectly possible that a household can include two carers who are capable of hurting or injuring a child.

(ii) It is more probably arguable that an incident of injury would occur within a domestic environment rather than outside in the open where a perpetrator runs the risk of being seen by, and apprehended by a third party.

(iii) Perpetration in the absence of witness rather than in the presence of a witness arguably will be more likely, unless of course the perpetrator can rely on the silence or the collusion of any witnessing party. This is because self-restraint or fear of ultimate detection would tend to lead to such caution. Of course if two adults hurt or injure a child then each might have a reason to keep quiet about it.

(iv) A finding that it is more probable that A is the perpetrator rather than B is not a conclusion that A is the perpetrator rather than B for certain, but rather that I conclude that there is more evidence in favour of A being the perpetrator rather than B.

44. If I cannot identify a perpetrator to the necessary standard in a case of non-accidental injury, then in an uncertain perpetrator case I must consider whether I can identify a group of possible perpetrators, applying the following well known test; is there a likelihood or a real possibility that an individual was the perpetrator of inflicted injury? If I am able to identify a perpetrator then I should do so, however I should not strain to do so where that is not possible.
45. The threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 could be satisfied if I conclude that either parent was the perpetrator of a non-accidental injury, or in an uncertain perpetrator case if the group of possible perpetrators was comprised of the parents, or indeed a parent or a carer.
46. If the Court makes findings of uncertain perpetration then those caught in the group of perpetrators are of course treated as being possible perpetrators. Accordingly an innocent party may be tainted by an uncertain perpetrator outcome. On the other hand, the consequences of the identification of an incorrect perpetrator could be disastrous for R, and perhaps for other children as well. Accordingly the stakes are extremely high.
47. In this case there are substantial issues of credibility which relate to both parents. They may have lied or they may have concealed the truth. I remind myself of the guidance given in R v Lucas [1981] QB 70; a witness may lie for a variety of reasons and motivations which may not be related to culpability. The fact that a person may lie about one aspect does not necessarily mean that he or she is lying about another aspect. If there is no innocent explanation for a lie then it can be taken into account in my overall assessment of the witness. The more significant and the more frequent be the lying, then of course the more relevant it may be.
48. In Care Proceedings if the threshold is established, I must next consider the Local Authority's Plan for R, having regard to the paramountcy of his welfare and applying the so called 'welfare checklist' provisions under section 1 of the Children Act 1989.
49. In accordance with the Convention, a Care Plan must be a proportionate and a necessary response to the risk of harm. In Re B [2013] 2 FLR 1015 a Care Order depriving a parent of his or her care of a child, particularly where this involves a placement outside the birth family by way of adoption, is to be considered as a last resort. In cases involving adoption a consideration of the pros and cons of each realistic placement option is required.
50. I will deal in a separate section of this judgment with the specific legal requirements for a Placement Order, however the division of this judgment into separate headings is intended to provide some structure to the judgment and to assist with its clarity, and it is not intended to restrict "a proper holistic evaluation of the central welfare question", and I am well aware of the observations of McFarlance LJ in Re C [2013] EWCA Civ 1257 at paragraphs 28 and 29.

R's medical presentation

51. There are no substantial medical issues in this case. The trial bundle includes the medical reports and the records generated from R's initial attendance at the local hospital. However, for the purpose of this section of the judgment, I shall include and make reference to the second opinion reports of Dr Fairhurst and Dr Alexander; they are the single joint experts instructed in this case, being a Paediatric Radiologist and a Consultant Paediatrician respectively.
52. There is a schedule of medical concurrence dated 5^th January 2015 (see E36-41). That can and should be read in its entirety into this judgment.
53. Before 31^st July 2014 R was basically a well baby. The first visit by the health visitor (SE) took place on 14^th July 2104 (see I193) at the mother's sister's (A) address. R was weighed and for this purpose his clothes were removed, and there was no sign of injury.
54. The second visit by the health visitor on 23^rd July 2014 (see I196) was again at the mother's sister's address. R was not weighed nor examined on this occasion, but he appeared to the health visitor to be generally well.
55. After R's admission on 31^st July 2014 the following injuries were detected:

(i) 0.5 x 0.5 cm bruise to the right mid forearm;

(ii) two bruises 0.5 x 0.5 cm on the left mid forearm (medial side);

(iii) 0.5 x 0.5 cm bruise over the tip of the right shoulder (the acromion);

(iv) two 1.5 x 1.5 cm bruises on the anterior surface of the right shin;

(v) 1.5 x 1.5 cm bruise on the posterior surface of the right shin;

(vi) two 1 x 1 cm bruises on the anterior left shin;

(vii) 1 x 1 cm bruise on the posterior surface of the right shin;

(viii) 2.5 x 1.5 cm oval area of skin loss (this was dry and scaly) over the mid lumbar region.

56. A body map identifies the distribution of this bruising (see G61-63). Many of the bruises identified at G61 are marked "swollen" or "swollen tender", this being an indicator of clinical appearance and recent or fairly recent infliction.
57. There are some poor quality photographs taken in the hospital on 1^st August 2014 (see G23-24) but there is a much clear set of Police photographs and I have both photocopies and the originals available to me.
58. It is readily apparent that the oval area of skin loss over the mid lumbar region is significant in its dimension and extremely obvious by its red/raw colouration. This is an injury which could not be missed by any carer who saw R's naked back at the relevant time.
59. There were also bony injuries detected subsequently (see E37):

(i) a fracture to the left clavicle;

(ii) a fracture of the right seventh rib;

(iii) a probable periosteal injury to the sixth, seventh and eighth right ribs.

