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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Clark, R (on the application of) v Child Support Agency [2002] EWHC 284 (Admin) (20 February 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2002/284.html Cite as: [2002] EWHC 284 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		Wednesday 20th February, 2002

MR JUSTICE WILSON:

1. There are the following three proceedings before the court, all initiated by Mr Dale Clark:

(1) an application for judicial review (No CO/4219/2000) of an Interim Maintenance Assessment ("the IMA") made against him by the defendant, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, acting through the Child Support Agency ("the agency"), and of a variety of decisions made by the agency consequent upon the IMA. The application was issued on 16 November 2000. Since the IMA was made on 6 November 1995, the application is very substantially outside the time set by Rule 54.5(1) CPR 1998. Mr Clark needs extension of the time set by that rule, as well as permission under Rule 54.4, in order to proceed with the substantive application.

(2) an appeal filed on 20 March 2001 by way of case stated (No CO/1088/2001) against the decision of the "East Berkshire Magistrates' Court" dated 8 September 2000, by which it dismissed a complaint which he had issued and ordered him to pay £620 by way of costs to the agency. His application to the magistrates to state a case and his appeal were both lodged in time; so the appeal already requires substantive attention today.

(3) an application for judicial review issued on 26 April 2001 (No CO/1690/2001) of the same decision of the "East Berkshire Magistrates' Court". I have been perplexed as to why Mr Clark's assault upon that decision could not entirely be comprised within the appeal by way of case stated referred to at (2). The explanation appears to be that Mr Clark wishes to raise criticisms of the way in which his complaint was handled which have not been addressed in the case stated, in that they were matters not articulated before the magistrates and thus not matters which they could recite in their statement of the case. It is obvious, however, that an application for judicial review issued in April 2001 relating to a decision in September 2000 is, again, significantly out of time and requires an extension of time as well as permission before it may substantively proceed.

