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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> B (A Child), Re [2015] EWFC B93 (14 April 2015)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2015/B93.html
Cite as: [2015] EWFC B93

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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of his family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Case No. BC14C00047

IN THE PRESTON FAMILY COURT

Sessions House
Lancaster Road
Preston
14th April 2015

B e f o r e :

HER HONOUR JUDGE SINGLETON QC
____________________

In the matter of:
Re: B (A CHILD)

____________________

Transcribed from the Official Recording by
AVR Transcription Ltd
Turton Suite, Paragon Business Park, Chorley New Road, Horwich, Bolton BL6 6HG
Telephone: 01204 693645 - Fax 01204 693669

____________________

Counsel for the Local Authority: MISS GREENHALGH
Counsel for the Mother: MISS HEPPENSTALL
Solicitor for the Father: MISS LATHAM
Counsel for the Child/Guardian: MR. HART

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    APPROVED JUDGMENT
  1. THE JUDGE: During a hearing on 7th April and today, 14th April, I have been hearing evidence and argument in the case of L B (born 7th October 2014). L is the subject of an application by Lancashire County Council for a care order. The application was made very shortly after he was born, on 9th October 2014. His mother is N B. She is 27 years old, born on 23rd October 1987. His Father is J B, born on 5th June 1992. He is 22 years of age.
  2. The facts in this matter have not been in dispute. L was born at Wythenshawe Hospital in Manchester. At that point, his mother was and still is, serving a sentence in Styal Women's Prison. She is serving a long sentence for a violent assault perpetrated on another adult. The sentence that she is serving was imposed at the beginning of her pregnancy with L. Her earliest release date is set for autumn of 2015 but, thanks to her own good conduct in prison, she is eligible for extensive leave and may well be released on curfew from May of this year. Had an assessment of the mother's capacity to be a safe parent to L taken place immediately before or after the sentence she is serving, the picture would have been a bleak one.
  3. Indeed, neither the mother nor the father dispute the threshold criteria. The mother had a traumatically difficult childhood herself and she became an adult whose lifestyle consisted of excessive drinking, drug abuse and offending, including violent offences. She has an older child, who has lived with her own mother since his babyhood. The father's situation is not much better than the mother's. Although he is not in prison, he has also a history of violent offending and of drug and alcohol abuse. The written evidence before the court includes police records of incidents of abusive and volatile behaviour between the parents. This evidence establishes that their own relationship has not been a safe context for the care of a child. At the point of L's birth, the father was of no fixed abode. As I have already said, and to their credit, the parents agree those facts to be true and have agreed the threshold criteria in line with what I have just outlined.
  4. A schedule of more detailed facts which the parents do agree has been drafted by counsel for the Local Authority. The facts are sourced from the written evidence that I have read and I adopt the findings of that threshold document, which can be placed on the court file. This judgment is not about those facts which are not in dispute.
  5. The facts do not end on the negative note of the threshold criteria because the mother's response to that sentence of imprisonment has been entirely positive. She has taken up every opportunity offered to her in custody to seek to change her situation and to demonstrate a changed attitude to her situation. She has impressed the prison authorities and the probation officer supervising her. She has been described as a model prisoner. As a result of that, she earned a good prospect of being offered a place, when her baby was born, at the Mother and Baby Unit at Styal Prison. That position reflected her achievements in prison after sentence and before L's birth.
  6. The Local Authority commenced proceedings, as I have said, immediately after L was born. That is not surprising, given the presenting facts. What is perhaps more surprising is that their plan for the interim care order they sought was one of separation and placement of L in foster care. That plan was based upon concerns that the Local Authority had about how the mother would cope outside the prison environment, which was described by the Local Authority in the evidence they filed as a false environment. I note, however, that the then key social worker failed to attend two Admission Board meetings at Styal Prison when the mother's application to be placed on the mother and baby unit was to be considered. That meant that the first meeting – and, indeed, the second meeting – had to be adjourned until after the first hearing before me, putting at risk the availability of a