BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
Independent Newspapers Marketing Ltd /Retailers [1997] IECA 482 (15th April, 1997)
COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
Competition
Authority Decision of 15 April 1997 relating to a proceeding under Section 4 of
the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No CA/375-376/92E and CA/1139/92EX - Independent Newspapers Marketing Ltd /
Retailers (agencies)
Decision
No. 482
Price
£3.00
(£3.70 incl. postage)
Notification
nos. CA/375, 376/92E and CA/1139/92EX - Independent Newspapers Marketing Ltd /
Retailers (agencies).
Decision
No.
482
Introduction
1. This
notification concerns three standard distribution agreements between
Independent Newspapers Marketing Ltd. (INML) and newspaper retailers which was
notified to the Authority on 30 September, 1992. The first agreement applied
to new retail outlets, the second to existing retail outlets and the third
applied in the case of transfer of ownership of outlets. The notification
requested a certificate under
Section 4 (4) of the
Competition Act, 1991 or, in
the event of a refusal by the Competition Authority to issue a certificate, a
licence under
Section 4 (2). A Statement of Objections was issued on 19
December 1996 to the notifying party indicating the Authority’s intention
to refuse to issue a certificate or grant a licence in respect of the notified
agreements and an oral hearing was held on 19 March 1997.
The
Facts
(a)
The Subject of the Notifications
2. The
notification concerns standard agreements for the supply and distribution of
newspapers - The Irish Independent, Evening Herald and the Sunday Independent -
to newsagents throughout the State by the publisher. The agreement set out
various requirements for the supply of the newspapers to the retail outlets
around the country such as opening hours, premises, credit-rating, location,
home delivery, price and no-resale.
(b)
The Parties involved
3. INML
is a part of The Independent Newspapers plc (INP) Group of companies and
distributes the publications published by Independent Newspapers (Ireland)
Limited. The other parties to this agreement are the retailers who sell the
newspapers.
(c)
The Products and the Market
4. The
products involved are daily newspapers. There are four domestically produced
national daily newspaper titles on sale in the State (The Irish Times, Irish
Independent, The Cork Examiner and The Star), two domestically produced evening
titles (Evening Herald and The Evening Echo) and four domestically produced
Sunday titles (The Sunday Business Post, The Sunday Independent, The Sunday
Tribune and The Sunday World). In addition eleven UK national daily newspapers
and nine UK Sunday titles are distributed and sold throughout the State. The
Authority stated in its interim report on the newspaper industry that there
were several distinct newspaper markets in the State.
[1]
The arrangements relate to the Irish Independent, Evening Herald and Sunday
Independent. In the case of daily newspapers the Authority concluded that
there was a distinct Irish quality daily newspaper market which is the market
in which the Irish Independent competes. The arrangements also affect the
evening newspaper market and the market for quality Irish Sunday newspaper
titles.
5. Table
1 indicates that total daily sales of Irish national newspapers between January
and June 1996 were just under 399,000. The Irish Independent is the largest
selling daily newspaper with average daily sales of 157,393 in the first half
of 1996, equivalent to 39% of the market. The Star is a tabloid newspaper
which is 50% owned by Independent Newspapers and it had daily sales amounting
to 85, 973 in the first six months of 1996. It is not covered by the
arrangements and is not part of the relevant market. Sales of The Cork
Examiner Group are largely confined to the Munster region. According to the
National Newspapers of Ireland (NNI) sales for all UK daily newspapers in
Ireland amounted to 27% of all daily paper sales in 1995.
Table
1: Irish Daily Newspaper Sales in Jan-Jun 1996
Title
|
Number
|
Percentage
|
Irish
Independent
|
157,393
|
39.44%
|
Irish
Times
|
101,223
|
25.37%
|
The
Star
|
85,973
|
21.55%
|
Cork
Examiner
|
54,406
|
13.64%
|
TOTAL
|
398,995
|
100.00%
|
Source:
ABC
6. There
are only two evening newspapers, the Evening Herald and the Evening Echo.
Sales of the Evening Echo are confined mainly to the Cork area. The Evening
Herald is the only evening newspaper in other parts of the country.
7. Table
2 gives the breakdown of the sales of Irish Sunday Newspapers in 1994. The
Sunday Independent accounted for almost 256,000 or 35.2% of sales of Irish
Sunday newspapers, while the Sunday World accounted for 28.3%. The latter
title is owned by Independent Newspapers but it competes in the tabloid end of
the market with UK imports. It is not covered by the notified arrangements and
is not part of the relevant market. The Sunday Press which accounted for 21.5%
of Irish newspaper sales has not been published since May 1995. The Sunday
Tribune is partly owned by Independent Newspaper but is not subject to the
notified arrangements. There are also nine Sunday titles imported from the UK,
with sales in September 1994 of 416,000 according to the NNI.
Table
2 : Sales of Irish Sunday Newspapers in Jan-June 1996.
Title
|
Number
|
Percentage
|
S.
Independent
|
336,849
|
49.1%
|
S.
World
|
233,364
|
34.0%
|
S.
Tribune
|
79,180
|
11.5%
|
S.
Business Post
|
37,074
|
5.4%
|
Total:
|
686,467
|
100.0%
|
Source:
ABC
The
Distribution System
8. The
distribution system for newspapers and magazines in Ireland was described in
detail in the 1979 report by the Restrictive Practices Commission.
[2]
Essentially, the actual system of distribution has not changed a great deal
since that date. Irish national newspapers are primarily distributed by the
publishers, acting as their own wholesalers, to a large number of retail
outlets. Time is an essential factor in the publishing and distribution of
newspapers, and since they are generally considered to be a highly perishable
product with a short shelf life, they have to be distributed quickly and
frequently to many outlets throughout the country.
9. There
are differences in the methods of delivery of newspapers between Dublin and the
rest of the country and between the morning, evening and Sunday papers. Each
newspaper publisher is responsible for its own despatch operation. In the
Dublin area each newspaper carries out its own delivery service to retail
outlets, with the exception of city centre news vendors who are supplied by
"shoppers" who take bulk copies of newspapers and resell to the vendors.
Deliveries outside Dublin involve parcels of newspapers being transported by
train and by trucks to certain focal points throughout the country and
thereafter transferred to buses, district mail vans, postmen, private
contractors, local hauliers or special delivery agents. Independent Newspapers
uses its own wholesale distributor (Newspread) for newspapers in a few
locations (Cork, Enniscorthy and Donegal). The Examiner is mainly delivered in
its own vans with a small proportion of deliveries being transported by mail
vans, bus and local trains.
10. There
are approximately 6,000 outlets in the country which sell the three Irish
Independent titles which are the subject of the notified arrangements. Some of
these sell them on the basis of the arrangements for new outlets (CA/375/92E
and CA/376/92E) which only came into effect in April 1991. The remainder of
the 6,000 outlets sell the newspapers on the basis of the older agreement
(CA/1139/92EX). The multiple supermarkets have also commenced selling
newspapers in their outlets with Dunnes Stores selling newspapers in 45 of
their branches and Quinnsworths selling newspapers in 36 of their branches.
Newspaper
prices
11. It
appears that newspapers are almost always sold at the stated cover price which
is printed on the masthead. In its Interim Report on the Newspaper Industry
the Authority noted that there was a remarkable similarity in the timing of
price changes of three of the Irish daily newspapers papers over a period ten
years. The Irish Times and the Independent had repeatedly increased prices on
the same day and by the same amount while constantly maintaining a price
differential of 5p between them. Following publication of the Report the price
of the Irish Independent was unilaterally increased by 5p. The Report also
noted that Independent Newspapers ran a campaign, in October 1994, whereby
copies of the Saturday edition of the Irish Independent were effectively sold
at 30p in certain retail outlets in South Dublin City for two successive
Saturdays.
[3]
In addition Independent Newspaper introduced a direct delivery service in
parts of North County Dublin in 1994. A feature of the service was that
consumers were offered the copies of the Independent Newspaper titles for less
than the cover price. Discounts are also given to students.
(f)
The Agreement
12. INML
notified three separate agreements to the Authority. One agreement was for a
new agency, one for an existing agency and the third one was a transfer of
agency agreement. The application form for the new agency agreement requires
details of the proprietor such as the name of the business and/or company,
whether the premises was owned, leased or rented and whether the proprietor
owned or rented his own home, hours of business and the nature of the business.