60. At E38-39 the schedule continues in this way:

"9. R does not suffer from any medical condition which would render him vulnerable to suffering fractures during the course of normal handling. Each of the fractures described above are highly indicative of non-accidental causation. An extreme degree of force is necessary to produce these fractures and they are not seen in the normal handling of a baby.

The smaller bruises over the forearms and the shoulder measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm are typical of what is known as fingertip bruising, and suggest that that particular part of the limb and the shoulder have been gripped tightly by a hand which leaves a fingertip imprint.

The marks to the lower legs are from severe squeezing and twisting. The area of skin loss over the lumbar region appears typical of a friction burn and is typical of a naked baby being dragged across a carpeted floor, or being thrown across a floor.

The metaphyseal fractures to both lower limbs (the bucket handle fractures) are highly indicative of non-accidental injury. These fractures are caused by an adult gripping the legs and twisting them violently. The force required to cause such an injury is well in excess of that used in normal day-to-day handling of an infant with normal bones.

The larger marks over the lower limbs, would together with the swelling, suggest that the limb has been gripped very tightly by an adult hand.

The fractured clavicle (collar bone) and the bruising to the shoulder occurred as a result of blunt trauma, or was due to a forcible pulling out of R's arm away from his body. This would have been a violent manoeuvre and would involve griping the chest, which is probably the cause of the fracture to the right seventh rib.

The fractures of the posterior aspect of the rib do not occur from a direct blow but require compressive force to be applied to the ribs, such as when the chest is squeezed as the infant his held around the chest during a shaking episode."

61. From the x-ray evidence solely the fractures occurred within 10 days of the skeletal survey, that being a timeframe of 22^nd to 31^st July 2014.
62. The next section of the schedule refers to, firstly the timing of the injuries, and secondly the effect of any injury upon R.

"It is not possible to put any date or time on the bruising, but taken in the round there was swelling and the bruising would have occurred at the same time as the fractures because of the mechanism of the fractures. The fractures probably occurred as one event, and therefore the bruising and gripping would have occurred at the same time, within a few hours of R being seen at AB Hospital on 31^st July 2014. On admission an examination by Dr Bandla she found 'both ankles and shins were swollen and tender, the left more than the right'. The bruises over both shins are obvious in the photographs; swelling and tenderness suggest that the injuries were fresh. The consensus view is that all the injuries occurred at around the same time but involved multiple manoeuvres."

63. So far as the effects on R are concerned the schedule continues:

"The whole attack would have been excruciatingly painful for R. He would have screamed with pain and continued to scream for many minutes. He would have been distressed for one to two hours thereafter and would have cried out on being handled after this event, as indeed he did when he was admitted to hospital. The perpetrator would have known immediately that R had been badly injured. If a non-perpetrator had been in the vicinity of the scene but not a witness, then R's screams would have been so out of character and different that the non-perpetrator should have appreciated that something serious had occurred.

The metaphyseal fractures, the rib fractures, the periosteal injuries and the fracture of the clavicle would have caused R some distress for several days after the injuries occurred. For several days after the injuries occurred a non-perpetrator who was not present when the injuries occurred would have noticed a change in R's behaviour and noticed that R was in distress, and that something serious had happened to him.

R presented to hospital with swollen and tender shins and ankles, and was very distressed when handled. It should have been obvious to a carer handling R at any time after the incident, for example (changing nappies) that something serious had happened to him."

64. While there is considerable doubt about the mother and R's exact movements between 2^nd July 2014 and 31^st July 2014 there seems to be a consensus that between 25^th and 31^st July 2014 the mother, father and R were together as a family in the father's bedsit in [name of street given]. They also appear to have been together there as a family during the initial period after the mother and R were discharged from hospital on 2^nd July 2014 following R's birth. It is the intervening period which is confusing and uncertain.
65. However, in the week or so leading up to R's presentation with injury on 31^st July 2014 the mother and father had joint care of R, the mother being perhaps the main carer.
66. The father's flat in [name of street given] was a house of multiple occupation; there were 8 flats there with the father's being the flat on the top attic floor. The bedsit offered very basic accommodation; sleeping/living and cooking facilities in a single room, smaller than this courtroom. There was a communal bathroom in the flat, down a flight of stairs, across a landing and down a few more steps. Accordingly R was bathed usually in a bowl in the bedsit.
67. It was within this confined space with two adult carers where R appears to have sustained his injuries.
68. The neighbours offered very little by way of assistance. The father told me that he "kept himself to himself".
69. Neither the mother nor the father blame any third party individual for perpetration, and no other party has been joined as an intervenor in this case.

