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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> FDA, R (On the Application Of) v The Prime Minister And Minister for the Civil Service [2021] EWHC 3279 (Admin) (06 December 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2021/3279.html Cite as: [2022] 4 WLR 5, [2021] EWHC 3279 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MRS JUSTICE STEYN
____________________
THE QUEEN (on the application of the FDA) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE |
Defendant |
____________________
Sir James Eadie Q.C., Cecilia Ivimy, Christopher Knight and Jason Pobjoy (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant.
Hearing dates: 17 and 18 November 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Lewis handed down the following judgment of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
THE MINISTERIAL CODE
The Emergence of the Code
Amendments dealing with harassment, bullying and discriminatory behaviour
"This Code sets out the standards of behaviour expected from all those who serve in Government. The values it promotes should underpin our conduct as we tackle the challenges of our times and seek to build that fairer Britain, a country of genuine opportunity for all where everyone plays by the same rules. Parliament and Whitehall are special places in our democracy, but they are also places of work too, and exactly the same standards and norms should govern them as govern any other workplace. We need to establish a new culture of respect at the centre of our public life: one in which everyone can feel confident that they are working in a safe and secure environment."
"1.2 Ministers should be professional in all their dealings and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect. Working relationships, including with civil servants, ministerial and parliamentary colleagues and parliamentary staff should be proper and appropriate. Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated."
The Current Code
"To fulfil this mission, and win back the trust of the British people, we must uphold the highest standards of propriety – and this code sets out how we must do so.
There must be no bullying and no harassment; no leaking; no breach of collective responsibility…."
"1 MINISTERS OF THE CROWN
1.1 Ministers of the Crown are expected to maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety.
1.2 Ministers should be professional in all their dealings and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect. Working relationships, including with civil servants, ministerial and parliamentary colleagues and parliamentary staff should be proper and appropriate. Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated.
1.3 The Ministerial Code should be read against the background of the overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law and to protect the integrity of public life. They are expected to observe the Seven Principles of Public Life set out at Annex A, and the following principles of Ministerial conduct:
a. The principle of collective responsibility applies to all Government Ministers;
b. Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments and agencies;
c. It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister;
d. Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public, refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest, which should be decided in accordance with the relevant statutes and the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
e. Ministers should similarly require civil servants who give evidence before Parliamentary Committees on their behalf and under their direction to be as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code;
f. Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises, or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private interests;
g. Ministers should not accept any gift or hospitality which might, or might reasonably appear to, compromise their judgement or place them under an improper obligation;
h. Ministers in the House of Commons must keep separate their roles as Minister and constituency Member;
i. Ministers must not use government resources for Party political purposes; and
j. Ministers must uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service and not ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code as set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
1.4 It is not the role of the Cabinet Secretary or other officials to enforce the Code. If there is an allegation about a breach of the Code, and the Prime Minister, having consulted the Cabinet Secretary, feels that it warrants further investigation, he may ask the Cabinet Office to investigate the facts of the case and/or refer the matter to the independent adviser on Ministers' interests.
1.5 The Code provides guidance to Ministers on how they should act and arrange their affairs in order to uphold these standards. It lists the principles which may apply in particular situations. It applies to all members of the Government and covers Parliamentary Private Secretaries in paragraphs 3.7 – 3.12.
1.6 Ministers are personally responsible for deciding how to act and conduct themselves in the light of the Code and for justifying their actions and conduct to Parliament and the public. However, Ministers only remain in office for so long as they retain the confidence of the Prime Minister. He is the ultimate judge of the standards of behaviour expected of a Minister and the appropriate consequences of a breach of those standards.
1.7 Ministers must also comply at all times with the requirements which Parliament itself has laid down in relation to the accountability and responsibility of Ministers. For Ministers in the Commons, these are set by the Resolution carried on 19 March 1997 (Official Report columns 1046-47), the terms of which are repeated at b. to e. above. For Ministers in the Lords, the Resolution can be found in the Official Report of 20 March 1997 column 1057. Ministers must also comply with the Codes of Conduct for their respective Houses and also any requirements placed on them by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority."