The newsagent was asked why a newsagency was considered necessary in the area
and the distance of the premises from the nearest existing newsagency. The
application also required the applicant to give details of the newspapers,
magazines and paperbacks currently sold by the business and the sources of
supply in each case. The agent was also requested to state if there had been
any new development in the area such as a new housing estate, shopping centre
or new factories or offices. The application form for the transfer of an agency
agreement requests similar details as well as the name, address and account
number of the previous agent. This form also states that the application for
the transfer of an newsagency would not be considered unless the previous
agent's account had been cleared in full and it stated too that the transfer
was at the absolute discretion of the company and no reasons would be given for
a refusal.
13. The
terms and conditions of business were the same on the two new application
forms. The terms and conditions for the existing agents was similar to the new
agents except that some clauses were not included. The new newsagent was now
required to complete a bankers reference before the application would be
considered. The new agent was also obliged to lodge a sum of money with the
company as a security for payment of account. If the proprietor of the
newsagency was a limited company, a personal guarantee had to be signed by each
of the directors. Clause (d) required that the account must be paid by weekly
variable direct debit, payment in full was due on receipt of statement for new
agents only (clause (e)) and non-payment or part payment of the account when
due resulted in a discontinuation of supplies, and could lead to the
termination of the agreement for new agents (clause (f)). Where supplies were
stopped for non-payment of supplies, the company required the cash value of two
months business as well as the amount owed before supplies would be resumed
(clause (g)). Under clause (i) of the terms and conditions credit for unsold
copies to a maximum of 5% was permitted except in certain cases where the
company could specify a minimum supply with no allowance for unsold copies.
Clause (j) specified that the publication must be sold at the cover price only
and could not be sold to a third-party for resale, except with the prior
consent in writing of the company, and where a newsagent (appointed after April
1991) became aware of another newsagent re-selling supplies to a third party,
he was obliged to notify the company in writing immediately. Clause (k)
restricts the sale of the publications to the premises of the applicant only.
The retail price of the company's supplies and titles remained solely within
the discretion of the company (clause (s)) - in the new agreements only. The
sale of the publication was restricted to the address of the premises in the
company's records, and the publication could not be displayed, collected,
distributed or sold from any other premises.
14. The
company considered it essential that a secure and safe place be provided for
the publication, failure to do so could result in no credit being extended for
missing copies. Adequate supplies had to be provided to meet demand, a
prominent and permanent display was required for the paper, a newsagency
service had to be provided on all publication days and a home delivery service
must be provided if required. Clause (p) specified that a service/delivery
charge would be applied. Under clause (q) of the terms and conditions - from
April 1991 - the agreement was not transferable or assignable by the newsagent,
but a third party could make an application in writing for a transfer. Such an
application could be refused at the absolute discretion of the company and no
application for the transfers of agencies would be considered unless the
previous newsagent's account was paid in full. Failure to comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the agreement could lead to the withdrawal of a
granted newsagency and termination of the agreement (clause (t)).
15. Table
3 gives details of the number of applications for supply of newspapers during
each of the years 1992-94. This shows that several hundred requests were
received each year for supplies of newspapers. The level of refusals in 1992
and 1993 was relatively high. In 1992 almost 38% of requests were
unsuccessful. In 1994 both the level of requests increased considerably while
the number of refusals fell so that the rate of refusals in that year was just
15%.
Table
3: Details of Applications to INML for Supply of Newspapers.
Year
|
No.
of applications
|
No.
granted supply
|
No.
refused supply
|
Refusals
as % applications
|
1992
|
348
|
216
|
132
|
37.9
|
1993
|
386
|
262
|
124
|
32.2
|
(to
Aug.)1994
|
498
|
304
|
74
|
14.9
|
Source:
INML
(g)
Submissions by the Parties
Arguments
in support of a certificate
16. INML
submitted that the arrangements related to the distribution in Ireland of
publications of Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd by INML to the retailers,
(who must first be approved by the Company). Retailers of Independent
Newspapers publications provided the key link between the publisher and its
readers and it was therefore of crucial importance that they be selected
carefully in the interests of ensuring the widest possible distribution of the
company's publications and a high standard of service to its readers at a
reasonable cost. The criteria whereby retailers were approved by the company
and the terms and conditions of supply were designed to achieve these objectives.
17. The
company submitted that it must be satisfied with the applicant's credit-rating
and the applicant must complete a mandate to settle its account with the
company by weekly direct debit. New applicants were required to lodge a
security deposit equal to the value of four weeks' net supply which was held
until the retailer had either ceased trading or had transferred the business to
another owner, at which point any net balance was returned to the retailer. The
security deposit was required because retailers paying by weekly direct debit
could generally secure up to one month's unofficial credit before the company's
financial control system finally stopped further supplies until unpaid direct
debits were discharged. The retail trade experienced a high level of business
failure which left suppliers very exposed unless provision for guarantees or
security was made. They submitted that the requirement of a lodgement or
guarantee as security had been implicitly accepted by the EU Commission in the
AMP Notice.
[4]
The company submitted that the transfer of an agency required the previous
account to be cleared in full since from the transferee's point of view, it
ensured that the new applicant would not have to assume the liabilities of the
existing agent to INML in respect of the agency and from the company's point of
view, it was considered necessary in order to avoid the transfer of agencies
(sometimes to associates of the transferor) in circumstances where significant
debts were left unpaid and became very difficult to collect.
18. The
company submitted that the applicant's premises must be suitable, i.e. a dry
and secure place be provided for the receipt of the publications, a prominent
location must be provided for display purposes and any other business carried
on at the premises must be compatible with the sale of the INML publications.
Details of the suppliers of other newspapers, magazines and paperback books
were sought in the application form in order to establish the applicant's bona
fides as a news retailer. They maintained that such details were normally
sought of applicants for admission to any selective distribution system, as for
example in the Parfums Givenchy case
[5]
where the EU Commission noted that the sale of competing brands in the same
retail outlet gave customers an opportunity to compare products. The company
did not restrict the retailers in any way in their choice of other publications
for stock. The applicant must be prepared to open the premises on all days
considered necessary by the company - all publishing days. The company must be
satisfied with the location of the retailer's premises. Such factors as the
pattern of supply and demand in the locality, the extra cost and logistical
implications of supplying newspapers to the applicant's premises, the number of
copies which the applicant was likely to sell, the number and size of existing
authorised retailers in the locality and the likely effect of the opening of
the new outlet on net sales of the publications in the area. The company
maintained that some limit to the acceptable levels of returns was necessary in
order to control distribution costs and to minimise the risk of fraud by
retailers (who in many cases return only mastheads rather than complete
copies). The 5% level was the target level which the company would like to
achieve, [ ] % had been the typical level for the past number of years. The
higher the level of permitted returns, the greater the company's distribution
costs and it was in the company's interest to keep these as low as possible.
INML pointed out that in practice it tended to be quite flexible in individual
cases as regards returns and the 5% level would be required only in exceptional
circumstances. The average cost of returns as a percentage of production costs
was approximately [ ]% (i.e. £ ). The company did not, at present,
specify a minimum supply with no return allowance. The applicant was required
to provide suitable staff to comply with the company's standard terms and
conditions of trade, especially with regard to opening hours, sorting of
returns, accounting and the provision of a home delivery service, where
required.
19. The
standard terms and conditions in use since April, 1991, were intended to cover
earlier versions of the standard terms and conditions which comprised some, but
not all, of the provisions contained in the current ones. They stated that
those earlier versions still apply to many retailers appointed when those
versions were in general use. The company submitted that the following
provisions could be regarded as restricting the parties in their freedom to
take independent commercial decisions. Clause (j) of the terms and conditions
essentially limited the type and number of retailers who sold the company's
publications by restricting the retailers freedom due to the prohibition on
sales to unauthorised resellers. Clauses (j) and (s) obliged the retailers to
sell newspapers at a price set by the company. Clause (k) contained an
obligation that the retailer sell the publications only from the designated
premises. Under clause (n) the retailer was required to ensure that adequate
supplies were available to meet the demand by consumers. Other restrictions in
the terms and conditions imposed obligations on the retailers in line with the
criteria for the selective distribution system. The company applied slightly
different terms of supply to the wholesalers and shoppers than it did to the
approved retailers due to the different roles of each, (for example different
amounts of commission were given to the retailers). The company submitted that
this did not amount to the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions, but to the application of modified terms commensurate with the
differences in the status and function of the other parties.