placement for the mother and L. I am surprised to note that, by way of contribution to the first meeting held at the prison prior to L's birth, all the prison received from the key social worker was a short and rather peremptory letter explaining that the Local Authority did not agree with any placement in the Mother and Baby Unit. As a result of that, the then key social worker was specifically invited to attend a second meeting. He failed to attend that second meeting to the minuted dismay of the other attenders. Therefore, it came about that the mother and L were separated after his birth and he was placed in foster care, despite her having demonstrated utter compliance with the prison regime and her being on the point of a place in a highly sought after Mother and Baby Unit.
  7. That care plan for separation was approved by the lay justices on 10th October 2014 who also adjourned a contested interim care hearing to me to take place on 27th October – 17 days later and 20 days after L was born. This unfortunate delay enabled the children's guardian to investigate the mother's situation and the Mother and Baby Unit and to make a recommendation, on her initial analysis, that L should be placed on a care order with his mother on the unit. I think the Local Authority's concession that they should change their care plan was made only on the day of the hearing before me on 27th October, when I approved the plan and L was moved to his mother in Styal. All has gone exceedingly well. The mother continues to be a model prisoner. L is thriving and mother is looking after him to a high standard.
  8. The father's position has been less closely scrutinised but also seems to have improved. He has shown a commitment to travelling from this area to Manchester on a weekly basis to have contact with L, and that contact is reported to be of a high quality. He has achieved fixed accommodation; he is no longer of no fixed abode. He has not committed any offences and he is committed to seeking work. The only question over the father's position at present is that there has been a positive hair strand test for cannabis use during the proceedings. He vehemently denies having used cannabis and attributes that hair strand test to his having shared a confined space with a colleague who is a very heavy user of cannabis. I do not propose, because I have not heard evidence from the parents, to resolve that dispute. The father concedes that it is reasonable for the Local Authority, if they wish to, to continue to test him for cannabis use. That seems to me to be a proper way forward in respect of that dispute.
  9. As I have already said, the reasoning that the Local Authority originally advanced for the draconian plan of separation of L and the mother, notwithstanding her conduct in the prison, was based, upon the risks that the mother, once released, might present to this child after her release from prison, described by the local authority as "A false environment." It is certainly right that, at an early stage in the case, a key issue was how those risks, on release, were to be managed, assuming that the mother continued (as I have described she did) to comply with the prison regime, to take advantage of the opportunities and to care excellently for her baby.
  10. As part of the concern, and to attempt to answer the question of how mother would cope upon release, the court authorised in December, at the invitation of all the parties, coordinated by the child's team, a psychological assessment of both parents to be undertaken by Dr K H. I therefore have, dated 17th January2015, a very full assessment of them. This is a useful report prepared, effectively, at public expense on the joint instruction of each party divided equally between them. That report is an extremely important piece of evidence. It is, in essence, a guardedly optimistic report but it sounds notes of caution about how the situation should be managed upon the mother's release from custody. I do not want to read vast tracks of written evidence into this judgment but I note several paragraphs from that report. At paragraph 1.9, page E48 in the bundle, Dr H says this about the mother:
  11. "Her self-esteem and sense of identity is somewhat perilous and she has sought compensatory relationships in the form of her partners and by surrounding herself with others."

    At E49, addressing the mother's vulnerability to substance misuse, she notes that mother appears to have internal means of achieving moderate drinking and abstinence from drugs and she says this:

    "120. Her remaining period of custody will help her to consolidate this position but she still needs a clear strategy to prevent her from slipping back into future substance misuse."
    "121. The challenge will come when, if L is placed with Miss B, her circumstances settle down and she feels less scrutinised and is faced with the normality of parenting, which can be exhausting, unrewarding and mundane at times, it is then that she will be more vulnerable to return to substance misuse. This is in the more distant future but I cannot be more specific than that."

