Limitation of Actions Appendix A [2001] EWLC 270(APPENDIX A) (09 July 2001)

Limitation Bill

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

PART I

THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS

The standard limitation defences

Clause

1. The standard limitation defences.

The date of knowledge

2. The date of knowledge.

The starting date

3. The starting date.

Constructive knowledge etc

4. Constructive knowledge.

5. Corporate knowledge etc.

Application of s. 1(1) to particular cases

6. Joint claims.

7. Assignment.

PART II

MODIFICATIONS OF THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS FOR

PARTICULAR CLAIMS ETC

Consumer protection

8. Claims under Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.

Personal injury claims, claims for the benefit of an estate and claims

under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976

9. Disapplication of section 1(2).

10. Application of section 1(1) to claims for the benefit of an estate.

11. Claims under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976: further provision.

Court’s discretionary power

12. Court’s discretionary power in certain cases.

Limitation

Claims for a contribution

Clause

13. Claims for a contribution.

Conversion

14. Conversion.

Mortgages

15. Mortgages.

Land

16. Recovery of land.

17. Recovery of land; supplementary.

18. Extinction of title to land

19. Recovery of proceeds of the sale of land.

20. Certain claims for compensation or indemnity.

21. Cure of defective disentailing assurance.

Trusts and charities

22. Trusts and charities.

Insolvency and bankruptcy

23. Insolvency and bankruptcy.

Derivative claims

24. Derivative claims.

Certain new claims

25. Certain new claims.

PART III

GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS ETC

Concealment

26. Concealment.

Acknowledgments and part payments

27. Acknowledgments and part payments.

Special parties

28. Children.

29. Persons under a disability.

Limitation

Restrictions on making claims

Clause

30. Restrictions on making claims.

PART IV

MISCELLANEOUS AND SUPPLEMENTAL

Miscellaneous

31. Agreements.

32. Claims in respect of certain loans.

33. Family proceedings.

34. Equitable jurisdiction and remedies.

35. Crown application.

36. Saving for other limitation enactments.

37. Burden of proof.

Supplemental

38. Interpretation.

39. Amendments and repeals.

40. Commencement.

41. Citation and extent.

SCHEDULES:

Schedule 1—Accrual of rights of action to recover land.

Schedule 2—Application of section 1(1) in case of insolvency

and bankruptcy.

Part I—Companies and insolvent partnerships.

Part II—Individuals.

Schedule 3—Minor and consequential amendments.

Schedule 4—Repeals.

Limitation

DRAFT

OF A

B I L L

Make provision about time limits on the making of civil A.D. 2001.

claims; and for connected purposes.

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and

with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,

and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the

authority of the same, as follows:—

5 PART I

THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS

The standard limitation defences

1.—(1) It is a defence to a civil claim that the claim was not made The standard

limitation before the end of the period of three years from the date of knowledge of

defences. 10 the claimant.

(2) It is also a defence to a civil claim that the claim was not made

before the end of the period of ten years fromthe starting date in relation to

the cause of action on which the claim is founded.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are subject to the following provisions of

15 this Act.

(4) In this Act “civil claim” means a claim made in civil proceedings

in which the claimant seeks—

(a) a remedy for a wrong,

(b) restitution, or

20 (c) the enforcement of a right.

(5) The reference in subsection (4) to a claim made in civil proceedings

includes a reference to—

(a) a claimmade in the course of such proceedings by way of set-off or

counterclaim,

25 (b) a claim so made involving the addition or substitution of a new

cause of action, and

Limitation

PART I (c) a claim so made involving the addition or substitution of a party.

(6) Where a civil claim is founded on more than one cause of action,

this Act shall apply as if a separate civil claim were made in respect of

each cause of action.

(7) In this Act— 5

“civil proceedings” includes any proceedings in a court of law,

including an ecclesiastical court,

“claimant” includes a person who makes a claim by way of set-off or

counterclaim,

“defendant” includes a person against whom a claim by way of set-off 10

or counterclaim is made.

The date of knowledge

The date of

2.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and this Act,

knowledge. any reference in this Act to a person’s date of knowledge is a reference to

the date on which he first had knowledge of— 15

(a) the facts which give rise to the cause of action,

(b) the identity of the defendant, and

obtained, the fact that the injury, loss, damage or benefit is

significant. 20

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in determining the date on which a

person first had knowledge of the facts which give rise to a cause of

action, there shall be disregarded the extent (if any) of his knowledge on

any date of whether those facts would or would not, as a matter of law,

give rise to a cause of action. 25

(3) In the case of a cause of action in respect of a breach of duty

(whether in tort, in contract or otherwise) which involves a failure to give

correct advice as to the law, subsection (1) shall have effect as if it also

required knowledge to be had of the fact that correct advice had not been, or

may not have been, given. 30

(4) In the case of a cause of action in respect of restitution based on a

mistake of law, subsection (1) shall have effect as if it also required

knowledge to be had of the fact that a mistake of law had been, or may

have been, made.

(5) For the purposes of this section, a person (“A”) shall be regarded as 35

having knowledge of the fact that any injury, loss, damage or benefit is

significant—

(a) if he has knowledge of the full extent of the injury, loss, damage or

benefit, or

(b) if a reasonable person with A’s knowledge of the extent of the 40

injury, loss, damage or benefit would think, on the assumption

that the defendant did not dispute liability and was able to

satisfy a judgment, that a civil claim was worth making in

respect of the injury, loss, damage or benefit.

Limitation

PART I The starting date

3.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and this Act, The starting date.

any reference in this Act to the starting date is a reference to the date on

which the cause of action accrued.

5 (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section and this Act, any

reference in this Act to the starting date—

(a) in the case of a cause of action in tort which does not accrue

unless injury, loss or damage occurs, or

(b) in the case of a cause of action in respect of breach of statutory

10 duty,

is a reference to the date of occurrence of the act or omission which gives

rise to the cause of action (whether the cause of action accrues on that

date or on a later date).

(3) Where two or more acts or omissions give rise to a single cause of

15 action falling within subsection (2)(a) or (b), the starting date shall be

determined by reference to the last of those acts or omissions.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a cause of action in respect of a

breach of the duty imposed by section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 c. 35.

1972.

20 Constructive knowledge etc

4.—(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person’s knowledge includes Constructive

knowledge. knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—

(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him, or

(b) where he has acted unreasonably in not seeking appropriate

25 expert advice, from facts ascertainable by him with the help of

such advice.

(2) In determining for the purposes of this section—

(a) the knowledge which a person might reasonably have been

expected to acquire, or

30 (b) whether a person has acted unreasonably in not seeking

appropriate expert advice,

his circumstances and abilities (so far as relevant) shall be taken into

account.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be treated as having

35 knowledge of a fact if an agent of his—

(a) who is under a duty to communicate that fact to him, or

(b) who has authority to take decisions about the cause of action

concerned,

has actual knowledge of that fact; but except as so provided a person

40 shall not treated as having knowledge of a fact merely because an agent of

his has knowledge of the fact.

(4) For the purposes of this section, a person has authority to take

decisions about a cause of action if he has authority—

(a) to seek legal advice in connection with the making of a civil

45 claim in respect of the cause of action, or

Limitation

PART I (b) to take decisions about whether to make such a claim.

Corporate

5.—(1) For the purposes of this Act, a relevant body shall be treated as

knowledge etc. having knowledge of a fact—

(a) if a qualifying individual has knowledge of that fact, or

(b) if the relevant body is treated as having knowledge of that fact by 5

virtue of section 4(3).

(2) In this section “relevant body” means—

(a) a body corporate,

(b) a corporation sole,

(d) a body of persons which does not fall within paragraph (a) or (c)

but which is capable of suing and being sued in its own name.

(3) In this section “qualifying individual”, in relation to a relevant

body, means an individual—

(a) who is an officer of the body or has authority on behalf of the 15

body to take decisions about the cause of action concerned (or is

one of a number of individuals who together have such

authority), or

(b) who is an employee of the body and is under a duty to

communicate any fact relevant to the cause of action concerned 20

to any other employee of the body or to an individual falling

within paragraph (a),

but does not include an individual falling within subsection (4).

(4) An individual falls within this subsection if he is an individual—

(a) against whom the cause of action concerned subsists, or 25

(b) who has dishonestly concealed any fact relevant to the cause of

action concerned from any other individual falling within

subsection (3)(a) or (b).

(5) Sections 4(4) and 26(6) shall apply for the purposes of this section

as they apply for the purposes of those sections. 30

(6) In this section “officer” includes a partner.

Application of s. 1(1) to particular cases

Joint claims.

6.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where a

cause of action is vested in two or more persons jointly or jointly and

severally, section 1(1) shall apply separately in relation to each of them. 35

(2) Where, by virtue of subsection (1), the defence under section 1(1)

is available against one or more, but not all, of the persons mentioned in

that subsection, it may not be raised against the other or others.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to—

(a) a cause of action vested in a partnership, or 40

(b) a cause of action vested in trustees or personal representatives.

(4) Where a cause of action is vested in trustees or personal

representatives, the date of knowledge of the trustees or personal

Limitation

PART I representatives shall be treated as falling on the same date as the earliest

date of knowledge of any person who was a trustee or personal

representative on that date.

7.—(1) This section applies where a civil claim in respect of a cause of Assignment.

5 action is made by a person to whom the cause of action has been assigned

(“the assignee”).

(2) It is a defence to a civil claimin respect of the cause of action made by

the assignee that the assignment was made after the end of the limitation

period under section 1(1) which would have applied to a civil claim in

10 respect of the cause of action made by any person in whom the cause of

action was vested before him.

(3) If the assignment was made after the limitation period mentioned in

subsection (2) has begun to run but before it has ended, that limitation

period shall apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action made by

15 the assignee.

(4) If the assignment was made before the limitation period mentioned

in subsection (2) has begun to run, the limitation period under section

1(1) which is to apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action

made by the assignee shall be treated as running from the later of—

20 (a) the date of the assignment, and

(b) the date of knowledge of the assignee.

(5) For the purposes of this section, a cause of action is assigned by a

person if he enters into any transaction the effect of which is to assign his

right to make a civil claim in respect of the cause of action.

25 (6) In determining for the purposes of subsection (2) whether the

limitation period under section 1(1) would have applied to a civil claim

made by a person, his date of knowledge shall be disregarded if it falls

after the cause of action ceased to be vested in him.

PART II

30 MODIFICATIONS OF THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS FOR

PARTICULAR CLAIMS ETC

Consumer protection

8.—(1) Section 1(2) does not apply to a civil claim under any Claims under Part

I of the Consumer provision of Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (“the 1987

ProtectionAct 35 Act”).

1987.

(2) Acivil claimunder any provision of Part I of the 1987 Act may not be 1976 c. 30.

made after the end of the period of ten years from the relevant time,

within the meaning of section 4 of that Act.

(3) Subsection (2) operates to extinguish any right to make the civil

40 claim and does so—

(a) whether or not that right has accrued, and

(b) whether or not time under any other limitation period under this

Act applicable to the claim has begun to run at the end of that

ten year period.

Limitation

PART II (4) Nothing in the following provisions of this Act—

(a) shall operate to override or extend the limitation period under

subsection (2), or

(b) shall affect the operation of subsection (3).

Personal injury claims, claims for the benefit of an estate and claims 5

under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976

Disapplication of

9. Section 1(2) does not apply to—

section 1(2). (a) a civil claim if and to the extent that the remedy sought by the

claimant is damages in respect of personal injury to him,

1934 c.41. (b) a civil claim made by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform 10

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 if and to the extent that the

remedy sought by the claimant is damages in respect of personal

injury to the deceased, or

1976 c. 30. (c) a civil claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.

Application of

10.—(1) This section applies where a civil claim in respect of a cause of 15

section 1(1) to action is made by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous

claims for the Provisions) Act 1934 (“the 1934 Act claim”).

benefit of an

estate. (2) It is a defence to the 1934 Act claim that the deceased died after the

end of the limitation period under section 1(1) which would have applied

to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action made by him. 20

(3) If the deceased died before the end of the limitation period

mentioned in subsection (2), the limitation period under section 1(1)

which is to apply to the 1934 Act claim shall be treated as running from

the later of—

(a) the date of the deceased’s death, and 25

(b) the date of knowledge of the deceased’s personal representatives.

Claims under the

11.—(1) It is a defence to a civil claim under the Fatal Accidents Act

Fatal Accidents 1976 (“the 1976 Act”) that the person injured died when he could no

Act 1976: further longer maintain a civil claim for damages in respect of the injury.

provision.

(2) In relation to a civil claim under the 1976 Act— 30

(a) the limitation period under section 1(1) shall be treated as

running from the date of knowledge of the person for whose

benefit the claim is made, and

(b) where there are two or more persons for whose benefit the claim is

made, section 1(1) shall apply separately in relation to each of 35

them.

(3) Where, by virtue of subsection (2)(b), the defence under section

1(1) is available against one or more, but not all, of the persons

mentioned in subsection (2)(b), it may not be raised against the other or

others. 40

(4) For the purposes of this section, the person injured shall be treated

as having died when he could no longer maintain a civil claim for

damages in respect of the injury if at the time of his death—

(a) a defence under this Act, or under any other enactment limiting

the time within which proceedings may be taken, could have 45

been raised in respect of such a claim, or

Limitation

PART I (b) he could no longer maintain such a claim for any other reason.

(5) In determining for the purposes of this section whether the person

injured died when he could no longer maintain a civil claim for damages in

respect of the injury, no account shall be taken of the possibility of any

5 defence under this Act which could have been raised in respect of such a

claim being disapplied under section 12.

Court’s discretionary power

12.—(1) This section applies where a defence under this Act is raised Court’s

discretionary in respect of—

power in certain

10 (a) a personal injury claim, or cases.

(b) a civil claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (“the 1976 1976 c. 30.

Act”).

(2) The court may direct that the defence shall not apply in relation to

the claim if it is satisfied, having regard to—

15 (a) any hardship which would be caused to the defendant (or any

person whom he represents) if such a direction were given, and

(b) any hardship which would be caused to the claimant (or any

person whom he represents) if such a direction were not given,

that it would unjust not to give such a direction.

20 (3) In acting under this section the court must take into account—

(a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay on the part of the

claimant,

(b) the effect of the passage of time on the ability of the defendant to

defend the claim,

25 (c) the effect of the passage of time on the cogency of any evidence

adduced or likely to be adduced by the claimant or defendant,

(d) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose,

including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests

reasonably made by the claimant for information or inspection

30 for the purpose of discovering facts which were or might be

relevant to the claim,

(e) the extent to which the claimant acted promptly and reasonably

once he knew that he might be entitled to make the claim,

(f) the steps, if any, taken by the claimant to obtain medical, legal or

35 other expert advice and the nature of any expert advice he may

have received,

(g) any alternative remedy or compensation available to the claimant,

(h) the strength of the claimant’s case, and

(i) any other relevant circumstances.

40 (4) In relation to a personal injury claim falling within subsection

(8)(b), any reference in subsection (3)(a) or (d) to (f) to the claimant

includes a reference to the deceased.

(5) In relation to a civil claim under the 1976 Act, any reference in

subsection (3)(a) or (d) to (f) to the claimant includes a reference to the

45 deceased; and subsection (3) shall have effect with such modifications as

may be appropriate in consequence of this subsection.

Limitation

PART II (6) Where a civil claim under the 1976 Act is made by personal

representatives, any reference in subsection (3) to the claimant includes a

reference to the person for whose benefit the claim is made.

(7) Where the court gives a direction under this section disapplying the

defence under 11(1), the person injured shall be treated for the purposes 5

of section 1(1) of the 1976 Act as if he had died when he could have

maintained an action for damages in respect of the injury.