20. INML
submitted, in their arguments in support of a certificate, that in selective
distribution systems the EU Commission and the ECJ outlined three conditions
where the prohibition in Article 85(1) did not apply: (i) the goods involved
had characteristics which justified the suppliers in restricting the outlets in
which they should be sold; (ii) the authorised agents were selected solely on
the basis of objective qualitative criteria as opposed to quantitative criteria
designed to restrict the number of authorised outlets; and (iii) the selection
criteria were applied in a uniform, objective and non-discriminatory way so
that all suitably qualified resellers were admitted to the system. The company
submitted that the goods involved in this notification had characteristics
which justified the suppliers (INML) in restricting the outlets in which they
should be sold. Newspapers were found to be products which justified the
operation of a selective distribution system, by the ECJ in the Binon and Cie
SA v. Agence et Messageries de la Presse SA cases.
[6]
Newspapers (and other periodicals) had a limited shelf-life making a rapid and
reliable system of distribution essential. Once the limited shelf-life for sale
of the newspapers had expired, they had practically no value. It was for this
reason that publishers were required to operate a "returns" policy. They
submitted that the very limited shelf-life cast doubt on the viability of sales
for resale otherwise than through the distribution system. They claimed that
there was very little elasticity in the demand for newspapers at the point of
sale. They submitted that the fundamental role of a free press in the
preservation of a democratic system of government (Article 40.6.1.i of the
Constitution of Ireland) together with the special social and cultural role of
the press in society justified the maintenance of a specialized distribution
network which ensured the orderly availability of a variety of titles to as
large a number of citizens as possible. They maintained that this special role
was recognised by publishers as akin to a public service obligation and their
operations were consequently not always motivated by solely commercial
considerations.
21. INML
submitted that the authorised agents were selected solely on the basis of
objective qualitative criteria as opposed to quantitative criteria designed to
restrict the number of authorised outlets. The classification of various
criteria as "objective qualitative criteria" varied depending on the nature of
the product.
[7]
The company submitted that the criteria relating to credit rating, suitability
of premises, opening hours, location, staffing, the obligation to maintain
adequate supplies of publications and the obligation to sell publications from
specified premises had been deemed qualitative criteria by the EU Commission
and the ECJ in a number of cases.
[8]
They further maintained that the criteria relating to location and the
obligation to sell from specified premises was essential, in the context of the
specific character of the market in the distribution of newspapers, required a
stable and balanced distribution network with an adequate geographical spread.
They pointed out that the RPC Report on the newspaper industry
[9]
recognised the impossibility of devising a set of general rules which could be
applied to individual cases to decide whether a publisher should supply a
retailer or not and also that there should be a mechanism (Board of Appeals)
that permitted applications for supplies to be dealt with on a case by case
basis. The company submitted that the suggestions concerning the relevant
criteria to be considered by a future board of appeals, such as (i) the
convenience of the public (especially where there were new developments such as
housing, factories or shopping centres), (ii) the legitimate interests of the
applicants and (iii) the necessity for newspaper publishers of keeping the cost
of distribution, in terms of both time and money, within manageable limits,
corresponded broadly to criteria currently used by INML.
22. INML
submitted that the location criteria were essential to a workable distribution
system for newspapers and that this in turn stimulated inter-brand competition
in Ireland and also to ensure an adequate geographical spread of distribution
of INML publications. These two aspects were particularly important in the
context of the special role of newspapers in a democratic society. Not all
dealers who satisfied the criteria were admitted to the system, over 6,000 have
been approved, as the stability of the system would be endangered and it would
not be possible to ensure the rapid delivery which newspapers required nor the
operation of the "returns" system. The company's decision to limit the number
of outlets approved did not prevent other newspaper distributors from approving
the same outlets. They further submitted that the distinction drawn by the EU
Commission and the ECJ between the qualitative and quantitative selection of
retail outlets was a distinction without meaning in economic terms since
outlets could be limited quantitatively for the same reasons that they were
limited qualitatively. The company submitted the sole reason for the
quantitative restrictions (in Article 85) was their capacity to lead to
territorial market division which was contrary to the Single European Market,
but this was not an objective of
Section 4 of the
Competition Act, and
consequently the Authority should not feel bound by to follow the ECJ's
reasoning.
23. INML
submitted that the US courts had taken a more liberal approach to the analysis
of the effect of refusals to deal (one of the essential characteristics of a
distribution network which operated only through approved outlets) and had
considered that unilateral action by a supplier was not prohibited. On this
basis the company suggested that the selection of retailers by INML constituted
unilateral action which should not be regarded as coming within
Section 4(1).
They submitted that the US courts had generally upheld refusals on the grounds
that (a) a belief that a manufacturer already has sufficient distribution; (b)
an attempt to implement standards imposed on distributors, such as appearance
and image standards, credit requirements and sales quotas and (c) failure to
meet quality standards. The company submitted that the selection criteria were
applied in a uniform, objective and non-discriminatory way so that all suitably
qualified resellers were admitted to the system.
24. The
company submitted that the application of dissimilar criteria and terms to the
supply of shoppers, wholesalers and retailers was justifiable on the basis of
the different functions performed by these entities and that
Section 4(1) of
the Act did not apply to these aspects of the notified arrangements. They
maintained that if they were obliged to supply all potential retailers, this
would involve greater distribution costs in supplying smaller quantities to a
larger number of outlets. Consequently it could force the company to reduce the
acceptable level of returns and retailers might not maintain sufficient stocks
to satisfy the requirements of all potential customers. The company pointed out
that it was shown in the RPC Report where there was a sufficient number of
outlets in an area, supplying additional outlets tended to spread the same
sales over an increased number of outlets rather than increasing total sales
and it also lead to an increase in unsold copies, thereby adding to the
supplier's costs. The company stated that it did not impose a service/delivery
charge but absorbed the cost of distributing newspapers. Service/delivery
charges were imposed by certain wholesale distributors of newspapers and INML
might be obliged to impose such charges in certain circumstances in the future
(e.g. if distribution costs were to increase to a level which INML felt unable
to absorb).
25. The
setting and maintenance of a retail price by the company was an inherent aspect
of a selective distribution system in the newspaper sector. RPM here did not
have the object or effect of restricting or distorting competition since its
sole purpose was to support the cost to the company of taking back unsold
copies and it was a well established feature of a workable distribution system
for newspapers. The financial burden of unsold copies was transferred to the
publisher, thus encouraging retailers to stock a wide variety of publications,
not just the more popular titles. Therefore, RPM stimulated inter-brand
competition. They submitted that the purpose of RPM in the newspaper
distributor sector was to support and protect the specialised distribution
system which involved rapid delivery and the returns policy. The widespread
availability of a variety of newspapers (a vital element of the current
distribution system) would be endangered if uncontrolled intra-brand
competition was permitted. The company pointed out that the Authority should
note that a system of RPM which ensured that all consumers were charged the
same price for access to an organ of the media was consistent with public
policy in relation to the media, both in Ireland and abroad.
26. They
maintained that because of their perceived "public service" obligations,
newspaper operators could not permit a situation to arise where cover prices
permitted discrimination among readers. The abandonment of price controls might
result in lower prices in certain urban areas where distribution costs per copy
were lower and retailers achieved higher turnover, but in rural areas where the
higher cost of distribution per copy and the possibility of local geographic
monopolies for certain retailers could lead to increased prices and could
prejudice the accessibility for certain consumers of important news,
information and debate. They pointed out that the prices charged to users of
non-cable broadcast media (e.g. television and radio licence fees) did not vary
regardless of the number of channels or stations available in a user's area or
by reference to the increased per-subscriber costs of transmitting signals to
small numbers of users in remote areas.