The mother's account

70. The common account from R's parents of his presentation in the bedsit in [address given] immediately before the emergency services were called has been reasonably consistent. R was basically well until the afternoon when between 17:30 and 18:00 hours he vomited; there was a streak of blood detected in the vomit. R's father bathed him afterwards. Later R's colouration changed to yellow and very pale. The mother was alerted; she was in the bedsit at the time, and R's eyes appeared to roll back and then the ambulance was summoned. That account is summarised in Dr Whisby's report (see B12).
71. What this common account does not mention, nor explain, is what incident or episode gave rise to this altered presentation in a child only four weeks of age. Having regard to the medical evidence, the absence of any adequate explanation from the parents unavoidably results in severe credibility issues for each of them from the very outset. Since they accept that the 'pool of perpetrators' is confined to the two of them, and the bedsit accommodation is itself so confined, and the medical timeframe is so limited the perpetrator obviously appears to be withholding a truthful account. However a non-perpetrator in this scenario could hardly fail to be aware of an incident/episode of causation, or its aftermath, and either is also actively concealing what occurred, or is wilfully turning a blind eye to some pretty obvious indicators; either the external physical signs of injury, the child's behaviour and likely reaction to injury, or the behaviour of the perpetrating carer.
72. This is coupled with another phenomenon in this case, namely the developing narrative from the mother and the father during these proceedings. This is a case where the recollection of both parties appears to improve with the passage of time, rather than as might be expected, fade with the passage of time. Unravelling where the truth lies in this case, therefore, is not a straightforward process.
73. The explanation offered at the hospital for R's injuries at the outset was obviously inadequate; namely that R had caught his limbs on the side of a Moses basket when moving or flailing about (see D4).
74. In these proceedings the mother's first statement dated 11^th September 2014 is quite clear, this statement of course having been filed after the parents' separation:

(i) R was a quiet and a happy baby (see paragraph 15).

(ii) The mother had never heard R screaming.

(iii) The mother had no explanation for the red/raw friction injury to R's back. On 31^st July 2014, "When I changed him" [R] "the mark was not there" (see paragraph 18). Having regard to the medical evidence this stretches credulity to breaking point. Since R was bathed by his father prior to the emergency services being contacted (and R was therefore naked) there was every opportunity for the parents to see this obviously disfiguring cosmetic blemish. The mother apparently dressed R in his babygrow before his journey to the hospital, and yet in her first Police interview on 1^st August 2014 (see I5) she indicated that she was alerted to this mark at the hospital itself on 31^st July 2014.

(iv) The mother is quite clear that she has never seen the father "… do anything untoward to R" (see paragraph 26 of her first statement). In the light of her subsequent statements this is a withholding of the truth, or alternatively her later statements, are a fabrication. However, this assertion in her first Court statement accorded with her Police interview on 1^st August 2014 (see I43). When asked how the fractures could have been caused her reply:

"I really don't have a clue how that could have happened. Not even the slightest clue how that would have happened".

(v) Fifthly, the mother indicated that the father was a controlling partner with difficulties with his anger management. That is in contrast to her Police interview 1^st August 2014 (see I14) when she indicated that everything was fine in their relationship, and at I49:

"I definitely know the father wouldn't hurt R because we were over protective".

And later:

"I can't understand how really it would have happened".

She went on to say the father "… has been very gentle with him" [R].

75. On 27^th October 2014 the mother completed another statement of evidence for this Court in which she stated:

(i) At that stage she was now "one hundred per cent certain" that R was hurt by his father (see paragraph 3).

(ii) The father had confessed to the assault on her voicemail, the confession being "I hurt your son". Unfortunately no third party has corroborated this admission/confession and the voicemail has been deleted and cannot be retrieved (see paragraph 3). I would not accept this "confession" on such a flimsy and self-interested basis.

(iii) The father could be "very rough" when winding R and R would cry. The mother would tell the father to stop, but he would snap at her (see paragraph 9 of the mother's second statement). Further (see paragraph 11) R would "scream" when being winded by his father. The mother tried to intervene but she worried that this would agitate the father further and she continued:

"When the injuries came to light I suspected that this could have been the reason for it".

No satisfactory explanation is given for withholding this disclosure.

(iv) On one occasion the mother saw the father change R's nappy and "… pull R along the floor to him". The carpet in the bedsit was extremely rough and the mother said: "I believe this may have been what caused the cut to R's back" (see paragraph 10 of the mother's statement). It is certainly true that the carpet in the father's bedsit was "… particularly rough" (see H6, the Section 47 enquiry).

76. Again there is no satisfactory explanation by the mother for withholding this disclosure. Indeed in the Police interview of the mother of 1^st August 2014 (see I40) her then explanation for the friction burn was that R's babygrow or vest had rubbed against his skin when he was being winded. That is simply not a credible account.
77. These belated disclosures, of themselves, in the second statement by the mother give rise to very significant failures by the mother to protect R, because forewarned by these episodes, if they were true, why did she not protect R by obtaining assistance? If later he was injured by his father, then the mother's responsibility for what transpired was very significant indeed.
78. Finally, on 22^nd January 2015 (days only before this final hearing) the mother completed her final statement of evidence. In summary the following account was given:

(i) Five days before R was admitted to AB Hospital [name of hospital given] on 31^st July 2014 the mother and R had returned to live at the father's bedsit. Prior to that they had moved out and were staying either at the maternal grandfather's or the maternal aunt's (that of course being an issue in the case). There was an episode when the father "… grabbed R and then threw R onto the bed", that being only a few inches away. The father was shouting at R to shut up and R was crying. The mother was hysterical, the mother realised that R was on the floor:

"I don't know how R came to be on the floor. I don't think the father did drop him but I didn't see" (see paragraph 9).