(8) In this section “personal injury claim” means—

(a) a civil claim if and to the extent that the remedy sought by the

claimant is damages in respect of personal injury to him, 10

1934 c.41. (b) a civil claim made by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 if and to the extent that the

remedy sought by the claimant is damages in respect of personal

injury to the deceased.

Claims for a contribution 15

Claims for a

13.—(1) The starting date in relation to a cause of action under section 1

contribution. of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 to recover contribution in

1978 c. 47. respect of any damage from any person shall be determined in accordance

with this section.

(2) If the person concerned is held liable in respect of the damage— 20

(a) by a judgment given in any civil proceedings, or

(b) by an award made on any arbitration,

the starting date shall be the date on which the judgment is given or, as

the case may be, the date of the award.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) no account shall be taken of any 25

judgment or award given or made on appeal in so far as it varies the

amount of damages awarded against the person concerned.

(4) If, in a case not falling within subsection (2), the person concerned

makes or agrees to make any payment to a person in compensation for

that damage (whether he admits any liability in respect of the damage or 30

not), the starting date shall be the earliest date on which the amount paid or

to be paid by him is agreed between him (or his representative) and that

person.

Conversion

Conversion.

14.—(1) Where— 35

(a) a cause of action has accrued to a person in respect of a

conversion of goods which was not a theft from that person, and

(b) before that person recovers possession of the goods, a further

conversion takes place,

the starting date in relation to the further conversion shall be treated as 40

falling on the date on which the original conversion took place.

(2) Where a cause of action has accrued to a person in respect of a

conversion of goods which was a theft from that person—

(a) section 2(1) shall have effect in relation to the theft, and any

conversion related to the theft, as if it also required knowledge 45

to be had of the location of the goods, and

Limitation

PART I (b) subject to subsection (3), section 1(2) shall not apply to the theft

or any conversion related to the theft.

(3) Section 1(2) shall apply to—

(a) the first conversion related to the theft which involves a person

5 purchasing the goods in good faith, and

(b) any subsequent conversion related to the theft;

and the starting date in relation to any conversion falling within

paragraph (a) or (b) shall be treated as falling on the date on which the

goods are purchased by the person mentioned in paragraph (a).

10 (4) Where—

(a) a cause of action in respect of the conversion of goods has

accrued to a person,

(b) the limitation period under section 1(2) (if any) which applies to

that or any further conversion has ended before a civil claim is

15 made in respect of that or any further conversion, and

end of that period,

the title of that person to the goods shall be extinguished.

(5)A conversion of goods shall be treated for the purposes of this

20 section as related to a theft of those goods if it occurs after the theft but

before the person from whom they were stolen recovers possession of the

goods.

(6) In this section—

“goods” includes all chattels personal other than things in action and

25 money,

“theft” includes—

(a) any conduct outside England and Wales which would

be theft if committed in England and Wales, and

(b) obtaining any goods (in England and Wales or

30 elsewhere) in the circumstances described in section 15(1) of

the Theft Act 1968 (obtaining by deception) or by blackmail 1968 c. 60.

within the meaning of section 21 of that Act.

Mortgages

15.—(1) This Act does not apply to a civil claim to redeem a Mortgages.

35 mortgage.

(2) Section 1(1) does not apply to—

(a) a civil claim for a remedy under a mortgage of land, or

(b) a civil claimwhich does not fall within paragraph (a) but which is a

claim to enforce an obligation secured by a mortgage of land.

40 (3) Where any limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil

claim by a mortgagee in respect of a mortgage would, apart from this

subsection, end—

(a) during any period in which a prior mortgagee is in possession of

the property subject to the mortgage, or

Limitation

PART II (b) during the period of one year beginning with the date on which

the prior mortgagee ceases to be in possession of the property,

it shall instead be treated as ending at the end of the period mentioned in

paragraph (b).

(4) No limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil claim 5

by a mortgagee in respect of a mortgage shall run during any period in

which the property subject to the mortgage consists of or includes any

future interest or any life policy which has not matured or been

determined.

(5) No limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil claim 10

to foreclose a mortgage shall run during any period in which the

mortgagee is in possession of the property subject to the mortgage.

(6) Where the limitation period under section 1(2) which would apply

to a civil claim by a mortgagee in respect of a mortgage has ended before

any such claim is made, the interest of the mortgagee in the property 15

which is subject to the mortgage shall be extinguished.

(7) Any reference in this section to a civil claim by a mortgagee in

respect of a mortgage is a reference to—

(a) a civil claim by a mortgagee for a remedy under the mortgage, or

(b) a civil claim by a mortgagee which does not fall within paragraph 20

(a) but which is a claim to enforce an obligation secured by the

mortgage.

(8) Any reference in this section to a mortgage includes a reference to a

charge, and any reference to a mortgagee shall be construed accordingly.

(9) Any reference in this section to a mortgage of land includes a 25

reference to a mortgage of land and other property.

Land

Recovery of land.

16.—(1) Subsections (1) and (2) of section 1 do not apply to a civil

claim to recover land.

(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a civil claim to 30

recover land may not be made by a person after the end of the period of

ten years from the earlier of—

(a) the date on which the right of action to recover the land first

accrued to him, and

(b) if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, the 35

date on which it first accrued to that person.

(3) In its application to a civil claim by the Crown to recover

foreshore, subsection (2) shall have effect as if the period referred to in it

were sixty years not ten years.

(4) Where any right of action to recover land which has ceased to be 40

foreshore accrued to the Crown when the land was foreshore, a civil

claim by the Crown to recover the land may not be made after the end of

the period of—

(a) sixty years from the date of accrual of the right of action, or

Limitation

PART I (b) ten years from the date on which the land ceased to be foreshore,

whichever period ends first.

(5) No civil claim may be made to recover any estate or interest in land

under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the

5 land had accrued to—

(a) the person by whom the assurance was made,

(b) some person through whom he claimed, or

unless the claim is made within the period in which the person by whom

10 the assurance was made could have made such a claim.

(6) Where—

(a) any person is entitled to any estate or interest in land in

possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to any future

estate or interest in that land, and

15 (b) his right of action to recover the estate or interest in possession is

barred by this Act,

no civil claim may be made by that person, or by any person claiming

through him, in respect of the future estate or interest, unless in the

meantime possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled

20 to an intermediate estate or interest in the land.

(7) In this section “foreshore” means the shore and bed of the sea and of

any tidal water, below the line of the medium high tide between the

spring tides and the neap tides.

17.—(1) Schedule 1 (which contains provisions for determining the Recovery of land;

supplementary. 25 date of accrual of rights of action to recover land) has effect.

(2) The provisions of this Act relating to civil claims to recover land

shall apply to equitable interests in land as they apply to legal estates in

land.

(3) Accordingly a right of action to recover land shall be treated for the

30 purposes of this Act as accruing to a person entitled in possession to an

equitable interest in the land in the like manner and circumstances, and

on the same date, as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in

the land (and any relevant provision of Schedule 1 shall apply in any such

case accordingly).

35 (4) For the purposes of the provisions of this Act relating to civil

claims to recover land, an administrator of the estate of a deceased person

shall be treated as claiming as if there had been no interval of time

between the death of the deceased person and the grant of the letters of

administration.

40 (5) Where land is vested in the incumbent from time to time of a

benefice as a spiritual corporation sole but the benefice is vacant, a civil

claim to recover the land (or any part of it) may be made in the name of

and on behalf of the corporation sole by the priest in charge of the

benefice or the sequestrators of the benefice.

18.—(1) Subject to section 75 of the Land Registration Act 1925 and Extinction of title

to land the following provisions of this section, where a civil claim to recover

land is not made by a person before the end of the limitation period under 1925 c. 21.

Limitation

PART II section 16 which would apply to the claim, the title of that person to the

land shall be extinguished.

(2) Where the limitation period under section 16 has expired for the

making of a civil claim to recover land by a tenant for life or a statutory

owner of settled land— 5

(a) his legal estate shall not be extinguished if and so long as the

right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a

beneficial interest in the land either has not accrued or has not

been barred by this Act, and

(b) the legal estate shall accordingly remain vested in the tenant for 10

life or statutory owner and shall devolve in accordance with the

1925 c. 18. Settled Land Act 1925;

but if and when every such right of action has been barred by this Act, his

legal estate shall be extinguished.

(3) Where any land is held upon trust and the limitation period under 15

section 16 has expired for the making of a civil claimto recover the land by

the trustees, the estate of the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so

long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a

beneficial interest in the land either has not accrued or has not been

barred by this Act; but if and when every such right has been so barred 20

the estate of the trustees shall be extinguished.

(4) Where—

(a) any settled land is vested in a statutory owner, or

(b) any land is held upon trust,

a civil claim to recover the land may be made by the statutory owner or 25

trustees on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in

possession in the land whose right of action to recover the land has not

been barred by this Act, notwithstanding that the right of action to

recover the land of the statutory owner or trustees would apart from this

subsection have been barred by this Act. 30

Recovery of

19. Section 1(1) does not apply to a civil claim to recover proceeds of

proceeds of the the sale of land.

sale of land.

Certain claims for

20.—(1) Section 1(2) does not apply to—

compensation or (a) a civil claim for indemnity under the Land Registration Act 1925, indemnity.

1925 c. 21. (b) a civil claim to recover compensation under section 25 of the Law 35

1969 c. 59. of Property Act 1969, or

1975 c. 76. Local Land Charges Act 1975.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person’s date of knowledge in the

case of a cause of action to recover compensation under section 10 of the 40

Local Land Charges Act 1975 shall be determined without regard to the

1925 c. 20. provisions of section 198 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (under which

registration under certain enactments is deemed to constitute actual

notice).

Limitation

PART I

21.—(1) Subsection (2) applies where—

Cure of defective (a) a person entitled in remainder to an entailed interest in any land

disentailing makes an assurance of his interest which fails to bar the issue in assurance.

tail or the estates and interests taking effect on the determination

5 of the entailed interest, or fails to bar those estates and interests

only, and

(b) any person takes possession of the land by virtue of the

assurance.

(2) If the person taking possession of the land by virtue of the

10 assurance, or any other person whatsoever (other than a person entitled to

possession by virtue of the settlement), is in possession of the land for a

period of ten years from the commencement of the time when the

assurance could have operated as an effective bar, the assurance shall

thereupon operate, and be treated as having always operated, to bar the

15 issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect on the

determination of the entailed interest.

(3) The reference in subsection (2) to the time when the assurance

could have operated as an effective bar is a reference to the time at which

the assurance, if it had then been executed by the person entitled to the

20 entailed interest, would have operated, without the consent of any other

person, to bar the issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect

on the determination of the entailed interest.

(4) Where—

(a) a right of action to recover land has accrued to a person entitled to

25 an estate or interest taking effect on the determination of an

entailed interest,

(b) time is running against that person under subsection (2), and

person,

30 subsection (2) shall cease to apply to the land on the date of the

acknowledgment.

Trusts and charities

22.—(1) No limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil Trusts and

charities. claim by a beneficiary to recover trust property or the proceeds of trust

35 property shall run against himduring any period in which he is entitled to a

future interest in the trust property.

(2) A cause of action to recover property held on a bare trust shall not

accrue unless and until the trustee acts in breach of trust.

(3) This Act does not apply to a civil claim made by the Attorney

40 General or the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales with

respect to a charity or the property or affairs of a charity.

(4)A beneficiary under a trust as against whom a defence under this

Act could have been raised may not derive any greater or other benefit

from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary under the

45 trust than he could have obtained if he had made the civil claim and a

defence under this Act had been raised.

Limitation

PART II (5) In this section “charity” has the same meaning as in the Charities

1993 c. 10. Act 1993.

Insolvency and bankruptcy

Insolvency and

23. Schedule 2 (which makes provision as to the application of section

bankruptcy. 1(1) in the case of insolvency and bankruptcy) has effect. 5

Derivative claims

Derivative

24.—(1) Where—

claims. (a) a cause of action is vested in a body corporate or trade union, and

(b) a civil claim in respect of the cause of action is made on behalf of

the body corporate or trade union by a member of it, 10

the limitation period under section 1(1) which is to apply to the claim

shall be treated as running from the date of knowledge of the member.

(2) Where a civil claim falling within subsection (1) is made by two or

more members, section 1(1) shall apply separately in relation to each of

them. 15

(3) Where, by virtue of subsection (2), the defence under section 1(1)

is available against one or more, but not all, of the persons mentioned in

that subsection, it may not be raised against the other or others.

Certain new claims

Certain new

25.—(1) Where— 20

claims. (a) a civil claim is made in the course of any civil proceedings,

(b) the claim is by way of set-off or counterclaim by a party who has

not previously made any claim in the proceedings, and

commenced, it would not have been made after the end of any 25

applicable limitation period under this Act,

no defence under this Act may be raised in respect of the claim.

(2) Where—

(a) a civil claim (“the new claim”) is made in the course of any civil

proceedings, 30

(b) the new claim involves the addition or substitution of a new

cause of action,

events as are already in issue in a civil claim previously made in

the proceedings (“the existing claim”), and 35

(d) the existing claim was not made after the end of any applicable

limitation period under this Act or any other enactment,

no defence under this Act may be raised in respect of the new claim.

(3) Where—

(a) a civil claim (“the new claim”) is made in the course of any civil 40

proceedings,

(b) the new claim involves the addition or substitution of a new

party,

Limitation

PART I (c) the addition or substitution is necessary for the determination of a

civil claim previously made in the proceedings (“the existing

claim”), and

(d) the existing claim was not made after the end of any applicable

5 limitation period under this Act or any other enactment,

no defence under this Act may be raised in respect of the new claim.

(4) The addition or substitution of a new party is not necessary for the

determination of a civil claim previously made in civil proceedings

unless—

10 (a) the new party is substituted for a party whose name was given in

that claim in mistake for the new party’s name, or

(b) that claim cannot be maintained by or against an existing party

unless the new party is joined or substituted as a party to that

claim.

15 (5) Rules of court may make provision which allows a party to a civil

claim to claim relief in a new capacity in respect of a new cause of action

notwithstanding that he had no title to make that claim at the time when

the claim was made.

(6) Subsection (5) shall not affect the power of rules of court to make

20 provision which allows a party to a civil claim to claim relief in a new

capacity without adding or substituting a new cause of action.

PART III

GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE STANDARD LIMITATION PROVISIONS ETC

Concealment

26.—(1) This section applies where a person (“A”) against whom a Concealment.

cause of action subsists (or an agent of his) has dishonestly concealed

from a person (“B”) in whom the cause of action is vested (or an agent of

his) any fact relevant to the cause of action.

(2) In its application to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action

30 made by B, or any person claiming through him, against A, or any person

claiming through him, the limitation period under section 1(2) or 16 shall

not run during the period beginning with the date on which the fact was

first dishonestly concealed and ending with the earliest date on which B,

or any person claiming through him, first had knowledge of the fact.

35 (3) In the case of the fresh cause of action which accrues by virtue of

section 3(1) of the Latent Damage Act 1986 (accrual of cause of action to 1986 c. 37.

successive owners in respect of latent damage to property), a fact

dishonestly concealed from the person in whom the original cause of

action mentioned in that section was vested (or an agent of his) shall be

40 treated for the purposes of subsection (1) as dishonestly concealed from

the person in whom the fresh cause of action is vested.

(4) Where the starting date in relation to a cause of action falling

within section 3(2)(a) or (b) falls before the date of accrual of the cause of

action, the cause of action shall be treated for the purposes of subsection

45 (1) as subsisting against A, and vested in B, from the starting date.