Arguments
in support of a licence
27. INML
submitted, in support of its request for a licence, that the arrangements
contributed to the improved distribution of the goods. They submitted that the
advantages of INML's distribution system outweighed any perceived negative
effects on competition by the restriction of the number of retailers, the
obligation on retailers to sell from a designated premises and the obligation
to sell at cover prices set by the company. The location criteria, which
permitted INML to restrict the number of retailers it supplied was an essential
feature of an efficient and workable distribution system in the newspaper
sector. Such a system was necessary to ensure the rapid distribution of the
publications at a reasonable cost to the consumer throughout a wide
geographical area. It would be uneconomic and logistically impossible for INML
to distribute to every retail outlet in the country (because of the high costs
in time and money of serving a single outlet). A totally unrestricted network
would lead to a higher cost to the consumer and to a less efficient
distribution service without providing any advantages.
28. The
company suggested the Authority should note the fundamental differences between
a selective distribution system for newspapers (the primary motivation for
which was rapid and widespread circulation) and those for luxury goods (such as
cosmetics, jewellery, etc. where the primary motivation was the protection of
the exclusive or luxury character of the product) considered on several
occasions by the EU Commission. The criteria for admission to the latter's
distribution network were much more stringent than those imposed by INML. The
company suggested that the Authority should look at the EU Commission's "AMP
Notice"
[10]
where they declared their intention to grant an exemption under Article 85(3)
to a selective distribution system in the newspaper sector in Belgium. The
Notice proposed to exempt a minimum turnover or quantitative criterion and
rejecting criteria limiting a number of outlets within a geographical area. The
RPC Report rejected the minimum turnover criterion as unworkable in favour of
quantitative criteria relating to location. The EU Commission, in Ivoclar
[11],
exempted a manufacturer of artificial teeth who supplied them to authorised
exclusive distributors, stating that "...supplying a much larger number of
distributors would be detrimental to its objective of ensuring competent
distribution of its products and involve needless expense.." and that "...the
restriction of distribution to the authorised ...depots also created the
conditions for the distributors to exploit the market intensively and to
maximise the sales of Ivoclar products. The obligation on ...depots to maintain
comprehensive stocks and to carry out sales promotions are a corollary of this
restriction."
29. The
company submitted that the operation of the RPM condition was an essential part
of a viable, economic and efficient distribution system. The EU Commission, in
its AMP Notice, was prepared to approve the fixing by the publisher of the
cover price of its publications provided that it did not restrict retailers'
freedom to import the publications from approved outlets in other member states
(and sell those imported publications below the cover price fixed for Belgium).
In Binon
[12],
the EU Commission acknowledging that RPM may be justified in the case of
newspaper and periodical distribution, said "..if in so far as the distribution
of newspapers and periodicals is concerned, the fixing of the retail price by
publishers constitutes the sole means of supporting the financial burden
resulting from the taking back of unsold copies and if the latter practice
constitutes the sole method by which a wide selection of newspapers and
periodicals can be made available to readers, the Commission must take account
of those factors when examining an agreement for the purposes of [granting an
exemption under] Article 85(3)". INML submitted that they investigated the
national rules relating to the cover price of newspapers in eleven European
countries and in all of them the newspapers were sold at cover prices fixed by
the publishers. This practice was not expressly prohibited in any of those
countries and was in fact expressly permitted in some (e.g. Germany, Denmark
and Norway).
30. INML
submitted that the restriction on retailers to sell from their specified
premises was a vital part of the overall distribution system. INML submitted
that their distribution policy was designed to optimise supplies and stock
levels and minimise returns and the prohibition on re-sale to third parties
related to this. Supplies and returns for each edition of each paper were
recorded by computer and closely monitored and certain standards had to be
maintained in their exposure for sale (eg. to be kept dry, well-displayed and
easily accessible for consumers) and to ensure that the company's papers were
given a position in each outlet which reflected their status as popular
national newspapers. These marketing efforts would be undermined if sub-sales
to third parties were permitted and optimisation of stock levels and
merchandising would become impossible if the company had no direct contact with
the sub-sellers. Given that the newspaper market was static or declining,
sub-selling would result in fragmentation of sales, higher levels of returns
(waste) and sellouts (lost sales opportunities). Retailers had little incentive
to become involved in sub-selling to other retailers, since approved retailers
had ready access to supplies and because of the short shelf life of the
product, purchases from another retailer were unlikely. The company submitted
that the principle of a prohibition on cross-supplies between retailers of
newspapers in the same Member State was accepted by the EU Commission (in AMP
Notice, para 18).The principle of confining sales of the product to specified
premises had been accepted in many EU Commission cases
[13].
In many cases, approval was given as much to the premises as to the retailer.
31. If
retailers could transfer the publications to another address or person for
resale, this would ultimately affect the business of other retailers in the
same area and would lead to an increase in returned copies and consequently, to
an unacceptable increase in the cost of operating the distribution system. In
the RPC Report, it was claimed that if resales from undesignated premises were
permitted, it would lead to a fragmentation in the market with the result that
retailers would only stock the most popular titles. They maintained that this
would obviously damage inter-brand competition and prejudice consumers who
prefer less popular titles. INML submitted that in reality, sub-sales to other
retailers were most unlikely given the extremely short shelf life of the
product. In the AMP Notice the EU Commission indicated that it was prepared to
exempt a restriction which prohibited retailers from passing on newspapers or
periodicals to any third party with a view to their being resold.
32. INML
submitted that the keeping of minimum stock quantities was essential in
offering a choice of titles to readers and in ensuring that consumer demand was
adequately met. Newspaper retailers were sometimes obliged to accept extra
copies over normal orders ("box-outs") where a 'scoop' story or a promotional
campaign required this. All "box-outs" copies were supplied on a full sale or
return basis. They pointed out that the EU Commission, in its decision on
Givenchy, said " ... if there were no requirements regarding the holding of
stocks ...retailers would decide to concentrate their promotion activities on
the brand leaders products.." They maintained that, unlike the case with
luxury goods, this requirement was in no way burdensome on retailers because of
the low per unit cost of newspapers to retailers and because of the returns
system, which permitted them to recover outlay on unsold newspapers.
33. The
company stated that there were two types of consumers of INML newspapers,
readers and advertisers. They maintained that readers benefitted from the
current distribution system by being able to purchase newspapers in virtually
any part of the country at minimum cost and delay. The claimed that the current
distribution system was the most economic and efficient way of ensuring the
timely distribution of its newspapers and also promoted the availability of a
choice of titles to readers at the least possible cost to them. They maintained
that any obligations imposed on the company to undertake significant extensions
to the distribution network would not improve the access of consumers to
supplies of newspapers and would be likely to cause unacceptable delays in
delivery and would entail substantial extra costs, which would ultimately be
borne by the consumers.
34. The
company pointed out that the requirement that sales be made only from
designated premises and that minimum stock quantities be held were also in the
interests of consumers; they pointed out that a minimum stockholding or
purchasing requirement had already been accepted in principle by the Authority.
[14]
Consumers needed to be able to identify outlets where regular and reliable
supplies of a range of newspapers, in appropriate condition and suitably
displayed, were available; rather than visit a number of outlets where stocks
may have been exhausted. They submitted that a substantial amount of a
newspaper publisher's income was derived from advertising revenue. Advertisers
benefitted from an efficient distribution system which permitted publications
to be purchased by a maximum number of readers at a minimum cost and in as
widespread a geographical area as possible. It was imperative for advertisers
in the national press that their advertisements reached as many readers as
possible and that this was done as quickly as possible. The proportions of
INML's revenue attributable to sales and advertising were [ ]% and [ ]%
respectively. The company stated that in the EU Commission's Merger Task Force
on Newspaper Publishing
[15],
the proportion of revenue attributable to advertising in The UK was found to be
46% in 1992, it was higher in the quality segment (c. 58%) and lower for
tabloids (c. 27%-30%). The company pointed out that the Authority should note
that no unnecessary restrictions were imposed on retailers. Far from being
precluded from selling products competing with those of the company, they were
actively encouraged to sell a range of newspapers. The restrictions imposed by
the selection criteria went no further than was absolutely necessary to
preserve the efficiency of the distribution network.