    At E51, she goes on, in addressing all the progress that the mother has made, and says this:

    "Overall, she has made considerable progress in all these areas. During this sentence, she has had the opportunity to re-evaluate her life. She has engaged in an exemplary way with the considerable input she has had at HMP Styal. I thought she had made genuine gains, especially from the Thinking Skills Programme. Undoubtedly, the risks that Miss B may return to old patterns increase once she is released but this is far from inevitable."

    She goes on to hope that Miss B will have graded exposure to life beyond prison.

    I do not think I have so far noted that, at present, mother is enjoying and making good use of extensive day leave from prison – foreshadowing, I think, what Dr H hopes she would be able to do.

  12. I turn to page E83, paragraph 5.35, where Dr H addresses the relationship between the parents. At the time of the report, the mother's account to her was that she was committed to a separation, although it was conceded that this position had come about after her incarceration. Her position now has changed, albeit subtly changed, to one of being aware that the father does wish a reconciliation to be achieved and to the mother having an open mind about that rather than being committed to an ongoing separation. It would not be fair, it seems to me, as I think I commented during the evidence last week, to expect the mother to know her own mind until she has achieved her release.
  13. At 5.35, Dr H said this:

    "Mr B has, apparently, indicated that he sees no reason to split up and wants the relationship to continue. I think this will be difficult for Miss B because she does not really see that he poses a risk and she needs to be wanted. If he is persistent, she may find it difficult to resist him."

    At 5.37, she says this:

    "I think it will be difficult for Miss B to accept the end of the relationship, given there are some grounds to suggest that Mr B is trying to make changes. The separation is rather artificial and will be less easy to sustain when Miss B is released because the rationale for separation will be less persuasive given Mr B's apparent commitment to change. I do wonder if he needs to be assessed more fully so that the basis for separation, if warranted, is better established and is more persuasive for Miss B."

    Finally, she says this at 5.48, page E87:

