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	England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> Glamorgan v ABC (Welfare) [2016] EWHC 4239 (Fam) (10 December 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2016/4239.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC 4239 (Fam)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

		Cardiff Civil Justice Centre
		10/12/2015

MR JUSTICE MOOR:-

1. I have been hearing the welfare stage of care proceedings concerning four children, Child A, Child B, Child C and Child D. The case has not been at all easy to decide. The Mother of all four children is Mother (hereafter "the Mother"). The father of Child A is Father A ("Father A"). The Father of Child B and Child D is Father B ("Father B"). The Father of Child C is Father C ("Father C").

2. I conducted a fact finding hearing from 12th to 21st October 2015, delivering my judgment on 21st October 2015. This subsequent judgment should be read in conjunction with my earlier findings.

3. In short, I found the threshold criteria established in relation to all four children. I did dismiss some of the allegations. Re-amended threshold criteria, reflecting my findings, were filed on 25th October 2015.

The respective cases

4. The Local Authority, The Vale of Glamorgan Council says that I should make final care orders in relation to all four children. It urges me to approve care plans that place Child A with his father, Father A and Child C with his father, Father C, albeit assisted by his girlfriend, Ms MC. It proposes limited supervised contact for both children with their Mother on seven occasions per annum.

5. So far as Child B and Child D are concerned, the Local Authority argues that, as both the Mother and Father B are, on its case, ruled out as potential carers, I should make placement orders for adoption for both children, dispensing with parental consent. It is contended that "nothing else will do".

6. The Guardian, supports the Local Authority's position. Father A also supports the Local Authority in relation to Child A although he has previously said that he struggles with the plan for adoption due to Child A losing contact with his siblings. Father C also supports the Local Authority plans in relation to Child C.

7. The Mother seeks the return of all four children to her care. If, and only if, I am against her in that regard, she would support the placement of Child A and Child C with their respective fathers but on the basis of much greater contact with her than proposed. In such circumstances, she also urges me to consider placing Child C with Ms TE, a supporter of hers from the local Chapel.

8. Father B supports the Mother's position and seeks direct contact to Child B and Child D on his release from prison. If I am against him, he seeks farewell visits to Child B and to be allowed to meet Child D, whom he has not so far seen.

9. At the previous hearing, I gave permission to Father B's mother, Mrs DD to make an application for a Special Guardianship Order in relation to Child B and Child D. I ordered an Independent Social Work assessment by MM. Just before that assessment was completed, on 24th November 2015, Mrs DD withdrew her application. I therefore gave Mrs DD permission to do so on 30th November 2015 and I discharged her as a party. I have not read the report.

The Law

10. The first application is for a full care order in relation to all four children pursuant to the Children Act 1989. I have already made it clear in my fact finding judgment that the conditions for the grant of such an order are satisfied. Before I can make such an order, I must, however, consider the welfare checklist in section 1 of the Children Act, reminding myself that the children's respective welfare during their minorities is my paramount consideration.

11. The second application is for a placement order for adoption pursuant to section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 in relation to Child B and Child D. I can only do so if a child is subject to a care order or I am satisfied that the conditions in section 31(2) of the Children Act as to threshold are met. I have already satisfied myself of that.

12. A court will only make a placement order if it is justified having given paramount consideration to the child's welfare "throughout his or her life" (section 1(2) of the 2002 Act). I must have regard to the checklist set out in section 1(4) of the Act. Section 1(6) provides that the court must always consider the whole range of powers available to it (whether under the 2002 Act or the Children Act 1989) but must not make any order under the 2002 Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.

13. Section 21(3) provides that, in the absence of parental consent, I can only make a placement order if I am satisfied that parental consent should be dispensed with. Pursuant to section 52(1), I need to be satisfied that the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with. This is to be done in the light of the current circumstances (see Ms McFarlane LJ in Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 813 at Paragraph [13]).

14. In relation to dispensing with consent, Wall LJ said in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, [2008] 2 FLR 625 at Paragraph 126:-

"Section 52(1) is concerned with adoption – the making of either a placement order or an adoption order – and what therefore has to be shown is that the child's welfare "requires" adoption as opposed to something short of adoption. A child's circumstances may "require" statutory intervention, perhaps may even "require" the indefinite or long-term removal of the child from the family and his or her placement with strangers but that is not to say that the same circumstances will necessarily "require" that the child be adopted. They may or they may not. The question, at the end of the day, is whether what is "required" is adoption."

15. The case goes on to set out that "required" in this context means the connotation of the imperative. It is what is demanded rather than what is merely optional or reasonable or desirable. It is a stringent and demanding test. The court should begin with a preference for the less interventionist rather than the more interventionist approach. This should be considered to be in the better interests of children unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary (Re O (Care or Supervision Order) [1996] 2 FLR 755 at 760.

16. Adopting a child is a draconian order. It is an extreme order, only to be made as a last resort when there is no other order compatible with the child's long term welfare (Re B [2013] UKSC 33). In short, nothing else will do (per Lady Hale at paragraph [198]). I entirely accept that this is because the interests of the child self-evidently require his or her relationship with his or her natural parents to be maintained unless no other course is possible in the child's interest (Lord Neuberger at Paragraphs [76] to [77]). Cutting off all contact and the relationship between the child and his or her family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child (Lady Hale at Paragraph [198]).

17. The Court of Appeal considered the application of Re B in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 and re-emphasised the stringency of the welfare test when considering whether to dispense with parental consent. The President, Sir James Munby, said that there is a necessity for a "holistic" and rigorous evaluation of all placement options before coming to a decision. I remind myself that Article 8 of the ECHR is engaged.