35. The
fixing of selling prices ensured equality of access among consumers to the
information provided by newspapers. Abandonment of fixed selling prices could
lead to two tiers of access, with consumers in urban areas, where distribution
costs were low, favoured over consumers in more remote regions. They strongly
endorsed the submission of the German Government in Binon (para 42) that "[i]f
the possibility of fixing prices for newspapers ...is not accepted any
effective distribution system for such products would be incompatible with the
rules on competition and the effect on the diversity and freedom of the press
would be disastrous. From that point of view it is not unimportant to note that
systems of fixed prices in relation to the distribution of newspapers ...are
accepted under the legislation of most Member States or are operated without
encountering any difficulties."
36. The
company submitted that the arrangements did not afford the possibility of
eliminating competition for a substantial part of the products in question. The
company's products faced stiff competition from a number of other Irish
publishers and from UK and other publications. They wanted to emphasise that
any possible restriction on competition, which would affect only competition
between retailers, i.e. intra-brand competition, (which was less significant in
this sector than in others because of the short shelf life of the products
concerned) was outweighed by the importance of the current selective
distribution system for the stimulation of inter-brand competition and by its
guarantee of ready access for consumers to supplies of newspapers. Intra-brand
competition was of particular significance to the newspaper sector. They
pointed out also that the Authority should note that unsuccessful applicants
for admission to the company's network were in no way precluded from seeking to
sell other publisher's newspapers. The INML network operated to the benefit of
smaller retailers who formed an integral part of the distribution system.
(h)
Submissions by third parties
RGDATA
37. RGDATA
submitted that there had been continual difficulty over the supply of
newspapers to new outlets and that no objective criteria were published by the
newspapers to determine on what basis outlets did or did not receive
newspapers. They submitted that the payment of accounts by direct debit on a
weekly basis did not apply to all accounts at present. It should be applied to
all accounts and not be compulsory for new applicants only. They maintained
that the terms of payment weekly were onerous for the retailer and this also
provided significant benefits to the newspaper company in terms of collection
and other costs at the expense of the retailer. The Association believed that
the terms of payment should be on a monthly basis and that retailers should not
be required to pay by Direct Debit, except where this had been negotiated with
the retailer. They also pointed out that all the newspaper companies had
adopted this practice now and it could be considered as a concerted practice by
them.
38.
RGDATA maintained that the requirement that all publications must be sold at
the cover price only was a form of resale price maintenance and was prohibited
by
Section 4 (1). The Association did not object to a standard cover price on
newspapers provided it was applied to all newsagents. They considered it
essential that all newsagents received the same gross margins on sales.
39. They
did not know what the minimum order of copies required by the newspapers was,
but it recognised the need for a minimum order provided the quantity was stated
by the newspaper companies, it was not excessive and that it applied to all
customers. The Association assumed that if the arrangements received a
certificate or a licence that any amendments to the terms of business would
have to be notified to the Authority.
40. RGDATA
pointed out that in the case of a limited company, two guarantee forms were
required for the transfer of an agency. The Association strongly objected to
the requirement that the account of the previous proprietor must be cleared in
full before an application would be considered. They believed that this
requirement was in breach of
Section 4(1)(e) of the
Competition Act because it
was a supplementary obligation which had no connection with the subject of the
contract. The new proprietor should not have to pay off the account of the old
proprietor before supply was made. They maintained that in the case of
collusion between the former proprietor and the new proprietor, which was an
exceptional circumstance, there were other remedies open to the Irish
Independent Company.
Other
Submissions
41. One
individual submitted that they had taken over the proprietorship of a retail
outlet and was refused supplies of newspapers until the debts of the previous
operator have been paid. Another individual submitted that a substantial sum
- £700 - was demanded from him as security for payment of his account.
(i)
UK Study of Newspaper Industry.
42. The
UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was asked to investigate the supply
of national newspapers in England and Wales at two separate levels - the supply
from publishers to wholesalers, and the supply from wholesalers to retailers.
It presented a comprehensive report in December 1993
[16].
Newspaper distribution had been the subject of
previous
enquiries by the MMC and by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). This reference
arose from continuing complaints about refusal to supply would-be retailers,
and because there had been major changes in distribution arrangements between
publishers and wholesalers since the previous review of the newspaper
distribution system in 1985.
43. The
MMC noted that the sale or return system weakened the incentives and prospects
for active price competition at both wholesale and retail levels. Publishers
favoured sale or return, though both publishers and wholesalers imposed limits
on the allowed rate of returns. Cover prices were determined by publishers,
and were recommended prices, although they were almost always observed in the
market. Resale price maintenance is prohibited in the UK under the Resale
Prices Act, 1965. In certain circumstances, exemptions may be granted but no
such exemption has been given in the case of newspapers. Wholesale and retail
margins were set at discounts to the cover price, so the cover price also
determined trading margins. The MMC observed that there was near universal
observance of the publishers' cover prices by all retailers, and price
competition at the retail level was virtually non-existent.
44. Newspaper
wholesalers restricted the supply of newspapers to retail outlets of their
choice. The MMC examined the main criteria used, the use of trial periods or
trial supplies, the appeals procedures for applicants that had been refused
supplies, the procedures applied to transfers of supplies when a newsagency
changed ownership, and the costs and resources used within the evaluation
system as a whole. Retailers could not obtain supplies from wholesalers
operating outside their area, and, in order to obtain a full range of titles,
they usually had to obtain supplies from two or more wholesalers. Wholesalers
essentially focused on whether the applicant would make an 'effective'
newsagent, and whether the area was already adequately served. Those refused
could appeal to the wholesaler or to the newspaper publishers. Where a
newsagency changes hands, a simple application procedure applies. It appeared
that wholesalers almost never withdrew supplies from an existing newsagent,
whatever its level of sales or standard of performance.
45. While
some of the criteria could be objectively measured, the MMC considered that
others were a matter of judgment. Wholesalers might offer a trial to an
applicant where there was doubt about whether the criteria are satisfied, after
which supplies were provided or refused, depending upon whether a minimum sales
target had been attained. On average, in recent years, some 22% of applicants
to the larger wholesalers were granted supplies at the first stage, and a
further 13% trial supplies, of which 92% were subsequently given full supplies.
Including a small number granted supplies after appeal to the publishers, 34%
of applicants were ultimately successful.
46. In
its conclusions the MMC stated that the main barrier to entry to the retail
trade was the refusal to supply system operated by wholesalers. It considered
that the sale or return system was an important feature of the industry which
promoted the wide availability of newspapers by encouraging retailers to carry
the whole range of newspaper titles and to have copies on display through the
day. The MMC considered that the display of cover prices restricted
competition in that it encouraged retailers to observe the marked price and
discouraged them from determining their own selling price. It also considered
that the refusal to supply new outlets on the grounds that the wholesaler
considered the area to be adequately supplied, and the ban on retailers
selling-on newspapers, both restricted the number of newspaper retailers. They
thus prevented competition between existing retailers and the potential new
entrants who were denied supply. The proviso that sales might be made only
through the designated outlet restricted the retailer's freedom to sell
newspapers in the way he considered most effective and thus restricted
competition.
47. The
MMC considered that the display of cover prices amounted to effective resale
price maintenance and discouraged retailers from charging lower prices. It
found that it was very rare for national newspapers to be discounted by
retailers and that the maintenance of uniform prices clearly owed much to this.
It found little evidence suggesting that, in the absence of cover prices,
prices to the consumer would tend to be lower. While most retailers regarded
newspapers as a product which would attract custom, it was not one which they
were likely to use as a loss-leader. The fact that they received it on sale or
return terms also discouraged price-cutting. Overall, the MMC was not
confident that a change from the current practice would have beneficial effects
to outweigh the loss of convenience to consumers from knowing the price of the
product and that it would be available at the same price throughout the country.
48. The
MMC also considered whether the use of cover prices encouraged price leadership
among publishers and led to prices higher than would otherwise occur. It was
clear that publishers took account of the present and likely prices of
competing titles in the same segment of the market. Often prices settled at
the same level and moved closely together. This could, however, equally be
seen as a response to competitive forces. There was active competition at the
publisher level for readership and advertising revenue, and price was clearly a
weapon. In the 1993 price contest between The Sun and the Daily Mirror,
competition had led to a downward pressure on prices. While the use of cover
prices might sometimes have led to a more rapid response to a competitor's
price change than might otherwise have occurred, the MMC did not think that
there was any evidence that this had led to higher prices than would have
occurred in their absence. It saw no reason to think that a requirement on
publishers to make clear on the newspaper that the cover price was a
recommended and not a fixed price would have any practical effect in leading to
lower prices.
