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England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> Gloucestershire County Council v M & Ors [2016] EWFC B87 (9 November 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2016/B87.html Cite as: [2016] EWFC B87 |
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B e f o r e :
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Gloucestershire County Council |
Applicant |
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-and- |
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M |
First Respondent |
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-and- |
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F |
Second Respondent |
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-and- |
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B (a child) by her guardian |
Third Respondent |
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Richard Carron for the mother.
No appearance by the father
Helen Kelly for the child, B
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ Wildblood QC:
i) The mother would wish B to return to live with her. She would like him to return to her care in the near future if possible but recognises that her stronger argument is that the proceedings should be adjourned while she accesses therapy. That inevitably raised two issues about timescales: i) what length of adjournment would be necessary before the court could make an informed decision as to whether the mother might be able to care for B? and ii) how would a delay of that nature impact upon the welfare of B?ii) The Local Authority and guardian propose that B should be placed for adoption and that nothing less than that life-changing order for him would meet the demands of his welfare. The evidence about timescales was very thoroughly scrutinised and the upshot, they both submit, is that the necessary period of adjournment would be manifestly contrary to B's welfare.
iii) The mother has also raised through her counsel that, if B does not return to the mother, the court should consider long-term fostering for him as an alternative to adoption since that would allow him to maintain his family identity and contact with his mother and, possibly, his half-sister and father.
i) Nature, law and common sense require that it be recognised that the best place for this child to live is with his natural mother unless proven and proportionate necessity otherwise demands. Society must be prepared to recognise that there is a wide range in standards of parenting and the court must not apply the yardstick of optimal parenting. It is only if the circumstances of the case are exceptional that children will be removed from their parents under care and placement orders or, to put it another way, the making of the orders sought by the Local Authority is confined to circumstances where no other realistic solutions consistent with B's welfare are available.ii) Before the court could consider making a care or placement order the threshold criteria in section 31 of The Children Act 1989 must be fulfilled. It is agreed, in this case, that they are fulfilled on the basis that, at the time and in the circumstances of the issue of the proceedings on the day after B's birth, he was likely to suffer significant harm and that the likelihood of harm was attributable to the care that was then likely to be given to him, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him. The basis of the fulfilment of the criteria has not occupied any great amount of time in court given the agreement between the parties; however there is a document at A6 that records the basis of the mother's acceptance.
iii) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is heavily engaged in relation to both of the Local Authority's applications. Care and placement orders involve a very significant invasion of the rights of this mother and this child to a family life together. That invasion can only be justified if it is a) necessary, b) proportionate to the proven circumstances of the case and c) in accordance with the law.
iv) The domestic law of this country is to be found in s31 of The Children Act 1989 (the threshold criteria to which I have already referred), section 1 of the Children Act 1989 (the welfare provisions of the 1989 Act relating to the care application) and sections 52 and 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (relating to the placement application).
v) By section 52 of the 2002 Act it is necessary for the Local Authority to satisfy the court that the mother's agreement to B being placed for adoption should be dispensed with on the grounds that B's welfare so requires. That statutory provision has been interpreted in cases called Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625 and Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s47(5)) [2014] 1 FLR 1035 in terms that are summarised at page 285 of the Red Book and which I will not repeat here.
vi) Section 1 of the 2002 Act contains the welfare provisions of that Act by which the welfare of B, throughout his life, is the paramount consideration of the court. The application for a placement order overshadows the application for a care order and, therefore, the main welfare determination needs to be made by reference to the provisions of that Act and, in particular, the more stringent welfare checklist in section 1(4) of it.
vii) In considering the competing options for B's future the court must carry out an holistic or joined-up evaluation of them, weighing up the pros and cons that they represent. It is obviously wrong to look at the options one by one (in what lawyers have come to call linear analysis) because that can lead to a mistaken result where the order that is most invasive of family life is made by default.
viii) In considering the care that a parent might be able to provide for a child it is important to recollect the concept of parenting with support. The President stressed the significant of the concept in a reported case called D (A Child) (No 3) [2016] EWFC 1 in which he referred to the decision of the then Gillen J in Re G and A (Care Order: Freeing Order: Parents with a Learning Disability) [2006] NIFam 8, para 5. The very purpose of the welfare state is to provide support for those in need (as was said in Soares de Milo v Portugal, ECHR, Requête no 72850/14, para 106). The Local Authority must place evidence before the court of the support that is available to parents so that the court is then able to make a satisfactory welfare evaluation – Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227.
i) There continued to be numerous occasions when the mother displayed disproportionate responses resulting in verbal outbursts and aggression. The report from the residential assessment unit summarises the extent of this issue at C192;ii) It was very difficult to work with the mother because of the aggression and expressions of dislike that she directed at staff;
iii) Some of the incidents took place in front of B;
iv) When the incidents took place it was 'impossible to have any level of communication with the mother until she had time to calm down [which could] often take a significant period of time'.