(ii) R's father then proceeded to change R's nappy and "… dragged R by both of his legs towards him". The carpet was very rough, the mother "… could see R was in pain" (see paragraph 10). The mother did not suggest that this episode, alarming as it was, caused the multiple fractures and soft-tissue injuries evident on 31^st July 2014, but "… this may be when the (friction) burn was caused" (see paragraph 11). In her first Police interview (see I43) when asked by the Police whether R had been pulled across the floor, thereby accounting for the friction burn, the mother's reply then was:

"No, definitely not. He doesn't go on the floor, he's either on the bed or in his Moses basket".

(iii) The mother appreciated that she should have disclosed these very, very serious episodes far sooner (if of course they were true) but blamed her inability to "open up" for withholding this information. The mother attributed her newfound ability to come clean on these issues to the work of Women's Aid and the Freedom Programme. The mother told me in evidence that she had attended one session of this programme.

(iv) Needless to say, these extremely dramatic events described by the mother are omitted entirely from her two Police interviews in August and September 2014. This developing narrative by the mother, initially defending the father and then gradually implicating him to a greater and greater extent, is a process evident to some degree in the Police interviews as well as in the Court statements as I have identified.

79. By the 17^th September 2014 Police interview, "I believe (the father) has done it" (see I141). At I142/I143 the father "… is a compulsive liar". Again the mother said, "… he probably can't even spell the truth let alone tell it".
80. The Police were anxious in this second interview to clarify the mother's movements with R between 2^nd July 2014 and 31^st July 2014, and in particular prior to 25^th July 2014, when on the mother's own admission, she was not with the father. However, as the medical evidence has crystallised around an episode of inflicted injury to R, closer to his presentation at hospital on 31^st July 2014 the mother's precise movements and location has assumed perhaps a lesser forensic significance.
81. It was accepted during this hearing that the mother and father together (as I have said) were alone in the bedsit in [name of street given] on 31^st July 2014 when R's injuries were either wholly or almost totally occasioned. Even the mother's explanation for the infliction of the friction burn on 25^th July 2014 appears unlikely since neither the mother nor the father report seeing this injury between 25^th July and 31^st July 2014, an injury which is terribly, terribly obvious in the forensic photographs dated 1^st August 2014.
82. If hypothetically this injury had been caused five days before 31^st July 2014, and it presented with the appearance indicated in the photograph taken on 1^st August 2014, its appearance on 25^th or 26^th July 2014 would be even worse and far more obvious, and any reasonably competent and protective carer would have noticed it. The episode described by the mother on 25^th or 26^th July 2014 concealed by her (and on her account by the father also) would therefore amount to a monumental failure to protect, every bit as significant as the actual infliction of the later injury.
83. I am extremely sceptical and suspicious about the mother's last minute account. Its timing and the absence of any apparent aftermath of injury thereafter makes it extremely unlikely.
84. Furthermore there are discrepancies in the account provided, with regard to the mother's movements in July 2014, and where she was staying, but these are now perhaps of greater significance when considering the mother's overall credibility rather than affording a venue for infliction of injury by the mother solely, or by a third party.
85. The other issue referred to in the mother's second Police interview in September 2014 was a number of the text messages passing between her and the father. From some of the extracts I have seen they do not, to my mind, reveal a controlled individual or a submissive partner unable to assert her point of view.
86. The mother in the witness box was occasionally tearful, but usually defiant and stubborn in her responses. A standard response to the very many lies told by her over the months since 31^st July 2014 was essentially to the effect that she was unable to be frank and open with regard to the past because of the father's control over her, and because of her own personality/character weaknesses resulting from her troubled childhood experiences. The assistance provided by Women's Aid and her own reflections over the last weeks and months had now enabled her to see things more clearly, and prompted her greater candour in this courtroom. That at least was the basis of her case.
87. However, I would not be confident that if I waited a further six months, I might receive a wholly truthful account from the mother. On the basis of the mother's showing in the witness box I think that is extremely unlikely.
88. The mother's central problem is that she (like the father) simply cannot account for the serious multiple fractures and the soft-tissue injuries. However many times we go round and round in circles that is the simple problem that confronts each of them. Either she was responsible and the father knows that, or he was responsible and she knows that. What I cannot at this juncture fathom is why after their separation they both choose to remain silent, and I ask myself rhetorically are they both in some way involved so that neither of them can accuse the other?