    "It is impossible to set out a precise timescale by which the court may have confidence in Miss B's ability to look after L well enough. Being released from prison is a complicated adjustment in itself and it will take time for Miss B to settle. I can only suggest that, if the court is considering placement of L with his mother, attention is paid to the support framework around her and to its gradual relaxation over time in order to test out her ability to maintain her improvements."
  14. I return to the parents' relationship. The father wishes to reconcile. The mother is open-minded but undecided. It is to their credit that both acknowledge to the court and the Local Authority that the issue of reconciliation and how they achieve it, if that is what they decide they wish to do, is one about which they know they have to be extremely cautious and honest with those working with them. They both, it seems to me, concede, by agreeing the facts in this matter and the threshold criteria, that their relationship as it was conducted before Miss B's sentence was a dangerous relationship and not a safe context for any child to be brought up in. They need to be absolutely confident, open and honest about how they now propose to proceed to ensure that those dangers do not arise again.
  15. After Dr. H's report came in, a Looked after Children review meeting took place on 26th January 2015, attended by all of the agencies involved with L and the mother and the father (That is the Local Authority, the key social worker at the time, the independent reviewing officer, the health authority and probation). I have the minutes of that meeting and it is plain and unambiguous that those at the meeting agreed that the uncertainties in this case which surround what may happen when the mother is released mean that a placement of L at home with his mother was merited to reflect the progress she had made but that should be done within the framework of a care order to reflect the uncertainties which Dr. H's report outlines.
  16. There then followed, on 29th January 2015, an internal meeting of the local authority to discuss LB. That was attended by: Miss P H (who is a senior manager at Lancashire Social Services); Miss K M (the team manager of the social worker and the practice manager); the practice manager, Miss R M; and the key social worker – was held to discuss L B. This is not a meeting that had been put into anybody's diaries. It occurred because it was convenient for it to occur. It would seem that 29th January 2015 had been earmarked in the key social worker's diary for writing up the care plan. The attenders at the internal meeting simply happened to have been present together to discuss another and unrelated case and it was thought convenient for there to be a discussion about LB as well.
  17. At one point, there was a concern that the 29th January meeting had been called to change the decision of the Looked after Children review. I am quite satisfied that that is not what happened, having heard the evidence particularly of Miss H. This was a care plan that needed to be discussed at a senior level because it concerned a child who had been at home on a care order and the discussion took place without reference, surprisingly, to the Looked after Children review. At that meeting, the proposal to be put before the court was changed from care order to supervision order. I say it was changed but it seems that the only party aware that it had been changed would have been the then key social worker.
  18. Miss H, I am quite satisfied from her evidence, was not aware of the LAC review, of its conclusions or of what seemed to be the very clear views of the Independent Reviewing Officer (the IRO). Thus, it came about, when the matter came before me on 12th February for issues resolution, that all parties were agreed that the plan was for L to remain in the mother's care upon her release from custody. All parties were also agreed that her ability to continue to care for him would need to be closely monitored and assessed. In addition her ability either to maintain a separation from father or to achieve a safe reconciliation would have to be monitored and assessed. It became part of the Local Authority's plan, I think in response to Dr H's conclusions about the father, that he would need to be closely monitored and assessed, whatever role he was going to take in L's life. He has aspirations, if there were no reconciliation, of having a full role and being a proactive father in terms of the time he spends with L. Those plans seem to me to be entirely right.
