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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Independiente Ltd & Ors v Music Trading On-Line (HK) Ltd (t/a CD-WOW) & Ors [2007] EWHC 533 (Ch) (20 March 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/533.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 533 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) INDEPENDIENTE Ltd (2) EMI RECORDS Ltd (3) XL RECORDINGS Ltd (4) WILDSTAR RECORDS Ltd (5) MERCURY RECORDS Ltd (6) SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (UK) Ltd (7) SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT INC (The first to Sixth Claimants sue on behalf of themselves and for and as representing other members of the British Phonographic Industry Limited and Phonographic Performance Limited) |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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(1) MUSIC TRADING ON-LINE (HK) Ltd (2) MUSIC TRADING ON-LINE (BV) Ltd (3) UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING INTERNATIONAL PLC (5) PHILIP HOWARD ROBINSON |
Defendants |
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Philip Roberts (instructed by K & L Gates) for the First Defendant
Jeffrey Onions QC, Stephen Housman (instructed by Clyde & Co) for the Fifth Defendant
Hearing dates: 19th – 22nd February 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr. Justice Evans-Lombe :
"… from 4pm on 27th January 2004 (save for media comprising both audio and visual content, in which case from 4pm on 9th February 2004) they will not, without the express written consent of the relevant UK copyright owner or' exclusive licensee whether acting by their respective directors, officers, employees or agents or otherwise howsoever:
1. Despatch and/or supply any non-EEA Product (not being an Excluded Product) from anywhere in the world to any customer in the United Kingdom.
2. Issue any Non-EEA Product (not being an Excluded Product) to the public in the United Kingdom.
3. Do any of the following acts in the United Kingdom in relation to any Non-EEA Product (not being an Excluded Product) with knowledge of the fact that it is a Non-EEA Product or reason to believe it is a Non-EEA Product:
a. import into the United Kingdom;b. possess in the course of a business;c. sell;d. distribute in the course of a business.
4. Authorise any person to do any of the acts set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above."
The Background Facts
"I was told by Mr Wesslen that the defendant had given undertakings to the court whereby the defendant agreed not to despatch and or supply any non-EEA Products to the UK and Eire and that non-EEA essentially meant EEA "music" Products which had not previously been put into free circulation in the EEA. I fully understood this to mean that all Products despatched to the UK and Eire must have first been placed on the market in the EEA."
i) Miss Chow was not herself able to give any direct evidence of the extent of the changes in buying practice introduced by CD-WOW as a consequence of the Settlement Agreement and the consequent undertaking to the court. She was responsible for dealing with invoices from suppliers but she could not say how many new suppliers were acquired in consequence of the undertaking or by how much orders or Product available to be sold within the EEA ("Compliant Product") was increased from existing suppliers. No written records showing these supply changes were produced. Any of Mr Wesslen and the seven buyers could have given this evidence but none of them were called.
ii) The instructions to the warehouse staff were not given in writing but were passed to them initially at a meeting. When complaints were received from copyright proprietors no changes to the system were introduced. The reaction was to convene a further meeting after proceedings had been commenced at a time when Miss Chow understood that she was to provide an affirmation but some month to six weeks before she signed it. She said that the purpose of the meeting was to drive home the necessity of complying with the existing instructions and practice.
iii) Miss Chow accepted that the object of the system which was to ensure that only Compliant Product was delivered to customers in the EEA and, in particular, in the UK, depended on the warehouse staff not committing errors in the application of that system. She was unable to explain how a series of breaches of the undertaking by the delivery of non-compliant Product to UK customers could have occurred not long after this further meeting with the warehouse staff.
The Procedural history
"For all these reasons I consider that the claim is properly brought by the individual claimants on behalf of the relevant Members, as defined in the particulars of claim as proposed to be amended as well as on their own behalf. Similarly I see no reason to make any order under CPR Rule 19.6(2)… ."
The Contempt application
i) That each of these test purchases were despatched by CD-WOW from Hong Kong to customers based in the United Kingdom.
ii) That each of the CDs or DVDs involved in the test purchases was a physical embodiment of the whole or a substantial part of any copy of a film or sound recording (within the meaning of sections 5A or 5B of the CDPA).
iii) That UK sound recording or film copyright in the film or sound recording involved in each of the test purchases is owned by, or exclusively licensed to, one of the Claimants or a member of the British Phonographic Industry Ltd and/or of Phonographic Performance Ltd.
iv) That the CD or DVD involved in each of the test purchases has not previously been put into circulation in the EEA by or with the direct and personal consent of the owner or exclusive licensee of the United Kingdom copyright or EEA copyright owner or exclusive licensee.
v) That the CD or DVD involved in each of the test purchases was not an Excluded Product as defined in paragraph 4B of the order of Master Bowman of the 21st January 2004.
"As you are aware and have pointed out in correspondence, our client's evidence does not seek to challenge evidence your clients have put forward as to alleged breaches. Notwithstanding your clients' attempts to reverse the burden of proof' by seeking our client's "acceptance" of the alleged breaches, we can confirm that our client has not and will not challenge (in summary judgment or committal proceedings) that the specific pleaded test purchases were made, or that they did regrettably constitute breaches of the undertakings. It remains our client's case that these represent a tiny proportion of all its sales. Moreover, if your clients are prepared to submit to an enquiry as to damages restricted solely to the pleaded test purchases, our client would be prepared not to object to such an enquiry….
This letter should not be taken as an admission by our client of any deliberate contempt of court, which is strongly denied. As set out in the affidavit evidence of Chow Chui Yee, our client did nor deliberately or recklessly breach the Consent Order in respect of the pleaded test purchases, or otherwise. Our client has at all times endeavoured to ensure that procedures were put in place to avoid any mistakes occurring. We are instructed by our client to apologise to the Court in respect of the unchallenged incidents and Ms Chow will if necessary be in a position to explain to the Court the further safeguards which have been taken to avoid the repetition of such incidents in the future."