The father's account

89. The father's intellectual limitations were very obvious in the witness box. His oral evidence was taken in blocks of 20 minutes duration with intervening breaks. A Dr Shaun Mosher, a Clinical Psychologist, has provided a report on the father's difficulties. An appreciable time lag took place between each question and reply by the father in the witness box, and often he was inaudible in his replies.
90. In his first statement of evidence (28^th August 2014), the father indicated that there was an occasion, two or three days after the mother returned to his bedsit on 25^th July 2014, that he noticed "purplish bruising on the outside of (R) legs" when changing R's nappy. He drew these marks to the mother's attention but she said they were nothing to worry about.
91. No other episode of injury was noted by him until R's presentation deteriorated on 31^st July 2014, or at least that was the position until he entered the witness box.
92. In his oral evidence the father cannot say whether the bruises seen by him prior to 31^st July 2014 were the same ones as those identified in R's medical examination at AB Hospital [name of hospital given]. He was quite clear that he could not see any bruises to R until he got to AB Hospital on 31^st July 2014, save for those I have mentioned above. In clarification, in his evidence the father said that the bruise was visible on one ankle; he thought it was a birthmark, however the ankle was swollen in appearance. This mark was seen by the father, either days before 31^st July 2014, or alternatively a couple of weeks before 31^st July 2014. I was unclear from his oral evidence what the precise timeframe was.
93. The difficulty with the father's account is this:

(i) the earlier bruising did not result in any protective response by him whatsoever;

(ii) this mark, if indeed it was seen, is unlikely to be the far more extensive bruising subsequently identified to R's legs on 31^st July 2014 which were swollen/fresh in appearance, and the father does not in fact assert it was the same bruising, and the father's timeframe in evidence is extremely uncertain; and

(iii) the mother denied this earlier appearance of bruising in her oral evidence.

94. In a fresh disclosure in his oral evidence, while being cross-examined, the father asserted that there was an earlier episode before 31^st July 2014 when the mother had been rough in her handling of R. The mother was bathing R in a plastic bowl in the bedsit, she "… grabbed R by the hips and shoved him in a bowl". This happened about one and a half weeks before R's admission to AB Hospital [name of hospital given] on 31^st July 2014.
95. This incident was not (as the father told me) how he would have expected a mother to act. The father asked the mother why she had grabbed R in that manner but he was assured that R was okay, and the father checked R and he appeared to be fine.
96. This episode, if it did occur, would not account for all the injuries sustained, nor is it really put forward on that basis. It again is an extremely late disclosure at a time when the father has an obvious axe to grind, and its timing makes it extremely suspicious.
97. The father (like the mother) appears to recover his memory either at the door of the courtroom or in the courtroom itself.
98. In general the father essentially had the same difficulty as the mother. He is in the bedsit all day on 31^st July 2014, save on his account for one occasion, he says, when he went out and took the paternal grandmother's dog for a walk for approximately one hour. The mother denies this occurred, but in any event the father saw no sign of injury to R, nor indeed any changed or altered behaviour in R when he returned from his walk.
99. When the father handled R and bathed him shortly before the emergency services were called no sign of injury was noted by the father whatsoever.
100. The father in his evidence denied the mother's allegations against him, in particular the dragging across the floor, and the throwing of R onto the bed, or any rough winding or handling episode.
101. The father for his part did not directly allege that the mother had hurt R. He was "… 50/50" on that particular issue.
102. He was suspicious of the maternal family but he had no particular episode which he relied on. He denied controlling the mother, but there were some concessions of violence made by him in relation to two earlier relationships which were of significance, and I believe there was a degree of past violence in his relationship with the mother in this case also. I note the father has previous convictions for battery in 2012 (see I181).
103. The father also has been irregular in his attendance at contact as I have noted, in contrast to the mother, and his inability to engage in the Local Authority's Parenting Assessment has resulted in an incomplete assessment because of his own failings.
104. Whether he has been motivated to any degree by the uncertainty over paternity in this case it is simply impossible for me to judge.

Credibility issues generally

105. The Local Authority has raised two significant issues in this case with regard to R's future:

(i) safety and protection; and

(ii) parental honesty and openness.

106. When the mother was asked by her own counsel, within moments of going in the witness box, whether she had been honest during these proceedings the mother conceded virtually in her opening testimony:

"I wouldn't necessarily say honest. I have not come out with all the information I should have done".

That is something of an understatement.

107. The mother's credibility was shot through; there were so many inconsistencies evident from the layered account provided by her over the last weeks and months, and I have noted some of them already. Virtually at the outset of her evidence she accepted that she had contacted the Local Authority's Independent Reviewing Officer in December 2014 and asserted that R's injuries had been made up. She told me that she knew this was not true at the time she contacted the IRO, but she made that up because she was upset that R would not be home with her over Christmas.
108. R needs to be able to rely upon his mother's truthfulness and honesty, regardless of her mood, if R is to be safe. Hypothetically, if R were returned to his mother and she detected or was responsible herself for any bruise, even accidentally, would she report it to Social Services? I do not believe that she would; that is simply not in her nature. The mother appears to me to divulge information on a "need to know" basis, or for some perceived tactical advantage. She will stubbornly maintain a denial, even in the face of the blindingly obvious.
109. Some of the inconsistences in her evidence include the following:
110. The maternal grandmother provided a statement to the Police (see I190-191) with a basic chronology of the mother's movements:

(i) For the first 11 days of R's life the mother and father were together at the father's bedsit.

(ii) Between 11^th and 16^th July 2014 the mother and R were staying with the mother's sister A in [name of town given].

(iii) On 16^th July 2014 the mother and R were collected from A's house by the maternal grandparents late at night. There had been some falling out between the two sisters.

(iv) The mother and R stayed with the maternal grandparents until 18^th July 2014 when they returned to the father's bedsit.

(v) On 23^rd July 2014 the maternal grandparents again took in the mother, she having left the father late at night on this second occasion.

(vi) The mother stayed until 25^th July 2014 when she returned to the father's bedsit.