2. This amalgam of proceedings has generated a degree of complexity, confusion and expense at which the most indulgent of judges would baulk. There are six substantial bundles of documents and authorities; and sophisticated and complex legal arguments have been presented both by (and on behalf of) Mr Clark and on behalf of the agency. Mr Clark, Bachelor of Science and Doctor of Philosophy, though presently unemployed and on state benefits, has at times been acting in person and has had the time in which to throw himself fully, enthusiastically and, as I consider, blindly, into a protracted struggle with that national bête noire, the agency. Happily for me, however, public funding of Mr Clark's cases was extended on the day before yesterday in order to cover his representation at the hearing which began yesterday. Mr Buswell, already retained to represent Mr Clark in other proceedings, has represented him at this hearing. I am deeply grateful to Mr Buswell for not pressing all but the central points raised in his client's long home-made skeleton argument. It would have been a misuse of the public funding certificate for him to have done otherwise, The judgment which follows is an attempt - in quite difficult circumstances - to discern the wood rather than the trees.
3. As must already be apparent, this hearing relates to the liability of Mr Clark to maintain a child of whom he is said to be the father. There have been some 27 previous hearings in the magistrates' courts, in the Reading County Court, in the Reading District Registry of the Family Division of the High Court and in these proceedings, relative to the same issue.
4. The child, a girl, was born in November 1988. At the time of the birth, as of the conception, the mother, Mrs C, was living with her husband, Mr C. Whatever her paternity, the child was apparently treated as a child of that family.
5. Much later, in July 1995, the mother applied to the agency, alleging that Mr Clark was the child's father and that he should be made liable to support her. In August 1995 the agency wrote to Mr Clark at the address provided by the mother for him (which Mr Clark concedes to be his current residence today). In the letter the agency recited the allegation of paternity and invited Mr Clark to return a Maintenance Enquiry Form. There was no reply. Two chasing letters were sent. On 6 November 1995, in the further absence of reply and in particular of any presentation by Mr Clark of his means, the agency issued the IMA in the sum of £96.38 per week with effect from 8 November and sent it to Mr Clark at the same address. Further communications by the agency to Mr Clark at that address in 1996, which pressed for payment in accordance with the IMA, were, again, not the subject of response. In January 1997 the agency issued a summons, served upon Mr Clark by despatch to that address, by which it invited the magistrates' court at Bracknell to make a liability order against him under section 33 of the Child Support Act 1991. The summons was returnable on 20 February 1997. Mr Clark did not attend. The order was made in the sum of £3,800 and sent to his address.
6. Nothing was paid pursuant to the order. All was silence. An invitation by the agency to Mr Clark to seek a review went unanswered. In March 1998, apparently for enforcement purposes, the liability order of the magistrates' court was replicated by an order for recovery in the Reading County Court.
7. On 26 August 1998, before any enforcement proceedings had begun, Mr Clark contacted the agency by telephone. He denied paternity of the child and asked not to be contacted again lest his wife be upset. He refused to give his telephone number but confirmed that he was living at the address to which the agency had always sent mail.
8. The conversation led the agency to send a letter to Mr Clark dated 17 September 1998. In the letter it pointed out that, in that he was denying paternity, he should write to the agency, requesting cancellation of the IMA and explaining, and seeking to prove with supporting evidence such as the results of DNA testing or a court order, his denial of paternity. Whatever his state of knowledge about the IMA when it was made in November 1995, as to which there remains lively issue, the reference to the IMA in this letter clearly establishes Mr Clark's knowledge of it from September 1998 (not June 1999, as he says in his application).
9. Mr Clark ignored the invitation to make application for cancellation of the IMA. In his first letter ever written to the agency, which is dated 3 June 1999, Mr Clark reaffirmed his denial of paternity, referred to the agency's absurd demands for money and indicated an intention to seek damages against it unless it provided evidence of his paternity. Meanwhile the agency had launched proceedings in the county court to enforce the recovery order by means of a charging order over Mr Clark's home. That application itself engendered five hearings, the result of which has been that no charge has as yet been enforced against the home. As from 5 May 1999, however, being the date when the agency learnt that Mr Clark had become in receipt of income support, it reduced his liability under the IMA to nil; and it presently remains nil. The issue therefore relates to £17,962, being the total sum due under the IMA from November 1995 to May 1999, none of which has ever been paid. Were Mr Clark to provide the agency with evidence of his means during that period, it would even now reassess his liability accordingly.
10. On 10 November 1999 newly-instructed solicitors for Mr Clark wrote to the agency. Apart from reaffirming his denial of paternity and referring to the common law presumption of legitimacy, they took a fresh point. Under section 44(1) of the Act of 1991 there is jurisdiction to make a maintenance assessment, including an IMA, against an absent parent only if he (and I use the masculine only for the sake of convenience) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom. In the letter, by which the solicitors confirmed the contents of a telephone conversation which had probably occurred between them and the agency on that day, they alleged that Mr Clark had been habitually resident overseas between July 1995 and July 1998 and that for that reason also the IMA was invalid. On Mr Clark's behalf they articulated the request for the cancellation of the IMA which, 14 months earlier, the agency had suggested should be his course of action. For reasons to be set out in paragraph 17 below, the agency's appraisal of that request for cancellation has been suspended.
11. It will therefore be seen that, in relation at any rate to the paternity issue, Mr Clark's first application for judicial review, ultimately issued on 16 November 2000, raises potentially important points. They relate to the nature of the evidence of paternity which entitles the agency to make a maintenance assessment. Where the alleged father actively denies paternity before an assessment is made, the position is clear. Under section 26 of the Act of 1991 the agency cannot make an assessment without, if I may summarise, an order or declaration establishing paternity, including a declaration for which the agency or the mother (but not, until the coming into force in April 2001 of section 55A of the Family Law Act 1986, the alleged father) can specifically apply. But the position is less clear where, as here, there is no active denial of paternity before the assessment is made. In circumstances where (which the agency says is reflective of Mr Clark's position) the alleged father lies low or where (which Mr Clark says is reflective of his position) he was living away from home and received none of the agency's communications which preceded the IMA, what evidence of paternity does the agency then need? An interesting sub-question, again potentially raised by this case, relates to the situation where the mother is married to another man at the time of the birth. Does the common law presumption of legitimacy further disable the agency from making assessment in such circumstances? The agency regards the answers to these questions as crucial to its effective operation and says that, in the absence of denial, the Act of 1991 permits it, even in the context of the mother's marriage to another man at the time of birth, to make a working assumption of the paternity of the man named by the mother as the father, being an assumption which can be reviewed as the matter proceeds with the result that any assessment made from the foot of it can be cancelled in the light of a later court finding of non-paternity or even just of further evidence which satisfies the agency of non-paternity.