"Applications for committal or punishment for contempt of Court are treated with particular care. They are quasi criminal in nature. The applicant must prove the breach beyond reasonable doubt; furthermore, there are strict formal requirements as to the service and content of the order which is alleged to have been breached, and the content of the application notice. Perhaps of greatest significance in this case is the importance of the date and content of the application notice. The respondent is only obliged to meet the "charges" set out in the application notice. In other words, the charges are those specified in the application notice. The question of whether there has been contempt has to be determined as of the date of the application notice. Subsequent behaviour of the respondent may be highly relevant to whether he or she has purged or mitigated the alleged contempt. It may also throw light on the accuracy or otherwise of any evidence served. However, it seems to me that actions or inactions after, and therefore not encompassed within the application, cannot themselves be considered as part of the charges against the respondent."
I gratefully adopt and apply Mr Justice Laddie's approach to the facts of the present case.
"We have already informed you that our clients believed its dealings were compliant. The buyer responsible understood this DVD to be a region zero and, in any event, had not appreciated that it was a "music Product" covered by the order. The position has been rectified and we reiterate that if there has been any error, our clients apologise therefore."
"The reality (once again) is that:
1. There is no evidence of any act of deliberate or knowing breach of the order.
2. Our clients take the order and its effect very seriously and have at all times endeavoured to ensure compliance with the order.
3. Our client's position reflects assurances from its suppliers (in respect of Robbie Williams and Westlife) namely EMI (HK) and BMG (HK) that CDs delivered to our client are not in breach of the order."
Infringement of Copyright
"The question is not one of jurisdiction but of practice, that is, whether damages should be awarded or an inquiry directed where the proceedings before the court are punitive in form but where the breach alleged is both a breach of an undertaking to the court and a breach of contract with the other party. Although this course has not been taken in the past I can see no reason in principle why the court, if satisfied that the facts proved at the hearing of a motion to commit constitute both a breach of the undertaking to the court and a breach of contract and also that there is no tenable ground of defence to an action for damages for breach of contract, should not direct an inquiry into damages or in a sufficiently clear case make a summary award of damages. It would, I think, be unjust and give rise to unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, that an applicant who has established facts which constitute both a breach of an undertaking to the court and of the respondent's contractual undertakings should be put to the delay and expense of instituting separate proceedings in which the question whether there had been a breach of the undertakings would be res judicata."
"13 In summary therefore one can conclude that where the underlying infringement is established to the standard required to support an application to commit for breach of an injunction, then there is no arguable defence to a claim for copyright infringement; and the circumstance that the infringements complained of are committed in breach of a Court Order render either an enquiry as to additional damages or, in a proper case [render appropriate], a summary award of additional damages to the copyright owner."
"16(1) The owner of the copyright in a work has, in accordance with the following provisions of this Chapter, the exclusive right to do the following acts in the United Kingdom—
(a)…;
(b) to issue copies of the work to the public (see section 18);…
and those acts are referred to in this Part as the "acts restricted by the copyright".
(2) Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright.
Infringement by issue of copies to the public.
18.(1) The issue to the public of copies of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in every description of copyright work.
(2) References in this Part to the issue to the public of copies of a work are to
(a) the act of putting into circulation in the EEA copies not previously put into circulation in the EEA by or with the consent of the copyright owner".
"It is therefore submitted that for the purposes of the distribution right under Section 18 the act of putting a copy into circulation occurs when, and in the place where, the copy is delivered to a member of the public."
"The alternative submission was that by arranging the transport, Meneghetti had itself done the act of importing the goods into the United Kingdom. On the face of it, this is a startling submission. MFI was obviously the importer of the goods. Meneghetti's arranging the transport may or may not have been sufficient to amount to participation in the act of importation so as to make itself jointly liable as a secondary party, but in view of the abandonment of any allegation of joint liability, no such argument has been advanced. The contention is that Meneghetti was the importer.
In my opinion this argument must fail. Meneghetti made arrangements on behalf of MFI for the importation by MFI of its goods into the United Kingdom. The contract of carriage is presumed to have been made on behalf of the consignee and owner of the goods: see Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road (3rd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) at pp.428-429, para.216a. If there had been short delivery, MFI would have been the proper party to sue on the contract. But I do not think that one need rely on the technicalities of the contract of carriage. Meneghetti was not the importer because, whoever had contracted with the carrier, MFI was the importer."
"16 The policy of Community exhaustion is reflected in both the trade marks and design legislation by excluding from infringement goods put on the market in the EEA by the right owner or with his consent. Exclusion by reason of the owner's consent also arises in a similar manner in section 18 (2) of the CDPA 88. Two issues therefore next require attention: first whether Sony has given its consent to what is now complained of and secondly, whether by offering the goods for sale on its website, Pacific [the defendant] has fallen within any of the acts which under a relevant statute, give rise to infringement."
"25 Against this, Pacific pointed out in their evidence on the application inter alia that they were a Hong Kong company having no trading presence in the UK or EEA and that title to the goods they sold passed in Hong Kong. They asserted that their trading style 'Lik Sang' made sense only to Chinese speakers to whom the trading title and the characters [had a meaning]."
"27 The acts of which complaint is made have in my view been perpetrated not in Hong Kong but here in the EEA, and without Sony's consent. Moreover, it would make no sense if intellectual property rights in the EEA could be avoided merely by setting up a website outside the EEA crafted to sell within it. Were the acts of which complaint is made to have been committed physically within the EEA they would unarguably have been infringing acts. I cannot see how the electronic intermediary of a website which focussed at least in part on the EEA would make them any less so."
The Summary Judgment Application