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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Baker (Liquidator of TMG Brokers Limited) v Staines & Anor [2021] EWHC 1006 (Ch) (23 April 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/1006.html Cite as: [2021] EWHC 1006 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (ChD)
IN THE MATTER OF TMG BROKERS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
London, EC4A 1 NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
(1) BRIAN BAKER (As Liquidator of TMG Brokers Limited) (2) TMG BROKERS LIMITED (In Liquidation) |
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- and - |
Applicants |
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(1) MR DENNIS STAINES (2) MR ALOYSIUS IKECHKWU OBINWA MADU |
Respondents |
____________________
The Respondents in person
Hearing dates: 19 to 21 January 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
Insolvency and Companies Court Judge Burton :
Introduction
i) from the Company's bank account with Bank Frick & Co in Liechtenstein (the "Frick Account") to Mr Madu made during the period 12 September 2013 to 1 December 2016, totalling £175,053.32 (the "Frick Payments");ii) cash withdrawals from the Frick Account, which the Liquidator considers were most likely made by Mr Madu of €50,409.11 (the "Frick Cash Withdrawals");
iii) £213,791.94 directed to be paid by one of the Company's debtors to the account held by a connected company, TMG Pay Limited ("TPL") with Barclays Bank in England, which company and bank account were also under the control of the Respondents (the "TPL Account"). Of the £213,791.94 paid into the TPL Account which the Applicants seek to recover (the "TPL Payments") they refer in particular to the following "Identified Payments":
iv) £132,873 paid to Mr Madu;
v) £13,786 paid to Mr Staines;
vi) £6,552 was out in cash in Italy, where Mr Madu resides; and
vii) £53,747.91 used to discharge TPL's liabilities.
This left an unaccounted for balance of £6,831.84 (the "Balance").
i) the Frick Payments and Frick Cash Withdrawals were ultra vires, disguised distributions of capital, or that in causing or permitting the payments, the Respondents acted in breach of the fiduciary duties which they owed to the Company as its directors; andii) the TPL Payments were diverted away from the Company in breach of the Respondents' fiduciary duties.
Background
i) The End Customer would use the Company's portal to pay the amount claimed by the merchant for the goods or services the merchant was providing, by credit card. The credit card issuer would pay that amount into OSMM's bank account (which, like the Company's Frick Account, was also held with Bank Frick & Co in Liechtenstein).ii) Once a week, the Company would extract from OSMM's portal, a report of the week's transactions. Once a week, OSMM would retain a 2.8% processing fee as well as an additional 10%, the latter going towards what is described as a "Rolling Reserve" held by OSMM for 6 months to guard against situations where an End Customer requested a "chargeback".
iii) Two weeks later, OSMM would credit the remaining 87.2% of the payment to the Company's Frick Account.
iv) The Company would then pay the majority of funds, net of its own fee (4.5%) to the merchant.
The Respondents' defence
"I had understood that the payments comprising the sum of £49,622.28 were my "salary" payments for the period March 2015 to January 2015 [sic]. However during the course of [the Company's] liquidation I have discovered that the payments had not been properly dealt with in the [Company's] account with the consequence that I could not prove that they were, in fact, my salary. I believe that the fault for this lay with [Mr Madu] but, in any event, after taking advice, I also agreed to repay this sum".
"In view of the matters set out above, I believe that I did act honestly and reasonably in respect of the relevant payments, all of which were made at a time when [the Company] was solvent. Accordingly, should the court find that I am jointly liable for the payments with [Mr Madu] then I would respectfully ask that I am relieved from that liability".
"I had to ask for the hearing bundle download link to be renewed as it had expired. I had not previously given written notice to the Liquidator of acceptance of electronic service and this did not constitute proper service of the statement. I accepted the electronic service on this occasion on the 18th March 2020".
"Some of the amounts referred to in the application appear to be correct but some amounts have been added from [TPL's] accounts. I do not understand the reason for this but it seems likely that this will reduce the alleged indebtedness. It is also possible that this has led to some double accounting and amounts may have been included twice (no credit has been given for the payment of £49,622.28 that has already been made)".