(vii) At I193 in a Police statement the health visitor saw the mother and R at the mother's sister's address on 14^th July 2014 and 23^rd July 2014. The mother informed the health visitor (see I196) "She had moved to her sister's as a result of an argument with her boyfriend".

111. In a Court Order dated 21^st August 2014 (see A66) it is recorded "… the mother stayed with the maternal aunt between 11^th and 16^th July 2014". This was a recording of some significance in August 2014 since it was relevant to both R and to T's situation, and the paternal involvement, or the potential involvement of third party perpetrators.
112. The mother in the witness box repeatedly asserted:

"I would visit my sister during the day and at night I would stay with my parents between 11^th July and 16^th July 2014".

113. The mother could not provide any motive the maternal grandmother or the health visitor might have had for fabricating the evidence given to the Police in the two statements I have referred to.
114. I prefer the documentary evidence to which I have referred.
115. The mother has lied about this; I cannot work out why, I cannot work out the importance of it.
116. The mother's dates for her movements in her statement (see D4-D5) also do not tally with the maternal grandmother's statement to the Police, and the Police spent a significant amount of time with the mother in her second Police interview in September 2014, going over the mother's movements and the relevant discrepancies.
117. The mother and the maternal grandmother cannot both be correct, but I simply cannot understand why this fairly straightforward collateral issue is so important to lie about. I cannot understand that on either side; the mother or the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother has no obvious axe to grind and its relevance to R's injuries is only incidental in relation to credibility. The mother said to me that she did not get on with the maternal grandmother, but if this were an issue which did require a finding, I would be inclined to favour the maternal grandmother's Police statement.
118. However, this is one of those curious unresolved issues in this case, which may have some significance or it may not. It is a puzzling feature, but it seems to me I am not required to reach any conclusion about the correct sequence of these dates.
119. Secondly, the mother's acceptance (see B38) in the Parenting Assessment that she left her sister's because of a disagreement is at variance with the mother's interview (see I147) with the Police, that she left her sister's for no reason. That assertion to the Police, the mother accepted, was untrue.
120. Thirdly (see I27) in the Police interview the mother said she saw the health visitor at her parents' home. She accepted this was untrue.
121. Fourthly, she admitted receiving Child Benefit until October 2014 while R was living with foster carers under an Interim Care Order and had been since August 2014. She and the father were also claiming State Benefit separately while living on occasion as a couple.
122. Fifthly, in her oral evidence, the mother accepted her late night "flight" from the father's flat on 23^rd July 2014. In her Police interview (see I159), despite much prompting from the interviewing Police Officer, the mother denied it. The mother said in her oral evidence that she had forgotten this episode during the Police interview. That I believe is an original lie compounded by another lie in this courtroom.
123. Sixthly, (see G163) the mother told the health visitor on 23^rd July 2014 she had no immediate plans to move in with the father. In fact she returned within two days and she was there temporarily until later on 23^rd July 2014 itself. That was a lie to the health visitor.
124. Seventh, the mother's statement D6 paragraph 17 is flatly incompatible with D29 paragraph 11. She is therefore prepared to lie in Court statements.
125. When the mother told me that overall she had given her evidence "in dribs and drabs", that again would be a very considerable understatement. She said her motive in lying to the Police was to protect the father. Her overall unreliability and inconsistency do not lead me to accept her allegations against the father in her final written statement. The allegations are so self-serving in their timing, and incomplete as an overall explanation for R's injuries, and inherently unlikely – an outburst of uncontrolled violent behaviour by the father followed by a decision to change R's nappy – that I am unable to accept that this is credible. She has every possible reason to make this up – but that of itself is too slender a basis for jumping to a conclusion that she (the mother) must therefore be responsible solely for inflicting R's injuries.
126. However, the mother said she and the father were at home during the day on 31^st July 2014, "… neither of us went out". No one called to see them that day, all day. She told me that the father did not go out to walk his mother's dog, nor did he go out to a shop later on. She the mother was only away from R if she went to the bathroom during that day.
127. This evidence, since it is substantially adverse to the mother's interests, in the light of the medical evidence has a degree of credibility about it, unlike some of her other assertions.
128. The father for his part accepted this basic narrative, save that he said that he went out once (although he told the Police he went out twice), however, with no subsequent sign of injury to R on his return.
129. Accordingly what happened to R appears to me to be a closed secret known only to the mother and the father.
130. The father's inconsistencies at first blush were of course far less evident because he has been far more reticent in his evidence, both written and oral. His last minute disclosure in the witness box itself about the mother's rough handling of R is highly suspicious and I wonder if still waters run deep in the father's case.
131. The earlier episode of bruising described by him is so uncertain in its timescale and its overall detail that I could not, even on a balance of probabilities, conclude that this represented any kind of "harbinger" injury, or is linked to the injuries detected on 31^st July 2014.
132. However, the combined effect of parts of the mother and the father's evidence, when looked at as a whole, is simply incredible. The father bathed R and the mother dressed R in his babygrow before he was taken in the ambulance on 31^st July 2014. There was no visible mark and the mother had no difficulty getting R's arms and legs into the babygrow; this from a child with several fractures and soft-tissue injuries. That is simply incredible as an account.
133. The father told the Police that he had been out twice on 31^st July 2014 rather than on the one occasion referred to in his oral evidence in this Court.
134. The father, despite his rather passive appearance in the witness box, plainly has a temper. He was violent to two of ex-partners (L and B) as he admitted in this courtroom.
135. Despite efforts made on his behalf in closing submissions, having regard to the father's overall credibility, I would not on balance conclude that the mother inflicted the entirety of R's injuries while the father was out walking the paternal grandmother's dog. It is in the father's interests to invent an outing when he is away from the bedsit on 31^st July 2014.
136. I am unpersuaded by this evidence given by the father, however, even if it were true there is nothing in R's presentation, in R's behaviour, or the mother's conduct on the father's return to the bedsit to give rise to any conclusion that the mother inflicted a sustained attack on their son, R, during this interval when the father was away.
137. The mother and the father, I believe, were short of sleep on 31^st July 2014. They were living in woefully inadequate living conditions to care for an infant child. The mother and father had significant limitations and they were inexperienced parents with little reliable support. The health visitor service appears to have been kept in the dark about the mother and R's precise movements and exact living accommodation.
138. The father for his part also admitted to having significant doubts about R's paternity.