12. But there is one problem about addressing these questions in Mr Clark's proposed application. It is that he is the father of this child.
13. 13. In March 2000 the agency applied to the magistrates' court for a declaration of Mr Clark's parentage of the child under section 27 of the Act of 1991. The application was transferred through the county court to the High Court, Family Division, Reading District Registry, where, on 26 September and 30 October 2001, a district judge heard and determined it. Evidence was adduced before him of the results of tests of DNA samples which had been taken from the child, from the mother and from the mother's husband. The evidence excluded the husband from paternity. Mr Clark was invited, but refused, to offer a sample of his DNA; and an inference of his paternity was drawn from that refusal. On all the evidence before him the district judge found and declared that Mr Clark was the father of the child.
14. It seems almost embarrassingly trite to say that the effect of the declaration is not just that Mr Clark has been the father of the child with effect from 30 October it is that he has been the father of the child ever since her birth. In this case the presumption of legitimacy has been conclusively rebutted. Whatever the previous evidential uncertainties, it has now been established that Mr Clark has at all times been an absent parent of the child and, subject to the issue as to his habitual residence, thus liable in principle to a maintenance assessment.
15. Mr Buswell tells me that Mr Clark has issued notice of appeal against the declaration of parentage and that the appeal will in due course be heard by a high court judge of the Family Division here in London. But Mr Buswell accepts that the mere issue of notice of appeal cannot derogate from the effect of the declaration for my purposes today. In any event, even were the appeal to succeed, the entire issue would be resolved without difficulty. The agency would be obliged to accept that Mr Clark was not the child's father and would forthwith cancel the IMA. Since nothing has been paid by Mr Clark thereunder, no difficulties would arise in relation to recoupment from the mother or refund by the agency.
16. Mr Buswell is constrained to accept that he is in difficulties in repelling the argument that the declaration of parentage has rendered the proposed application for judicial review academic. To my mind that argument is indeed unassailable. Now that we know that Mr Clark is the child's father, his elaborate arguments presented during the last three years about the past lack of sufficient evidence of his paternity seem hollow and almost abusive of the process of the court. The important arguments to which I have referred must await a proper forensic vehicle. I hereby refuse Mr Clark permission to make his first application for judicial review.
17. I need refer, in effect only in parenthesis, to the issue relating to Mr Clark's habitual residence. His request by solicitors in November 1999 for cancellation of the IMA was founded upon his denial of habitual residence in the United Kingdom between 1995 and 1998 as well as upon his denial of paternity. Once proceedings to determine the issue of paternity were launched, the request for cancellation was suspended. When avenues of appeal relating to the paternity of proceedings have been exhausted, then, unless the current declaration of paternity is set aside, the agency will be obliged to proceed to appraise the request for cancellation in so far as it is based on denial of habitual residence. Were it to accept his denial, it would cancel the IMA as having been made without jurisdiction. Were it to reject his denial and so to refuse to cancel the IMA, Mr Clark's remedy would be to take the issue on appeal to the Child Support Appeal Tribunal under section 20(3)(a) of the Act of 1991 (as amended). Although Mr Clark has sought to include in his first application for judicial review a quantity of evidence about his habitual residence, this court is not the proper forum for the resolution of that potential dispute.
18. Apart, however, from permission, Mr Clark would need a substantial extension of time within which to bring the first application for judicial review. The time set by the rule is three months following the time when the grounds to make the claim first arose. Although Mr Clark seeks to challenge various later decisions of the agency, for example relating to its attempted enforcement of the assessed liability, these decisions are, as he himself says in the application, consequent upon the IMA made on 8 November 1995. The substantive challenge is to that decision and so in principle time runs from when it was made: see R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No 1) [1998] Env LR 415. In seeking to excuse the delay, Mr Buswell is driven to rely mainly on the alleged continuing effect of the IMA, in particular the steadily increasing liability thereunder over three and a half years. Were that argument valid, the significance of the time limit would be seriously emasculated in - I guess - the great majority of applications for judicial review. The focus is upon the date of the decision and not the length of its effect.
19. Even if, which is highly controversial, one assumes in Mr Clark's favour that he had no knowledge of the IMA until September 1998, there is thereafter a delay of over two years before he filed the application. Mr Clark seeks to explain that delay on the basis that he was pursuing his other remedies; but on analysis the explanation is barren. In September 1998, as I have shown, he was specifically invited to pursue another remedy, namely to make a written request for cancellation, which would have been pursuant to his right to seek review under section 18(2) of the Act of 1991. But he ignored the suggestion for 14 months and indeed remained entirely silent for the first eight months, whereupon conflict relative to the enforcement of the liability proceeded sporadically until the application for judicial review was ultimately issued. Independently of refusing permission to apply, I refuse such extension of time as would validate his first application for judicial review.
20. I propose to consider Mr Clark's appeal by way of case stated and his second application for judicial review almost as shortly as has Mr Buswell in his submissions.
21. 21. The facts relevant to them can briefly be stated. Between late in 1999 and early in 2000 bailiffs, acting at the request of the agency and pursuant to the liability order which had been made in the magistrates' court in February 1997, made preliminary attempts to levy distress upon Mr Clark's goods. They visited his house and spoke to neighbours. No goods were in fact distrained. In that he objected to the IMA, Mr Clark objected to the activities of the bailiffs. On 10 March 2000 he laid before the East Berkshire Magistrates' Court a complaint in which he protested about their activities and, purportedly under section 35 of the Act of 1991, he sought an order which would in effect annul the liability order made in February 1997 and thus all rights to enforce it. By letter dated 15 March 2000 the senior legal adviser to the magistrates wrote back to Mr Clark as follows:

