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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Malik v Governor of HM Prison Hindley (No.3) [2022] EWHC 2737 (Admin) (01 November 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/2737.html Cite as: [2022] 4 WLR 114, [2022] WLR(D) 430, [2022] EWHC 2737 (Admin) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN MANCHESTER
B e f o r e :
____________________
REHAN MALIK |
Applicant |
|
- and - |
||
GOVERNOR OF HM PRISON HINDLEY (No.3) |
Respondent |
____________________
Will Hays (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing 27.10.22
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE FORDHAM:
Introduction
The issue of substance
Discussion
In this claim, the Claimant … seeks to challenge "the date upon which the United Kingdom leaves the European Union", claiming that the Government had no power to extend the time for the UK leaving the European Union beyond 29 March 2017. Notification of withdrawal having been given on 29 March 2017, article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union provided that the European Treaties should cease to apply to the relevant Member State from entry into force of a withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the date of notification. It is submitted that, although that period could be extended by the European Council in agreement with the Member State unanimously agreeing to extend it, the Government had no power to agree an extension on behalf of the UK. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 granted the Prime Minister a statutory power only to give notification, not to extend the period referred to in article 50. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provided that, for domestic purposes, the Treaties were to cease to apply on "exit day", which was initially was 29 March 2019 but could be and has since been extended by statutory instruments), the power to amend that date could only be exercised where the date the Treaties are to cease to apply is different from 29 March 2019. It does not give the Government any statutory powers in relation to its conduct of relations with the EU on the international plane. The power to amend "exit day" has therefore not been triggered. The Claimant thus contends that the UK left the EU on 29 March 2019.
… [T]his claim is bound to fail, and is totally without merit, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 16-22 of the Summary Grounds of Resistance which I gratefully adopt as correct. In short, international agreements (including agreements as to extensions of time under article 50(3)) are matters for the Government in the exercise of prerogative powers; and, although such powers can be displaced by Parliament, this case is distinguishable from R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, because Parliament, in its various interventions into the withdrawal process or otherwise, has not arguably displaced those prerogative powers in respect of an extension of time under article 50(3). Indeed, Parliament has consistently made clear in the 2017 and 2018 Acts, and especially clearly in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, that timing of withdrawal (including agreeing extensions to the withdrawal date under article 50) was and is a matter for the Government.
16. The Government negotiates and enters into international agreements in the exercise of prerogative powers: i.e. the treaty and foreign relations prerogatives: see eg R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 [2018] AC 61 at §§54-55.
17. The Claimant's case is dependent upon the assertion that the statutory scheme set out above has displaced the Government's prerogative powers to negotiate and agree extensions of time to the withdrawal period under Article 50(3) TEU. The short answer to that contention is that the statutory scheme says no such thing; on the contrary, each of the relevant pieces of primary legislation is fundamentally inconsistent with it.
18. The 2017 Act authorised the Government to notify the EU of the UK's intention to withdraw. It did not purport to address when the UK would leave, or to control any power to agree extensions of time. By the express inclusion within s.1(1) of a reference to Article 50, Parliament was recognising and acknowledging that it was, necessarily, for the Government to exercise its powers in relation to the withdrawal process in accordance with Article 50, including extensions of time under Article 50(3).
19. So far as concerns the 2018 Act: (a) Section 20 as a whole presupposes that the prerogative power to seek and agree extensions exists. Thus, s.20(3) expressly recognises that an extension might be agreed between the UK and the EU under Article 50(3) TEU, and s.20(4) makes provision for the Government to amend the definition of "exit day" by regulations. Parliament did not purport to control or limit the prerogative power to agree such extensions under Article 50(3). Rather, Section 20(4) restricts the power to make regulations amending the definition of "exit day" to circumstances where an agreement under Article 50(3) has already been reached, in order that the definition be aligned with the date of withdrawal under the Treaties. It is therefore evidently premised upon Governmental exercise of the prerogative already having occurred. (b) Moreover, where Parliament did intend in the 2018 Act to control or limit the Government's prerogative powers in relation to the Article 50 process it did so expressly. Section 13 has the effect of preventing the Government ratifying any withdrawal agreement with the EU before it has been approved by the House of Commons and primary legislation has been passed to implement the agreement. That operates as a direct fetter on the Government's ordinary treaty prerogative to negotiate and agree a withdrawal agreement, under Article 50, departing from the ordinary preservation of that prerogative in s.20(4) and (8) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The absence of any similar control on the power to agree an extension under Article 50(3) in the 2018 Act is conspicuous.
20. So far as concerns the 2019 Act: (a) Section 1(6) recognises and preserves, in terms, the Government's power to 'seek and agree' extensions of time under Article 50(3). That is the sole purpose of that provision. (b) To the limited extent that Parliament intended to control or limit that prerogative power in the 2019 Act, it did so in express terms (eg in ss.1(4)-(5)); and then went out of its way to make clear (in s.1(6)) that otherwise the prerogative powers are preserved.
21. There is no parallel or analogue with the situation in Miller. Unlike sending the notification of intention to withdraw under Article 50(2) – and on the assumption of irrevocability the Supreme Court proceeded upon – an extension of the UK's period of membership of the EU preserves the existing legal position, including the rights and obligations of citizens, the sources and content of domestic law, and the constitutional arrangements of the UK for the period of the extension. It does not involve any constitutional or legal change, let alone one of the "major" or "fundamental" type which concerned the Supreme Court in Miller: at §§82-83. Where, as in this case, the exercise of the treaty prerogative does "not in any significant way alter domestic law", including in relation to EU treaties and agreements, the Supreme Court accepted that the prerogative power existed: at §89, approving R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552 in this respect.
22. It is equally plain that an extension of the UK's period of membership does not frustrate the purpose of any statutory provision: (a) An extension of time under Article 50(3) does not frustrate Parliament's expressed intention in s.1(1) of the 2017 Act that the UK should withdraw from the EU. Parliament set no date by which that intention was to be effected: it provided only a power to notify under Article 50(2), which could be exercised at any time. (b) Section 20(1) of the 2018 Act, as enacted, gave a specific definition of "exit day" as 11.00pm on the 29 March 2019. However, that was evidently to reflect the fact that under the terms of Article 50 – given the date of the notification – the ordinary two year period would expire on 29 March 2019. In any event, and dispositively so far as this point is concerned, s.20 also made direct provision to enable and to regulate – in ss.20(3)-(4) and §14 of Schedule 7 – extensions of time which would alter the definition of "exit day". It is therefore the Claimant's position, that there is no power to agree an extension, which would frustrate the evident purposes of ss.20(3)-(4). The extension regulation powers would be denuded of any purpose or function. Parliament would have legislated in vain to permit regulations to be made to reflect an agreed extension of time under Article 50(3) if, as the Claimant asserts, only primary legislation could authorise such a step. (c) No assistance can be drawn from the anticipated repeal of the 1972 Act in section 1 of the 2018 Act. Section 1 is not in force, and the commencement of it was both tied in terms to the definition of "exit day" (as to which, see above) and left by Parliament to be dealt with in regulations: s.25(4). The 1972 Act remains fully in force as an expression of Parliament's continued intent. Any extension of time of the UK's membership of the EU is wholly consistent with the intention of Parliament as expressed in the 1972 Act. Again, it is the Claimant's position which would frustrate the continued intention of Parliament by seeking to render the 1972 Act empty of effect without it having been repealed.
Conclusion
The issue of procedure
1.11.22