My conclusion with regard to threshold

139. On balance I conclude that R sustained his injuries on 31^st July 2104 while he was in the care of his mother and father. I simply cannot identify on the evidence as a whole which parent was responsible. One or other of them inflicted these injuries to R. I conclude that each of them knows what has happened but both have chosen to keep silent for reasons of their own.
140. The failure to protect R is very significant. Because I do not know what happened, nor why, the future risk with regard to R cannot be evaluated. The mother and the father have separated and if I returned R to their individual care I could be entrusting him to the perpetrating parent, or the parent who failed to protect him. I ask myself why would the future be any different for R? R was only a few days old when this happened; the parents had barely begun to care for him and yet the task was already beyond them. How on earth, I ask myself, could they cope with R in the future and cope with him safely?
141. The Local Authority should bear in mind that this finding with regard to the mother in this case has a relevance to the case of T also.
142. Accordingly, the Local Authority's Threshold Document is established on a balance of probabilities in its entirety. I would simply make the following adjustments:

(i) At paragraph 13 where it reads "… the Local Authority relies upon …", that should actually read, "The Court relies upon …";

(ii) In paragraph 14, "The grounds relied upon by the Local Authority …", for Local Authority there should be substituted, "The grounds relied upon by the Court …";

(iii) 14.1, "At all relevant times R was in the care of the mother and the father"; and

(iv) 14.5 there should be substituted, "It is probable that the injuries were inflicted non-accidentally by the use of an extreme force while R was in the care of his mother and father … While the Court is not able to identify which parent caused R's injuries there are no other persons who had the opportunity to do so".

Save in that respect the Threshold Document properly reflects the Court's findings.

The applications relating to R

143. Coupled with the application for a Care Order in this case I have an application for a Placement Order, together with a Statement of Facts, and an Annex B report in R's case. The Agency Decision Maker of the Local Authority made the appropriate recommendation on 15^th December 2014, and the Placement Application was issued by the Court on 20^th January 2015. The Statement of Facts is based on both the mother and the father's consent.
144. I have available to me the key documents which are a preliminary requirement of the Adoption Agency (Wales) Regulations 2005 as amended from 1^st September 2012, and section 18(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 has been established.
145. In accordance with the guidance given in the case of Re B-S (Children) [2014] 1FLR 1035 a 'pros' and 'cons' analysis has been undertaken both by the Local Authority and the Guardian in this case. The guidance given in case of Re B-S has now been supplemented by the guidance given in the case of Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625.
146. The alternatives to be considered have to be on the basis of the child's best interests, and they have to be "realistic":

"59. … Re B-S does not require that every conceivable option on the spectrum that runs between 'no order' and 'adoption' has to be canvassed and bottomed out with reasons in the evidence and judgment in every single case. Full consideration is required only with respect to those options which are "realistically possible"."

And then:

"In many, indeed probably in most, cases there will be only a relatively small number of realistic options. Occasionally, though probably only in comparatively rare cases, there will be only one realistic option. In that event, of course, there will be no need for the more elaborate processes demanded by Re B-S. The task for the court in such a case will simply be to satisfy itself that the one realistic option is indeed in the child's best interests and that the parent's consent can properly be dispensed with in accordance with section 52(1)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002"