"I am in receipt of your complaint under s.35(8) Child Support Act 1991 that you are aggrieved by the levying or attempt to levy distress. Having read your letter I would point out that this hearing will only look at the manner in which the distress was levied. It is not a hearing to appeal against the making of the liability order; there is no process to hear such an appeal in this court. The court is not entitled to look at the making of the liability order, only the manner in which distress was levied.

I should further alert you to the possibility of costs. As with any application, if you are unsuccessful, you may be ordered to pay the Child Support Agency's costs of coming to court."

Mr Clark, however, resolved to proceed.

22. There is no doubt that, in law, the contents of the letter dated 15 March were correct. The magistrates had no power to set aside the liability order made in February 1997. Mr Clark's reference in his complaint to section 35 of the Act of 1991 was indeed, as the writer of the letter surmised, a reference to section 35(8) which at (c) empowered the defendant to make a regulation providing for an appeal to a magistrates' court by any person aggrieved by the levying of, or an attempt to levy, distress pursuant to a liability order. Such is the genesis of Regulation 31 of the Child Support (Collection and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, which reads as follows:

"(1) A person aggrieved by the levy of, or an attempt to levy, a distress may appeal to the magistrates' court having jurisdiction in the area in which he resides.

(2) The appeal shall be by way of complaint for an order.

(3) If the court is satisfied that the levy was irregular, it may-

(a) order the goods distrained to be discharged if they are in the possession of the Secretary of State;

(b) order an award of compensation ...

(4) If the court is satisfied that an attempted levy was irregular, it may by order require the Secretary of State to desist from levying in the manner giving rise to the irregularity."

23. On 8 September 2000 Mr Clark's complaint was heard and dismissed; and he was ordered to pay costs of £620 to the agency. The heading of the order is "East Berkshire Magistrates' Court"; but the sub-heading is "Family Proceedings Court sitting at Maidenhead" and the stamp on the order says "East Berkshire Family Proceedings Court". Although at the time of the hearing Mr Clark did not object to the complaint being heard, if it was, by the specialist family panel of the magistrates' court, he would aspire, in the proposed proceedings for judicial review, to challenge the jurisdiction of the magistrates, if and in so far as they sat in that capacity, to hear his complaint.
24. In connection with the appeal by way of case stated, Mr Buswell concedes that the Magistrates were right to hold that they had no power to set aside the liability order. He does argue, albeit faintly, that, in all the wider circumstances of the case, the attempted levy should have been held to be irregular within the meaning of Regulation 31(4). But I am clear that the requisite enquiry into the regularity of a levy or attempted levy demands focus on the specific actions of the bailiffs and, by way of example, whether they were levying or attempting to levy distress upon chattels necessary for use in the course of the complainant's work or in the satisfaction of his basic domestic needs, such being contrary to section 35(3) of the Act of 1991. There was, as I hold, no evidence upon which the magistrates could have held that the attempted levy had been irregular. So the dismissal of the second part of his complaint was correct. Mr Buswell also challenges the lawfulness of the magistrates' order for costs. But, in the light of the failure of both parts of Mr Clark's substantive complaint, their discretionary conclusion referable to costs is unassailable. Mr Buswell seeks to suggest that the proceedings had wrung from the agency a valuable concession, namely that it would not seek to enforce the IMA pending determination of the paternity proceedings. But, once those proceedings were launched in March 2000, there was, for obvious reasons, no further activity by the bailiffs or otherwise to enforce the IMA. And there is nothing to indicate that it was Mr Clark's misconceived complaint, determined on 8 September 2000, which achieved that moratorium.
25. Accordingly I answer the questions posed by the magistrates in their case stated by holding that all their decisions were in accordance with law. I dismiss the appeal.
26. It remains for me finally to address Mr Clark's application for judicial review in respect of those same proceedings. A farrago of points is assembled with which Mr Clark would wish to attack the way in which they were conducted: that the delay of six months between the issue of his complaint and its determination ran counter to his rights under Article 6 of the European Convention; that, although in their case stated the magistrates claim to have sat in their general capacity, the sub-heading of the order and the stamp on the order indicate that they were sitting as members of their family proceedings court; that there was demonstrable bias against him at the hearing, particularly on the part of the clerk, again contrary to Article 6; and that their statement of the case for the purposes of his appeal was flawed. In that, as I have in effect already held, Mr Clark's entire complaint to that court was misconceived and was bound to attract dismissal, there is no way in which it would be proper for me to extend time or grant permission for the ventilation of such points in the second application for judicial review.
27. Yes, Mr Buswell.

MR BUSWELL: My Lord, may I just confirm one matter. (Pause) In the light of those decisions, my Lord, I am requesting permission to appeal in respect of the judicial review, the primary judicial review concerning the IMA, and in respect of the case stated, but I am reserving my position in a moment as regards the third matter, subject to any instructions, and I do say on the grounds that: firstly, in respect of the judicial review, concerning the IMA, that it would be wrong to have relied on the delay as the principal ground for preventing realisation of the main legal principle. That is my principal ground, that it should have been heard on a substantive basis because of the importance of that matter, and that your Lordship's analysis is subject to further scrutiny. In respect of the case stated, I have not formulated a point. But I am seeking permission on the basis that it would be wrong according to, as say, principles I have not articulated, but I seek permission now to avoid any further delay and requiring return to court unnecessarily.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Taking it stage by stage, can I give permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review, or is that something which only the Court of Appeal can give?

MR BUSWELL: I believe it is only the Court of Appeal, on reflection, in respect of the permission, but in respect of the extension of time I would have to.... My Lord, let me just confirm. (Pause)

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Mr Buswell, you are looking for the relevant rule. Would it be helpful to you if I was to ask Miss Moore to contribute to this debate?

MR BUSWELL: Indeed.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: On jurisdiction.

MR BUSWELL: On that very point, yes.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Then I will do so.

Miss Moore, can you help Mr Buswell?

MISS MOORE: My Lord----

MR JUSTICE WILSON: In this regard, please.