  19. As I have already said, the mother has been a model prisoner who has taken full advantage of all the opportunities offered to her in prison to change her life, and L deserves the opportunity to live with her if that remains safe for him and if she can sustain the changes that she has made once she is released. However, the situation once she is released seems to me – and to all parties – to be beset with uncertainties: as to what accommodation the mother will be able to live in; as to what her relationship with the father will be; as to her relationship with her wider family (she has the support of her mother but that is not, according to the written evidence, always the easiest of relationships); as to her ability to remain abstinent from drugs and to use alcohol only moderately; ad as to her ability to leave an ordinary life free of offending and associations which are inconsistent with caring for a child. This mother, to her great credit, has come a very long way but it may not take very much at all for her to fall back into dangerous habits and ways of living. The Local Authority, on 12th February 2015, despite the looked after children review, stuck by the meeting's decision of 29th January and now was saying that a Supervision order would be sufficient to achieve what was necessary in this case, despite all those uncertainties.
  20. I had the advantage on 12th February, at the issues resolution hearing, of a final analysis prepared by L's guardian, which was clear in its recommendation that there should be a care order. I gave, upon a neutral evaluation of the written evidence, a very clear indication in favour of the guardian's view. It is worth pausing to read into this judgment what is recorded on the face of the IRH order (reading from B78 in the bundle):
  21. "The court undertook a neutral evaluation of the filed evidence and offered an indication as follows. The plan for L to remain with his mother is a high risk one, which would require assiduous support and monitoring. The court requires the Local Authority, regardless of its stance as to the correct order, to file evidence setting out an extensive plan of the support and work which would underpin a care order with a plan for L to remain with his mother after her release from her sentence of imprisonment."

    I think I made it perfectly clear to the Local Authority that I wished to have a plan that would work under a care order. It was also anticipated at that hearing that there would be a meeting between the children's guardian and the social worker – in fact, the practice manager – to discuss what the right order would be and the plan for it.

    The Law.

  22. It is expedient for me to refer simply to the case of Re: T[2009] EWCA Civ 121 In that case, the Court of Appeal, consisting of Sir Mark Potter, the then President of the Family Division, Lady Justice Arden and Lord Justice Jackson, examined and surveyed the authorities over the years since the enactment of the Children Act 1989 on precisely this issue. It was a case where the judge at first instance had made a care order, notwithstanding that the parties before him were unanimous that a supervision order was sufficient to provide for the welfare of the child with whom he was concerned, and the Local Authority's appeal against that was successful. It is a useful authority because Sir Mark Potter sets out his survey of the authorities over the years as to care orders and supervision orders. He started with a decision of Mrs Justice Bracewell in the case of Re: T [1994] 1 FLR 103, in which she said, at page 106 to 107 of that report, this:
  23. "The nature of a supervision order is to help and assist the child where the parents have full responsibility for the care and upbringing. It does not involve any statutory level of monitoring and it does not give the Local Authority parental responsibility."