18. The President stated that the Court of Appeal had real concerns about the recurrent inadequacy of the analysis and reasoning put forward in support of the case for adoption both in the materials put before the court by both local authorities and guardians and in too many judgments. He said it was time to "call a halt". The evidence placed before the court must address all the options which are realistically possible and must contain an analysis of the arguments for and against each option and, in particular, the nature and extent of the risk of harm involved in each of the options (Paragraph [34]). The need for analysis of the pros and cons and a full reasoned recommendation was essential if the exacting test set out in Re B and the requirements of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention are to be met (Paragraph [36]). There must be adequately reasoned judgments (Paragraph [43]). The court rejected a linear approach whereby each option other than the most draconian is considered and rejected in isolation. Instead, a balancing exercise is required in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives. Each option should then be compared, side by side, against the competing option or options (Paragraphs [49] – [50]).

19. It is not sufficient merely to pay lip service to adoption being the most draconian order without engaging with the detail of the option as to do so would be nothing more than "formulaic window dressing."

20. It is also right to remember that an adopted child is treated in law as if he or she had been born as a child of the adopters (section 67 of the 2002 Act). The parental responsibility of the birth parents is extinguished (section 46). An adoption order is irrevocable except in exceptional circumstances.

21. Despite my fact finding judgment, there remain evidential issues. I remind myself that the burden of proof is on the party who seeks to prove a matter in issue. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. I set the law out in this regard in detail in my fact finding judgment. I also gave myself a Lucas direction as to lies. In so far as it is necessary to do so, I have reminded myself of that again.

22. In the fact finding judgment, I also reminded myself of the well-known words of Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [207] 1 FLR 2050 at Paragraph [50]. I repeat them now. He said that "society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done"

The evidence as it relates to the children's welfare

23. Some of the evidence with which I am concerned predates the fact finding hearing but other evidence has been put before me since my earlier judgment.

24. The first core assessment of the Mother by the Local Authority Social Worker, Mr W is dated 14th July 2015. It was negative. A significant part of the Local Authority's concern was the inability of the Mother to work openly and honestly with its staff as well as concerns as to her parenting ability.

25. Mr W's assessment of Father A is dated 10th September 2015. It finds Father A to be a suitable carer for Child A. It notes that they have a positive relationship with each other but there is concern as to some "vulnerabilities" which require further monitoring. Father A would benefit from parenting support. It therefore recommends placement of Child A with Father A on a long term basis but subject to a care order due to Father A being untested. Indeed, the final care plan for Child A is dated the same day. At that point, the proposal was for six supervised contacts per annum for Child A to his Mother. This would, of course, be a very significant reduction from the present frequency of three times per week, plus some contact on Sundays at the local Chapel.

26. Father A's position is set out in his statement dated 25th September 2015. I have already referred to his "struggle" with the plan to adopt Child B due to the effect on Child A of losing contact with her. He adds that he considers it is important that Child A maintains a relationship with the Mother.

27. I directed a further independent report on the Mother. It was undertaken by TS, an Independent Social Worker and is dated 2nd October 2015. The conclusion is again adverse to the Mother's case. The report refers to her previous episodes of depression, panic attacks and an eating disorder. It states that she was brought up in a dysfunctional family where she suffered abuse involving violence and alcohol from her father. She has had a volatile relationship with her mother. Her brother had assaulted her. She acknowledged to Ms Z that she felt very isolated. Ms Z was unable to rely on the Mother's assertion that her relationship with Father B has ended given her lies. Ms Z felt it was significant that the Mother still talks positively about him. Her focus has been on herself not her children. She has engaged for many years in telling professionals what she believes they want to hear. The children had behavioural boundary problems when they first went into foster care. The Mother has, at times, struggled to manage Child B's behaviour during contact sessions. She concluded that the Mother has been dishonest and continues to be so.

28. Ms Z had no confidence that the Mother would be able to sustain any changes she made. Her psychological deficits are deeply ingrained as a result of her dysfunctional family. Her engagement with services has been inconsistent and problematic in the past. She would need a significant time period to show she can sustain change. Ms Z concluded that she did not believe the Mother was able to sustain changes and consistently meet the children's needs, either individually or collectively within a timeframe that is commensurate with the children's need for stability and permanency.

29. The first parenting assessment of Father C by Mr W is dated the 28th October 2015. It notes that Father C has another child, who was born in 2010 and so is aged 5. Mr W was unable to complete the assessment due to a number of issues and considered a further period of assessment was required. He noted that Father C is in a new relationship (with Ms MC). He was homeless at the time. He had had very limited contact with Child C due to the delay in him being identified as Child C's father. At the time, this had been once per week since September 2015. He needed to undertake a parenting course but Mr W concluded that he had some potential. The contact visits had been relatively positive and Father C had a high level of motivation.

30. On 6th November 2015, Mr W completed a further parenting assessment of the Mother in relation to Child D. I have already referred to his first assessment (in relation to Child A, Child B and Child C) dated 14th July 2015. The second assessment acknowledged that, despite some concerns, the Mother has been able to meet Child D's basic care needs to a "good enough" standard in the foster placement but was concerned Child D would be exposed to similar experiences as the elder children and that the Mother would continue to prioritise her friendships and relationships over Child D.

31. The second parenting assessment of Father C is dated 23rd November 2015. It concludes that Father C should be able to meet the needs of Child C with the assistance of Ms MC. She was born in 1989 and so is aged 26. She has a daughter by a previous relationship, Ms DC, who was born in 2010. She is therefore very similar in age to P.