"We recommend that the first paragraph of the Questions for Procedure for Ministers should be amended to say: "It will be for individual Ministers to judge how best to act in order to uphold the highest standards. It will be for the Prime Minister to determine whether or not they have done so in any particular circumstance."
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Making of Allegations
The Investigation
"The Ministerial Code says "Ministers should be professional in their working relationships with the Civil Service and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect." I believe Civil Servants – particularly Senior Civil Servants – should be expected to handle robust criticism but should not have to face behaviour that goes beyond that. The Home Secretary says that she puts great store by professional, open relationships. She is action orientated and can be direct. The Home Secretary has also become – justifiably in many instances – frustrated by the Home Office leadership's lack of responsiveness and the lack of support she felt in DfID three years ago. The evidence is that this has manifested itself in forceful expression, including some occasions of shouting and swearing. This may not be done intentionally to cause upset, but that has been the effect on some individuals.
The Ministerial Code says that "Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code…" Definitions of harassment concern comments or actions relating to personal characteristics and there is no evidence from the Cabinet Office's work of any such behaviour by the Home Secretary. The definition of bullying adopted by the Civil Service accepts that legitimate, reasonable and constructive criticism of a worker's performance will not amount to bullying. It defines bullying as intimidating or insulting behaviour that makes an individual feel uncomfortable, frightened, less respected or put down. Instances of the behaviour reported to the Cabinet Office would meet such a definition.
The Civil Service itself needs to reflect on its role during this period. The Home Office was not as flexible as it could have been in responding to the Home Secretary's requests and direction. She has – legitimately – not always felt supported by the department. In addition, no feedback was given to the Home Secretary of the impact of her behaviour, which meant she was unaware of issues that she could otherwise have addressed.
My advice is that the Home Secretary has not consistently met the high standards required by the Ministerial Code of treating her civil servants with consideration and respect. Her approach on occasions has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals. To that extent her behaviour has been in breach of the Ministerial Code, even if unintentionally. This conclusion needs to be seen in context. There is no evidence that she was aware of the impact of her behaviour, and no feedback was given to her at the time. The high pressure and demands of the role, in the Home Office, coupled with the need for more supportive leadership from top of the department has clearly been a contributory factor. In particular, I note the finding of different and more positive behaviour since these issues were raised with her."
The Prime Minister's Conclusions
"Government Statement
The Prime Minister has taken advice from his Independent Adviser, Sir Alex Allan, in relation to the allegations made earlier this year around the Home Secretary's conduct. The Prime Minister takes this issue very seriously and recognises that it is always difficult for individuals to come forward and raise concerns and is grateful to those who have done so. The Prime Minister is grateful to Sir Alex for his advice and has considered his conclusions carefully.
It was clear from Sir Alex's advice that at times there have been difficult working relationships all round. Sir Alex's advice found that the Home Secretary had become – justifiably in many instances – frustrated by the Home Office leadership's lack of responsiveness and the lack of support she felt in DfID three years ago. He also found, however, that the Home Secretary had not always treated her civil servants with the consideration and respect that would be expected, and her approach on occasion has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals.
He went on to advise, therefore, that the Home Secretary had not consistently met the high standards expected of her under the Ministerial Code.
The Prime Minister notes Sir Alex's advice that many of the concerns now raised were not raised at the time and that the Home Secretary was unaware of the impact that she had. He is reassured that the Home Secretary is sorry for inadvertently upsetting those with whom she was working. He is also reassured that relationships, practices and culture in the Home Office are much improved. As the arbiter of the code, having considered Sir Alex's advice and weighing up all the factors, the Prime Minister's judgement is that the Ministerial code was not breached.