49. The
MMC stated that the wholesalers' practice of refusal to supply, based on the
criteria of the area being 'already adequately served' and of the suitability
of the applicant, clearly protected existing newsagents. Not only was this
likely to remove the spur that competition would provide to maintain
performance, thus protecting the inefficient newsagent, but the system would
also be slow to respond to changing patterns of demand or to try out new ways
of stimulating sales. The MMC recognised that the present system facilitated
widespread availability of newspapers but it protected inefficiency and
responded slowly to changes in demand, opportunities to offer consumers
improved convenience and new sales methods. The MMC concluded that some
consumers were receiving a lower level of service than would exist in the
absence of the restrictions, that this was an uncompetitive practice, and that
it was against the public interest.
50. The
MMC said that the wholesalers' requirements that retailers granted supply of
national newspapers might sell only by retail and only from the designated
outlet were primarily designed to support the main restriction on refusal to
supply and to ensure that it was not circumvented. In order to operate the
main criterion against which the wholesaler considered applications for supply
- whether the area was already adequately served - it was deemed necessary by
wholesalers that newspapers were sold only from identified outlets. This also
prevented retailers from responding to local variations in demand or
transferring them between different branches to take account of local
fluctuations in demand. The practice did have the advantage for publishers and
wholesalers, in that it enabled them to keep tabs on where sales took place and
to control returns. With the increasing use of information technology support,
the MMC thought that some of these advantages could be maintained. The MMC
concluded that the requirement by wholesalers that newspapers be sold only from
designated premises was an uncompetitive practice, which was against the public
interest.
51. Overall,
the MMC stated that remedies were difficult to frame and their effects could
not be foreseen at all precisely, and it had to proceed with caution. It
believed that to remove the present restrictions completely and to require
wholesalers to supply all creditworthy applicants on terms that covered the
extra costs of delivery to that outlet might well lead to a surge in
applications for supply, at least in the short term, because the existence of
sale or return greatly enhanced the attractiveness of newspapers to the
retailer as a virtually risk-free product. The growth in outlets could result
in sharp increases in wastage and higher costs for publishers and wholesalers,
leading either to a cut-back in supplies to individual outlets or to higher
newspaper prices. The MMC considered that the system had tended to protect the
traditional CTN (Confectioner-tobacconist-newsagent) outlet, and had
contributed to its survival. If changes led to a major exodus of these
businesses from the industry, and a reduction in home delivery services and
early opening hours, the loss to consumers would be unlikely to be made good by
the opening of other types of outlet.
52. The
MMC proposed that all existing retailers be given the right to move supplies
between outlets and the freedom, within existing retail margins, to sell on to
other retailers as this would allow retailers the opportunity to respond
sensibly to consumer demand. It would, according to the MMC, also provide a
useful safety valve which would permit those at present refused supply to make
arrangements with a newsagent in the neighbourhood to receive or collect
supplies. The MMC felt that, for various reasons, the scope and extent of this
remedy would be somewhat limited. It believed that copies would only move a
limited distance, where the loss of information to publishers would not have
serious effects. While the total number of outlets selling newspapers would
increase and while the volatility of sales at the individual outlet would
probably increase, the MMC did not think that this need lead to a growth in
waste since the existing controls on returns could continue to be applied at
the main retailer level. It considered that this remedy would provide a
useful, if not complete, answer to the detriments which had been identified,
and it recommended that steps be taken to secure its implementation.
53. The
Minister for Corporate Affairs introduced a code of conduct, agreed between the
newspaper wholesalers and the OFT, to implement more wide reaching reforms of
the newspaper distribution system. The newspaper wholesalers signed legal
undertakings to abide by the code of conduct. The code provides that any
retailer meeting certain requirements must be granted a supply of newspapers.
The main requirement is a minimum entry requirement in the form of a provision
under which the retailer must agree to take a minimum order for newspapers
equal to half the average level of sales in other outlets within the area of
the newspaper title in question. Such order must be on a firm sale as opposed
to a sale or return basis for the first six months. In addition the retailer
must pay a deposit equivalent to the value of three months sales of the minimum
order figure. This deposit is refunded after 12 months. In practice the
average level of deposit works out at around stg£750. Following the
introduction of the new code there was an increase in the number of retailers
selling newspapers. A number of multiple supermarket chains also began selling
newspapers. As new outlets were obliged, under the code, to take supplies of
newspapers on a firm sale basis, some had begun to sell newspapers at a
discount to the cover price.
54. A
number of newspapers in the U.K. were warned by the Director General of the OFT
for breaches of the Resale Prices Act 1976 concerning minimum resale prices
[17]
where clauses in their terms and conditions were found to contain requirements
that their newspapers must only be sold at the cover price displayed on the
mastheads. The newspapers in question were required to give written assurances
that they would not try to maintain minimum resale prices. The Newspaper
Society was also requested by the OFT to bring this fact to the attention of
their members.
(j)
Subsequent developments
55. The
Authority issued a Statement of Objections to the notifying party on 19
December 1996 indicating its intention to refuse to issue a certificate or
grant a licence in respect of the notified agreements. INML responded to the
Statement of Objections and an oral hearing was held on 19 March 1997.
56. INML,
in a written reply to the Statement of Objections, suggested amendments to a
number of clauses in their agreement. They proposed to remove the prohibition
against resale or sale from other outlets (clause k). In its place they would
substitute a provision requiring the retailer to notify INML of the location
from which the product was being sold. They also proposed removing the
provision, whereby in the transfer of a newsagency to a new proprietor, the
acquiring company was obliged to pay monies owed by the liquidated entity.
INML further proposed to accept, in place of the requirement for a deposit by
the new newsagent, a bank guarantee instead.
57. INML
maintained that the ability to set the cover price was important due to the
unique nature of newspaper distribution. They did not want to have any
unnecessary expenses added to the cost of their product as that would reduce
sales and the profitability of the company. INML considered that it was of
great commercial importance to maintain the maximum availability of its product
throughout the marketplace. They also considered that to remove the ability
to set the cover price would seriously interfere with the contractual and
marketing freedom of INML and it would be particularly damaging at a time when
there was considerable change already taking place. They believed that a
licence was appropriate in these circumstances.
58. INML
proposed to remove the prohibition on reselling newspapers from a premises
other than that of the premises of the retailers (clause k). It was a
unilateral decision of the company, not an agreement. They submitted that the
purpose of the deposit was to protect the company from bad debts and this was
very important to them. Before the introduction of deposits, the company had
bad debts of [£ ] million per year. The amount of the deposit depended
on the size of the outlet and it was based on the retailer’s expected
turnover for a four week period. They ranged from £400 to a maximum of
£1,000. The deposit was held indefinitely by the company and it was
refunded if the retailer ceased to trade or sold the business.
59. With
regard to the obligation to sell newspapers at the cover price (clause j), the
company said that it was aware of the decision in the Irish Times case
[18]
and they would have preferred to have met the Authority prior to the decision
as they accepted that it would be difficult for the Authority to allow INML to
operate RPM when it had been refused to the Irish Times. The main objective of
INML was to increase sales. They maintained that newspapers were an unusual
product and their availability throughout the country was of prime importance.
The retail outlets operated like advertising posters for the company in every
street corner and the ability for people to pick up a newspaper whenever they
wanted to was considered by the company to be very important.
60. They
maintained that the first issue to do with RPM was the possibility of a big
store “loss leading” with a newspaper which could undermine the
viability of smaller outlets to sell newspapers. If the smaller outlets began
to close, the impulse purchase of newspapers would be reduced and their
availability throughout the country would be reduced also. From an economic
point of view, the question was whether the risk of closing many outlets to
sell the product outweighed the benefits that would be derived from selling it
at a lower price. There were benefits for the consumer with the lower price,
but they did not think that the consumer would be better served if because of
loss leading by the supermarkets the smaller outlets were forced to close.