147. Since I have made threshold findings I have jurisdiction to make a Care Order and a Placement Order, in the latter instance because of section 21(2)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The Care Plan has to be scrutinised having regard to the paramountcy of R's welfare, as I have said, under section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and having regard to the paramountcy of his welfare throughout his life under section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
148. I have to apply the 'welfare checklist' provisions under section 1 of both of these statutes to the facts of the case.
149. The Care Plan has to be a proportionate and necessary response to the risk, see Re C & B (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 FLR 611. Adoption is to be regarded as a last resort, decided in Re B (Care Proceedings) [2013] 2 FLR 1075.
150. I can only make a Placement Order if the consent of the mother, and the father in this case, is dispensed with under section 52 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and I can only come to that decision by applying the paramountcy of R's welfare throughout his life, and by applying the provisions of section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. That section has to be applied when the Court comes to a decision which relates to R's adoption, which includes the making of a Placement Order. That is the combined effect of section 1(1) and 1(7) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
151. It was decided in the case of Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625 that the Court has to answer the question to which section 52 gives rise by applying the statue to the facts of the case, and the Order has to be a proportionate and necessary response because R's Convention Rights are engaged. What has to be shown is that R's welfare requires adoption as opposed to something short of that. That has the connotation of the imperative; what is demanded.
152. I have to bear in mind the suitability of all other Orders. I would not in the circumstances of this case make a defined Order for contact under section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and in fact neither parent has asked me to consider this. The indirect contact provision proposed, in my judgment, is entirely appropriate post-adoption. Adoptive parents with this history of injury for a child would not wish, I believe, to promote direct contact and there would be a significant risk, at least with the mother, of placement destabilisation, and the father's limitations means that he simply would not understand the purpose of the contact, nor his role in any such contact. The imposition of direct contact would simply hamper the placement search and would risk derailing the Plan, probably from the outset.
153. In the father's case also there is an unresolved issued to some degree with regard to paternity.
154. I do not propose to quote the 'welfare checklist' provisions under the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002, but they can be applied in the following way:
155. Under section 1(3)(e) of the Children Act 1989 and the corresponding section 1(4)(e) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 there is a risk, having regard to the findings made in this case, a real possibility that the significant harm done to R in the past might be repeated in the future if R were to be returned to the care of his parents, or indeed to any one of them, having regard to the findings I have made.
156. There is simply no protective parent in this case whatsoever. I have no means really of assessing the risk for the reasons I have explained already, and it is this feature of safety which is the overwhelming factor in this case, and it illuminates all of the other statutory considerations adversely from a parent's, or indeed the family's point of view. There is simply no safe parental or familial carer and no protective parent whatsoever.
157. Even if R, hypothetically, could articulate a wish to live with his parents that wish could not possibly be acceded to in this case without a very grave risk to his physical and emotional safety. R, as a very young child, requires nurturing, he requires warm and attentive parenting. How could the parents provide such care, having regard to the threshold findings in this case?
158. So far as familial relationships generally are concerned, no other significant familial relationships appear to exist for R in the wider family; at least that is the current position. I realise that adoption would cut off the prospect of any such relationships being developed, but the loss of any future familial relationship, and indeed the loss of the birth parental relationship in this case has to be balanced with the potential gain of a legally secure, safe and hopefully stable adoptive placement.
159. Suitable adopters would view R as their own child, they would be able to commit to him fully, they would be able to provide him with appropriate and loving care buttressed by the legal security which an Adoption Order provides. This would be a far more normal childhood than a childhood in long-term foster care, which would be prone to breakdown and to change, and to a process of repeated statutory reviews. R would be far more likely, in my judgment, to form firm and secure attachments which would benefit him during his childhood and into his adulthood, and help him also with his future relationships, and provide a future template for his future capabilities as a parent himself, if he is cared for within an adoptive setting.
160. I am required under section 1(4)(c) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to consider the likely effect upon R throughout his life of having ceased to be a member of his birth family, and of being an adoptive person. This inevitably draws the Court into a process of some highly speculative crystal ball gazing, however, within this context I have to consider what kind of family life has it been for R hitherto within his birth family, and what kind of family life would it be likely to be if R were returned to the care of his parents, or to any one of them, because that has to be considered in the balance.
161. This adoption (as I have said already) is intended to promote R's safety, that being an essential prerequisite for a happy childhood and as a building block for a healthy adulthood. I have to assume that in due course R will acquire an account of why he was removed from parental/familial care, this being provided as part of his life history as he grows into adulthood. I accept that an adopted child might emerge into adulthood resentful of being removed from his family of origin, and I accept that the decision I am making today could in these circumstances, destabilise, disable and disadvantage a child thereafter as an adult during his or her life.
162. Much of course will depend upon R's actual experience of adoption, but in this case my decision is prompted by an overwhelming imperative to protect his safety during his childhood, without physical and emotional harm. If R does have this knowledge available to him in due course, and applying a mature judgment of an adult, he will I believe, on balance be more likely to accept my decision and hopefully emerge as a secure and grounded adult himself.
163. I ask myself what is the alternative on the other side? Would R emerge into adulthood with the benefit of parental and familial care available to him in this case, and after what I believe is likely to be a risk of a damaged early family upbringing, have any better prospect for his future? I ask myself rhetorically what is available for R as a young child, if not adoption? A childhood within the Care system in foster care with the artificiality and the attendant uncertainty of such family life, regular LAC reviews, periodic social worker visits, 'looked after' children's medicals; that is simply not ordinary family life.
164. I have considered the Local Authority and the Guardian's assessment of the various factors, both for and against reunification, adoption and long-term fostering. I agree with the conclusion of the Local Authority and the Guardian and in the circumstances of this case the balance overwhelmingly points to the requirement of a Placement Order as being necessary and proportionate in these particular circumstances.
165. I fully recognise that the severance of parental and indeed familial relationships is always a very serious step to contemplate, but in my judgment, in the particular circumstances of this case, R's welfare requires such an outcome pursuant to the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
166. Accordingly for these reasons I approve the Care Plan for R, and having made threshold findings I make a Final Care Order in R's case. I dispense with the consent of the mother and father to the application for a Placement Order, and I make also a Placement Order for R.

End of judgment