The Prime Minister has full confidence in the Home Secretary and considers this matter now closed. He is grateful to the thousands of civil servants working extremely hard to support delivery of the Government's priorities."
Additional Matters
THE CLAIM
(1) Is the claim justiciable?; and
(2) Did the defendant misdirect himself as to the meaning of the word "bullying" in paragraph 1.2 of the Ministerial Code?
THE FIRST ISSUE – JUSTICIABILITY
Submissions
Discussion and conclusion
Preliminary Observations
The Approach to Determining Justiciability
"41. There is a number of rules of English law which may result in an English court being unable to decide a disputed issue on its merits. Some of them, such as state immunity, confer immunity from jurisdiction. Some, such as the act of state doctrine, confer immunity from liability on certain persons in respect of certain acts. Some, such as the rule against the enforcement of foreign penal, revenue or public laws, or the much-criticised rule against the determination by an English court of title to foreign land (now circumscribed by statute and by the Brussels Regulation and the Lugano Convention) are probably best regarded as depending on the territorial limits of the competence of the English courts or of the competence which they will recognise in foreign states. Properly speaking, the term non-justiciability refers to something different. It refers to a case where an issue is said to be inherently unsuitable for judicial determination by reason only of its subject matter. Such cases generally fall into one of two categories.
42. The first category comprises cases where the issue in question is beyond the constitutional competence assigned to the courts under our conception of the separation of powers. Cases in this category are rare, and rightly so, for they may result in a denial of justice which could only exceptionally be justified either at common law or under article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . The paradigm cases are the non-justiciability of certain transactions of foreign states and of proceedings in Parliament. The first is based in part on the constitutional limits of the court's competence as against that of the executive in matters directly affecting the United Kingdom's relations with foreign states. So far as it was based on the separation of powers, Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, 935–937 is the leading case in this category, although the boundaries of the category of "transactions" of states which will engage the doctrine now are a good deal less clear today than they seemed to be 40 years ago. The second is based on the constitutional limits of the court's competence as against that of Parliament: Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321. The distinctive feature of all these cases is that once the forbidden area is identified, the court may not adjudicate on the matters within it, even if it is necessary to do so in order to decide some other issue which is itself unquestionably justiciable. Where the non-justiciable issue inhibits the defence of a claim, this may make it necessary to strike out an otherwise justiciable claim on the ground that it cannot fairly be tried: Hamilton v Al Fayed [2001] 1 AC 395.
43. The basis of the second category of non-justiciable cases is quite different. It comprises claims or defences which are based neither on private legal rights or obligations, nor on reviewable matters of public law. Examples include domestic disputes; transactions not intended by the participants to affect their legal relations; and issues of international law which engage no private right of the claimant or reviewable question of public law. Some issues might well be non-justiciable in this sense if the court were asked to decide them in the abstract. But they must nevertheless be resolved if their resolution is necessary in order to decide some other issue which is in itself justiciable. The best-known examples are in the domain of public law. Thus, when the court declines to adjudicate on the international acts of foreign sovereign states or to review the exercise of the Crown's prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs, it normally refuses on the ground that no legal right of the citizen is engaged whether in public or private law: R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin); R (Al-Haq) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 1910 (Admin). As Cranston J put it in the latter case, at para 60, there is no "domestic foothold". But the court does adjudicate on these matters if a justiciable legitimate expectation or a Convention right depends on it: R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2003] UKHRR 76. The same would apply if a private law liability was asserted which depended on such a matter. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] AC 1356, para 8, there are
"issues which judicial tribunals have traditionally been very reluctant to entertain because they recognise their limitations as suitable bodies to resolve them. This is not to say that if the claimants have a legal right the courts cannot decide it. The defendants accept that if the claimants have a legal right it is justiciable in the courts, and they do not seek to demarcate areas into which the courts may not intrude."
The Present Case
THE SECOND ISSUE – THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 1.2 OF THE MINISTERIAL CODE
Submissions
Discussion
CONCLUSION