Relevant legal principles
"A limited company not in liquidation cannot lawfully return capital to its shareholders except by way of a reduction of capital approved by the court. Profits may be distributed to shareholders (normally by way of dividend) but only out of distributable profits computed in accordance with the complicated provisions of the Companies Act 2006 (replacing similar provisions in the Companies Act 1985).
Whether a transaction amounts to an unlawful distribution of capital is not simply a matter of form. As Hoffmann J said in Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626, 631: "Whether or not the transaction is a distribution to shareholders does not depend exclusively on what the parties choose to call it. The court looks at the substance rather than the outward appearance." Similarly Pennycuick J observed in Ridge Securities Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1964] 1 WLR 479 , 495:
"A company can only lawfully deal with its assets in furtherance of its objects. The corporators may take assets out of the company by way of dividend, or, with the leave of the court, by way of reduction of capital, or in a winding up. They may, of course, acquire them for full consideration. They cannot take assets out of the company by way of voluntary distribution, however described, and, if they attempt to do so, the distribution is ultra vires the company"."
"(1) A company may only make a distribution out of profits available for the purpose.
(2) A company's profits available for distribution are its accumulated, realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital duly made".
"A director of a company must:
a) act in accordance with the company's constitution, and
b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they were conferred".
"(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters to):
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others …"
"The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company."
"(a) Where the duty extends to consideration of the interests of creditors, their interests must be considered as "paramount" when taken into account in the directors' exercise of discretion. …
(b) … the subjective test only applies where there is evidence of actual consideration of the best interests of the company. Where there is no such evidence, the proper test is objective, namely, whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned could, in the circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transaction was for the benefit of the company. …
(c) Building on (b), I consider that it also follows that where a very material interest, such as that of a large creditor (in a company of doubtful solvency, where creditors' interests must be taken into account), is unreasonably (i.e. without objective justification) overlooked and not taken into account, the objective test must equally be applied. Failing to take into account a material factor is something which goes to the validity of the directors' decision-making process. This is not the court substituting its own judgment on the relevant facts (with the inevitable element of hindsight) for that of the directors made at the time; rather it is the court making an (objective) judgment taking into account all the relevant facts known or which ought to have been known at the time, the directors not having made such a judgment in the first place".
"Judicial statements should never be treated or construed as if they were statutes but, in my judgment, the formulation used by Sir Andrew Morritt C and Patten LJ in Bilta v Nazir, and, by judgeS in other cases, that the duty arises when the directors know or should know that the company is or is likely to become insolvent accurately encapsulates the trigger. In this context, "likely" means probable".
"(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with:
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by a director in relation to the company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has."
"The objective test sets the basic standard. It is no excuse for a director to say that, in fact, she did not have the general knowledge, skill or experience reasonably to be expected of a person carrying out her appointed functions. The subjective test potentially raises the standard by reference to any greater general knowledge, skill or experience which the particular director actually has."
"I am satisfied that whether it is to be viewed strictly as a shifting of the evidential burden or simply an example of the well-settled principle that a fiduciary is obliged to account for his dealings with the trust estate, that Mr Aslett is correct to say that once the liquidator proves the relevant payment has been made the evidential burden is on the respondents to explain the transaction in question".
"The approach of the judge in this case was to seek to test the evidence by reference to both the contemporary documentary evidence and its absence. In my judgment, this was an approach that he was entitled to take. The evidence of the liquidator established a prima facie case and, given that the books and papers had been in the custody and control of the respondents to the proceedings, it was open to the judge to infer that the liquidator's case would have been borne out by those books and papers.
It was not open to the respondents … to escape liability by asserting that, if the books and papers and other evidence had been available, they would have shown that they were not liable in the amount claimed by the liquidator. Moreover, persons who have conducted the affairs of limited companies with a high degree of informality… cannot seek to avoid liability or to be judged by some lower standard than that which applies to other directors, simply because the necessary documentation is not available…"
"Directors who receive money from the company cannot be heard to say:- 'We have received company money but our record keeping is so bad that the basis upon which we received it is unclear. So by reason of our defaults we ask you to assume in our favour that we took the money lawfully'."
"…To my mind, it can properly be said that a director who knowingly allows a practice to continue under which lending by the company to his co-director is treated as acceptable, has authorised the individual payments which are made in accordance with that practice notwithstanding that he did not have actual knowledge of each individual payment at the time that it was made".
