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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sarao v The Government of the United States of America [2016] EWHC 2737 (Admin) (03 November 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2016/2737.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC 2737 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
and
MR JUSTICE NICOL
____________________
NAVINDER SINGH SARAO |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
Respondent |
____________________
Mark Summers QC and Aaron Watkins (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service)
for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 14 October, 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Gross :
INTRODUCTION
i) The alleged conduct does not amount to an extradition offence within the meaning of s.137 of the Extradition Act 2003 ("the Act") ("Ground I: Dual Criminality");ii) The Judge should have stayed proceedings as an abuse of process as the request did not contain a fair, proper and accurate description of the alleged conduct ("Ground II: Abuse of Process");
iii) Extradition is forum-barred under s.83A(1) of the Act as it is not in the interests of justice ("Ground III: Forum Bar").
" On numerous occasions between April 2010 and April 2014, SARAO spoofed the market and manipulated the intra-day price for near month E-minis on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), including on or about May 6, 2010, when the United States stock markets plunged dramatically in a matter of minutes in an event that came to be known as the 'Flash Crash'. SARAO sought to manipulate the market for E-Minis by placing multiple large-volume sell orders on the CME (to create the appearance of substantial supply and thus drive prices down) and modifying and ultimately cancelling the orders before they were executed. SARAO then exploited his manipulation for his personal profit. SARAO obtained substantial trading profits through this activity. SARAO also misrepresented and lied about his use of computer automation to effectuate the massive split-second modification and cancellation of orders that facilitated his market manipulation."
" 8. 'Layering' (a type of 'spoofing') is a form of manipulative, high-speed activity in the financial markets. In a layering scheme, a trader places multiple, bogus orders that the trader does not intend to have executed – for example, multiple orders to sell a financial product at different price points – and then quickly modifies or cancels those orders before they are executed. The purpose of these bogus orders is to trick other market participants and manipulate the product's market price (in the foregoing example of bogus sell orders, by creating a false appearance of increased supply in the product and thereby depressing its market price). The trader seeks to mislead and deceive investors by communicating false pricing signals to the market, to create a false impression of how market participants value a financial product, and thus to prevent legitimate forces of supply and demand from operating properly. The trader does so by creating a false appearance of market depth, with intent to create artificial price movements. The trader could then exploit this layering activity by simultaneously executing other, real trades that the trader does intend to have executed, in an attempt to profit from the artificial price movements that the trader had created. Such layering and trading activity occurs over the course of seconds, in multiple cycles that the trader repeats throughout the trading day. Given the speed and near simultaneity of market activity in a successful layering scheme, such schemes are aided by custom-programmed, automated trading software.
9. Beginning in or about January 2009, …SARAO…sought to enrich himself through manipulation of the market for E-Minis. By placing multiple large-volume orders on the CME at different price points, SARAO created the false appearance of substantial supply in order to fraudulently induce other market participants to react to his deceptive market information. SARAO thus artificially depressed E-Mini prices. With the aid of an automated trading program, SARAO was able to all but eliminate his risk of unintentionally executing these orders by modifying and ultimately cancelling them before execution. Meanwhile, he exploited his manipulation to reap large trading profits by executing other, real orders."
THE JUDGMENT UNDER APPEAL
" (i) Navinder Sarao set up and adapted, with the active assistance of 4 separate programmers, altered software system very different from the basic programme.
(ii) Navinder Sarao actively traded on the C.M.E. during the alleged illegal activity 2009 – 2014, all from his base in London.
(iii) Altering software is not per se illegal either against C.M.E. rules or U.S. Federal law and is not uncommon.
(iv) A very high percentage of contracts on the C.M.E. are routinely cancelled by traders large and small, perhaps 99%. Altering contracts is commonplace and legitimate.
(v) Navinder Sarao for instant purposes traded, albeit with some losses, making a very substantial profit of approximately $40 m and on the sample counts $8.1 m.
(vi) Emails sent by Navinder Sarao to his various programmers provide a powerful basis for concluding, absent any contradiction, that active market manipulation, including that known as spoofing, was expressly intended and was clearly known by him to be illegal.
(vii) While all of Navinder Sarao's contracts may have been at potential risk of execution, to his fiscal detriment, which is how the market operates, Navinder Sarao had adapted his software to minimise the risk way beyond ordinary market custom and practice.
(viii) Navinder Sarao was seemingly untruthful to Regulators in answering formal enquiries as to how he was operating on the C.M.E.
(ix) The Defence expert, Prof Harris, has not undertaken any examination of Navinder Sarao's market activity from any of the data potentially available to him. The Prosecutor's expert, Prof Hendershot, has formed a view based on an analysis of all that data.
(x) The causes of the Flash Crash (on 6/5/10) are not a single action and cannot on any view be laid wholly or mostly at Navinder Sarao's door, although he was active on the day. In any event, this is only a single trading day in over 400 relied upon by the prosecution.