They did not think that people would travel 10 to 15 miles to purchase a
newspaper. There was also the problem of managing supply from week to week in
terms of stability. If a large outlet dropped the price of the newspaper on a
Saturday night and sold out, then the other newsagents would not be able to
sell any. The company was not convinced that the whole supply and demand
relationship would be served by this.
61. Opening
hours were also an issue especially for 24 hour convenience stores which
because of their extra costs would charge more for the newspapers and this
could result in a lack of credibility between the consumer and the retailer.
Smaller traditional TSNs in small communities where newspapers formed a high
percentage of their turnover would be affected over time and would probably
close. Out of the company’s 6,000 outlets, 3,500 were traditional TSNs.
62. INML
maintained that the free rider argument that was used to justify RPM applied to
opening hours and shelf space. The issue of opening hours was critically
important to newspapers as newspapers were a very high impulse purchase
product, much more so than ten years ago. The importance of sale or return was
recognised by the MMC in its report and by the Court of Justice too. It was
very important to the company because it ensured the availability of the
newspapers everywhere, but it was a heavy risk. It cost the company [£
]. every year with returns amounting to [ %] of product. This cost was for
print and it did not include distribution. If a big supermarket discounted
heavily on a newspaper, it would require extra product, but this in turn would
lead to higher returns from the other retailers. The stability of the
distribution arrangement was recognised internationally. The product was
particularly perishable. For the Evening Herald opening hours were also
critical as it was sold mainly through shops that opened late.
63. The
logistics and timing of the distribution of newspapers was important. It
involved bar codes, monitoring of the product and the extra costs of sending
extra supplies at particular times of the year. The costs of deliveries were
incurred by the newspaper company. There was a provision for a service charge
in their terms and conditions, but the company did not apply it. The company
maintained that there was a shakeout happening in the smaller outlets, but they
alleged that the removal of RPM would speed up the process and create losses
that would not otherwise occur. People would purchase their newspapers from
the large discounting stores not from the TSNs and the TSNs would loose not
only the sales of newspapers but other sales as well. INML agreed that there
was some latitude for the TSNs to reduce their margins on newspapers, but in a
free for all, they would loose out. If consumers saw that a newsagent was 5p
dearer for newspapers, then they would assume that the newsagent was more
expensive for everything else too. The company’s objective over time was
to reduce the newsagent’s margin as it was an extra cost to them.
64. The
marketing of newspapers now was all about convenience and the product was much
more an impulse purchase now than ten or fifteen years ago. If the small
outlets were forced to close because of discounting by the larger outlets, then
people would purchase newspapers less frequently. Newspapers were all about
loyalty purchasing six days a week and that loyalty would be affected. People
did not need to purchase newspapers everyday now to get information. If the
number of distribution points contracted to say 3,000 outlets, there would be
less points so people would have to travel further in order to purchase
newspapers or they might not do so.
65. INML
maintained that there was a much larger variation in sales of newspapers per
day. The absence of RPM would mean that the company could not set the masthead
price for the product nor could they decide how their distribution system
operated. INML considered that they were the best people to make decisions
concerning their products. Traditionally, newsagents acted as agents for the
suppliers, they sold the newspapers at the price on the paper and they took no
inventory risks. Supermarkets and newsagents sold many other items besides
newspapers. Irish Independent sold only one item - newspapers - and its
objective as a manufacturer was to increase its output and maximise the number
of sales.
66. They
did not consider that the newsagents had much market power in terms of price
competition. If they reduced the price of newspapers and if the margins from
newspapers formed a large percentage of their overall turnover, then their
business would suffer. They pointed out that RPM was allowed and encouraged
around Europe. INML also maintained that RPM was an item for a licence, not a
certificate. If in doubt, the Authority could issue a licence for a limited
period of time.
(k)
Meetings with newsagents associations
RGDATA
67. RGDATA
maintained that the insistence on a cover price by INML was resale price
maintenance since it did not permit retailers to determine their own prices and
it eliminated price competition between retailers. They further maintained
that such a stipulation was not necessary for the widespread and speedy
distribution of newspapers. They considered that the ban on onward sales to
third parties was designed to limit the number of outlets selling the
newspapers. There did not appear to be any benefits for consumers in this nor
was it indispensable for an efficient distribution system. They further
maintained that permitting onward sales would reduce the pressure to obtain
direct supplies for those retailers who had been refused supplies by the
company. RGDATA were also of the view that not having newspapers for sale
might create a competitive disadvantage for certain retailers and they would
benefit from being able to purchase supplies even at the cover price.
68. The
requirement by INML that the previous newsagent’s debts be cleared in
full before the “agency” could be transferred to the new retailer
was unprecedented in the trade and grossly offensive, according to RGDATA.
They also maintained that there were different conditions applied to new
retailers such as weekly direct debit, which did not apply to existing outlets
who had 28 days credit. They considered that when the new retailers had
established a good credit rating, they should be entitled to longer credit
terms. RGDATA maintained that the requirement for a security lodgement or
deposit from new retailers, which could be as high as £1,000, was again
unfair discrimination since existing outlets did not have to pay it. These
deposits were held indefinitely by INML and could be viewed as an interest-free
loan. It would be more equitable if the deposit was returned after a period of
time. There was also the possibility that the retailers could lose their
deposits if INML got into financial difficulties, as happened with the Press
Group.
69. RGDATA
considered that the insistence by INML that adequate supplies to meet demand be
available at all times seemed to be illogical and it also appeared to permit
the company to impose a minimum purchase requirement which could be varied from
retailer to retailer. This could become a maximum requirement and be used as a
barrier to entry to the market. They considered that the requirement for a
home delivery service, if required by INML, was unreasonable as it could be
applied to some retailers and not to others and it could also mean that the
service might have to be provided at a loss to the retailer.
National
Federation of Retail Newsagents
70. The
National Federation of Retail Newsagents (NFRN), referring to the requirement
in the INML’s terms and conditions for a home delivery, did not think
there was a great demand in this country for home delivery or among retailers
to affect it. The shops here were a more convenience-type market whereas in
the UK they were more of the newsagent type. They maintained that the agency
for newspapers belongs to the premises and not to the owner and therefore any
outstanding debts applied to the premises and not to the owner. They also were
of the view that the deposits paid to INML should be put into an interest
earning account, because in the case of the Irish Press the deposits were
swallowed up. The margin was based on the net price of the newspaper. The
existing margin on newspapers was vital for the continued existence of
newsagents, and the N.F.R.N. felt that any increase in charges should be taken
off the cover price as was the position with any other product as opposed to a
separate charge which they were obliged to pay.
Irish
Retail Newsagents Association
71. The
Irish Retail Newsagents Association (IRNA) represented 1,500 outlets
nationwide. Irish newspapers were sold in 7,500 outlets and Irish and English
Newspapers were sold in 5,000 outlets. Only about 2,000 of the 7,500 outlets
were the traditional type newsagent with news, lotto, light grocery and
tobacco. IRNA said that their members had problems with INML concerning the
collection of a deposit from new retailers, which could be as high as
£1,000 and it was, in effect, a non-returnable payment. When new
newsagents commenced business, they paid the deposit to INML, who in turn used
this money to refund the previous newsagent. They said that the distribution
of news (papers and magazines) in general was highly complicated and
unsatisfactory. The £1,000 deposit was paid by new entrants only and it
was related to bad debt prevention. The publishers attempted to recover bad
debts from new agents, if the previous ones left bad debts. All new agents had
to have a weekly direct debit too. Only those agents who were in business for
a long time did not have a direct debit facility.
72. They
said that newspapers were sold in 7,500 outlets nationwide (in 1973 the figure
was about 6,000)and most places who wanted to sell newspapers now were doing
so. Thee criteria used now was less rigid. The distribution of newspapers had
changed considerably with some volumes very small, as low as 3-5 copies only.
The sale of news by Dunnes and Quinnsworth had been perceived to be a threat,
but in reality, that was not so. In some locations, it had decimated the sale
of local newspapers. Dunnes and Quinnsworth did not open at 7.00 am in the
morning, or on Sundays, or in the evening or during bank holidays, generally.
The publishers usually put pressure on new agents to open up on bank holidays.