"…acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case…ought fairly to be excused."
"The courts' approach to relief under section 1157 of the 2006 Act can be illustrated by reference to In re D'Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561, where relief was sought and granted under section 727 of the Companies Act 1985. Hoffmann J observed at p 564:
'It may seem odd that a person found to have been guilty of negligence, which involves failing to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy a court that he acted reasonably. Nevertheless, the section clearly contemplates that he may do so and it follows that conduct may be reasonable for the purposes of section 727 despite amounting to lack of reasonable care at common law.'
Hoffmann J went on:
'In my judgment, although Mr D'Jan's 99% holding of shares is not sufficient to sustain a Multinational defence, it is relevant to the exercise of the discretion under section 727. It may be reasonable to take a risk in relation to your own money which would be unreasonable in relation to someone else's. And although for the purposes of the law of negligence the company is a separate entity which Mr D'Jan owes a duty of care which cannot vary according to the number of shares he owns, I think that the economic realities of the case can be taken into account in exercising the discretion under section 727. His breach of duty in failing to read the form before signing was not gross. It was the kind of thing which could happen to any busy man, although, as I have said, this is not enough to excuse it. But I think it is also relevant that in 1986, with the company solvent and indeed prosperous, the only persons whose interests he was foreseeably putting at risk by not reading the form were himself and his wife. Mr D'Jan certainly acted honestly. For the purposes of section 727 I think he acted reasonably and I think he ought fairly to be excused for some, though not all, of the liability which he would otherwise have incurred.'
The burden of proving honesty and reasonableness lies on those seeking relief (see Bairstow v Queens Moat Houses plc [2001] 2 BCLC 531, para 58)."
"The essence of the Duomatic principle, as I see it, is that, where the articles of a company require a course to be approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it inequitable for them to deny that they have given their approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, ratification, waiver, estoppel, and whether members of the group give their consent in different ways at different times does not matter."
"Before the Duomatic principle can be satisfied, the shareholders who are said to have assented or waived must have the appropriate or 'full' knowledge. If a shareholder is not aware that his 'assent' is being sought to the matter, let alone that the obtaining of his consent is at least a significant factor in relation to the matter, he cannot, in my view, have the necessary 'full knowledge' to enable him to 'assent'".
"In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors arises. If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But when a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company's assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that, through the medium of the company, are under the management of the directors pending either liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative administration."
Witness evidence in court
The Liquidator
I accept the evidence of Mr Baker which was given in a straightforward manner and not undermined during cross-examination.
Mr Madu
Mr Staines
The Company's Insolvency
"From this period [from which I understand him to be referring to the period between 13 February 2015 and 20 April 2016] the chargebacks under the Agreement increased significantly, and sums owed to [OSMM] by the Company likewise increased. However, the Company did not have the means to pay the debt due to [OSMM] because its assets had been diverted away to [TPL]; Mr Madu and Mr Staines had authorised payments to themselves and payments to [TPL]'s creditors (as set out above) from monies that should have been repaid to the Company; and no monies were retained in the Company to pay its creditors, with the result that if [OSMM] (or any creditor) took action to recover its debts, there would be no means of the debt being repaid. This meant that the winding up of the Company was inevitable.
Even on their own evidence, Mr Madu and Mr Staines knew that the Company would be hit with a significant number of chargebacks from at least November 2015 but evidently took no steps to ensure that monies were available to pay the debts that would fall due as a result. As set out above in paragraph 18 above, Mr Staines has admitted that the Company could not pay the chargebacks because it did not have the funds to do so".
Period | Currency | Total |
21.06.2013 – 03.02.2016 | £ (GBP) | £ 1,103,296.92 |
25.02.2014 – 18.08.2014 | US$ | US$ 157,410.26 |
06.09.2013 – 16.09.2014 | Euro | € 6,178.42 |
"My staff have reviewed the bank statements for [the TPL Account] and a summary of the payments into and out of the account between 13 February 2015 and 20 April 2016 are described below and set out in summary form."
The Frick Payments and Frick Cash Withdrawals
Mr Madu's liability in respect of the Frick Payments and Frick Cash Withdrawals
"I had expenses but not every month, so …besides, you know, there wasn't enough margin in those accounts to … you know, when you're earning three per cent, you can't pay that amount out".