Limitation

PART III (5) Nothing in this section enables a civil claim—

(a) to recover, or recover the value of, any property, or

(b) to enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction

affecting, property,

to be made against the purchaser (or any person claiming through him) in 5

any case where the property has been purchased for valuable

consideration by an innocent third party since the concealment took

place.

(6)A person shall not be treated for the purposes of this section as

concealing a fact from another person unless— 10

(a) he is a party to, or is privy to, any action the effect of which is to

prevent that other person from discovering the fact for some

time, or

(b) he fails to disclose the fact to that other person in breach of a duty

to do so. 15

(7) The provisions of Part I of this Act which apply for determining the

date on which a person first had knowledge of a fact shall also apply for

the purposes of subsection (2).

(8) For the purposes of subsection (2), knowledge acquired by a person

after a cause of action ceased to be vested in him shall be disregarded. 20

(9)A purchaser is an innocent third party for the purposes of this

section if he was not a party to the concealment and did not at the time of

the purchase have reason to believe that the concealment had taken place.

Acknowledgments and part payments

Acknowledg-

27.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where— 25

ments and part (a) a person (“A”) against whom a cause of action subsists has payments.

acknowledged the cause of action or made a payment in respect

of it,

(b) the acknowledgment or payment was made to a person (“B”) in

whom the cause of action is vested, and 30

period under this Act which would apply to a civil claim in

respect of the cause of action made by B (or any successor of

his) against A (or any successor of his) has ended,

any such limitation period which has begun to run before the date on 35

which the acknowledgment or payment was made shall instead be treated

as running from that date.

(2) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where—

(a) a cause of action subsists against two or more persons jointly or

jointly and severally, and 40

(b) an acknowledgment or payment under this section is made by one

or more, but not all, of those persons,

this section shall not operate to extend any limitation period under this

Act which applies to any such person who does not make the

acknowledgment or payment (or any successor of his). 45

Limitation

PART III (3) Subject to subsection (4), where—

(a) a cause of action is vested in two or more persons jointly or

jointly and severally, and

(b) an acknowledgment or payment under this section is made to one

5 or more, but not all, of those persons,

this section shall not operate to extend any limitation period under this

Act which applies to any such person to whom the acknowledgment or

payment is not made (or any successor of his).

(4) Where—

10 (a) a cause of action subsists against or is vested in, trustees or

personal representatives, and

(b) an acknowledgment or payment under this section is made by or

(as the case may be) to one or more, but not all, of the trustees or

personal representatives,

15 the acknowledgment or payment shall bind or (as the case may be) be

treated as made to all of the trustees or personal representatives.

(5) An acknowledgment or payment under this section in respect of the

title to any land, benefice or mortgaged personal property by any person

in possession of it shall bind all of the persons in possession of it during

20 the ensuing limitation period.

(6) Where this section extends the limitation period under section 1(2)

which applies to a civil claim in respect of the original cause of action

mentioned in section 3 of the Latent Damage Act 1986 (accrual of cause of 1986 c. 37.

action to successive owners in respect of latent damage to property)), it

25 shall also extend the limitation period under section 1(2) which applies to a

civil claimin respect of the fresh cause of action which accrues by virtue of

that section.

(7) Where the starting date in relation to a cause of action falling

within section 3(2)(a) or (b) falls before the date of accrual of the cause of

30 action, the cause of action shall be treated for the purposes of subsection

(1) as subsisting against A, and vested in B, from the starting date; and

subsection (2) to (4) and (11) and (12) shall be construed accordingly.

(8) To be effective for the purposes of this section an acknowledgment

must be in writing.

35 (9) For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment or payment

made by or to an agent of a person shall be treated as made by or to that

person.

(10)A limitation period which has been extended under this section

may be further extended under this section by further acknowledgments

40 or payments.

(11) For the purposes of this section, a person acknowledges a cause of

action if—

(a) he acknowledges liability in respect of the cause of action, or

(b) he acknowledges any right or title upon which the cause of action is

45 based.

(12) For the purposes of this section, a person makes a payment in

Limitation

PART III respect of a cause of action if he makes a payment the effect of which is

to—

(a) acknowledge liability in respect of the cause of action, or

(b) acknowledge any right or title upon which the cause of action is

based. 5

(13) Where there is a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at

any time, this section shall not operate to extend any limitation period

under this Act which applies to a civil claim to recover the remainder

then due.

(14) Any payment of interest shall be treated for the purposes of this 10

section as a payment in respect of a cause of action to recover the

principal debt.

Special parties

Children.

28. Where a cause of action is vested in a person who was under the

age of 18 on the starting date in relation to the cause of action, any 15

limitation period under this Act which would apply to a civil claim in

respect of the cause of action made by him shall be treated as ending—

(a) at the end of the period of three years from the date on which he

attains the age of 18, or

(b) at the end of the period when the limitation period would 20

otherwise end,

whichever is the later.

Persons under a

29.—(1) This section applies where a cause of action has accrued to a

disability. person (“the relevant person”) who is under a disability at any time after

the date of accrual of the cause of action. 25

(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the limitation

period under section 1(1), so far as applicable to a civil claim in respect of

the cause of action made by the relevant person, shall not run during any

period in which he is under a disability.

(3) Subsections (4) and (5) apply where— 30

(a) the remedy sought by the relevant person in the civil claim

mentioned in subsection (2) is damages in respect of personal

injury to him,

(b) the relevant person is under a disability at the end of the period of

ten years from the later of the date of accrual of the cause of 35

action and the date of the onset of disability (“the ten year

period”),

responsibility for the relevant person at the end of the ten year

period, 40

(d) the responsible person is not the defendant to the claim, and

(e) whether by virtue of subsection (2) or otherwise, the limitation

period under section 1(1) has not ended by the end of the ten

year period.

Limitation

PART III (4) Subsection (2) shall not apply after the end of the ten year period.

(5) The limitation period under section 1(1) shall instead be treated as

running from the earlier of the following dates—

(a) the date of knowledge of the responsible person,

5 (b) the date of knowledge of any person who subsequently has

responsibility for the relevant person, and

the ten year period, the date of knowledge of the relevant

person;

10 but if any such date of knowledge falls before the end of the ten year

period, it shall be treated for the purposes of this subsection as falling on

the date immediately following the end of the ten year period.

(6) A person is under a disability for the purposes of this section if—

(a) he is unable by reason of mental disability to make decisions on

15 matters relating to the cause of action concerned, or

(b) he is unable to communicate such decisions because of mental

disability or physical impairment.

(7) In subsection (6) “mental disability” means a disability or disorder

of the mind or brain, whether permanent or temporary, which results in an

20 impairment or disturbance of mental functioning.

(8) For the purposes of this section a person has responsibility for the

relevant person if—

(a) he is a member of the relevant person’s family who has attained

the age of 18 and is responsible for the day to day care of the

25 relevant person, or

(b) he is a person who is authorised under Part VII of the Mental 1981 c. 20.

Health Act 1983 to conduct proceedings in the name of the

relevant person.

Restrictions on making claims

30.—(1) No limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil Restrictions on

making claims. claim made by a person shall run against that person during any period

after the accrual of the cause of action in which he is prevented by any

enactment (other than this Act) or any rule of law from making the claim.

(2)A person shall not be regarded for the purposes of this section as

35 prevented from making a claim—

(a) where the claim could have been made on his behalf by a

litigation friend,

(b) where he is prevented from making the claim by reason only of a

contractual term, or

40 (c) if leave is required to make the claim, unless and until he has

taken all reasonable steps to obtain that leave.

Limitation

PART IV

MISCELLANEOUS AND SUPPLEMENTAL

Miscellaneous

Agreements.

31.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, nothing in

this Act prevents the making of an agreement the terms of which— 5

(a) modify or disapply any of the provisions of this Act, or

(b) make provision in place of any of the provisions of this Act.

(2) An agreement is unenforceable if and to the extent that its terms—

(a) modify or disapply, or make provision in place of, section 8 or

this section, 10

(b) in the case of the limitation period under section 1(2) or an

agreed limitation period to which subsection (5) applies, reduces

the protection given to a claimant by section 26,

(d) in the case of the limitation period under section 1(1) or an 15

agreed limitation period to which subsection (4) applies, reduces

the protection given to a claimant by section 29.

1977 c. 50. (3) Where neither the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 nor the Unfair

S.I. 1999/2083. Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 apply to any terms of an

agreement falling within subsection (1)(a) or (b), those terms shall be of 20

no effect except in so far as they satisfy the requirement of

reasonableness as stated in section 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms

Act 1977; but this subsection shall not apply to an agreement to

compromise or settle litigation.

(4) Subject to subsection (7) and the terms of any agreement, the 25

provisions of this Act shall apply to an agreed limitation period which

runs from a date determined by reference to a person’s actual or

constructive knowledge as they apply to the limitation period under

section 1(1); and any reference in any provision of this Act (other than

this section) to a limitation period or defence— 30

(a) under section 1(1), or

(b) under this Act,

shall be construed accordingly.

(5) Subject to the terms of any agreement, the provisions of this Act

shall apply to an agreed limitation period which runs from a date 35

determined otherwise than by reference to a person’s actual or

constructive knowledge as they apply to the limitation period under

section 1(2); and any reference in any provision of this Act (other than

this section) to a limitation period or defence—

(a) under section 1(2), or 40

(b) under this Act,

shall be construed accordingly.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), section 29(1) and (2) shall apply to an

agreed limitation period to which subsection (5) applies as if the

reference in section 29(2) to the limitation period under section 1(1) werea 45

reference to the agreed limitation period.

Limitation

PART IV (7) Section 29 (whether it applies by virtue of subsection (4) or

subsection (6)) shall not operate to extend an agreed limitation period

beyond the period of ten years from the starting date in relation to the

cause of action.

5 (8) Any reference in this section to an agreed limitation period is a

reference to a limitation period for which provision is made by the terms of

any agreement (whether those terms modify any limitation period under

this Act or provide for a limitation period in place of any limitation

period under this Act).

32.—(1) A cause of action to recover the debt under a qualifying loan Claims in respect

of certain loans. shall not accrue unless and until a demand in writing for repayment of the

debt is made by or on behalf of the creditor (or, where there are joint

creditors, by or on behalf of any one or more of them).

(2) In this section “qualifying loan” means a contract of loan which—

15 (a) does not provide for repayment of the debt on or before a fixed or

determinable date, and

(b) does not effectively (whether or not it purports to do so) make the

obligation to repay the debt conditional on a demand for

repayment made by or on behalf of the creditor or on any other

20 matter,

but a contract of loan is not a qualifying loan if, in connection with taking

the loan, the debtor enters into a collateral obligation to pay the amount of

the debt or any part of it (as, for example, by delivering a promissory note

as security for the debt) on terms which do not satisfy both of the

25 conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b).

33.—(1) This Act does not apply to civil proceedings which are Family

proceedings. business of a description which in the High Court is for the time being

assigned to the Family Division and to no other Division by or under

section 61 of, and Schedule 1 to, the Supreme Court Act 1981. 1981 c. 54.

30 (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the civil proceedings there

mentioned are commenced in the High Court.

34.—(1) This Act does not apply to a civil claim for the specific Equitable

jurisdiction and performance of a contract to grant or transfer an interest in property if the

remedies. claimant—

35 (a) has acquired an interest in the property by virtue of the contract,

and

(b) is in possession of the property.

(2) Nothing in this Act affects any equitable jurisdiction to refuse

relief on the ground of delay, acquiescence or otherwise.

40 35.—(1) This Act binds the Crown. Crown

application.

(2) This Act does not apply to any civil claim by the Crown for the

recovery of any tax or duty or interest on any tax or duty.

Limitation

PART IV (3) For the purposes of this Act, a civil claim by petition of right shall

be treated as made on the date on which the petition is presented.

Saving for other

36. Except as provided by Schedules 3 and 4, this Act does not

limitation apply—

enactments.

(a) to any civil claim for which a limitation period is provided by any 5

other enactment (whenever passed or made), or

(b) to any civil claim to which the Crown is a party and for which, if it

were between subjects, a limitation period would be provided by

any such other enactment.

Burden of proof.

37.—(1) Where a defence to a civil claim is raised under section 1(1), 10

7(2) or 10(2) or paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2, it is for the claimant to

prove that the claim was made before the end of the limitation period

applicable to that defence.

(2) Where a defence to a civil claimis raised under any other provision of

this Act, it is for the defendant to prove that the claim was not made 15

before the end of the limitation period applicable to that defence.

Supplemental

Interpretation.

38.—(1) In this Act—

“civil claim” shall be construed in accordance with section 1(4) to

(6), 20

“civil proceedings” shall be construed in accordance with section

1(7),

“claimant” shall be construed in accordance with section 1(7),

“date of knowledge” shall be construed in accordance with sections 2,

6(4) and 14(2), 25

“defendant” shall be construed in accordance with section 1(7),

“enactment” includes an enactment comprised in subordinate

1978 c. 30. legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978),

“land” includes corporeal hereditaments, tithes and rentcharges and

any legal or equitable estate or interest therein, but except as so 30

provided does not include any incorporeal hereditament,

“personal injury” includes any disease and any impairment of a

person’s physical or mental condition,

“personal representative” includes an executor who has not proved

the will (whether or not he has renounced probate), but not 35

anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in

relation to settled land,

“rent” includes a rentcharge and a rent service,

“rentcharge” means any annuity or periodical sum of money charged

upon or payable out of land, except a rent service or interest on a 40

mortgage on land,

“settled land”, “statutory owner” and “tenant for life” have the same

1925. c. 18. meaning as in the Settled Land Act 1925,

Limitation

PART IV “starting date” shall be construed in accordance with sections 3, 13

and 14,

“successor”, in relation to a person in whom a cause of action is

vested or against whom a cause of action subsists, means his

5 personal representatives or any other person on whom his rights

or, as the case may be, liabilities in relation to the cause of

action devolve (whether on death or bankruptcy or the

disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate

or interest in settled property or otherwise),

10 “trust” and “trustee” have the same meaning as in the Trustee Act 1925 c. 19.

1925.

(2) Subject to subsection (3)—

(a) a person shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as claiming

through another person if he became entitled by, through, under

15 or by the act of that other person to the right claimed, and

(b) any person whose estate or interest might have been barred by a

person entitled to an entailed interest in possession shall be

treated for the purposes of this Act as claiming through the

person so entitled.

20 (3) A person becoming entitled to any estate or interest by virtue of a

special power of appointment shall not be treated for the purposes of this

Act as claiming through the appointor.

(4) Any reference in this Act to a right of action to recover land shall

include a reference to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the

25 case of rentcharges and tithes, to distrain for arrears of rent or tithe; and

any reference in this Act to the making of a civil claim to recover land

shall include a reference to the making of such an entry or distress.

(5) Any reference in this Act to the possession of land shall, in the case of

tithes and rentcharges, be construed as a reference to the receipt of the

30 tithe or rent; and any reference in this Act to the date of dispossession or

discontinuance of possession of land shall, in the case of rentcharges, be

construed as a reference to the date of the last receipt of rent.

(6) In the provisions of this Act relating to civil claims to recover land,

any reference to the Crown includes a reference to the Duke of Cornwall.

35 (7) For the purposes of this Act a cause of action upon a judgment

shall be treated as accruing on the date on which the judgment became

enforceable.

39.—(1) Schedule 3 (minor and consequential amendments) has effect. Amendments and

repeals.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the repeals set out in Schedule 4 have

40 effect.

(3) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Limitation Act 1980, 1980 c. 58.

section 38(2) to (6) of that Act shall continue to have effect for the

purposes of section 3(4) of the Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954. 1954 c. 58.

40.—(1) This Act comes into force at the end of the period of one year Commencement.

45 beginning with the day on which it is passed.

Limitation

PART IV (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act has

effect in relation to causes of action accruing and things taking place

before, as well as in relation to causes of action accruing and things

taking place after, the commencement of this Act.