    She goes on at the end of the cited paragraphs to say this:

    "The contract drawn up between the parents and the Local Authority cannot be enforced without further court proceedings, whereas a care order places on the Local Authority a positive duty to ensure the welfare of the child and protect her from inadequate parenting. That is the framework and essence of the Act."
  24. Sir Mark Potter went on to quote extensively from another, older judgment – that of HHJ Coningsby QC sitting as a High Court judge in Re: S (J) [1993] 2 FLR 919, in which Judge Coningsby said this ( as set out in paragraph 29 of the Re: T case):
  25. "I believe that it is an appropriate approach for the court to look at the case as a whole, to look at the gravity of it, to decide what its view is as to the risk of harm to the child (both physical harm as in this case and also emotional deprivation or failure to thrive because of the situation in the home or of some other situation arising) and to decide whether, in the light of the gravity of the case as a whole, the Local Authority ought to have imposed upon it the extra duties that I have referred to."

    Sir Mark Potter in Re: T sounded a note of caution about that approach, saying this at paragraph 31:

    "Since the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998, it is necessary also to emphasise and have regard to the issue of proportionality when contemplating the removal of parental responsibility from, or its enforced sharing by, those otherwise entitled to exercise it exclusively."
  26. Going on through his survey, Sir Mark Potter then quoted extensively from Lady Justice Hale (as she then was) in the case of Re: O (Supervision Order) [2001] EWCA Civ 16 and he summarised her views on the difference between a care order and a supervision order in terms of three factors:
  27. (i) the power under a care order to remove a child without recourse to the court;
    (ii) the sharing of parental responsibility;
    (iii) the potential duration of the orders made.

    He quotes her saying this as to a care order:

    "It gives the Local Authority parental responsibility for the child coupled with the power to control the parents' exercise of that responsibility."

    Also, she says this (this is paragraph 27 of Lady Justice Hale's judgment):

    "Each case [on the choice between care and supervision orders] is an exercise of discretion on its own particular facts and earlier case law may be of limited help in this context. But, in any event, it has to be considered in the light of the Human Rights Act and article 8 of the European Convention."
  28. I am clear, and was clear when I gave my evaluation and indication on 12th February, that the uncertainties in this case for the mother upon release do require there to be shared parental responsibility and for the Local Authority to have the authority to control mother's and perhaps the father's exercise of their parental responsibility for a proper period following release. That is a positive, not a negative, approach to this case. It seems to me that it is a proportionate approach having regard for article 8 and the European Convention. So far as duration of an order is concerned, that plays in both ways in this case because I anticipate that, if mother continues on the upward trajectory that she has started, there will come a point – within, perhaps, even the foreseeable future – when the Local Authority will apply to the court to discharge the care order, which all parties now agree I should make. However, what is not possible now is to predict exactly when the mother is to be released from Styal prison. She has got plans to work in the prison restaurant. It is called 'Clink' and it is an excellent project. I do not know whether that will postpone her release beyond May. She may be entitled to be released in the autumn. The difficulty with the supervision order is that it is of a fixed duration, whereas a care order can be flexible in its duration. Therefore, whilst some of the authorities look at the issue of duration of order as being an issue for those cases where a long term order is required, in this case, it is the flexibility of duration either way which seems to me to militate in favour of a care order over a supervision order.
  29. It is important for me to say, as I think I said during argument and evidence, that I very much hope that the parents do not think that the dispute which has necessitated this contested hearing has been about what they have or have not done. As I have already noted, the mother has done as much as could be expected of her, given the limits of her incarceration and I do not ignore the fact that the father also seems to have turned around his life. I did not mention in summarising, as I now do, that there is a positive report from the father's alcohol worker. I have mentioned how well he has done in contact. I have mentioned the dispute about cannabis use but his commitment to the Local Authority plan to monitor him. This case is all about how best to ensure that the mother and the father do continue along the path of changing their lives and maintain those changes so far made so that L can be safely cared for by his mother as is his right and their responsibility.
  30. Until Friday of last week the Local Authority's care plan remained one of Supervision order. The care plan that accompanied that supervision order was, I am afraid to say, initially unimpressive. The schedule of expectations and the consequences of breach seemed to be vague and it seemed to me, as I commented on lots of occasions during the evidence last week, that it was not fair for the parents not to know what the parameters of the Local Authority's interventions were going to be. The father wants to be a couple with the mother. The mother's stance has changed to one of open-mindedness about this. It did not seem to me that the Local Authority had thought through their approach to that issue. There were vague threats of possible escalation of child protection procedures in the event of breach which were tantamount to an invitation to the mother and father not to work openly with the Local Authority. Everyone needs to know exactly where they stand and have that spelt out in simple terms. It was disappointing, that no one from the Local Authority team with knowledge of this case attended the family group conference on 2nd April. I accept that this was because of the great pressures that everybody has upon their time in the present climate. However, a rather unrealistic plan for father's contact emerged from that Family Group Conference which made no proper acknowledgment of the need to manage any increase in his contact in a gradual way.
  31. I received from the children's guardian, in advance of the hearing last week, a position statement – she had already completed a final analysis – reporting upon the meeting that she conducted in response to the directions that were given on 12th February with the practice manager who was, by then, directly working the case as key social worker. The contents of the children's guardian's position statement were such that I issued a direction requiring the Local Authority to arrange for the practice manager, R M, to attend to give evidence on 7th April. She did so without complaint, notwithstanding the fact that I have now been told –, that she was due to have been on leave. Nevertheless she came to give evidence. The position statement of the children's guardian sets out the discussion between the children's guardian and the practice manager. It was this particular paragraph (11) that caused me to require Miss M to attend:
  32. "Miss M informed the guardian that it is her professional experience that home placements do not work. However, this view was provided without any real clarity as to her reasoning. Miss M states that she has balanced the risk and is of the view that, should any safeguarding concerns arise in the future, this could be managed under either child protection or pre-proceedings procedures."