Should Mr Staines be jointly and severally liable for the Frick Payments and the Frick Cash Withdrawals?
"CA: So [Mr Madu] did that, those movements?
DWS: Yeah, I didn't have access to the Bank Frick account.
CA: You didn't?
DWS: No
CA: Okay. So [Mr Madu] was the sole signatory on that?
DWS: I don't know. I mean, I think I was, but I never had access to the account. I can't say yes or no, because I don't know".
i) knowing that Mr Madu sent payments to Mr Staines without, apparently, any clear explanation for the basis upon which such payments were being made;ii) saying he thought he was entitled to receive salary payments from TPL, but not disclosing his receipt of such payments to HMRC;
iii) assuming Mr Madu was making similar payments to himself;
iv) complying with Mr Madu's request that he sign the Company's accounts showing the Company to be dormant when he knew that was not the case, and that the Company was actively conducting business through the Frick Account,
Mr Staines never asked to be given access to the Frick Account or to see the Frick Account statements.
i) The Frick Payments and Frick Cash Withdrawals were ultra vires, disguised distributions of capital;ii) in making the Frick Payments and the Frick Withdrawals, Mr Madu breached his duties to the Company pursuant to sections 171, 172 and 174 CA06; and
iii) by failing to exercise the basic standard of reasonable skill and diligence expected of a director, Mr Staines breached his duties to the Company pursuant to section 174 CA06 with the consequence that the amounts of the Frick Payments and Frick Cash Withdrawals were lost to the Company.
The TPL Payments
Diverting the Company's money to the TPL Account
" … we did have a UK bank account for [TPL] during the time of this, having this facility, yes. But we didn't have one for [the Company] that we could use. So to do … as I said, to make payments, we're paying people in Wales, we're not paying people in Outer Mongolia, so if you're paying someone who's in Australia or New South Wales, somewhere like that, you could be paying from somewhere offshore. It's a toss-up as to where it's going to come cost wise. But if you're paying someone in the UK we say we've made a payout to you, they expect to see it today. So that was the logic of doing that".
"It would have been far easier for us if we had one. But I can't remember after which attempt we gave up the ghost on trying to get one. The only way that I can recall that we would have a chance of getting one at that time was if we omitted the fact that we were doing processing".
"It was done as a precautionary measure as Processing companies often go out of business, loose licences or cut services & as such one needs to have a back up [sic]".
£13,786.93 paid to Mr Staines
£132,873 paid to Mr Madu and cash withdrawals in Italy totalling £6,552.35
£53,747.91 to discharge TPL's liabilities
"The larger sum of £53,747.91 represents monies paid out by TPL to develop an eWallet for a customer and in respect of the Company's other expenses. A customer paid TPL an amount to supply a branded version of this eWallet. The amount of £53,747.91 was paid out in costs associated with that development and other costs of the Company. R1's recollection as to the amounts set out on [396] is as follows:
- Leo - £3981.91 – this is the virtual office for both the Company and [TPL] – the payee was Leo Offices;
- OPPE - £27,860 – this is the software development company that [TPL] used to build the eWallet – Based near Derby.
- Pemb - £18,600 – This was rent for the Company's physical serviced office in Egham, Surrey – Pembroke Business Offices. R1 worked in this office.
Save to the extent that the Company and [TPL] shared offices, there was no benefit to [TPL]".
"We only had a serviced office in Egham, the Runnymede Malthouse. We left there January 2017. Didn't really need it, to be honest, when there's only two of you, or one of me".
He described 45 Pont Street (which I understand to be the same office as referred to in his skeleton argument under the reference "Leo") as a virtual office, never physically occupied by the Company but from which they had a mail-forwarding service and occasionally rented rooms for meetings.
The Balance of £6,831.84
Summary regarding the TPL Payments
Duomatic and section 1157 CA06
Mr Staines' reliance on the Duomatic principle
Mr Staines' reliance on section 1157 CA06
i) the very substantial amounts Mr Madu was extracting from both accounts; andii) the extent to which the Company's money, now paid into the TPL Account, was being used to discharge TPL's liabilities.
Mr Madu's reliance on section 1157
Conclusion and the Court's discretion under section 212 of the IA 1986