(3) Nothing in this Act— 5

(a) enables any civil claim to be made which was barred by the

1980 c. 58. Limitation Act 1980 or any other enactment before the

commencement of this Act,

(b) applies to any civil claim made in civil proceedings which were

commenced before the commencement of this Act or the title to 10

any property which is the subject of any such claim, or

executed as a deed where the contract was made before the

commencement of this Act.

(4) Where— 15

(a) a cause of action has accrued before the commencement of this

Act, and

(b) no provision was made by any enactment passed or made before

the passing of this Act, or by any rule of equity, for a limitation

period to apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action, 20

any limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil claim in

respect of the cause of action shall, if it would otherwise end earlier, be

treated as ending at the end of the period of six years beginning with the

day on which this Act comes into force.

(5) Where— 25

(a) the starting date in relation to a cause of action falls before the

commencement of this Act, and

(b) provision was made by any enactment passed or made before the

passing of this Act, or by any rule of equity, for a limitation

period to apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action, 30

any limitation period under this Act which applies to a civil claim in

respect of the cause of action shall, if it would otherwise end earlier, be

treated as ending at the end of the limitation period which would have

applied to the claim if this Act had not been passed.

(6) In determining for the purposes of subsection (5) the limitation 35

period which would have applied if this Act had not been passed—

(a) section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 (concealment) shall

be disregarded, and

(b) section 32(1)(a) or (c) of that Act (fraud and mistake) shall not

operate to extend the end of any limitation period under that Act 40

beyond the end of the period of six years beginning with the day

on which this Act comes into force.

(7) In determining for the purposes of this section whether a civil

claim is barred by the Limitation Act 1980 or any other enactment,

section 32A or 33 of that Act or any other enactment enabling a 45

limitation period to be overridden shall be disregarded.

(8) For the purposes of this section, a right to a payment under section

1979 c. 17. 1(1) of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 shall be treated as a

Limitation

PART IV cause of action and a claim for such a payment shall be treated as a civil

claim in respect of the cause of action.

41.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Limitation Act 2001. Citation and

extent.

(2) This Act extends to England and Wales only.

Limitation

S C H E D U L E S

Section 17. SCHEDULE 1

ACCRUAL OF RIGHTS OF ACTION TO RECOVER LAND

Right not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession

1.—(1) No right of action to recover land shall be treated as accruing unless the 5

land is in the possession of some person in whose favour a limitation period

under section 16 can run (referred to in this paragraph as “adverse possession”).

(2) Where under the following provisions of this Schedule—

(a) a right of action to recover land is treated as accruing on a certain date, and

(b) no person is in adverse possession on that date, 10

the right of action shall not be treated as accruing unless and until adverse

possession is taken of the land.

(3) Where—

(a) a right of action to recover land has accrued, and

(b) after its accrual, but before the right of action is barred, the land ceases to 15

be in adverse possession,

the right of action shall no longer be treated as having accrued and no fresh

right of action shall be treated as accruing unless and until the land is again

taken into adverse possession.

(4) Where— 20

(a) a right of action to recover land has accrued, and

(b) after its accrual, but before the right of action is barred, there is a

change of person in adverse possession of the land,

the right of action shall no longer be treated as having accrued and a fresh right of

action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of the change. 25

(5) Sub-paragraph (4) does not apply—

(a) if any person in adverse possession of the land before the change

continues to be in adverse possession of the land after the change, or

(b) where a person’s period of adverse possession of the land is followed by,

and is continuous with, a period of adverse possession of the land by a 30

person who claims through him.

(6) Where a person’s period of adverse possession of land is interrupted by a

period of adverse possession of the land by another person which comes

between, and is continuous with, his own periods of adverse possession, subparagraph

(4) shall not apply— 35

(a) when his period of adverse possession of the land is interrupted, or

(b) when his period of adverse possession of the land is resumed.

(7) For the purposes of this paragraph—

(a) possession of any land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the

person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be 40

treated as adverse possession of the rentcharge, and

(b) receipt of rent under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming to be

entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the

determination of the lease shall be treated as adverse possession of the

land. 45

(8) For the purpose of determining whether a person occupying any land is in

adverse possession of the land it shall not be assumed by implication of lawthat his

occupationis bypermissionof the person entitled to the land merely by virtue of the

Limitation

SCH. 1 fact that his occupation is not inconsistent with that person’s present or future

enjoyment of the land.

(9) Sub-paragraph (8) shall not be taken as prejudicing a finding to the effect

that a person’s occupation of any land is by implied permission of the person

5 entitled to the land in any casewhere such a finding is justified on the actual facts of

the case.

Accrual of right in case of present interests in land

2. Where the person making a civil claim to recover land, or some person

through whom he claims—

10 (a) has been in possession of the land, and

(b) has while entitled to the land been dispossessed or discontinued his

possession,

the right of action to recover the land shall be treated as having accrued on the date

of the dispossession or discontinuance.

15 3. Where—

(a) a person makes a civil claim to recover any land of a deceased person

(whether under a will or on intestacy),

(b) the deceased person was on the date of his death in possession of the

land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect

20 upon his death, in possession of the land charged, and

possession of it,

the right of action to recover the land shall be treated as having accrued on the date

of his death.

25 4. Where—

(a) a person makes a civil claim to recover an estate or interest in land in

possession which was assured otherwise than by will to him, or to

some person through whom he claims,

(b) the person making the assurance was on the date on which the

30 assurance took effect in possession of the land or, in the case of a

rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land

charged, and

the right of action to recover the land shall be treated as having accrued on the date

35 on which the assurance took effect.

Accrual of right in case of future interests

5. Where—

(a) the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or

remainder or any other future estate or interest, and

40 (b) no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or

interest claimed,

the right of action to recover the land shall be treated as having accrued on the date

on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the

preceding estate or interest.

45 6.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2), a tenancy from year to year or other

period, without a lease in writing, shall for the purposes of this Act be treated as

being determined at the end of the first year or other period; and accordingly the

right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be

treated as having accrued on the date on which in accordance with this sub-

50 paragraph the tenancy is determined.

Limitation

SCH. 1 (2) Where any rent has subsequently been received in respect of the tenancy, the

right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of the last receipt of

rent.

7.—(1) Where—

(a) a person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by 5

which a rent of not less than ten pounds a year is reserved,

(b) the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to

the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of

the lease, and

the right of action to recover the land of the person rightfully so entitled shall be

treated as having accrued on the date on which the rent was first received by the

person wrongfully claiming to be so entitled and not on the date of the

determination of the lease.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply to any lease granted by the Crown. 15

Accrual of right in case of forfeiture or breach of condition

8.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2), a right of action to recover land by

virtue ofa forfeiture or breach of condition shall be treated as having accrued on the

date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken.

(2) If— 20

(a) a right of action to recover land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of

condition has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest in

reversion or remainder, and

(b) the land was not recovered by virtue of that right,

the right of action to recover the land shall not be treated as having accrued to that 25

person until his estate or interest fell into possession.

Possession of beneficiary not adverse to others interested in settled land or

land held subject to a trust of land

9. Where any settled land or land subject to a trust of land is in the

possession of a person— 30

(a) who is entitled to a beneficial interest in the land, and

(b) who is not solely or absolutely entitled to the land,

no right of action to recover the land shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as

accruing during that possession to any person in whom the land is vested as

tenant for life, statutory owner or trustee or to any other person entitled to a 35

beneficial interest in the land.

Section 23. SCHEDULE 2

APPLICATION OF SECTION 1(1) IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY

PART I

COMPANIES AND INSOLVENT PARTNERSHIPS 40

Administrator

1.—(1) The limitation period under section 1(1) shall not run against a

company or insolvent partnership in which a cause of action is vested during any

period in which there is an administrator of the company or partnership.

(2) An administrator of a company or insolvent partnership shall not be 45

regarded as a qualifying individual for the purposes of section 5.

Limitation

SCH. 2 (3) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to a period in which there is an

administrator includes a reference to a period in which there is a temporary

vacancy in the office of administrator.

(4) Any reference in this paragraph to an administrator includes a reference to a

5 person performing functions under the laws of a country outside Great Britain

equivalent to those of an administrator.

Administrative receiver

2.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2), the limitation period under section 1(1)

shall not run against a company or insolvent partnership in which a cause of

10 actionis vestedduringanyperiod inwhich there is an administrative receiver of the

company or partnership.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply to a cause of action which subsists

against an administrative receiver.

(3) An administrative receiver of a company or insolvent partnership shall

15 not be regarded as a qualifying individual for the purposes of section 5.

(4) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to a period in which there is an

administrative receiver includes a reference to a period in which there is a

temporary vacancy in the office of administrative receiver.

(5) Any reference in this paragraph to an administrative receiver includes a

20 reference to a person performing functions under the laws of a country outside

Great Britain equivalent to those of an administrative receiver.

Winding up

3.—(1) This paragraph applies in the case of a cause of action vested in a

company or insolvent partnership which is being wound up.

25 (2) Where the limitation period under section 1(1) has begun to run, but has not

ended, before the date on which a liquidator of the company or partnership is first

appointed, it shall be suspended for the period of one year beginning with the

date of that appointment.

(3) Where the limitation period under section 1(1) has not begun to run

30 before the date on which a liquidator of the company or partnership is first

appointed, it shall be treated as running from the later of—

(a) the first anniversary of the date of that appointment, and

(b) the date of knowledge of the liquidator (or, where there are two or

more liquidators, the earliest date of knowledge of any of them).

35 (4) Any reference in this paragraph to a company includes a reference to an

unregistered company.

(5) Any reference in this paragraph to a liquidator includes a reference to a

person performing functions under the laws of a country outside Great Britain

equivalent to those of a liquidator.

40 Civil claims under section 213, 214, 238, 239 or 423 of 1986 Act

4.—(1) In its application to a civil claimby a liquidator under section 213 or 214

of the 1986 Act (fraudulent trading and wrongful trading), the limitation period

under section 1(1) of this Act shall be treated as running from the later of—

(a) the first anniversary of the date onwhich a liquidator is first appointed, and

45 (b) the date of knowledge of the liquidator (or, where there are two or

more liquidators, the earliest date of knowledge of any of them).

(2) In its application to a civil claim by an administrator or liquidator under

section 238, 239 or 423 of the 1986 Act (transactions at an undervalue,

Limitation

SCH. 2 preferences and transactions defrauding creditors), the limitation period under

section 1(1) of this Act shall be treated as running from the later of—

(a) the first anniversary of the date on which an administrator or (as the

case may be) liquidator is first appointed, and

(b) the date of knowledge of the administrator or (as the case may be) 5

liquidator (or, where there are two or more administrators or

liquidators, the earliest date of knowledge of any of them).

Interpretation of Part I

5.—(1) In this Part—

“administrator” means a person appointed as administrator, special 10

administrator or special railway administrator under any provision of

the 1986 Act,

“administrative receiver” has the meaning given by section 251 of the 1986

Act,

1985 c. 6. “company” means a company as defined in section 735 of the Companies 15

Act 1985 or a foreign company,

“foreign company” means a company incorporated outside Great Britain,

“insolvent partnership” includes an insolvent partnership under the laws of a

country outside England and Wales,

“liquidator” means a persons appointed as liquidator or provisional 20

liquidator under any provision of the 1986 Act,

1986 c. 45. “the 1986 Act” means the Insolvency Act 1986,

“unregistered company” means an unregistered company as defined in

section 220 of the 1986 Act.

(2) Any reference in this Part to a person being appointed as a liquidator 25

includes a reference—

(a) to a person becoming liquidator by virtue of a nomination, and

(b) to the official receiver becoming liquidator by virtue of section 136 of the

1986 Act.

PART II 30

INDIVIDUALS

Bankruptcy

6.—(1) This paragraph applieswhere a cause of action has become vested in the

trustee of a bankrupt’s estate.

(2) It is a defence to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action made by the 35

trustee that the bankruptcy order was made after the end of the limitation

periodunder section1(1)whichwould have applied to a civil claimin respect of the

cause of action made by the bankrupt.

(3) If the bankruptcy order was made after the limitation period mentioned in

sub-paragraph (2) has begun to run but before it has ended, that limitation 40

period shall apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action made by the

trustee but it shall be suspendedfor the period of one year beginningwith the date of

the bankruptcy order.

(4) If the bankruptcy order was made before the limitation period mentioned in

sub-paragraph (2) has begun to run, the limitation period under section 1(1) 45

which is to apply to a civil claim in respect of the cause of action made by the

trustee shall be treated as running from the later of—

(a) the first anniversary of that date, and

Limitation

SCH. 2 (b) the date of knowledge of the trustee (or, where there are two or more

trustees, the earliest date of knowledge of any of them).

(5) This paragraph shall apply in relation to an individual who is subject to the

insolvency laws of a country outside than England and Wales as it applies in

5 relation to a bankrupt.

(6) In relation to such an individual—

(a) any reference in this paragraph to the trustee of a bankrupt’s estate is a

reference to a person performing functions under those laws which

are equivalent to those of a trustee of a bankrupt’s estate, and

10 (b) any reference in this paragraph to the making of bankruptcy order is a

reference to the occurrence of any event under those laws which is

equivalent to the making of a bankruptcy order.

Civil claims under section 339, 340, 342A, 343 or 423 of 1986 Act

7.—(1) The provisions to which this paragraph applies are—

15 (a) section 339 of the 1986 Act (transactions at an undervalue),

(b) section 340 of that Act (preferences),

(d) section 343 of that Act (extortionate credit transactions), and

(e) section 423 of that Act (transactions defrauding creditors).

20 (2) In its application to a civil claim by the trustee of a bankrupt’s estate

under a provision to which this paragraph applies, the limitation period under

section 1(1) of this Act shall be treated as running from the later of—

(a) the first anniversary of the date of the bankruptcy order, and

(b) the date of knowledge of the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate (or, where

25 there are two or more trustees, the earliest date of knowledge of any of

them).

Interpretation of Part II

8.—(1) In this Part “the 1986 Act” means the Insolvency Act 1986. 1986 c. 45.

(2) Expressions which are used in this Part and the 1986 Act shall have the

30 same meaning in this Part as they have in the 1986 Act.

SCHEDULE 3 Section 39.

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Law of Property Act 1925 (c. 20)

1. In section 205 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (general definitions), in

35 subsection (1)(xii) for “the Real Property Limitation Acts 1833, 1837 and

1874” substitute “the Limitation Act 2001 and any other enactments (whenever

passed) limiting the time within which proceedings may be taken”.

Land Registration Act 1925 (c. 21)

2. In section 3 of the Land Registration Act 1925 (interpretation), in

40 paragraph (xii) for “the Real Property Limitation Acts 1833, 1837 and 1874,

and any Acts amending those Acts” substitute “the Limitation Act 2001 and any

other enactments (whenever passed) limiting the time within which proceedings

may be taken”.

3. In section 83 of that Act (indemnity for errors or omissions in the

45 register), omit subsection (12).

Limitation

SCH. 3 Administration of Estates Act 1925 (c. 23)

4. In section 21A of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (debtor who

becomes creditor’s executor by representation or administrator to account for

debt to estate), in subsection (2) for “the Limitation Act 1939” substitute “the

Limitation Act 2001, or any other enactment (whenever passed) limiting the 5

time within which proceedings may be taken,”.

Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 (c. 16)

5.—(1) In section 2 of the Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945

(interpretation), in subsection (1), in the definition of “statute of limitation”, for

“the Limitation Act 1980” substitute “the Limitation Act 2001”. 10

(2) After that subsection insert—

“(1A) The reference in section 1(1) of this Act to the period prescribed by

any statute of limitation includes a reference to an agreed limitation

period under section 31 of the Limitation Act 2001.”

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (c. 28) 15

6.—(1) In section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945

(apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence), in subsection

(5) for “the Limitation Act 1939” substitute “the Limitation Act 2001”.

(2) After that subsection insert—

“(5A) The reference in subsection (5) of this section to a person 20

pleading the Limitation Act 2001 includes a reference to a person

pleading the expiry of an agreed limitation period under section 31 of that

Act.”

Agriculture Act 1967 (c. 22)

7. In Schedule 3 to the Agriculture Act 1967 (conditions applying to 25

amalgamated agricultural units), in paragraph 7(6) for “the Limitation Act

1980” substitute “the Limitation Act 2001”.

Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 (c. 10)

8. In Schedule 3 to the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 (claims for

compensation by owners and contributories), for paragraph 6(2) substitute— 30

“(2) In relation to England and Wales, Part III of the Limitation Act

2001 shall apply to the limitation period under sub-paragraph (1) above as it

applies to the limitation period under section 1(2) of that Act.”

Law of Property Act 1969 (c. 59)

9. In section 25 of the Law of Property Act 1969 (compensation in certain 35

cases for loss due to undisclosed land charges), omit subsection (5).

Animals Act 1971 (c. 22)

10. In section 10 of the Animals Act 1971 (application of certain enactments to

liability under sections 2 to 4), for “the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)

Act 1945 and the Limitation Act 1980” substitute “and the Law Reform 40

(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945”.

Limitation

SCH. 3 Defective Premises Act 1972 (c. 35)

11. In section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (duty to build dwellings

properly), in subsection (5) for the words from“for the purposes” to “accrued” (in

the first place where it occurs) substitute “for the purposes of the Limitation Act

5 2001 to have accrued”.

Land Compensation Act 1973 (c. 26)

12. Insection19of the Land CompensationAct 1973 (interpretation of Part I), in

subsection (2A) for “the Limitation Act 1939, a person’s right” substitute “the

Limitation Act 2001, a cause”.

10 13. In section 32 of that Act (supplementary provisions about home loss

payments), in subsection (7A) for “the Limitation Act 1939 a person’s right”

substitute “the Limitation Act 2001 a cause”.

14.—(1) Section 36 of that Act (supplementary provisions about farm loss

payments) is amended as follows.

15 (2) In subsection (1) for the words from “Subject to subsection (7)” to

“complied with” substitute “No farm loss payment shall be made except on a

claim in that behalf made by the person entitled thereto”.

(3) For subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) Where a person entitled to a farm loss payment dies without

20 having claimed it, a claim to that payment may be made by his personal

representatives.

(3A) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, a cause of action to

recover a farmloss payment shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on

which the requirement in section 34(1)(b) above is complied with.”

25 (4) In subsection (6) for “mentioned in subsection (1) above” substitute “on

which the requirement in section 34(1)(b) above is complied with”.

(5) Subsection (7) is omitted.

Control of Pollution Act 1974 (c. 40)

15. In section 88 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (civil liability for

30 contravention of section 3(3)), omit subsection (4)(c).

Local Land Charges Act 1975 (c. 76)

16. In section 10 of the Local Land Charges Act 1975 (compensation for

non-registration or defective official search certificate), omit subsection (7).

Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (c. 30)

35 17. In section 1 of the Fatal AccidentsAct 1976 (right of action for wrongful act

causing death), in subsection (1) for “and recover” substitute “for”.

Rent Act 1977 (c. 42)

18. In section 57 of the Rent Act 1977 (recovery from landlord of sums paid in

excess of recoverable rent etc), in subsection (3) for paragraphs (a) and (b)

40 substitute “any limitation period under the Limitation Act 2001 which would

apply to a civil claim to recover that amount”.

19. In section 94 of that Act (recovery from landlord of sums paid in excess of

recoverable rent etc), in subsection (3) for “2 years from the date of payment”

substitute “any limitation period under the Limitation Act 2001 which would

45 apply to a civil claim to recover that amount”.

Limitation

SCH. 3 Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 (c. 17)

20.—(1) Section 3 of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979

(determination of claims) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1) omit paragraph (c).

(3) After that subsection insert— 5

“(1A)Aclaimmay not be made after the time limit which would apply to

the claim if it were a civil claim under the Limitation Act 2001 for

damages in respect of personal injury which was made by the disabled

person or, as the case may be, his personal representatives against the

Secretary of State. 10

(1B) In its application for the purposes of subsection (1A), the

Limitation Act 2001 shall have effect—

(a) as if section 12 were omitted,

(b) as if the reference in section 28 to the starting date were a

reference to the date of the vaccination to which the claim 15

relates,

cause of action were references to the date of the vaccination to

which the claim relates, and

(d) with such other modifications as may be appropriate.” 20

Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Act 1982 (c. 37)

21. In section 8 of the Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Act 1982

(time for bringing legal proceedings), for subsection (2) substitute—

“(2) In England and Wales the following provisions of the Limitation

Act 2001 apply to the limitation period prescribed by subsection (1) as 25

they apply to any limitation period under that Act—

(a) section 25 (certain new claims),

(b) section 26 (concealment),

(d) section 29 (disability).” 30

Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (c. 16)

22. In section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (application of

foreign limitation law), in subsection (3) omit the words “and, accordingly”

onwards.

Latent Damage Act 1986 (c. 37) 35

23.—(1) Section 3 of the Latent Damage Act 1986 (accrual of cause of

action to successive owners in respect of latent damage to property) is amended as

follows.

(2) For paragraph (b) of subsection (1) substitute—

“(b) another person acquires an interest in that property after the date on 40

which the original cause of action accrued but before the

earliest date of knowledge (within the meaning of the

Limitation Act 2001) in relation to that cause of action of any

person who has any interest in the property on that date of

knowledge;”. 45

(3) For subsection (2) substitute—

“(2)A cause of action accruing to any person by virtue of subsection (1)

above shall be treated as if based on breach of a duty of care at common law

owed to the person to whom it accrues.

Limitation

SCH. 3 (2A) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, the starting date in

relation to a cause of action accruing to any person by virtue of

subsection (1) above shall be treated as falling on the same date as the

starting date in relation to the original cause of action.”

5 (4) Subsections (3), (5) and (6) are omitted.

Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c. 43)

24. In section 5 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (damage giving rise to

liability) for subsections (5) to (7) substitute—

“(5) In determining for the purposes of this Part who has suffered any

10 loss or damage to property and when any such loss or damage occurred, the

loss or damage shall be regarded as having occurred on the earliest time at

which a person with an interest in the property had knowledge that the

loss or damage was significant.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above, a person has knowledge

15 that the loss or damage is significant—

(a) if he has knowledge of the full extent of the loss or damage, or

(b) if a reasonable person with his knowledge of the extent of the

loss or damage would think that a civil claimwas worth making in

respect of the loss or damage against a defendant who did not

20 dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

(7) Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act 2001 shall apply for the

purposes of subsections (5) and(6) above as theyapplyfor the purposes of that

Act.”

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c. 48)

25 25. In section 99 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (order for

delivery up), in subsection (2) for the words from “An application” to “no

order” substitute “No order under this section.”

26.—(1) Section 113 of that Act (period after which remedy of delivery up not

available) is amended as follows.

30 (2) For subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, the right to apply for an

order under section 99 (order for delivery up in civil proceedings) shall be

treated as accruing on the date on which the infringing copy or article in

question was made.”

35 (3) Subsections (2) and (3) are omitted.

27. In section 195 of that Act (order for delivery up), in subsection (2) for the

words from “An application” to “no order” substitute “No order under this

section.”

28.—(1) Section 203 of that Act (period after which remedy of delivery up not

40 available) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, the right to apply for an

order under section 195 (order for delivery up in civil proceedings) shall be

treated as accruing on the date on which the illicit recording in question

45 was made.”

(3) Subsections (2) and (3) are omitted.

Limitation

SCH. 3 29.—(1) Section 230 of that Act (order for delivery up) is amended as

follows.

(2) In subsection (2), for the words from “An application” to “no order”

substitute “No order under this section”.

(3) For subsection (3) substitute— 5

“(3) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, the right to apply for an

order under this section shall be treated as accruing on the date on which the

article or thing was made.”

(4) Subsections (4) and (5) are omitted.

Environmental Protection Act 1990 (c. 43) 10

30. In section 73 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (appeals and

other provisions relating to legal proceedings and civil liability), omit

subsection (9)(c).

Water Industry Act 1991 (c. 56)

31. In section 209 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (civil liability of 15

undertakers for escapes ofwater etc), in subsection (4) for “the Fatal AccidentsAct

1976 and the Limitation Act 1980” substitute “and the Fatal Accidents Act

1976”.

Water Resources Act 1991 (c. 57)

32. In section 208 of the Water Resources Act 1991 (civil liability of the 20

Agency for escapes of water etc), in subsection (4) for “the Fatal Accidents Act

1976 and the Limitation Act 1980” substitute “and the Fatal Accidents Act

1976”.

Coal Industry Act 1994 (c. 21)

33. In section 10 of the Coal Industry Act 1994 (protection for certain 25

interests in coal and coal mines), for subsection (2)(a) substitute—

“(a) under sections 15 or 17 of the Limitation Act 1980 or sections 16 to

18 of the Limitation Act 2001 (time limits on proceedings to

recover land and extinction of titles); or”.

Trade Marks Act 1994 (c. 26) 30

34. In section 16 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (order for delivery up of

infringing goods, materials or articles), in subsection (2) for the words from

“An application” to “no order” substitute “No order under this section”.

35.—(1) Section 18 of that Act (period after which remedy of delivery up not

available) is amended as follows. 35

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 2001, the right to apply for an

order under section 16 (order for delivery up of infringing goods, material or

articles) shall be treated as accruing—

(a) in the case of infringing goods, on the date on which the trade 40

mark was applied to the goods or their packaging,

(b) in the case of infringing material, on the date on which the trade

mark was applied to the material, or

made.” 45

Limitation

SCH. 3 (3) Subsections (2) and (3) are omitted.

Arbitration Act 1996 (c. 23)

36. In section 13 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (application of Limitation

Acts), in subsection (4)(a) for “the Limitation Act 1980” substitute “the

5 Limitation Act 2001”.

SCHEDULE 4 Section 39.

REPEALS

Chapter Short title Extent of repeal

1925 c. 21. The Land Registration Act Section 83(12).

10 1925.

1969 c. 59. The Law of Property Act Section 25(5).

1969.

1973 c. 26. The Land Compensation Section 36(7).

Act 1973.

15 1974 c. 40. The Control of Pollution In section 88(4), paragraph

Act 1974. (c) and the word “and”

immediately preceding it.

1975 c. 76. The Local Land Charges Section 10(7).

Act 1975.

20 1979 c. 17. The Vaccine Damage In section 3(1), paragraph (c)

Payments Act 1979. and the word “and”

immediately preceding it.

1980 c. 58. The Limitation Act 1980. The whole Act, except for

sections 40(1) and 41(1)

25 and (4) and paragraph 2 of

Schedule 2.

1981 c. 66. The Compulsory Purchase Section 10(3).

(Vesting Declarations)

Act 1981.

30 1983 c. 20. The Mental Health Act In Schedule 4, paragraph 55.

1983.

1984 c. 16. The Foreign Limitation In section 1(3), the words

Periods Act 1984. “and, accordingly”

onwards.

35 1986 c. 37. The Latent Damage Act Sections 1 and 2.

1986. Section 3(3), (5) and (6).

Section 4(1) and (2).

1987 c. 43. The Consumer Protection In section 6(6), the words

Act 1987. “the Limitation Act 1980

40 and”.

In Schedule 1, Part I.

1988 c. 48. The Copyright, Designs Section 113(2) and (3).

and Patents Act 1988. Section 203(2) and (3).

Section 230(4) and (5).

45 1990 c. 43. The Environmental In section 73(9), paragraph

Protection Act 1990. (c) and the word “and”

immediately preceding it.

1994 c. 26. The Trade Marks Act Section 18(2) and (3).

1994.

Limitation

SCH. 4

Chapter Short title Extent of repeal

1996 c. 31. The Defamation Act 1996. Section 5.

1997 c. 40. The Protection from Section 6.

Harassment Act 1997.

1999 c. 31. The Contracts (Rights of Section 7(3). 5

Third Parties) Act

1999.

2000 c. 14. The Care Standards Act In Schedule 4, paragraph 8.

2000.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

This Bill introduces a new limitation regime in place of that enacted in the Limitation Act 1980.

Under the new regime, claims will be subject to two limitation periods, a primary limitation

period, of three years, running from the date on which the claimant knows, or ought to know of

the relevant facts, and a long-stop limitation period, of ten years, running from either the accrual

of the cause of action or the date of the act or omission which gives rise to the claim. A claim

may be barred by the expiry of the long-stop limitation period even where the primary limitation

period has not started running.

Clause 1

This clause provides for the two limitation defences which are at the heart of the core limitation

regime we recommend.

Subsection (1) implements the primary limitation period: it is a defence that the claimant failed

to issue proceedings within three years of the date of his or her knowledge. The ‘date of

knowledge’ is defined in clause 2.

Subsection (2) implements the long-stop limitation period: it is a defence that the claimant

failed to issue proceedings within ten years of the starting date of the claim. This applies

whether or not the primary limitation period has begun to run. The ‘starting date’ is defined in

clause 3.

Subsection (3) provides that both the primary limitation period and the long stop limitation

period are subject to the modifications made in the rest of the Bill.

Subsections (4) and (5) define the claims which will be subject to the provisions of the Bill.

Purely administrative claims, such as an application for the appointment of a new trustee, or an

application by a trustee for directions as to the exercise of his functions under the Settled Land

Act, for example, will be excluded.

Subsection (6) ensures that where the claimant relies on more than one cause of action in

bringing a claim, a separate limitation period will apply to each cause of action. It may therefore

be the case that the defendant has a defence in respect of only one of the claims brought by the

claimant.

Clause 2

This clause defines the date of knowledge, the point at which the primary limitation period starts

to run under clause 1(1). (See paragraphs 3.5 - 3.44 of the Report).

Subsection (1) sets out the facts which the claimant needs to know in relation to the claim.

Where the claimant (or any other relevant person) has suffered loss, damage or injury, or the

defendant (or any other relevant person) has received a benefit, these facts include the fact that

the injury, loss, damage or benefit is “significant”.

Subsection (2) ensures that whether the claimant knows that the facts give rise to a legal claim is

irrelevant. This will prevent the claimant who knows all the facts pleading ignorance of the law

to extend the primary limitation period. This does not apply to claims which come within

subsections (3) and (4).

Subsection (3) applies where the claim arises from the defendant’s failure to give correct advice

as to the law. It ensures, for the avoidance of doubt, that the fact that the advice in question was

incorrect is considered to be one of the facts which give rise to the cause of action which the

claimant needs to know under subsection (1) before the primary limitation period starts to run

against him or her.

Subsection (4) applies where the claimant claims restitution based on a mistake of law. It

ensures (again for the avoidance of doubt) that the fact that a mistake of law has been made is

treated as one of the facts giving rise to the cause of action which the claimant needs to know

under subsection (1) before the primary limitation period starts to run against him or her.

Subsection (5) defines what is meant by “significant”, for the purpose of subsection (1), using a

similar formula to that employed in section 11A(7) of the Limitation Act 1980 (“the 1980 Act”)

in relation to claims for negligence not involving personal injuries. To ensure that the start of the

primary limitation period is not delayed where the loss suffered by the claimant is trivial (so that

it can never be considered to be ‘significant’ under this test) the claimant is also considered to

know that the loss, injury, damage or benefit is significant if he or she knows the full extent of his

or her loss, or the benefit to the defendant.

Clause 3

This clause defines the starting date, the point at which the long-stop limitation period under

clause 1(2) starts to run. See paragraphs 3.108 to 3.113 of the Report.

Subsection (1) sets out the general rule that the long-stop limitation period starts to run on the

date on which the cause of action accrues.

Subsection (2) provides for an exception to this general rule for claims in tort where the claimant

must prove loss or damage for the claim to succeed, and for claims for breach of statutory duty.

In these cases the starting date will be the date on which the act or omission giving rise to the

claim takes place, not the date on which the claimant suffers loss.

Subsection (3) clarifies the operation of subsection (2) where the claimant has a single cause of

action which is founded on more than one act or omission. In this case, the starting date is the

date of the last such act or omission. For example, the claimant may seek relief under section

459 of the Companies Act 1985 on the grounds that he has been unfairly prejudiced by the

conduct of the defendants. The conduct relied on in support of the claim may be a series of

actions none of which are sufficient, considered individually, to amount to unfair prejudice, but

which collectively do give the claimant grounds on which to base a petition. If it is only the

happening of the last event which gives the claimant sufficient grounds to make a claim, it is the

date of that event which decides the starting date.

Subsection (4) preserves the effect of section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, which

determines when a cause of action under that Act accrues, and therefore what the starting date

will be for claims under that Act.

Clause 4

This clause defines the circumstances in which the claimant will be deemed to have constructive

knowledge of the facts so that the primary limitation period will start running against him or her.

See paragraphs 3.45 to 3.62 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides that the claimant’s constructive knowledge will depend first on those

facts which the claimant can reasonably be expected to observe or ascertain for himself or

herself. No account will be taken of any facts that the claimant could have discovered only with

the assistance of an appropriate expert unless the claimant (a) has failed to consult any expert,

and (b) was acting unreasonably in not consulting an expert. Where the claimant has consulted

an expert, the claimant will not be fixed with knowledge of any facts which the expert either

failed to find out, or failed to communicate to the claimant (unless the expert was also an agent

of the claimant in which case facts which the expert knew but failed to communicate may be

imputed to the claimant under subsection (3)).

Subsection (2) ensures that the circumstances and abilities of the claimant will be taken into

account in determining what he or she could reasonably be expected to do.

Subsection (3) describes the circumstances in which the claimant will be considered to have

knowledge of any facts known to his or her agent.

Subsection (4) defines the circumstances in which an agent will be considered to have the

necessary authority for knowledge to be imputed to the claimant for the purposes of subsection

(3).

Clause 5

This clause defines the circumstances in which an organisation such as a company will be

considered to have knowledge for the purposes of the ‘date of knowledge’. See paragraphs 3.63

to 3.80 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides two ways in which an organisation will be treated as having the relevant

knowledge. The knowledge (both actual and constructive) of ‘qualifying individuals’ will be

treated as the knowledge of the organisation. In addition, the actual knowledge of its agents will

be relevant under subsection 4(3).

Subsection (2) lists the organisations which are subject to the rules in this clause.

Subsections (3) and (6) identify those individuals whose knowledge is to be taken into account

in determining the date of knowledge for an organisation which is subject to this clause.

Subsection (4) ensures that the organisation will not be fixed with knowledge which is possessed

only by an individual who is a defendant to the claim, or who has dishonestly concealed

information from the organisation.

Subsection (5) applies the test in clause 4(4) for “authority” to subsection (3) and the general

test for ‘dishonest concealment’, set out in clause 26(6) of the Bill to subsection (4).

Clause 6

This clause explains how the primary limitation period will apply where there are two or more

claimants who are jointly, or jointly and severally, entitled to the remedy sought (see paragraphs

3.81 to 3.91 of the Report). Under subsection (1), each claimant is to be considered

individually. Thus, there may be a defence against one of the claimants, but not against the

others.

Subsection (2) clarifies the fact that if the defendant can show that one claimant is time-barred

this will not prevent the other claimants from succeeding in their claim against the defendant,

and from recovering the full amount of the claim from the defendant. Only when the primary

limitation period as expired as against all of the joint claimants will the defendant have a

complete defence.

Subsection (3) provides for an exception to this rule where the claimants are partners (where the

date of knowledge is to be determined in accordance with clause 5, as described above), or

trustees or personal representatives.

Subsection (4) provides that the primary limitation period will start running against all the

trustees (or personal representatives) from the earliest date on which any one of them has the

relevant knowledge.

Clause 7

This clause explains how the primary limitation period will apply where the cause of action on

which the claim is founded has been assigned to the claimant, ensuring that time starts running

against the claimant from the first date on which someone had both the right to make a claim,

and the knowledge of the relevant facts. See paragraphs 3.92 to 3.94 of the Report.

Subsection (1) sets out the circumstances in which the clause applies.

Subsection (2) applies where the primary limitation period in respect of a claim by a person in

whom the cause of action was vested before the assignment has ended before the date of the

assignment. It ensures that the defendant does not lose that defence because the cause of action

has been assigned to a new claimant.

Subsection (3) applies where the primary limitation period has started to run in relation to a

claim by a person in whom the cause of action was vested before the assignment, but has not

ended before the date of the assignment. That limitation period will also apply to a claim by the

claimant to whom the cause of action has been assigned. This ensures that the assignment will

not extend the primary limitation period for the benefit of the new claimant.

Subsection (4) applies where the primary limitation period has not started to run in relation to

any claim by a person in whom the cause of action was previously vested before the assignment

of the cause of action. It ensures that where the new claimant knew the relevant facts before the

cause of action was assigned to him that knowledge will not be taken into account to start the

primary limitation period until the date of the assignment.

Subsection (5) explains what is meant by “assigns a cause of action”.

Subsection (6) ensures that where anyone in whom the cause of action was previously vested

acquired the knowledge of the relevant facts required for the “date of knowledge” only after he or

she had assigned the cause of action to another person, no primary limitation period is to be

treated as running from that date for the purposes of subsection (2). The defence under

subsection (2) will therefore only arise if a prior assignor of the cause of action had both the

relevant knowledge and the right to bring the claim at the same time. Equally the limitation

period can only be considered to have begun to run for the purposes of subsection (3) if

someone in whom the cause of action was vested before the assignee had both the relevant

knowledge and the right to bring an action at the same time.

Clause 8

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in relation to claims brought under the

Consumer Protection Act 1987, to ensure that the Bill complies with the terms of the Product

Liability Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985. See paragraphs 4.34 to 4.37 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides that the long-stop limitation period does not apply to such a claim.

Subsection (2) provides that no claim may be brought more than ten years after the relevant

time. This is defined in the Consumer Protection Act section 4 as the date on which the

defective product is supplied by the producer of the product (or anyone holding himself out as

the producer of the product), or by the person who imported the product into a Member State of

the European Union. This ten year period replaces the long-stop limitation period provided for

in subsection 1(2).

Subsection (3) provides that once this ten year period has expired, the rights of the claimant are

extinguished.

Subsection (4) ensures that neither the ten year period or its effect on the claimant’s rights can

be modified whether under another provision of the Act or otherwise.

Clause 9

This clause ensures that the long-stop limitation period does not apply to any personal injuries

claim, including claims brought under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 in

respect of personal injuries to the deceased, and claims under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.

This exception only applies to claims for damages for personal injuries. Where the claimant

brings a claim for another remedy (such as damages for property damage), the long-stop

limitation period will apply to that claim. See paragraphs 3.102 to 3.107.

Clause 10

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in its application to claims brought by virtue of

the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. See paragraphs 4.10 to 4.15 of the

Report.

Subsection (2) ensures that the defendant will not lose the benefit of a limitations defence which

would have been available if a claim had been brought by the deceased before his or her death.

Subsection (3) ensures that the primary limitation period will not start to run against the

personal representatives before the death of the deceased, even if they had the relevant

knowledge before that date. It starts from the later of the date of the death and the date on

which the personal representatives themselves had the relevant knowledge.

Clause 11

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in its application to claims under the Fatal

Accidents Act 1976. See paragraphs 4.16 to 4.22 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides a defence where the deceased would not have been able to bring a claim

at his or her death.

Subsection (2) provides that the start of the primary limitation period is determined by reference

to the knowledge of the dependant for whose benefit the claim is made. Where there is more

than one dependant, each will be treated as though he or she has a separate claim.

Subsection (3) provides, in consequence, that the primary limitation period may have expired

against one dependant, but not the others. As a result, that dependant will not be able to recover

anything in respect of his or her claim, but this will not prevent the other dependants receiving

their full entitlement.

Subsection (4) defines the circumstances in which the deceased would be considered to be

unable to bring a claim at his death (as, for example, where the deceased had entered into a

compromise with the defendants in “full and final settlement” of his claims). Under subsection

(5) the deceased will not be considered to have been capable of bringing a claim if the primary

limitation period had expired, even though a defence to that claim might be disapplied under

clause 12 of this Act.

Clause 12

This clause gives the court a discretion to disapply the three year primary limitation period

applying to claims in respect of personal injuries claims and claims under the Fatal Accidents

Act 1976 (under clause 9, no long-stop limitation period applies to these claims). See

paragraphs 3.160 to 3.169 of the Report.

Subsection (2) sets out the test for the exercise of the discretion. The court may not exercise its

discretion in favour of the claimant unless it is satisfied that it would be unjust not to allow the

claim to proceed, and this will in practice only apply if the hardship which would be suffered by

the claimant (if the claim were rejected) would exceed the hardship suffered by the defendant (if

the claim were to be allowed to proceed).

Subsection (3) sets out the factors which the court must take into account in exercising its

discretion.

These factors are modified by subsections (4) to (6) in respect of claims under the Law Reform

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 to take account not only

of the actions and knowledge of the claimant, but of the deceased and (in the case of a Fatal

Accidents Act claim) any person for whose benefit the claim is made.

No claim exists under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 where the deceased is not able to maintain

a claim at the date of death. Subsection (7) preserves the Fatal Accidents Act claim where,

though a defence would have existed against a claim by the deceased, the court has exercised its

discretion under this clause in favour of the claimant.

Subsection (8) defines ‘personal injury claim’ for the purpose of this clause.

Clause 13

This clause defines the starting date for the long-stop limitation period in relation to claims for a

contribution under section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. (See paragraphs 4.80

to 4.83 of the Report). It re-enacts the provisions of section 10(2) to (4) of the 1980 Act.

Under subsection (2), where there has been a judgment or arbitration award against the claimant

the long-stop limitation period will start on the date of that judgement or award.

Subsection (3) ensures that a judgment on appeal which merely raises or lowers the amount of

the damages awarded will be irrelevant to the starting date.

Subsection (4) defines the starting date where the claimant claims a contribution in relation to a

claim which has been settled by reference to the date on which the claimant agreed the amount

to be paid under the settlement.

Clause 14

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in relation to claims for conversion. See

paragraphs 4.47 to 4.67 of the Report.

Subsection (1) only applies where there has not been a theft from the claimant. It provides that

where there has been any further conversion of the same goods, the starting date for the longstop

limitation period shall be the date of the first conversion - the long-stop limitation period

will not start to run again each time there is a fresh conversion. This preserves the rule in section

3(1) of the Limitation Act 1980.

Subsection (2) applies where the goods which are the subject of the claim have been stolen from

the claimant. It modifies the definition of the date of knowledge by providing that the primary

limitation period will not start to run until the claimant knows (or ought to know) of the location

of the goods, in addition to the other relevant facts. It also provides that the long-stop limitation

period under clause 1(2) will not apply.

However, subsection (3) provides for an exception where stolen goods have been purchased for

value by a purchaser acting in good faith. In this case, the long-stop limitation period will run

from the date on which the goods were purchased in good faith.

Subsection (4) provides that the claimant’s title to the goods which are the subject of the claim

will be extinguished if the long-stop limitation period under clause 1(2) expires before he or she

has either brought a claim or recovered possession of the goods. This prevents the anomaly of

the claimant being regarded as the owner of the goods in question even though he or she is

unable to bring any claim to recover them, and ensures that the claimant cannot, for example,

exercise any self-help remedies.

Subsection (5) defines the circumstances in which a conversion will be considered to be ‘related

to a theft’ for the purposes of this clause.

Clause 15

This clause provides for the application of the core limitation regime to claims related to

mortgages. It also provides mortgagees with protection equivalent to that given by the

Limitation Act 1980. See paragraphs 4.158 to 4.196 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides that the Act does not apply to a civil claim to redeem a mortgage. No

limitation period will apply to such a claim (in contrast to section 16 of the Limitation Act 1980

which subjects claims to redeem land to a limitation period of 12 years).

Subsection (2) provides that the primary limitation period will not apply to mortgage related

claims where the mortgaged property is land (just as claims to recover land are not subject to the

primary limitation period, but only to an equivalent of the long-stop limitation period).

‘Mortgage related claims’ for this purpose means claims for a remedy under the mortgage or

secured by the mortgage (that is, claims for payment of moneys secured by the mortgage,

including claims on the mortgagor’s covenant to repay the mortgagee, claims for sale of the

mortgaged property, foreclosure, possession of the property or its reconveyance). The only

limitation period applying to such claims will be the long-stop limitation period of ten years.

Subsection (3) provides a mortgagee who holds a second (or subsequent) mortgage with

protection equivalent to that now given under section 20(6) of the Limitation Act 1980. Where

the prior mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property at the date on which the

limitation period applying to a claim by the second mortgagee expires (or at any time during the

year before the expiry of the limitation period), that limitation period will be extended so that it

cannot end earlier than the date one year after the prior mortgagee ceased to be in possession of

the property.

Subsection (4) ensures that the limitation period will not run against the mortgagee where the

property which has been mortgaged is not a present interest. It re-enacts section 20(3) of the

Limitation Act 1980.

Subsection (5) suspends the limitation period for foreclosure claims where the mortgagee is in

possession of the property concerned, providing equivalent protection to section 20(2) of the

1980 Act.

Subsection (6) extinguishes the rights of the mortgagee in the property once the long-stop

limitation period applying to his claim has ended.

Clause 16

This clause, with clauses 17 and 18, makes provision for claims to recover land (see paragraphs

4.126 to 4.150 of the Report). In practice, if the recommendations in Land Registration for the

Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document, Law Com No 254 (1998) are enacted this

provision will only apply to claims to recover unregistered land, and in respect of unregistrable

interests in registered land.

Subsection (1) provides that the primary and long-stop limitation periods do not apply to claims

to recover land.

Subsection (2) subjects claims to recover land to a limitation period of ten years, and defines the

date on which that limitation period will start to run. In contrast to other claims, where, under

clause 1, a defence will arise after the end of the limitation period, subsection (2) provides that

no claim shall be brought after the end of the limitation period. This reflects the fact that the

expiry of the limitation period will extinguish the claimant’s title to the land.

Subsection (3) extends the limitation period applying by the Crown to claims to recover

foreshore to sixty years. Subsection (4) ensures that the Crown benefits from this protection for

claims to recover land which was once, but is no longer, foreshore for ten years from the date on

which the land ceased to be foreshore.

Subsection (5) re-enacts section 15(4) of the 1980 Act, ensuring that a transfer of the land which

is made after a cause of action to recover the land has accrued to the transferor (or anyone

previously entitled to the land) will not extend the limitation period applying to a claim to that

land by the person to whom it is transferred.

Subsection (6) re-enacts section 15(5) of the 1980 Act. It ensures that the claimant entitled to

both a present and a future interest in land who has allowed the limitation period to expire

without bringing a claim cannot benefit from the extended protection given to future interests

unless someone else holds an intermediate estate in the land before the claimant’s future interest

falls into possession.

Clause 17

This clause contains a number of supplementary provisions relating to claims to recover land.

Subsection (2) re-enacts the first part of subsection 18(1) of the 1980 Act. It provides that

claims in relation to equitable interests in land should be treated in the same way as claims to a

legal estate in land.

Subsection (3) re-enacts the second part of subsection 18(1). It provides that the rules which

determine when the cause of action accrues in relation to a legal estate in land should therefore

apply similarly to equitable estates in land.

Subsection (4) re-enacts section 26 of the 1980 Act. It ensures that where a claim to recover

land which forms part of a deceased’s estate accrues on or after the date of death, the limitation

period will start to run against the administrator from the date of accrual, whether or not letters

of administration have been granted at that date.

Subsection (5) is a new provision. It ensures that the priest in charge or sequestrators of a

benefice have the capacity to bring a claim to recover land on behalf of a spiritual corporation

sole when no-one else is able to act because the freehold is in abeyance.

Clause 18

This clause provides for the consequences of the expiry of the limitation period in relation to a

claim to recover land.

Subsection (1) provides for the extinction of the claimant’s title to the land after the expiry of

the limitation period.

Subsections (2) and (3) re-enact section 18(2) and (3) of the 1980 Act. They ensure that the

estate of a tenant for life or statutory owner of settled land (in subsection (2)) or of trustees (in

subsection (3)) will not be extinguished until there is no-one entitled to a beneficial interest in

that land with a right of action which has not accrued or has not been barred by the expiry of the

limitation period, even if the limitation period for a claim by the tenant for life or statutory

owner or trustees themselves has expired.

Subsection (4) re-enacts section 18(4) of the 1980 Act. It ensures that, even if the limitation

period applying to a claim made by a trustee or statutory owner of land on their own behalf has

expired, the trustee or statutory owner may bring a claim to recover land on behalf of anyone

entitled to a beneficial interest in the land where the limitation period applying to a claim by

that person has not expired.

Clause 19

This clause provides that the primary limitation period will not apply to a claim to recover the

proceeds of a sale of land (see paragraph 4.151 of the Report). Such claims are treated as being

equivalent to a claim to recover the land in question, and in consequence, only the long-stop

limitation period will apply.

Clause 20

The Acts listed in subsection (1) apply a separate limitation period to claims under the

appropriate provisions, running in each case from the date on which claimants should have had

notice of certain facts (see paragraph 4.286 of the Report). To ensure that these claims are

brought under the core limitation regime (and in particular the ‘knowledge’ provisions of that

regime, which are set out in Part I of the Bill) these limitation provisions are repealed in

Schedule 3 to this Bill (see paragraphs 3, 9, and 16). Subsection (1) ensures that the long-stop

limitation period does not apply to any of the claims.

Subsection (2) ensures that the claimant seeking compensation under section 10 of the Local

Land Charges Act will not be regarded as having sufficient knowledge to trigger the primary

limitation period only because he or she would be regarded as having notice of any of the facts

relevant to the date of knowledge under section 198 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

Clause 21

This clause provides for the consequences of making a defective disentailing assurance - that is,

an assurance which attempts, but fails, to bar an entailed interest. It re-enacts section 27 and

29(2)(b) of the 1980 Act.

Clause 22

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in its application to certain trusts and charitiesrelated

claims. See paragraphs 4.94 to 4.119 of the Report.

Subsection (1) protects the beneficiary who only has a future interest in trust property by

ensuring that no limitation period can run until his or her interest becomes an interest in

possession.

Subsection (2) protects the beneficiary under a bare trust. In the absence of this provision, the

cause of action for a claim to recover the trust property would accrue once the trustee holds the

property on trust for the beneficiary absolutely, which may be when the trust was set up, since

the beneficiary may claim the property as from that date. This sub-clause postpones the accrual

of the cause of action until there has been a breach of trust (where for example the trustee

refuses the transfer the property to the beneficiary on request).

Subsection (3) ensures that no limitation period will apply to a claim made by the Attorney

General or the Charity Commissioners of England and Wales in relation to a charity.

Subsection (4) ensures that where the limitation period for a claim by one beneficiary has

expired, he or she will not be able to benefit from a successful claim made by another beneficiary

of the trust.

Clause 24

This clause modifies the core regime in its application to derivative claims where a member of a

company, for example, claims a remedy on behalf of the company. See paragraphs 4.205 to

4.210 of the Report.

Subsection (1) ensures that only the knowledge of the member bringing the claim is considered

in order to determine when the primary limitation period started to run in respect of that claim.

No account will be taken of the date on which the company itself or any other member acquired

knowledge of the relevant facts.

Subsection (2) and (3) ensure that where two or more members bring a claim together on behalf

of the company or trade union, each is to considered to have a separate claim for the purpose of

the limitations Bill. Therefore, if the primary limitation period has expired, but only against one,

no defence may be raised against the other member.

Clause 25

This clause modifies the core limitation regime in its application to some ‘new claims’: that is

claims made after the start of proceedings by one of the parties to those proceedings. It also

preserves the court’s power to make rules in relation to those claims. See paragraphs 5.5 to 5.19

of the Report.

Subsection (1) applies to the first claim made by the defendant (or a third party) to the original

proceedings (whether the claim is made by counter claim or by set off). It ensures that if the

claim would have been made in time if it had been made at the start of the proceedings, no

limitation defence may be raised against it even if either the primary limitation period or the

long-stop limitation period has since expired.

Subsection (2) applies to new claims which seek to change the cause of action in issue in

existing proceedings. Provided that the existing claim was made in time (that is before the end of

any relevant limitation period), and that the new claim arises out of the same conduct,

transaction or events as the existing claim, no limitation defence may be raised against the new

claim.

Subsection (3) applies to new claims which add or substitute a party to the existing proceedings.

Provided that the existing claim was made in time and the change to the existing parties is

necessary to decide the existing claim, no limitation defence may be raised against the new

claim.

Subsection (4) explains when such a change to the existing parties is necessary to decide the

existing claim.

Subsections (5) and (6) re-enact section 35(7) of the 1980 Act. Subsection (5) gives the court

the power to provide that a party may claim relief in a new capacity in a new cause of action

even though that party had no title to make that claim at the start of the proceedings.

Subsection (6) preserves the power of the court to allow a party to claim relief in a new capacity

in other circumstances.

Clause 26

This clause extends the limitation period where facts relevant to the cause of action have been

dishonestly concealed from the person with a right to bring a claim founded on that cause of

action. See paragraphs 3.134 to 3.145 of the Report.

Subsection (1) defines the circumstances in which the clause applies: the facts must be

concealed from a person who at the time of the concealment had the right to bring the claim

(whether the claimant or a predecessor in title of the claimant) or from their agent. Similarly, the

facts must be concealed by a person who was liable to the claim at the time of the concealment.

The clause will not apply unless the concealment was dishonest. This is a far more stringent test

than applies under section 32 of the 1980 Act. It is intended to overturn the interpretation of

‘deliberate concealment’ given in Brocklesby v Armitage & Guest.1

Subsection (2) provides that dishonest concealment will suspend the long-stop limitation period

and the limitation period applying to claims to recover land from the date on which the fact was

concealed until the date on which it comes to the notice of the claimant. This suspension will

apply to any claim made by the person from whom the facts were concealed, or by any person

whose right to make a claim against the defendant derives from him. This clarifies the position

which applied under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, which did not expressly extend this

protection to any claimant claiming through the person from whom the facts were originally

concealed. In contrast, section 32 of the 1980 Act did provide that concealment by any person

through whom the defendant claims is sufficient to extend time as against the defendant. Subclause

(2) retains this provision. This may be relevant where the defendant asserts a competing

claim to property claimed by the claimant, and the person from whom the defendant derived the

claim has been guilty of dishonest concealment from the claimant or his predecessor (as in Eddis

v Chicester Constable).2

The primary limitation period will not be affected, since this will only run from the date of

knowledge.

Subsection (3) ensures that a purchaser of property which has a latent defect can rely on any

concealment by the defendant from the seller of that property to extend the long-stop limitation

period which would apply to the purchaser’s own claim against that defendant.

Subsection (4) ensures that our provisions on dishonest concealment are effective to suspend

the long-stop limitation period where the concealment takes place between the starting date and

the accrual of the cause of action if the starting date occurs before the accrual of the cause of

action.

1 [2001] 1 All ER 172.

2 [1969] 2 Ch 345.

Subsection (5) re-enacts subsection 32(3) of the 1980 Act, ensuring that the long-stop limitation

period applying to a claim against an innocent purchaser (that is, one who has not therefore

contributed to the concealment of the facts in any way, or been aware that any facts have been

concealed) will not be extended by virtue of clause 26.

Subsection (6) defines ‘concealment’ for the purpose of this clause.

Subsection (7) provides that the date on which the claimant discovers the concealed fact is to be

determined by the same rules which apply to the ‘date of knowledge’ which starts the primary

limitation period.

Subsection (8) ensures that the suspension of the limitation period will only end if a person has

the right to bring a claim at the same time as he or she acquires the relevant knowledge. If

someone only acquires the relevant knowledge after the cause of action ceased to be vested in

him or her, that person’s knowledge will not be sufficient to start time running again in respect of

the claim.

Clause 27

This clause extends the limitation period where a defendant to the claim has acknowledged the

claimant’s rights by a written acknowledgment or a part payment. See paragraphs 3.146 to 3.155

of the Report.

Subsection (1) sets out the conditions which must be satisfied if an acknowledgment is to be

effective to extend the limitation period. First the acknowledgment or payment must be made by

a person liable to the claim at the time the acknowledgment or payment is made. Secondly, it

must be made to a person with a right to bring the claim. Thirdly, it must be made when a

limitation period is running against the potential claimant. If these conditions are met, the

limitation period concerned (which may be either the primary limitation period or the long-stop

limitation period or both) will start again from the date on which the acknowledgment or part

payment is made.

Subsection (2) applies where there are two or more joint, or joint and several, defendants to the

claim. It provides that an acknowledgment or part-payment made by one of them will only

extend the limitation period against the acknowledgor and his or her successors, and not the

other defendants. However, although the other defendants will be able to raise a defence against

a claim by the claimant, if the claimant succeeds against the defendant acknowledging the claim,

that defendant may claim a contribution from his or her co-defendants.

Subsection (3) applies where there are two or more joint, or joint and several, claimants. It

provides that where an acknowledgment or part-payment is made to one (but not all) of them,

the limitation period is only extended as regards the person to whom the acknowledgment or

payment is made and his or her successors, rather than the other claimants. However, should the

claimant to whom an acknowledgment is made be successful as against the defendants, his or

her co-claimants may be able to recover their share from that claimant by a claim in restitution.

Subsection (4) provides for an exception to the rule set out in subsections (2) and (3) where the

joint claimants (or defendants) are trustees or personal representatives. In this case, an

acknowledgment or part payment made by (or to) one will extend the limitation period against

(or for the benefit of, as the case may be) all the trustees or personal representatives.

Subsection (5) provides for a further exception to the rule set out in subsection (2) where an

acknowledgment or payment is made by one of a number of people in possession of land or

mortgaged property. This will serve to extend the limitation period against everyone who is in

possession of the property during the ensuing limitation period.

Subsection (6) ensures that a purchaser of defective property who has a new cause of action

under section 3 of the Latent Damage Act 1986 may rely on any acknowledgment or partpayment

given by the defendant to the previous owner of that property to extend the long-stop

limitation period applying to his or her own claim against the defendant.

Subsection (7) ensures that if an acknowledgment or part payment is given after the starting date

of the long-stop limitation period but before the cause of action has accrued (in relation to a

claim where the starting date for the long-stop limitation period is the date of the act or

omission giving rise to the cause of action rather than the date of accrual), that acknowledgment

or part-payment will be effective to restart the long-stop limitation period.

Subsection (8) imposes a requirement that the acknowledgment be made in writing, to minimise

the uncertainty as to whether an acknowledgment has been given. The requirement in the 1980

Act, that any acknowledgment should be signed by the person giving it, is not being re-enacted,

as this unnecessarily limits those documents which may serve as acknowledgments.

Subsection (9) ensures that an acknowledgment made by or to an agent is treated as made by or

to the principal.

Subsection (10) provides that a limitation period may be extended more than once under this

clause.

Subsection (11) defines an ‘acknowledgment’ for the purposes of the clause.

Subsection (12) defines a ‘payment in respect of a cause of action’ for the purposes of the clause.

Subsections (13) and (14) explain the effect of a payment of rent or interest due on the

limitation period. They re-enact section 29(6) of the 1980 Act.

Clause 28

This clause extends any limitation period which applies to a claim by a child, by ensuring that

the limitation period cannot end before the date on which the claimant reaches the age of 21.

See paragraphs 3.115 to 3.121 of the Report.

Clause 29

This clause extends the limitation period when the claimant is under a disability. See paragraphs

3.122 to 3.133 of the Report.

Subsection (1) ensures that the protection given to the disabled claimant applies not only when

the disability existed on the date of accrual of the cause of action, but also (in contrast to the

current law), where the disability only develops after that date.

Subsection (2) suspends the primary limitation period while the claimant is under a disability.

The long-stop limitation period is not affected.

Subsections (3) defines the circumstances in which the protection given to the claimant in a

personal injury claim (which is not subject to a long stop limitation period) will come to an end.

This will be ten years after the later of the accrual of the cause of action or the onset of the

disability if three conditions are satisfied on that date. First, the claimant must still be under a

disability; secondly, the primary limitation period must not have expired at that date, and

thirdly, there must be an adult who is responsible for the claimant at that date, who is not the

defendant to the claim. If these conditions are not met, the protection given to the claimant will

continue.

Subsection (4) ensures that the protection given to the claimant under subsection (2) will come

to an end after ten years if the conditions in subsection (3) are satisfied.

Subsection (5) defines the time at which the primary limitation period will start running against

the claimant under a disability when the conditions in subsection (3) are satisfied. It provides

that the knowledge of the responsible adult may be taken into account to decide whether the

primary limitation period has started running.

Subsection (6) defines ‘disability’ for the purpose of this clause. The test is whether the

claimant’s ability to make decisions is impaired by mental disability, or his or her ability to

communicate is impaired by mental disability or physical impairment. It is intended to include

both those cases where the claimant lacks the capacity to know or understand the relevant facts,

and where the claimant is unable to act on his or her knowledge of the facts.

Subsection (7) defines ‘mental disability’ for the purpose of this clause.

Subsection (8) defines the circumstances in which a person will be considered to be a

‘responsible adult’ for the purposes of this clause.

Clause 30

This clause protects the claimant where he or she is unable to bring proceedings in respect of

the claim. See paragraphs 5.24 to 5.28 of the Report.

Subsection (1) suspends all limitation periods under the Bill where, after the cause of action has

accrued, the claimant is subject to a legal restriction which means that he or she cannot bring a

claim (such as the requirement that a solicitor may not bring a claim on a bill of costs until the

expiry of one month after the delivery of the bill, although the cause of action accrues on

completion of the work).

Subsection (2) defines three situations where the claimant will not be considered to be under

such a restriction, so that subsection (1) will not apply. These are where the claimant is under a

disability (whether minority or adult disability) so that he or she has to act through a litigation

friend; where the claimant would be in breach of contract if he or she issued proceedings; and

where the claimant requires the leave of the court to issue proceedings (unless, in this last case,

the claimant has taken all reasonable measures to obtain the leave required).

Clause 31

This clause gives parties the power to contract out of the core limitation regime by disapplying

any of the provisions of the Act (with certain limited exceptions) and to agree that an alternative

limitation period should govern their disputes. See paragraphs 3.170 to 3.175 of the Report.

Subsection (1) allows parties to make agreements which disapply or change provisions of the Bill

in relation to limitation periods.

Subsection (2) ensures that, as an exception to this general rule, no change may be made to the

provisions of the Bill in relation to claims under the Consumer Protection Act (clause 8),

dishonest concealment (clause 26), minority (clause 28) or other disability (clause 29).

Subsection (3) provides that no agreement within subsection (1) will be valid unless it is

‘reasonable’ as defined by section 11 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1978. Agreements which

are made in settlement of litigation between the parties do not have to satisfy this requirement.

Subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) explain how the provisions of the Bill apply to limitation periods

which have been modified between the parties. Subsection (4) ensures that all the provisions of

the Bill which apply to the primary limitation period under clause 1(1) will apply to any agreed

limitation period which runs from a date dependant on someone’s knowledge. So if the parties

have agreed that a limitation period of five years running from the date on which the claimant

knows the relevant facts should apply to any disputes between them, all the provisions of the Bill

relating to knowledge (including for example constructive knowledge, organisational knowledge,

agency and disability) will apply to that limitation period unless they have been specifically

excluded by the parties.

Similarly, subsection (5) ensures that where the parties have agreed that their disputes should be

subject to a limitation period running from a date determined in any other way (for example, by

reference to a set date or the happening of a particular event such as accrual) that limitation

period will be subject to all of the provisions of the Bill which apply to the long-stop limitation

period. The agreed limitation period will, for example, be subject to the provisions on

acknowledgments and part payments, restrictions on making claims and burden of proof, unless

those provisions are expressly excluded by the parties.

Subsection (6) and (7) explain how the provisions of the Bill in relation to disability are to apply

to an agreed limitation period. Subsection (6) ensures that (subject to subsection (7)), even an

agreed limitation period which runs from some date other than the date of knowledge (such as

the accrual of the cause of action) will also be suspended while the claimant is under a disability.

The equivalent effect is achieved in relation to agreed limitation periods which run from the date

of a person’s knowledge by subsection (4).

Subsection (7) ensures that this suspension does not extend the agreed limitation period more

than ten years after the starting date. Under the standard limitation provisions of the Bill, the

long-stop limitation period overrides the protection given to the claimant under a disability. An

agreed limitation period is treated analogously, so that the claimant under a disability is assured

ten years, but no more than ten years, of protection.

Clause 32

This clause changes the date on which the cause of action accrues in respect of a claim to

recover a debt in relation to certain loans. It adopts the same policy as section 6 of the 1980 Act

(See paragraphs 4.4 to 4.6 of the Report) .

Subsection (1) provides that the cause of action shall accrue on the date on which a demand is

made for repayment of the loan.

Subsection (2) defines the loans to which this applies. It is limited to those cases where the

debtor is not under an obligation to repay the loan on a fixed or determinable date, or on

demand.

Clause 33

This clause ensures that the primary and long-stop limitation periods do not apply to any familyrelated

proceedings. This includes, for example, any matrimonial proceedings, non-contentious

probate applications or proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (among others).

Clause 34

Subsection (1) ensures that no limitation period will apply to a claim for specific performance of

a contract to grant or transfer an interest in property, so that the Bill does not interfere with the

rule that a contract to transfer a legal interest in property is as good as a transfer of that interest

when a party has taken possession of the property in reliance on that interest (See paragraphs

4.269 to 4.273 of the Report). In consequence the court will remain free to make an award of

damages in lieu of specific performance in the event that the claimant’s application for specific

performance is rejected however long after the events giving rise to the claim the claimant’s

application is made.

Subsection (2) preserves the court’s equitable jurisdiction to deny the claimant the relief claimed

because of his or her delay, even if the limitation period applicable to the claim under this Bill

has not expired.

Clause 35

Subsection (1) provides for the application of the Bill to the Crown.

Subsection (2) ensures that claims by the Crown to recover tax or duty (or interest on either) are

not subject to any limitation period. This exemption is limited to claims to recover tax which

has been assessed. The Crown remains bound by the limitation periods in, for example the

Taxes Management Act 1970, with regard to the assessment of tax.

Subsection (3) defines the point at which proceedings are commenced when a claim is made by

petition of right.

Clause 36

This clause ensures that the provisions of the Bill do not affect any claim which is subject to a

limitation period under any other Act or statutory instrument. See paragraphs 4.279 to 4.293 of

the Report.

Clause 37

This clause lays down the burden of proof applying to a claim that a limitation period under the

Bill has expired. See paragraphs 5.29 to 5.32 of the Report.

Subsection (1) provides that the burden of proof in relation to the primary limitation period lies

on the claimant. The same applies both where the primary limitation period applies directly to a

claimant, and in those cases where it is applied indirectly.

Subsection (2) provides that the burden of proof in relation to the long-stop limitation period

lies on the defendant.

Clause 40

This clause provides for the commencement of the Bill. See paragraphs 5.33 to 5.40 of the

Report.

Subsection (1) provides that all provisions of the Bill will come into force twelve months after it

receives Royal Assent.

Subsection (2) provides that the provisions of the Bill apply to all causes of action whether or

not they have already accrued on the date on which the Bill comes into force.

Subsection (3) ensures that the Bill will not enable a claim which has become barred under the

provisions of an earlier enactment to be revived, and that it will not apply to claims where the

claimant has issued proceedings before the Bill came into force.

It also provides that the Bill will not apply to a claim on a contract made before it comes into

force which is treated as a ‘specialty’ under section 8 of the 1980 Act. The claimant will in such

a case therefore continue to benefit from a limitation period of twelve years running from the

date on which the cause of action accrued.

Subsection (4) ensures that a claimant whose claim was not subject to any limitation period

(whether under statute or in equity) before the Bill comes into force will have at least six years

from that date within which to issue proceedings.

Subsection (5) ensures that a claimant whose claim accrued before the Bill comes into force will

not be subject to a shorter limitation period in those cases where the Bill reduces the limitation

period applying to his or her claim, but where the limitation period under the Bill is longer than

that applying under the previous law, the claimant will have the benefit of the longer period.

Subsection (6) ensures that, in deciding whether the claimant’s claim would be subject to a

longer limitation period under the previous law, no account is to be taken of the provisions in

section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act which extend the limitation period where the defendant is

considered to have deliberately concealed any relevant facts from the claimant. Such a limitation

period would only be extended by concealment which satisfies the definition of dishonest

concealment under clause 26 of the Bill.

In addition subsection (6) ensures that in deciding whether the claimant’s claim would be

subject to a longer limitation period under the previous law, section 32(1)(a) and (c) of the 1980

Act shall be treated as extending the limitation period for no longer than six years from the date

on which the Bill comes into force.

Subsection (7) ensures that a civil claim may be considered to be barred for the purposes of

subsection (3) even if court has a discretion under any enactment to disapply the limitation

period applying to the claim in question.

Subsection (8) ensures that the commencement provisions work properly for the amendments to

the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 made in Schedule 3 of the Bill.

SCHEDULE 1

This Schedule lays down the rules which determine when a right of action to recover land

accrues to the claimant, and thus the date on which the limitation period under clause 16 starts

to run against the claimant. It re-enacts the provisions contained in Part I of Schedule 1 to the

1980 Act.

Paragraphs 1(1) and (2) re-enact paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 1(3) re-enacts paragraph 8(2) of the Schedule to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 1(4),(5) and (6) are new provisions, which explain the consequences of a change in

the identity of the person (or persons) in adverse possession. The general rule, given in

paragraph 1(4), is that if the person in adverse possession changes, the adverse possession of the

land is considered to have ended. The claimant is considered to have a new cause of action, and

a new limitation period will therefore start running against him or her from the date on which the

next person took adverse possession of the land.

Paragraph 1(5) provides for an exception to this rule in two situations: first, where more than

one person was in adverse possession of the land and not all of them leave, so that, though there

could be said to have been a ‘change of person in adverse possession’, at least one person

remains in adverse possession before and after the ‘change’; secondly, where the second adverse

possessor claims possession in succession to the first adverse possession (because, for example,

he has ‘bought’ the land from the first adverse possessor)

Paragraph 1(6) provides another exception to the rule where an adverse possessor who has

himself been displaced returns to resume adverse possession of the land in question.

Paragraph 1(7) re-enacts paragraph 8(3) of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraphs 1(8) and 1(9) re-enact paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 2 re-enacts paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 3 re-enacts paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 4 re-enacts paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 5 re-enacts paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 6 re-enacts paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 7 re-enacts paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 8 re-enacts paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

Paragraph 9 re-enacts paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act.

SCHEDULE 2

This Schedule modifies the application of the primary limitation period where the claimant is

subject to insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings.

Part I of the Schedule applies to corporate insolvency proceedings. Paragraph 1 applies to a

company or an insolvent partnership in administration. It suspends the running of the primary

limitation period against a company or partnership whilst it is in administration, and ensures

that the primary limitation period is not started by the administrator attaining the relevant

knowledge about the claim.

Paragraph 1(4) ensures that the same protection applies to a foreign company or partnership or

an English company or partnership which is subject to foreign insolvency proceedings equivalent

to administration if it seeks to bring a claim in this jurisdiction.

Paragraph 2 applies to a company or insolvent partnership in administrative receivership. It

suspends the running of the primary limitation period while the administrative receiver is in

office and ensures that the primary limitation period is not started by the administrative receiver

attaining the relevant knowledge about the claim. Paragraph 2(2) provides that this rule does not

apply where the claim is one by the company or partnership against the administrative receiver.

Paragraph 2(5) ensures that this also applies to a foreign company or partnership or an English

company or partnership which is subject to foreign insolvency proceedings equivalent to

administrative receivership.

Paragraph 3 applies when a company or insolvent partnership is being wound up. Paragraph 3(2)

suspends the primary limitation period for one year after the appointment of a liquidator if the

primary limitation period is already running when the liquidator is appointed. Paragraph 3(3)

ensures that, if the primary limitation period has yet not started when the liquidator is

appointed, it will not start for at least one year after that date. The same protection applies,

under paragraph 3(5) to a foreign company or partnership or an English company or partnership

which is subject to foreign insolvency proceedings equivalent to liquidation.

Paragraph 4 ensures that the primary limitation period for claims by liquidators under sections

213 and 214, and claims by administrators or liquidators under sections 238, 239 and 423 of the

Insolvency Act 1986, will not start for at least one year after an administrator or liquidator is

appointed.

Part II of the Schedule applies to bankruptcy proceedings. Paragraph 6 explains how the

limitations regime will apply to claims which have become vested in a trustee in bankruptcy as a

consequence of the individual’s bankruptcy.

Paragraph 6(2) protects defendants from claims which were already time-barred at the date of

bankruptcy being revived at a later date by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Paragraphs 6(3) suspends the primary limitation period for one year from the date on which the

bankruptcy order is made if it is running at that date. Paragraph 6(4) ensures that, if the primary

limitation period has yet not started on the date of the bankruptcy order, it will not start for at

least one year after that date.

Paragraph 6(5) ensures that the same protection applies for an individual subject to foreign

insolvency laws in relation to a claim in this jurisdiction.

Paragraph 7 ensures that the primary limitation period for claims by the trustee in bankruptcy

under sections 339, 340, 342A, 343 and 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to recover assets for

distribution to the bankrupt’s creditors will not start for at least one year after the bankruptcy

order is made.

SCHEDULE 3

Schedule 3 makes minor amendments to previous statutes to ensure that references to past

Limitation Acts are read as references to the Bill, and to ensure that references which have

become obsolete are deleted. In addition:

Paragraph 3 deletes section 83(12) of the Land Registration Act 1925. This subsection provided

that a claim under section 83 of the 1925 Act for an indemnity for loss resulting from an error or

omission on the Land Register was to be treated, for limitation purposes, as a simple contract

debt (and subject therefore to a limitation period of six years), and that the cause of action was

to be treated as accruing on the date on which the claimant should know of the claim. Instead,

such claims will be subject to the primary limitation period of three years.

Paragraph 5 ensures that the protection given to claimants by section 1 of the Limitation

(Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 applies not only to limitation periods set down in statute

but also to limitation periods which have been agreed between the parties.

Paragraph 6 ensures that section 1(5) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945

applies both to defendants relying on the expiry of a limitation period set down in statute and

defendants who rely on the expiry of a limitation period agreed between the parties.

Paragraph 9 deletes section 25(5) of the Law of Property Act 1969. This subsection provided

that a claim by a purchaser under section 25 of the 1969 Act for compensation for loss caused

by undisclosed land charges, was to be treated, for limitation purposes, as accruing when the

charge came to the notice of the purchaser. Instead these claims will be subject to the primary

limitation period.

Paragraph 11 amends section 1(5) of the Defective Premises Act 1972 so that reference is made

to the Bill. The amended provision preserves the date of accrual provided for in that section for

the purposes of determining the start of the long-stop limitation period under the Bill.

Paragraph 14 deletes section 36(7) of the Land Compensation Act 1973, a transitional provision

relating to farm loss payments, and makes amendments consequent upon that deletion. This

paragraph also clarifies that the cause of action to recover such a payment is deemed for the

purposes of the Bill to accrue on the date on which the right to receive the payment arises. Such

claims will be subject to the core limitations regime.

Paragraph 16 deletes section 10(7) of the Local Land Charges Act 1975. This section provided

that a claim for compensation for non-registration of a land charge (or the production of a

defective official certificate) should be subject to a limitation period of 6 years running from the

date on which the claimant should have notice of the facts. Instead the claim will be subject to

the primary limitation period under the core limitations regime.

Paragraphs 18 and 19 replace the time limits laid down in sections 57 and 94 of the Rent Act

1977, with the limitation periods provides for under the Bill, to ensure that the core limitations

regime applies to claims under these sections.

Paragraph 20 applies the core regime, with some modifications, to claims under the Vaccine

Damage Payments Act 1979. A claim under the 1979 Act will be treated as a personal injury

claim and therefore subject to the primary limitation period (but not the long-stop limitation

period).

Paragraph 23 re-enacts the present provisions of the Latent Damage Act 1986 in relation to the

accrual of a cause of action to a successive owner of property with latent damage. This will

ensure that a new cause of action accrues to the owner of property which has latent damage

which occurred before he or she acquired the property, but only became known after that date.

The claim by the successive owner is then subject to the core regime, although the ‘starting

date’ for the long-stop limitation period remains the same as in the original owner’s action. This

paragraph also deletes the provisions relating to knowledge in sections 3(5) and (6) of the Latent

Damage Act so that the general rules as to knowledge in the Bill apply.

Paragraph 24 amends subsections 5(5) to 5(7) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 so that the

time when loss or damage to property giving rise to liability under the Act occurred is

determined in accordance with the time the person with an interest in that property would be

considered to know that the loss or damage is significant in accordance with the tests laid down

in the Bill. It also ensures that the provisions of the Bill in relation to constructive and corporate

knowledge apply in such a case.

Paragraphs 25 to 29 remove the six year time limits imposed in sections 113, 203 and 230 of the

bringing these claims within the core regime. In addition, paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 also ensure

that the date on which the cause of action is deemed to accrue for these claims is the same as

the date on which the old time limits started to run.

Paragraph 35 removes the six year time limit in section 18 of the Trade Marks Act 1994, so

bringing claims for the delivery up under section 16 of the 1994 Act within the core regime, and

ensures that the date on which the cause of action is deemed to accrue for these claims is the

same as the date on which the old time limits started to run.

The Law Commission

APPENDIX A

Draft
Limitation Bill

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	The Law Commission
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Law Commission >> Limitation of Actions Appendix A [2001] EWLC 270(APPENDIX A) (09 July 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/other/EWLC/2001/270(APPENDIX_A).html Cite as: [2001] EWLC 270(APPENDIX A)

The Law Commission

APPENDIX A Draft Limitation Bill

APPENDIX A

Draft
Limitation Bill