32. Child C's contact to Father C has increased to twice per week for one and a half hours per session. The assessment nevertheless highlights a number of vulnerabilities. Mr W had spoken to P's mother, CT who had concerns that, when P is with Father C, it is Father C's mother who does the majority of the care of P. There was further concern about Father C's use of cannabis and drinking alcohol. He had, however, established appropriate boundaries for Child C during contact. There were some unsubstantiated allegations made about Father C when he was a very young child. I make it clear that he was not asked about this and I have ignored it completely. It would be quite wrong to take this into account in any way, particularly given his age at the time.

33. He does, however, have a criminal record, including a caution for criminal damage and a conviction for supplying MDMA for which he received a suspended prison sentence. He had positive results for two constituents of cannabis from June to September 2015. He is not currently employed. Nevertheless, the conclusion was that he may have the ability to care for Child C to a good enough standard and he should be given that opportunity with Ms MC but, as this would be untested and the relationship with Ms MC is new, there would need to be the monitoring of a care order.

34. Mr W's final evidence is dated 30th November 2015. The Mother was placed in a mother and baby foster placement with Child D on 1st September on her release from hospital. Unfortunately, the Mother had to be admitted to hospital again on 30th October when her appendix burst. In other words, she had peritonitis. She had to have an operation to have the appendix removed. She was in hospital until 11th November but then had to be readmitted on 13th until 16th due to a related infection.

35. The children, particularly Child B, are, at times, challenging to the Mother during contact but they were becoming more settled, although there had been difficulties in October involving both Child C and Child B. He reminded the court that there had been a negative viability assessment of Mrs MQ (the maternal grandmother), which Mrs MQ had accepted. Child C has established a relationship with Father C and now calls him "dad". The proposed ongoing level of contact for Child A and Child C to the Mother was seven times per annum. Any higher level of contact would risk destabilising the two placements.

36. Mr W goes on to say that the Mother is, in his view, unable to make changes. Father A wants to have support with caring for Child A, which will be achieved by the grant of a final care order to the Local Authority. This will assist Father A in dealing with the Mother. The same will be true for Father C in relation to Child C.

37. So far as Child B and Child D are concerned, Mr W has concluded that there is no alternative other than a placement order. Both children require permanence and deserve the opportunity to grow up within a safe and stable home environment where their needs will be consistently met.

38. Father C's final statement is dated 2nd December 2015. He is currently living at address with Ms MC but is hoping that they will move back to the area of his home town imminently. He has completed five "one-parenting" classes. He hopes and intends that Child C will attend the same school as Child A. He accepts that he is more laid back than Ms MC. He would be happy to be assisted by an experienced foster carer, such as Ms CS.

39. His partner, Ms MC filed a statement on 2nd December 2015. She confirmed that she intended to move with C to Father C's hometown shortly with Father C. She met Father C four months ago and they established a relationship shortly thereafter which is secure and viewed by both of them as permanent.

40. The Cafcass Officer, filed his final report on 3rd December 2015. He supports the Local Authority's position. Child A and Child C should live with their respective fathers and should have contact to their Mother on seven occasions per annum. Child B and Child D should be adopted together. He confirmed that Child A is happy, relaxed and at home in his father's care.

41. Father A's position statement is dated 3rd December 2015. He confirms that he has had unsupervised contact with Child A each Tuesday and each weekend. Child A stayed overnight with him for the first time on 28th November.

42. The Mother's final statement is dated 4th December 2015. From 1st September 2015, she resided with Child D in a mother and baby foster placement in an area outside of the Mother's home town, with foster carer, Ms ED. Since 11th October, she has resided with Child D at the Mother and Baby foster placement in an area outside of the Mother's home town with foster carer, Mrs CM. The move was primarily due to the fact that the location is more convenient. The Mother says that Mr W has focussed on past concerns whereas she has looked to the future. She has approached Women's Aid and another agency and has undertaken a number of courses. She says she has, for the first time, understood the effect of domestic violence on children. She is now clear that she can keep inappropriate adults away from the children. She is currently on a Phoenix Programme run by Women's Aid plus she is doing the Freedom Programme and a course called "Mum and me". She has also enrolled on a Stress Relief course and a course called Action for Living. She will enter no new relationship without the Local Authority's approval. She accepts that she took the children for granted but says it is not in the children's interests to be separated and reminds the court that Child B has a close relationship with Child C.

43. On the same day, 4th December 2015, the Local Authority filed its application for a placement order in relation to Child D, together with the Child's Adoption Report and Annex B report. It had already done so previously in relation to Child B.

The oral evidence

44. I heard oral evidence from:-

(a) The Social Worker, Mr W;

(b) Father C;

(c) Father B;

(d) The Independent Social Worker, TS, who undertook a further assessment of the Mother;

(e) The Mother herself;

(f) Father C's partner, Ms MC; and

(g) The Guardian, Mr Y.

45. I did not hear oral evidence from Father A as no-one wished to cross-examine him. I remind myself, however, that I had heard evidence from him on the previous occasion and was impressed by him.

The Social Worker, Mr W

46. Mr W was cross-examined by Mr Allen for the Mother primarily on the basis that he had not given the Mother a fair chance. It was put to him that he had ruled her out at an early stage and certainly before the parenting assessment of her and Child D. Whilst Mr W was not prepared to accept that contention, he was constrained to admit that he had taken into account matters that I had not found proved against the Mother at the fact finding hearing, such as the neglect allegations, although he was clear he would have come to the same conclusion anyway. I remind myself that the only reason I found the neglect allegations not proved was because the children had been removed from the Child Protection Register in October 2014 due to an improvement in their care and there was no evidence of a subsequent deterioration between then and the care proceedings being instituted.