v) The staff at the unit also had concerns regarding the mother's ability to protect B from other 'risky' adults. The mother spoke about her wish to be a family unit with the father despite the allegations of domestic violence within their relationship (as reported by the unit at C198 and as the mother outlined in graphic terms to the psychiatrist at E3 – 'he was very volatile…and was extremely violent towards her, for example hitting her, throwing her down the stairs and attempting to strangle her') and she also appeared to have formed a liaison with another man who has a history of domestic abuse.
i) The local children's centre. I heard one of the workers from the centre in evidence. She was an impressive witness who knows the mother well and gave evidence that, despite the improvements that the mother has made in her self-regulation in recent weeks, B would not be safe in her care even with the continued involvement of the current package of support.ii) A heath visitor. The health visitor also gave very impressive and careful evidence. She spoke of the improvements that the mother has made recently but did not want to express a view as to whether the mother could care for B safely. Since B has not been with her the mother has been receptive to advice. The health visitor said that, if the mother thinks that a professional is working with her as part of a team she is much more receptive than if she feels she is being criticised. She said that the health visiting service could also remain involved if B returned to the mother's care.
iii) The local family mental health team. Another impressive witness, from that team, gave evidence at very short notice. She also spoke of the improvements that the mother has made in recent weeks but did not want to express an opinion about whether B would be safe in her care now. She also gave evidence of the therapeutic mental health support that would be provided to the mother; I need to say more about that below because it raises central issues concerning timescales. I would wish to record my gratitude to the family mental health practitioner not only for the support of the mother but also for the quality of the evidence that she provided both orally and, through endeavour, in documentation.
i) A referral would have to be made and that need take no more than a week (i.e. it would be done by about 16th November).ii) There would then be one or two sessions of therapy to assess the mother's suitability to engage in longer term therapy. That assessment would probably be completed within a month –i.e. by mid December.
iii) There would then be a referral for full therapy. It was anticipated that this would probably be done by the end of December given the intervention of Christmas.
iv) Full therapy would commence within three months of that referral – by the end of March although possibly earlier (Mr Carron suggested the end of February 2017).
v) From the evidence of the consultant psychiatrist three months of therapy would be needed to see if the mother was on the pathway to responding to therapy but six months of therapy would be needed before it could be said whether it was effective. That would be August / September 2017.
vi) If the mother was responding positively to therapy it would be necessary to test the mother's ability to care for B in the community through increased contact (as started to occur in the residential unit). I accept that it would be inevitable that there should be that degree of testing at that stage and that it would take at least six weeks. Thus it would be October / November 2017 before B could be moved to the mother's full-time care if everything went well.
i) There is no power in the court to order a Local Authority to fund therapy. Mr Carron's suggestion that I should leap through the barriers surrounding the provision of therapy on the grounds of proportionality was attractively argued but would require an unavailable pole-vault rather than a simple leap.ii) Adjourning the case for the Local Authority to re-think its position about private finding of therapy would achieve nothing since the Local Authority will not do so – why should it when NHS funded therapy is available? An adjournment for that purpose would simply add to the delay in any event.
iii) Private funding of therapy would probably only shorten the timescales by about a month at most since there would still have to be assessments, waiting lists and six months while therapy took effect. There would still have to be post therapy community assessment as well.
i) The mother loves B profoundly. Her wish to care for him is heartfelt and genuine.ii) The mother's basic care of B is satisfactory. She is very capable of providing the nuts and bolts of parenting.
iii) The mother has a tendency of extreme volatility and aggression that has been characterised as demonstrating symptoms of emotionally unstable personality disorder: impulsive type.
iv) There has been a very lengthy period of detailed assessment of the mother's ability to care for B. The Local Authority has carried out its own assessments, there was the period of testing when the mother was at the mother and baby foster placement, there was the residential assessment, the guardian has carried out her assessments and there has been the impressive evidence of those caring now for the mother in the community.
v) The overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that mother could not care for B safely in the community as matters currently stand even with the impressive support that is available. I have no doubt that B would be at very significant risk of emotional and physical harm if he were with her, even under supervision. In the light of the assessments that have taken place it would be irresponsible to place B with the mother now. When the mother loses self-regulation, she does so quickly and dramatically and there are no adequate community crisis facilities or techniques (such as mindfulness) that could mitigate the risk adequately. I note in particularly how quickly the residential assessment broke down once contact started to be increased.
vi) There is reason to hope that the mother would respond well to a combination of drug and psychological therapy. However, it is far from certain that she would do so in the long–term to the extent necessary to render her a safe parent of B.
vii) Even if she did engage fully in the lengthy process of therapy that I have outlined above, that process is way beyond the timescales for B. It could not possibly be in his interests, either in the short-term or in the long-term, for him to remain in interim foster care, probably for the next year, while the mother undergoes the course of therapy and assessment that I have set out. It is always possible to extend the time-table for cases where to do so is 'necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly' – see s 32(5) of the amended Children Act 1989 and, e.g. Re NL (Appeal: Interim Care Order; Facts and Reasons) [2014] 1FLR 1384 and Re M-F (Children) [2014] 2014] EWCA Civ 991. However, in this case, it would be positively unjust to the child and contrary to his welfare to do so.
HHJ Stephen Wildblood QC
9th November 2016.