(xi) Prof Harris accepts, while he disagrees with the conclusions of the U.S. Prosecutors, he is not saying the complaint of illegal market manipulation is not a genuine belief of both the U.S. Prosecution authorities and the U.S. Judge who issued the warrant or the grand jury and its 22 count indictment."
The language used here needs to be adjusted to fit within English contract law concepts. The "contracts" to which the Judge referred would be categorised as "offers" in our terminology and "execution" would be regarded as "acceptance".
" Essentially, has the USA established that the same actions in this jurisdiction at the same time would be capable of being prosecuted for one or more offences known to the criminal law? This is not the forum for testing the evidence as in a trial. To my mind when all is said and done the USA are correct in arguing they have shown dual criminality. ….In my judgment 'representations' are made by making orders/contracts, the prosecution can show the motivation for this fact given the heavily modified software and the reasons for that (see the email exchanges with the four software programmers) which is intended to dishonestly create a gain for Navinder Sarao (and loss for other market users). "
The Judge held that, if it took place in the United Kingdom, such conduct would amount to an offence under s.2 of the Fraud Act 2006 ("the Fraud Act"). For Dual Criminality purposes, the Judge further held that financial market offences under s.397 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the FSMA 2000") and s.90 of the Financial Services Act 2012 ("the FSA 2012") were also made out.
"A 'false' impression as to price is clearly intended and created by the conduct alleged and that is dishonest, again by reference to the conduct outlined in clear and unambiguous terms by this USA Request."
" (1) The extradition of a person ('D') to a category 2 territory is barred by reason of forum if the extradition would not be in the interests of justice.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the extradition would not be in the interests of justice if the judge –
(a) decides that a substantial measure of D's relevant activity was performed in the United Kingdom; and
(b) decides, having regard to the specified matters relating to the interests of justice (and only those matters), that the extradition should not take place.
(3) These are the specified matters relating to the interests of justice –
(a) the place where most of the loss or harm resulting from the extradition offence occurred or was intended to occur;
(b) the interests of any victims of the extradition offence;
(c) any belief of a prosecutor that the United Kingdom, or a particular part of the United Kingdom, is not the most appropriate jurisdiction in which to prosecute D in respect of the conduct constituting the extradition offence;
(d) were D to be prosecuted in a part of the United Kingdom for an offence that corresponds to the extradition offence, whether evidence necessary to prove the offence is or could be made available in the United Kingdom;
(e) any delay that might result from proceeding in one jurisdiction rather than another;
(f) the desirability and practicability of all prosecutions relating to the extradition offence taking place in one jurisdiction, having regard (in particular) to –
(i) the jurisdictions in which witnesses, co-defendants and other suspects are located, and
(ii) the practicability of the evidence of such persons being given in the United Kingdom or in jurisdictions outside the United Kingdom;
(g) D's connections with the United Kingdom. "
i) The better view was that most of the "harm" occurred in the US, bearing in mind that harm "can include damage to the integrity of that particular trading market".ii) With regard to the interests of any victims, the balance was neutral or slightly in favour of the US.
iii) There was no view from any United Kingdom prosecutor.
iv) All the evidence could be made available in the United Kingdom.
v) So far as concerned delay, the Judge pointed out that the US authorities were ready to try the matter but any delay in this country would not be significant.
vi) With regard to the desirability and practicability of all prosecutions taking place in one jurisdiction, the Judge came "down firmly" in favour of the US.
vii) There was no dispute as to the Applicant's connections with the United Kingdom.
" …[The Applicant] self-evidently and understandably does not wish or desire to be extradited, few do, or face trial in any jurisdiction, this one included. That is not the test in law. To my mind the 'interests of justice' make trial in the USA both the desirable and practicable venue and I reject the challenge advanced of the forum bar…."
GROUND I: DUAL CRIMINALITY
i) First, it is irrelevant that the Applicant was at risk of having some of his offers accepted before cancellation – though it may be noted that the material before us suggests he sought software which would minimise the risk of such an eventuality.ii) Secondly, it is likewise immaterial that many, perhaps even most, traders frequently cancel offers prior to acceptance.
GROUND II: ABUSE OF PROCESS
" Under United States law, 'spoofing' includes, among other activity: (a) submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an appearance of false market depth; and (b) submitting or cancelling bids or offers with intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards. The legitimate, good-faith cancellation or modification of orders……does not violate the anti-spoofing provision. To distinguish between legitimate trading and spoofing, the finder of fact should evaluate the market context, the defendant's trading practices and patterns, and other relevant facts and circumstances…."
It follows that the Abuse of Process challenge was doomed to fail; the Request drew attention to the lawful cancelling of offers and, in terms, distinguished between them and spoofing.
GROUND III: FORUM BAR
" …the test is not, as …[counsel]…appeared to suggest at one point in his submissions, whether the appellant should be tried in the requesting state or in the United Kingdom. The question is whether, in the interests of justice, there should not be an extradition to the requesting state. That is an entirely different test."
OVERALL CONCLUSION
Mr Justice Nicol: