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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council, R (on the application of) v Perks & Anor [2003] EWHC 1749 (Admin) (08 July 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1749.html Cite as: [2003] EWHC 1749 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		8th July 2003

Tuesday, 8th July 2003

1. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Sandwell Metropolitan Council appeals pursuant to Regulation 51 of the Valuation and Community Charge Tribunal Regulations 1989 (as amended) against a decision dated 7th January 2003, made by the West Midlands (West) Valuation Tribunal ("the Tribunal") by which it allowed the appeal of Mr John Perks against a decision of the council. By that decision, the council had refused Mr Perks' application under the Council Tax Reduction for Disability Regulations 1992, for a reduction in his council tax.
2. The basis upon which Mr Perks had sought a reduction was that one of the rooms in his home at 125 Hurst Road, Smethwick, West Midlands, had been occupied by his mother, who is disabled, and therefore he claimed to be entitled to a reduction of the council tax that would otherwise be payable.
3. The provisions which enables exemption to be given from council tax are paragraphs (1)(a), (2) and (3) of Regulation 3 of the Council Tax Reduction for Disability Regulations 1992 ("The Regulations"). They provide, insofar as it is material to the present appeal, that:

"(1) a person is an eligible person for the purposes of these regulations if -

(a) he is a liable person as regards a dwelling which is the sole or main residence of at least one qualifying individual and in which there is provided -

(i) a room which is not a bathroom, a kitchen or a lavatory and which is predominantly used (whether for providing therapy or otherwise) by and is required for meeting the needs of any qualifying individual resident in the dwelling; or

(ii) a bathroom or kitchen which is not the only bathroom or kitchen within the dwelling and which is required for meeting the needs of any qualifying individual resident in the dwelling; or

(iii) sufficient floor space to permit the use of a wheelchair required for meeting the needs of any qualifying individual resident in the dwelling;

(2) For the purposes of a paragraph (1) and subject to paragraph (3), references to anything being required for meeting the needs of a qualifying individual are references to its being essential or of major importance to his well-being by reason of the nature and extent of his disability."

4. It is not now disputed that Mr Perks' mother, Mrs Elizabeth Perks, is an eligible person, but the issue on this appeal concerns the use that is being made of a room.
5. Mr Timothy Jones, who appears for the council, makes three submissions. First, he says that in order to obtain exemption the use by the disabled person must be of a room which is predominantly used, and is essential and/or of major importance, to the well-being of the disabled person by reason of the nature and extent of his disability.
6. Second: he submits that there has to be a causal link between the disability and the use of the room.
7. Third: he contends that the Tribunal failed to apply the right tests.
8. The first two submissions of Mr Jones can conveniently be dealt with together. He relies on a decision of the Court of Appeal in Williams v Wirral Borough Council [1981] 79 L.G.R. 697, in which it allowed an appeal by a rating authority on the basis that a person with a disability was not entitled to rating relief because that person's use of the room was unrelated to her disability. The statutory framework with which that case was concerned, the Rating (Disabled Persons) Act 1978, is, for all relevant purposes, similar to Regulation 3 of the Regulations with which this matter is concerned.
9. Fox LJ, giving the only reasoned judgment in the Court of Appeal, with which Oliver LJ agreed, states, at page 700, that the statutory exemption refers:

"... to a room which is predominantly used (whether for therapy or for other purposes) by, and is essential or of major importance to, the well-being of a disabled person by reason of the nature and extent of his disability."

10. He later goes on to explain that in his view the living room used by the applicant in that case was:

"... not essential or of major importance to the well-being of the applicant by reason of the nature and extent of her disability. She needs the living room as such, merely in the way that anybody, whether disabled or not, needs a living room as part of ordinary life. She does not need the room because of the nature and extent of her disability."

11. Later Fox LJ states:

"It cannot have been the intention of Parliament to grant a rebate merely because a room is predominantly used by a disabled person; that is quite inconsistent with the language of the section. It seems to me that the user of the room must be related to the disability. Section 1(2)(a) refers to both user and to the fact that the room must be required to meet the needs of the disabled person because of the disablement. The form of the paragraph is such that the two requirements are very closely related; that, I think, is emphasised by the word "required" - the room must be required to meet the needs of the disabled person by reason of the disability."

12. More recently, in Luton Borough Council v Ball [2001] EWCH Admin 328, Turner J had to consider the basis of a disabled person's use of a shower room, in order to see whether it qualified that person for an exemption under the same regulations as those with which I am concerned.
13. In his judgment Turner J regarded the 1992 Regulations as being similar, in all relevant respects, to the provisions in the Rating (Disabled Persons) Act 1978, with which the Court of Appeal dealt with in Howell Williams. I respectfully agree.
14. To my mind, Mr Jones has made good his two submissions which I regard as being correct. It is important that any tribunal, which has to consider whether or not a person is entitled to exemption under Regulation 3, should consider if there has been the appropriative causative link between the disability and the requirement of the use of the room, because the use has to be essential or of major importance, because of the nature and extent of the disability.
15. That takes me on to the third submission, which is that in this case the Tribunal failed to approach the appeal on the correct basis and, in particular, that it did not apply the principle in Howell Williams v Wirral Borough Council to which I have referred. That case was drawn to the tribunal's attention, but the Tribunal identified three factual differences when compared with the present case. Those were:

"(a) Mrs Howell-Williams was the single occupier of a two bedroom flat whereas Mrs E. Perks was in effect occupying her family's lounge as a bed-sitter.

(b) Because she was permanently domiciled in the lounge, the other members of Mrs E. Perks' family, her son, daughter in law and two grandchildren were having to use the kitchen and bedrooms as living room. Consequently, Mrs E. Perks' occupation of the lounge had caused the remainder of the family to alter their living arrangements.

(c) Mrs Howell-Williams had however chosen to predominantly occupy her living room rather than one of her bedrooms. In contrast, Mrs E Perks was unable to occupy any room other than the lounge due to her lack of mobility."

16. The Tribunal then concluded:

"In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal placed little weight on the Howell-Williams case."

17. It is important to stress that the Howell-Williams case is authority for the need for the causal link to which I have referred. The Tribunal, in my view, failed to take note of that point, and thus erred. In those circumstances their decision cannot stand. Mr Perks, who is neither present nor represented today, has signed a consent order agreeing that the decision under challenge should be set aside and that is what I propose to order.
18. Hopefully, when the Tribunal consider the matter again, they will bear in mind what I have said in this judgment.
19. MR JONES: Thank you, my Lord. There is no application for costs.
20. MR JUSTICE SILBER: I make no order for costs. Thank you, Mr Jones, very much for your very helpful written and oral submissions.
21. MR JONES: Thank you.