MISS MOORE: My Lord, I believe that the appropriate course of action is for - if Mr Buswell thinks fit, is to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal your Lordship's decision to refuse permission to bring judicial review, and the relevant rule is Part 52.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: I think he concedes that; but he would have me rule on an application for permission to appeal against the refusal to extend time.

MISS MOORE: My Lord, I do not believe there is any separate procedure. I understand your Lordship's decision is refusing permission both on the grounds of refusing to extend time and because there is no substantive merit in the case in any event. I am certainly not aware of any procedure by which a separate decision to refuse to extend time in an application for permission to bring judicial review may be a separate subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: It would really be very artificial, would it not, Miss Moore?

MISS MOORE: It would be very artificial because in any event my learned friend is going to have to go to the Court of Appeal to get permission in respect of the substantive matter, in any event. So I think that must be the right and proper course of action for him to take, if he thinks fit.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Thank you Miss Moore.

Mr Buswell?

MR BUSWELL: I do not think I can advance matters any further than that in any event.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Mr Buswell, I do not think my giving permission arises in respect of my despatch of your first application for judicial review.

MR BUSWELL: Indeed.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: You make no application in respect of my despatch of the second application for judicial review, but even if you did so the situation would be the same.

MR BUSWELL: Yes.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: My role in relation to your present applications is limited to your current aspiration to carry forward the appeal from the Magistrates' Court.

MR BUSWELL: Indeed.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: That of course would be a second appeal with the attendant difficulty for you, would it not?

MR BUSWELL: It is.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: I have no hesitation in refusing you permission to appeal against the dismissal of your appeal.

MR BUSWELL: Indeed. My Lord, that, subject to any other applications, concludes the three matters.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: It does. Thank you.

MR BUSWELL: All I may require is public funding detailed assessment in respect of costs that may arise.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Mr Buswell, you are clearly entitled to that. Let me see whether there is anything else to be said about costs; but you must have that.

MR BUSWELL: Yes.

MISS MOORE: My Lord, the only application I have is for a transcript of your Lordship's judgment.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: So far as costs are concerned, you are content that there be no order as to costs inter partes.

MISS MOORE: I am, my Lord, since Mr Clark is now legally aided.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Yes, it does not follow that he has been publicly funded throughout the period referable to these proceedings when you have incurred costs. But your agency is taking a policy decision not to go down that line.

MISS MOORE: My Lord, if I may just confirm the position? (Pause) My Lord, we are content to let matters rest as they are.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: So in respect of costs there will be no order as to the costs of any of the three sets of proceedings, including no order as to costs hitherto reserved, save that there be a public funding assessment of such of the costs of Mr Clark as were incurred while he was in receipt of a public funding certificate.

MISS MOORE: Yes, my Lord, I am grateful.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: You said that you had another application, Miss Moore.

MISS MOORE: The only application I had was for a transcript of your Lordship's judgment.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Do you need that? You are a party. You can go down now to the Mechanical Recording Department and bespeak a transcript. You will have to pay for it but it is your right, is it not, Miss Moore?

MISS MOORE: I believe that is right, my Lord. I was instructed to make the application, but I withdraw it.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: I am quite sure you have a right to a transcript, and if you indicate to the Mechanical Recording Department that you consider it urgent and I consider it urgent that the transcript be prepared quickly, no doubt it will be and I will attend to it and approve it urgently too.

MISS MOORE: I am most grateful, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: Are there any other matters from your perspective, Miss Moore?

MISS MOORE: No, my Lord, there are not.

MR BUSWELL: My Lord, in respect of a transcript it may be, because there is a potential always for other matters arising, always a possibility that transcripts be made available to both sides, and much as it may be a matter of discussion outside the court, if that is going to be carried into effect I mention it now. It may be that public funds might be sharing half the costs with the CSA's public funds in order to get that transcript prepared immediately.

MR JUSTICE WILSON: I think, Mr Buswell, that your side should have a transcript as soon as possible, and I would expect you to have no difficulty in advising the Commission to fund 50 per cent of the costs. We are not talking about any significant sum of money. I would approve that course of action.

MR BUSWELL: I am grateful for that. I am sure that can be arranged.