    There are other similar paragraphs but it was that one in particular that caused me to issue the direction. I was unaware of the practice manager's other personal commitments that week and I am, of course, grateful to her for coming off leave to give evidence.

  33. My impression when Miss M gave evidence of her stance in relation to the initial separation of L and his mother was that the Local Authority had fallen into line with the legal position that the separation of mother and baby was not sustainable. She still seemed to want to justify the original stance of the Local Authority. There does, therefore, arise what seems to me to be a remarkable conflict between saying it was right at the outset to say that separation was required and saying that only a supervision order is required now. Miss M based her conclusion that a supervision order is sufficient on the progress that the mother had made in prison, even though, on the Local Authority's case as originally put, the mother would never have had the opportunity to make that progress and they viewed prison as an artificial environment.
  34. Miss M was determined to advance a case that there would be no difference in the work to be done with the mother and father and the support to be offered between the two regimes – i.e. one of care and one of supervision. She was not willing to recognise a need for the Local Authority to hold an authoritative role in this family's life for some little time post-release, pending the resolution of all of those uncertainties that I have set out. She did not acknowledge the role that the Local Authority will need to hold within the family. She repeatedly said that she was confident that she could, with the key social worker, provide for the protection of L and saw no need for shared parental responsibility to do that. It did not seem to me that she had any focus on what I would describe as the diluted duty that the Local Authority would hold to L himself. Miss M held to what I have already described as a vague plan of escalating child protection processes in the event of a need for intervention. That seems to me to be a long way from having a clear, spelt out plan for potentially risky breaches of agreement.
  35. There were times when Miss M seemed determined to enhance the work that would be done under a supervision order and to overstate the disadvantages of a care order. I do understand the need for professionals to have the facility of a nuanced exercise of discretion in response to crisis but that does not seem to me to be a justification for not spelling out to parents those situations which will be considered by the Local Authority to constitute a risky crisis and also setting out the range of responses to such risks including removal of the child. Mr Hart, in cross-examination, asked her about the difference between the looked after children meeting of 26th January 2015 and its conclusions and those of the meeting on 29th January. She, quite freely and repeatedly asserted that the Local Authority have a policy against home placements on care orders. She equally made it perfectly clear that her own professional view in this case was in line with what she perceived to be that policy. It was this somewhat remarkable evidence about policy that caused me to adjourn the case part-heard until today, having originally fully anticipated that I was going to conclude it last week – incidentally, within 26 weeks. In addition the mother needed to travel back to the prison because she had come out to attend the hearing on leave, rather than being produced by the prison authorities. In the intervening week, the Local Authority drew up a fuller and clearer plan and all parties agree that this new plan does meet what is required in this case. Equally, and very importantly, the Local Authority changed its case and now agrees with the children's guardian, without opposition from the parents, that the right order is a care order.
  36. I have had the advantage of both a statement and written evidence from Miss H (a senior manager within the Local Authority responsible for this case), which, firstly, apologises for the delay in provision of a plan and also is absolutely clear that there is no policy against children being at home on care orders in this Local Authority. Miss H also explained, both in her statement and in her evidence, that those who participated in the discussion on 29th January (which means herself and the team manager) had been unaware of the Looked after Children meeting on 26th January and of the report of Dr K H and of the IRO's view. She explained that the discussion had taken place on the basis of the social worker's summary and report rather than on a scrutiny of all the documents. She also explained that, had she been aware of a need to scrutinise documents or of the conflict that was brewing between the local authority, the IRO and the children's guardian, the process would have been rather differently conducted. Miss H told me that there is now to be an internal investigation into the whole conduct of this case, to be undertaken by Lancashire County Council's principal social worker who is responsible for social work practice across the region and internally independent of those involved in this case. I am grateful to Miss H because I did not compel the attendance of senior members of staff from Lancashire County Council when I adjourned this matter part-heard. I left it to the Local Authority to decide whether that evidence was necessary or not. I am very grateful to have had the input of somebody so senior within the Local Authority and, indeed, her presence here throughout the day today.
  37. It is not my role to conduct an inquiry into Local Authority's processes or policies. I am only concerned with L and his welfare. It does seem to me that this case could and should have concluded, either at the issues resolution hearing or shortly thereafter, with a care order and with the plan that the court is now happy to approve. It does not seem to me that it is relevant or helpful to L and his family for me to start to consider how or why the apparent inflexibility of approach arose in this case and whether it is a matter of individual or systemic error. I am satisfied that there is no policy with regards to children at home on care orders. It may be that those on the frontline need also to be told that and while that is an issue of internal communication, it seems to me that there needs to be a clear message to Lancashire County Council social work staff that there is no such policy. I have got that message and I am grateful for it.
  38. The other issue that this case reflects is the need for everybody to know that, however large this authority is and whatever the structures of management, there is a means to access and request a flexibility of approach at a senior level.
  39. It is also important, I think, to bear in mind that a willingness to change your mind about a professional matter is a strength and not a weakness. It also seems to me plain from the evidence of Miss H that Lancashire County Council have in place a flexibility of structure to enable decisions to be changed accordingly. I am reassured that the Local Authority is to investigate this case and reassured that they will implement whatever is necessary to enable and communicate this flexibility in the future and to debunk any perceptions that anybody has that there is a policy against children being at home on care orders in family placements where that is necessary. That seems to me to be in line with the law and, importantly, in line with what is needed in this case for this child.
  40. I have found the threshold criteria satisfied. I do propose to make a care order because that is the order agreed by all the parties as appropriate. I am happy to have scrutinised the new care plan put before me today by the Local Authority and to approve it. All the parties have also had a proper opportunity to look at them. The parents are signed up to the agreement that underpins the plan. The plan seems to me to be proportionate and necessary. I have paid tribute to mother (and, to a lesser extent, the father) throughout this judgment. It only remains for me to say that I very much hope that everything goes as well upon the mother's release as it has during her imprisonment.
  41. (End of judgment)
    (Discussions as to the transcript followed)
    _____________


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