47. Mr Hartley-Davies for the Guardian, however, asked Mr W about the historical allegations. I am satisfied that I am entitled to take these matters into account given the terms of the welfare checklist in section 1 of the Children Act. Mr W stated that Child C did not have good teeth when he was taken into care. They were hugely decayed and had crumbled away. He did not believe Child C had been to a dentist prior to going into care. At the time the children went into care, Child A had been soiling himself. He would dress himself whilst still wet following a bath. Even though he was seven years old, he would eat with his hands and fingers. He did not know how to use a knife and fork. The same was true of Child B. Child C did not use toilet paper or wash his hands after going to the toilet. He had to be shown how to clean his teeth.

48. In answer to Mr Barry for Father C, Mr W said that, when the Mother's depression increases, she lets things slip. He added that all the children had issues in going to the toilet. They all undressed themselves completely even if they were only urinating.

49. Mr Hartley-Davies also asked about the programmes the Mother has undertaken. Mr W said that she had taken two courses before these proceedings were instituted, namely Journey Beyond Abuse and Pattern Changing but she had not been able to adjust her behaviour to enable her to escape domestic violence. She cannot be taught any more.

50. Mr W added that Child B has made good progress in foster care. She was quite angry at first. There would be tantrums in which she would kick and scream as well as bite her siblings and she would misbehave on school runs but, as the foster placement has progressed, he had seen a change. She is a lot happier and more caring. She has an extremely positive relationship with the foster carers and the number of incidents has reduced. She can reflect and say sorry now, whilst the incidents have become a rarity.

Father C

51. As with Father A, at first, none of the parties wished to ask Father C any questions. I indicated that I did wish to hear from him given that he is untested and there have been reservations about him due to a number of issues. Having said that, his evidence remained relatively brief.

52. He continues to live with Ms MC at an address outside his hometown. They have still not been able to find housing in the Barry area, in part due to their current status as benefit claimants. Mr Hartley-Davies asked him about his previous drug use. He said he did use MDMA in 2009, although he thought it was ecstasy. He said he stopped the day he got arrested as he discovered that day that he was to be a father, namely of P. On balance, I accept this evidence although he has continued to take cannabis occasionally. He told me he last did so in September 2015 and would not do so in the future. He offered to undertake drug testing on a monthly basis. He said there had been a few "hiccoughs" since. He referred to a fight at a family wedding although, somewhat confusingly, seemed to suggest he was not in fact involved. He has occasionally "had a few drinks" which I took to mean drinking alcohol to excess. He told me that his partner, Ms MC, would not put up with such behaviour. She is keeping him on the "straight and narrow" and would "kick him out" if he misbehaved. He added that she is a lot better organised than he is.

53. He had met Ms MC in August 2015 and accepted it was not the longest relationship but, apart from a few small arguments, about things such as him not being tidy, he told me it was a good relationship. Realistically, he accepted that it is impossible to know what the future holds. He told me he "would not put any money against us breaking up" but clearly meant the opposite, namely that he did not think they would break up. He did tell me that he remains good friends with Father A and the boys would go to the same school if he is successful in caring for Child C. I have to say that I consider Father A is a good influence on Father C. Whilst I would like to put some of the matters raised down to Father C being young, he is in fact the oldest parent in the case at 29. He has needed to mature. I will return to this when I consider the evidence of Ms MC. In fairness, he did present as having adopted a responsible approach in relation to his ex-partner and Ms MC' ex-partner.

Father B

54. Father B remains in HM Prison Cardiff. He told me he has been approved for tagging by the Probation Service and is just waiting for the Governor to sign his release papers. On the balance of probabilities, I find that he is likely to be released on tag within the next few weeks. He told me that the terms of his indefinite restraining order are that he is to have no direct or indirect contact with the Mother, including by social media and he is not to enter the area of Mother's hometown. On release from prison, he will live with his maternal grandparents at their home in Canton. He has done courses in prison, which seemed to be aimed particularly at anger management and coping with stress. Perhaps somewhat worryingly, he told me that his tutor said he was the angriest person the tutor had seen for a quite a while when he started the course but he does seem to have made significant progress as he has been asked to be a peer mentor for others doing the course. He said he held his hands up in relation to his behaviour to the Mother and she was right when she said he needed prison to sort himself out.

55. Mr Thomas for the Local Authority asked him about my judgment. He was present in court but he said he had not read the written document since, saying he felt it might "fry his head". I do not criticise him for being unable to read it. He said he was half-truthful in his evidence to me but then repeated the evidence he had previously given. In particular, he was adamant that the video was the worst act of violence between him and the Mother and he was insistent that the Mother was equally to blame for the violence, saying she was violent to him as well. He accepts he put himself at risk by breaching his bail conditions when he went to see her in 2009 and said that he had "found it difficult to resist her when she calls out for me". He was adamant however that there would be no relationship in the future due to the restraining order but confirmed that he has always been in love with her and there will always "be a feeling there". He stressed that he did not want the children going through "all of this again". He repeated that he would not go over even if invited when drunk. He told me he has been clean from drugs for six months and will not go back on to them now. He ended by saying that he will have to let the one he loves go and he will be able to do so. He referred to a potential five year sentence if he breached the restraining order.

TS, Independent Social Worker

56. The Independent Social Worker, TS gave detailed evidence. Although she had been instructed by the Mother following the Local Authority's original adverse parenting assessment of her, I requested the Guardian to call Ms Z to enable Mr Allen for the Mother to be able to cross-examine her.

57. Ms Z stuck resolutely to the opinion set out in her written report. My fact finding judgment had made no difference to her conclusions. In answer to questions by Mr Thomas for the Local Authority, she told me that the fact that the Mother was found to be lying to me at the October hearing was highly significant. She said that, sadly, it leaves professionals being unable to rely on what she says. It would need time to prove she can be trusted not to re-enter a relationship with Father B or another inappropriate male and to show that she would cooperate with the Local Authority. She had tried to show that she would cooperate by attending courses diligently but Ms Z was not convinced that it was enough.

58. She was cross-examined with great skill by Mr Allen for the Mother but did not shift her opinion. The restraining order made against Father B, which included the threat of imprisonment if broken, did not convince her that they would not reunite. Ms Z said that the Mother had told her the relationship was finished and how abusive it was but, the following day, she said Father B was not all bad. Whilst it was impressive that she had done so many courses herself, Ms Z still had concerns in relying on her. She did confirm that the Mother had met Child D's basic care needs for stimulation and emotional warmth but her deceit and lies were so pervasive for so many years that there was no alternative to monitoring her twenty four hours per day. Her vulnerability and isolation was important.

The Mother

59. In her evidence in chief, the Mother told me about the importance of the Church to her and the support it provided for her. She disputed the observations of the foster carers as to the behaviour of the children when they first went into foster care (such as bed-wetting, toileting difficulties and feeding problems) saying that the children did not display such deficiencies when with her. She accepted that she had not taken Child C to the dentist, although she stressed that she had ensured he brushed his teeth twice per day, saying his top front teeth were discoloured rather than black. I have to say that, with the exception of Child C's teeth, she seemed to be describing an almost idyllic home life for the children. By then, she had heard Father B give evidence. She told me she did not think he had changed. She said she could hear him "getting angry" whilst he was being cross-examined. She said that she did not deserve what he had put her through and she had learned this from the courses she has recently undertaken. She accepted she had undertaken a Pattern Changing course in 2013.

60. She was cross-examined yesterday morning. I make allowance for the fact that she was not feeling well and I could see that this was the case. She was first asked about the findings I made as to the lies she told in court. She was unable to accept that she had lied concerning her pregnancy with Child D, saying the first person she told was MI. Given what was being said by the mothers at the school and Child A, this is demonstrably incorrect. At first, she said she could not remember that Child A had stayed overnight with Mr Aaron Hughes until she spoke to him on the telephone in prison but she later was prepared to admit that she had lied to me in this regard. I have to say that I did not find this in the least bit reassuring. I consider she realised that it was just impossible for her to sustain the lie so she changed tack but that did not stop her initially trying to mislead me again.

61. She told me she has now changed and she said this had happened at the end of October when she had her appendix removed. She said she got really ill and began to hallucinate. She had a moment of clarification and she saw her whole life without her children, which would not be a life. She added that she had not been dealing with the issues since February because she couldn't bear to be without her children and therefore suppressed it all. I have to say that I found this all very difficult to accept. I consider it should have been the taking of her children into care or my fact finding judgment which caused her to realise the seriousness of her predicament. I do accept that her peritonitis may have been very frightening for her although medical professionals would have reassured her that treating such problems is now fairly routine.

62. She then said that she was unable to give me an example as to how this realisation had made a difference to her behaviour, such as an example of where she has now told the truth but would previously have lied. Whilst I have some sympathy with this, particularly when confronted with the question during cross-examination, the most obvious way to do so would have been to be clear as to the lies she had told me in October during the fact finding hearing.

63. She was asked about the children's behaviour with her. She said that Child B is "challenging" but not badly behaved. She said that Child B did not listen to a lot of people but did listen to her mum but she then somewhat contradicted that by saying that Child B "turns quite violent towards me, screaming that she hates me and physically attacking me". She said this stopped after one to one contact. She put Child B's behaviour down to a fear that someone will take her away from her mum. I cannot accept that. She repeated this evidence when cross-examined by Mr Hartley-Davies for the Guardian. She told him that, when they were living at home, Child B would scream and shout. She would hit Child A and sometimes hit Child C but she had only been violent to the Mother whilst in foster care. She said that the smallest of things would set Child B off in contact and she would end up telling the Mother that the Mother doesn't love her and does not want her and that she hates her and doesn't love her. She said Child B thinks that the Mother is rejecting her because she is not letting her come home. I found this evidence both troubling and very sad. She did, however, say that, in one to one contact, Child B says she loves the Mother and gives her cuddles.

64. In re-examination, she told me that her own teeth are appalling. She has not been to a dentist since 2013, although she had an appointment recently that she missed due to her recent ill health. Initially, she had led me to believe that she had been to this appointment, which was very misleading although I accept she corrected herself shortly thereafter. She told Mr Allen that she uses her teeth to scare her children and ensure they brush their teeth religiously. I am not sure this is an appropriate way to ensure they do so but it is by no means the most serious matter in the case. Overall, however, I have to say that I did not find any real change in presentation or approach between the first time the Mother gave evidence to me and this occasion. The same criticisms can be made of her evidence on both occasions.

Ms MC

65. Father C's partner, Ms MC gave evidence briefly. No advocate wished to ask her any questions but I wanted to hear from her. I therefore asked her some general questions. She accepted to me that she had not been together with Father C for very long but told me that, although the relationship was new, it was good. There had been the odd stress and strain, particularly as a result of the quest for a house. I remind myself that the evidence is that Father C has been more laid back about this than Ms MC would wish. She told me that she and Cassie are happy to move to Wales. She seemed a quiet but decent woman with her heart in the right place. I had no reason to doubt what is said about her in the parenting assessment.

Mr NH

66. At the last minute, an agreement was reached that meant that Mr NH, the Deacon at the local chapel, was not required to be cross-examined although he did attend court. I accept that the Church is a source of support to the Mother and that Mr NH as a qualified social worker, is in a good position to help the Mother. Mr NH and Ms TE have both been fully involved in this case. They know the issues involved and the serious nature of the allegations made against the Mother. I accept that it is good that they are involved but equally it is clear that they are not able to provide the answer to all the points raised by the Local Authority, TS and the Guardian.

The Guardian

67. Finally, I heard from the Guardian. He said that nothing he had heard in oral evidence had caused him to reassess his recommendation. He said that splitting children in this way was not something that he would normally support but he could not see any other option.

68. When cross-examined by Mr Allen for the Mother, he made a lot of fair concessions. He accepted that the Mother has done nothing that he was aware of to undermine the children's foster placements. He recognised that the Mother is entitled to oppose the Local Authority's plans.

69. Both Mr Allen and Mr Douglas on behalf of Father B made a sustained attack on an alleged lack of proper consideration of the effect on the children of cutting the relationship between them in half, such that Child A and Child C would be entirely severed from Child B and Child D. I have been critical of the Local Authority for the length of many of its documents, particularly those of Mr W. Provided a recommendation is clearly made and supported by evidence, no advocate will succeed before me in the old chestnut "that was not in your report". Having said that, I do consider that there is force in the complaint that Mr Y's final document is virtually silent as to the effect on the children of the separation of each group from the other. There is a reference to it on page 18 under "detriments" of adopting Child B and Child D alone but I accept that even there, the position of Child A and Child C is not specifically referred to. This has given me pause for thought.

70. However, I consider that Mr Y did put this right in his oral evidence. He told me that he was unable to champion long term fostering as being in their interests. He reminded me of the detriments to children in general of languishing in the care system as against the advantages of stability and permanence of adoption. He said that, to give them that chance it was necessary for there to be the ending of the relationship with the other two children. In essence, he was saying to me that the very significant disadvantage of separating Child A and Child C from Child B and Child D was justified by the huge advantages of adoption for Child B and Child D such that, for him, there was no alternative and nothing else would do.

Care Orders

71. I have found part of this case relatively straightforward, albeit very difficult for the Mother and Father B to accept, and part exceptionally difficult. The part that I have found relatively straightforward relates to Child A and Child C. The part that I have found exceptionally difficult concerns Child B and Child D and particularly Child B.

72. It is clear to me that I must make care orders in relation to all four children. Indeed, there is no real dispute about that. The issue surrounds the care plan thereafter and the question of the placement applications. Father A and Father C both accept that there should be care orders in relation to Child A and Child C respectively albeit on the basis of care plans that place their sons with them. The Mother accepted the need for care orders even if the children were residing with her. She told me she had no problem with ongoing involvement by the Local Authority. She said a care order was fine and there was no difficulty with the Local Authority sharing parental responsibility with her.

73. I have already made detailed findings of fact. Some are very serious. I was quite satisfied that the threshold criteria in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 were made out in relation to all four children. I have no doubt that final care orders must be made in this case in relation to all four children. The Local Authority has to have parental responsibility for these children.

Possible placement with the Mother

74. I now turn to whether or not the Mother can care for the children even under a care order. I have to remind myself that I have already made very serious findings in relation to her in the fact finding judgment. The findings were more than just findings as to the lies about her ongoing relationship with Father B. There were a significant number of other matters. I mention just one at this point, namely allowing Child A to go on a sleepover with a man about whom she knew very little and, as it turned out, was an enormous risk. In addition, I found that she lied to me in court.

75. The Local Authority and its professional staff had already undertaken a negative viability assessment of her in relation to the three elder children. I was frankly troubled by this. I wanted to give the Mother every opportunity to satisfy the court that she could safely parent these children. I had already decided to take the unusual step of permitting a second assessment by an Independent Social Worker instructed by her but, very fairly, all parties agreed to such an instruction without me having to rule on it. The Mother instructed a very experienced ISW in TS who took exactly the same view as the Local Authority. Even that was not the end of the matter. Mindful of the particular importance of giving parents a chance to care for a baby, I indicated that the Mother should be given another opportunity in a mother and baby placement with Child D. I accept that the Mother has done her very best there in what must have been difficult circumstances for her, but, again, the Local Authority assessment was negative. I reject Mr B's submission that Mr W had already closed his mind when he began the second assessment. I accept that he could not ignore what had gone before but, as a conscientious and committed social worker, he assessed the Mother carefully and again concluded she could not care for Child D.

76. The Guardian, another very experienced professional, has also given this case anxious consideration. He too has come to exactly the same conclusion. All three main witnesses were cross-examined with great skill by Mr Allen on behalf of the Mother and by Mr Douglas on behalf of Father B. Indeed, nothing more could have been said or done on their behalf but the witnesses did not shift and gave their explanations cogently and to my satisfaction. I accept their evidence.

77. Finally, I heard from the Mother herself. On the balance of probabilities, I very much regret to say that I have been unable to find any change in her. I do make full allowance for the very difficult circumstances of giving evidence about such personal matters in front of so many people with so much at stake. I also recognise that she has not had good health and was not well during the hearing. I further accept that it is difficult to admit you lied to a High Court Judge but the strength of that submission evaporates as she was able to admit to me that she had lied in part. Whilst that is to her credit, she undoubtedly initially attempted to persuade me that she had not lied about not remembering that Child A had a sleepover with Mr Aaron Hughes. I find that she then weighed up whether it was better to lie to me again or not and decided that it was better to tell the truth but only in the context of already having told a further lie. Indeed, I consider she initially tried to mislead me about the dentist as well. Her first reaction when I asked when she had last been to the dentist was to say that it was only a few weeks ago. Again, it is to her credit that she later told me that she had not in fact gone but again any credit she gets for that is completely undermined by the initial attempt to mislead me.

78. I am not persuaded that she had a light-bulb moment during her peritonitis. I accept that this may have been frightening for her although I have already noted that experienced doctors would have reassured her that modern medicine can deal with such situations. She may have hallucinated. It may have involved the children but, if there was to be a light bulb moment, it should have been when the children were taken into care in February 2015 or, at the very latest, when I gave my earlier judgment. In fact, she gave evidence that all was rosy when the children were with her and would be equally fine if they returned to her care. I do not accept that evidence. I find that she was finding it very difficult to cope with the children when they were all with her before. The failure to see to Child C's teeth is but one example. To add a baby to the mix would make life even more problematic for her. I find that she has great difficulty in not having a man in her life. Very regrettably, she appears to attract abusive men. I have not heard evidence but it may be that they recognise her vulnerability.

79. I cannot ignore the neglect allegations. I do accept Mr B's point that I need to be very cautious about the statements made by the foster carers. I have not heard evidence from them. I also recognise that it is always possible to turn it round and argue that any such difficulties are caused by separation from their mother. The simple fact of the matter is that there have been significant difficulties over the years, ameliorated only by intense Local Authority involvement and then, as I find it, only to a "good enough standard".

80. So where does that leave me? I make it absolutely clear that the Mother loves all her children without reservation. Whilst she has at times found it impossible to prioritise their needs over her own, her own upbringing and difficulties have been a very significant factor in that. I recognise that she will be devastated by my conclusions. I don't think she has come to terms with the position, notwithstanding the evidence in the case pointing so firmly to what I have decided I must do.

81. I have accepted the evidence of Mr W, Ms Z and Mr Y. I have rejected the submission that the Mother has changed. Whilst I do take into account the wishes of the children and, in particular, Child A, I have concluded, with considerable reluctance, that I cannot place any of these children with the Mother for the foreseeable future. There was some debate as to how long the Mother would need to prove herself. At one point, Ms Z mentioned six months but that was only in relation to whether or not her relationship with Father B was truly over. I consider a six month period to be significantly over optimistic. I find that the time needed is much greater and, again with great regret, outside the timescales for the children.

Child A

82. I now turn to Father A. He has passed the parenting assessment. He has impressed Mr W and Mr Y. He also impressed me. He is building a good bond with Child A as the contact has increased. It has now developed to overnight staying contact without difficulties. It is all going well, although I entirely accept that the Local Authority needs to continue to be involved. Indeed, so does Father A.

83. Historically, there have been some concerns. In particular, there were periods when he was not as involved with Child A as he should have been and he has historically dabbled in drugs. I have already found that he regrets the periods when he was not fully involved and I am satisfied he was not fully aware of everything that was going on in the Mother's household. I have found that he has not and will not take drugs when caring for Child A. He is now aged 28. I find that he has matured and is now a proper and fit person to have care of his son. I must take account of Child A's preference to be with his Mother but it is only a preference and Child A has no difficulty with his father. All the other matters in the section 1(3) welfare checklist point to my approving a care plan that enables Child A to reside with one of his parents rather than with foster carers. I have no hesitation in approving the care plan for Child A. He will reside with his father.

Child C

84. I now turn to Child C. I have not found this quite so easy although I have again come to a clear conclusion. Father C is completely untried, yet part of the reason for this is that he was for so long misled and lied to by the Mother as to paternity. Even if she was in doubt, she should have ensured the doubt was swiftly resolved by DNA testing. She clearly blew hot and cold, depending on her own emotional position. Indeed, she veered between telling him he was the father and denying it aggressively within minutes. I reject her explanation that this was down to anything Father C had said.

85. Since he has discovered his paternity, Father C has behaved thoroughly appropriately. He has attended throughout this hearing and the previous one. He has made himself available for Child C. Contact has commenced and gone well. He has put himself forward as carer. He too has passed the parenting assessment. He has behaved responsibly in relation to P and has behaved as a good father to her. Although he has only met Ms MC recently, I find that she is a good influence on him. This all goes to his credit.

86. There are however reservations. He is completely untried. I have been troubled by his previous offending. His relationship with Ms MC is new and she will face considerable upheaval in moving to the area. He has no permanent home. I hope he too is now maturing although I have already noted that he is in fact the oldest of the parents. I trust he has begun to realise that he needs to step up to the plate for both his children and, in this context, Child C in particular. I have a suspicion that this process has been a considerable wake up call for him, particularly as he has learned the detail of the Mother's relationship with Father B. I consider his friendship with Father A to be another very good influence for him. They have sat next to each other throughout this hearing and are, I find, united in their wish to do the best for these boys, which will include the boys going to the same school.

87. There is no doubt that the Local Authority will have to be very closely involved, particularly initially. Father C does, to his credit, recognise the importance of this. I have considered the section 1(3) checklist with great care. I have come to the clear conclusion that placement of Child C with his father is infinitely preferable to the alternatives. I therefore approve that care plan as well. I also grant Father C parental responsibility for Child C. There was some suggestion that Ms TE from the Church was going to put herself forward to care for Child C. I know nothing of her circumstances, although I entirely recognise the good intentions behind this suggestion. The application has not, in fact, been made although I would not have considered it in preference to a father who has passed a parenting assessment and is ready, willing and able to take up the challenge. If anything was to go wrong, and I sincerely hope it won't, the situation might be different.

Contact

88. The next issue is the question of the Mother's contact to Child A and Child C. I am sure it should be the same for both boys. The Local Authority and Guardian suggest seven times per annum. I consider such a level of contact to be close to "identity contact" and more akin to the sort of order made when children are placed in long term foster care on a permanent basis. I do not consider the position is the same here. Although there are care orders in place, both boys are going to reside with their fathers. I consider that they should have more than just identity contact provided, of course, that it is safe and does not undermine their placements.

89. I recognise that the Local Authority wishes to ensure that the placements succeed, as do I. I do accept that this will involve a significant reduction in contact to Mother from the current three times per week plus contact on Sundays at the local Chapel but I must take into account the relationship the boys have with their mother. In one respect, reducing the contact too much may also provide difficulties for the placements. I remind myself that Child A has expressed a preference for living with his Mother. I accept that the matter will have to be kept under constant review and I accept the Local Authority will behave properly in this regard. Nevertheless, I consider that supervised contact of once per fortnight is the most appropriate figure on what I have heard to date. As I am making care orders, however, the matter is one for the Local Authority, in conjunction with the parents and there will have to be flexibility. If the Mother was to undermine the placements, I have no doubt the level would reduce dramatically. Equally, there may come a time when it can increase to weekly.

Child D

90. I now turn to the two aspects of this case that I have found the most difficult. I propose to start with Child D before turning to Child B. I have rejected placement of both children with their Mother for the foreseeable future. They cannot possibly reside with their father, Father B. Even he recognises that. No other possible carer, whether kinship or otherwise, has come forward or passed parenting assessments.

91. The choice therefore is stark. It is between long term fostering on the one hand as against placement for adoption on the other. I have to consider section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. It is, of course, in different terms to that I was considering under section 1(3) of the Children Act although some of the considerations are the same. The first change is that, although the welfare of the child remains my paramount consideration, I must now consider it throughout the child's life rather than until their majority. I must bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to my decision is likely to prejudice the child's welfare.

92. I must consider:-

(a) the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding);

(b) the child's particular needs;

(c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person;

(d) the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant;

(e) any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f) the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including –

(i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so;

(ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child's needs,

(iii) the wishes and feeling of any of the child's relatives or of any such person, regarding the child.

93. I have already noted that this is materially different to section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. The reason is obvious. Adoption is very different to making a care order. It is permanent. It changes the status of a child for ever. It cuts all ties with the birth family. It is rightly a draconian order only to be made when nothing else will do. In particular, I must pay regard to the fact that it will sever the relationship between Child A and Child C on the one hand and Child B and Child D on the other. I must consider the long-term effects of that on all four children. It is not easy.

94. I have come to a clear conclusion in relation to Child D. He is a baby. Although I accept he is developing a bond with his Mother, he is not in the same position as the other three. At present, he has no significant attachment to them due to his age. I recognise that he would wish, if possible, to be brought up in his birth family and having a fulfilling relationship with his siblings. But I have already found that it is not possible for him to be brought up by his birth family and I have to balance all the other factors against the advantages, on both sides, of him retaining a relationship with his birth parents and his siblings.

95. I have to consider his welfare throughout his life. He is entitled to security, stability and permanence. He should not languish in the care system. I recognise that, as a fall back, he could move to Child B and Child C's current foster placement but this would involve him in being within the care system for all eighteen years of his minority, with all the uncertainty and difficulties that this would bring. I have come to the clear conclusion that he is entitled to better than that. I find that his parents would recognise that if they were able to consider this objectively. I further find that his brothers and sisters would do so as well.

96. I therefore accept the analysis of both the Local Authority and the Guardian. Child D needs permanency for the rest of his life. Nothing else will do, notwithstanding the loss of his siblings and birth parents. It follows that I dispense with parental consent as that is what his welfare requires.

Child B

97. I now turn to Child B. She is not a baby. She is four and a half years of age. She has lived with her Mother for nearly the first four years of her life. She has lived with Child C for all her life. She has lived with Child A for much of her life. She has bonds with them.

98. I am troubled that she will feel rejected almost whatever I do. Her brothers are going to live with their fathers. She cannot. She must either stay in care or be adopted. If adopted, she will not see two of her brothers or her Mother and father again.

99. On the other hand, she too is entitled to permanence if it can be achieved. She cannot live with either of her parents. Languishing in the care system has real difficulties and uncertainties as already noted. It is a great shame that there is no-one available to care for her, short of the care system or adoption. I am not criticising anyone for that. It is just a statement of fact.

100. So what do I do to square the circle? Do I leave her with her current foster carers in the long term with all the uncertainties that this would bring but so that she can continue to see her Mother, Child A, Child C and Father B? Or do I find that this is completely unfair on her and that, like Child D, she deserves the chance of a permanent lasting placement for the rest of her life in an alternative adoptive family? I remind myself that this is not just a case of weighing up the two and coming down in favour of the better. I must be satisfied that, before I make a placement order, nothing else will do.

101. I have to weigh in the balance the professional evidence I have heard from both the Local Authority and from the Guardian. I have placed Child D for adoption. The Local Authority believes it can find a placement for both Child D and Child B together. This is important. I take the view that Child B is also entitled to permanency throughout her life. She is entitled to an adoptive family with Child D. I have therefore come to the conclusion that a placement order is the right order to make for her as well. I have decided that nothing else will do. She should not languish in the care system, seeing two of her brothers placed with their fathers and knowing that her youngest brother has been given the chance of a permanent adoptive family. If she can be in that family as well, I have decided that this is the correct order to make. I therefore do so. It follows that I dispense with parental consent as that is what her welfare requires.

102. I make it clear however that my approval so far as Child B is concerned is on the basis of a clear plan to place the children together. I have been given a six months' timeframe. I am of the view that, if placement together cannot be achieved, the matter should be restored for further hearing before me urgently.

103. I approve the Local Authority's care plan for contact to both the Mother and Father B prior to placement. So there is no doubt, Father B should see Child D before he is placed. I trust that will not be in prison but, if it has to be, it has to be.