73. Retailers
usually had a standing order for supplies from the publishers with a 5% level
of returns. The Irish Independent was somewhat more flexible, but the level was
still less than 10%. The newsagents were obliged to send back returns each
week, i.e. the masthead of the paper with the bar-code on it, to obtain credit
for them. They maintained that it should be open to retailers to sell
newspapers higher or lower than the cover price, but it was not happening.
They did not sell lower because this would cut into their own margins. Margins
were normally 23-25% of the cover price of the paper, exclusive of VAT. There
were no examples of newsagents who sold below the cover price. The newsagents
were never told in advance about any proposed promotions. The retailers only
get 3p for handling the voucher and the newspaper. The margin on the Irish
Independent was 24%, most newspapers had high margins. The gross margin for a
newsagency business overall was 18%. There was a lot of waste on magazines and
if this was taken into account, then the margin was only 17%. The handling of
newspapers and magazines was also expensive, with stocks being delivered at
5.00 am, so the newsagent had to be there to accept delivery. There were also
delivery charges for some newspapers and magazines which had to be borne by the
newsagent.
74. They
stated that newspaper sales in Europe and Ireland were on a downward swing.
Those at the lower end of the market were holding their own because of the low
prices. The price of Irish newspapers had continued to increase. There was
intense competition from the British newspapers. It was impossible to compete
with the price of British newspapers since they were prepared to give them
away. The differences between the UK market and the Irish market included more
home deliveries in the UK; there were not as many newsagents per head of the
population in the UK, consequently volume sales were considerably higher; some
newsagents in the UK specialised in home deliveries only and used their shop
only to store the newspapers. There were problems with getting papers delivered
here and it was expensive to pay at the end of the month (instead of daily).
There was a charge for home deliveries in the UK in the region of £1 -
£2 per week.
Assessment
(a)
Section 4 (1)
75.
Section
4 (1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, prohibits and renders void all agreements
between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or services in
the State or in any part of the State.
(b)
The Undertakings and the Agreement
76.
Section
3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as ´a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.' Independent Newspapers Marketing Ltd is engaged in the production and
supply of goods, in this case newspapers, for gain. The retail outlets,
newsagents, etc. are engaged for gain in the sale of these goods. Consequently,
both the publishers and the retailers of newspapers are undertakings within the
meaning of
Section 3 (1) of the
Competition Act. The standard newspaper
distribution agreements between the company and the retailers are agreements
between undertakings. The relevant geographic market is the State.
(c)
Applicability of Section 4 (1)
77. The
arrangements involve three forms of standard distribution agreement for certain
newspaper titles published by Independent Newspapers. These newspapers are
supplied to a wide variety of outlets including traditional newsagents, petrol
station forecourt outlets and street vendors. The agreements apply only to
retail outlets which have signed agreements for supply and they do not apply to
street vendors who are supplied under separate arrangements. The arrangements
constitute part of a selective distribution system for the newspaper titles.
Selective distribution agreements may or may not be anti-competitive and a
careful assessment of the facts is required in each case. Where such criteria
are adopted unilaterally by a supplier the question of an agreement or
concerted practice between undertakings does not arise. The position changes,
however, where refusal to supply an outlet is the result of an agreement or an
understanding with existing retailers. Such arrangements clearly protect
existing retailers against the emergence of new competitors and are contrary to
section 4(1). Where refusal to supply decisions are based on quantitative
rather than qualitative factors, it implies that the object and the effect is
to limit the number of retailers in order to protect existing outlets and
implies a tacit understanding or concerted practice between the supplier and
those retailers. The same would apply where qualitative criteria were not
applied uniformly.
78. The
Authority has received a number of complaints concerning the refusal by
newspaper publishers to supply new outlets. It is clear from the figures given
in Table 4 that the level of refusals to grant supplies can be relatively high.
INML argued that outlets were selected solely on the basis of objective
qualitative criteria as opposed to quantitative criteria designed to restrict
the number of outlets. The Authority accepts that criteria such as
creditworthiness, opening hours and the nature of the premises are qualitative.
INML also stated that factors such as the number and size of existing
authorised retailers in the locality were also taken into account. The
application form also asks that applicants state why they consider a newsagency
to be necessary in their area, how close their premises are to the nearest
existing newsagency along with a detailed sketch map showing the location of
the premises and the nearest existing newsagent. INML also stated that not all
dealers who satisfied the criteria were admitted to the system as its stability
would otherwise be endangered and it would not be possible to ensure rapid
delivery nor the operation of the returns system. They stated that their
decision to limit the number of outlets approved did not prevent other
newspaper distributors from approving outlets. In the Authority's opinion this
indicates that the criteria do involve limiting the number of outlets supplied
in an area. They therefore prevent new retailers entering the relevant
newspaper markets in competition with existing retailers. Given that
Independent Newspaper titles account for such a large share of the various
markets in which they operate, a refusal to supply can seriously impair a
retailers ability to enter the market for the sale of newspapers. The
arrangements therefore offend against
section 4(1).
79. Clause
(d) of the standard terms and conditions provide that retailers must pay all
charges by means of a weekly direct debit. While a number of submissions have
criticised this provision they have not shown that it is an anti-competitive
practice. The Authority accepts that it is a means of reducing the risk to the
publisher of supplying new outlets. While such provisions do not apply to
existing outlets with a good payments record, those outlets who have fallen
into arrears are subsequently required to switch to a system of direct debit
payments. The outlets not required to pay by direct debit are those which have
an established record for prompt payment. The Authority does not therefore
consider that such a provision involves discrimination between similar
customers or that it is designed to place new outlets at a competitive
disadvantage vis a vis existing outlets. Nor does the Authority believe that
such a provision amounts to making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. Consequently the
Authority does not believe that this provision offends against
section 4(1).
80. Clause
(s) of the new agreements require the newsagent to lodge a sum of money with
the company as security for payment of the account. No particular sum is
specified in the terms and conditions, but a submission from an individual
mentioned a figure of £700. This figure could be seen as substantial if
the weekly sales of the newspapers were small and consequently the amount due
to the company would also be small. If the sum required as security varied
from one applicant to another, then there was the possibility of discrimination
in the application of the company's terms and conditions. INML have indicated
that they accept a bank guarantee in lieu of such a deposit. The Authority
accepts that INML is entitled to protect itself against the risk of default.
This provision does not offend against
Section 4 (1) of
the Act.
81. Clause
(h) requires that unsold copies be sorted and ready for collection when INML's
agent calls. Clause (i) sets a maximum allowance for unsolds at 5% of gross
supplies, while enabling INML to specify a minimum supply with no unsolds
allowance. The provision of newspapers on a sale or return basis is designed
to enhance sales. Newspapers are an extremely perishable product. Unless sold
within a few hours of delivery they are unlikely to be sold at all. Newspapers
can be purchased on impulse by consumers. Thus having supplies available in
retail outlets leads to additional sales. In the absence of sale and return
arrangements, the risk to newsagents of not selling copies would increase and
this would prompt them to reduce orders. The likely result is that overall
newspaper sales would be reduced while some consumers who would buy a newspaper
would not be able to obtain one. While sale or return provides an incentive to
retailers not to discount on the cover price, the Authority believes that its
object and effect is to enhance newspaper sales rather than to restrict
competition. Consequently, in its opinion, such a provision does not offend
against
section 4(1).
82. The
setting of a minimum level of supply may help ensure that it is economically
viable for the publishers to supply new outlets. In such circumstances the
inclusion of minimum orders is not anti-competitive provided that the level of
such orders is not out of line with supplies to existing retailers within the
area. The Authority would be concerned were the minimum order level to be set
at a higher rate as this would, in its view, represent an attempt to exclude
retailers. In the Authority's opinion, therefore, such provisions are not
anti-competitive and do not offend against
section 4(1).
83. Clause
(j) provides that the publications must be sold at the cover price only while
clause 2 provides that the retail price remain solely within the discretion of
the Independent Newspapers Group of companies. In effect this provision
requires all retailers to sell the newspaper at the price specified on the
masthead. It therefore amounts to full scale resale price maintenance (RPM).
The Authority has previously set out its views on RPM in respect of books,
where it stated that:
´The
Authority considers that the weight of evidence indicates that RPM is generally
restrictive of competition. Consequently, in its view, agreements involving
RPM will generally offend against
section 4(1)’.
[19]RPM
describes a practice whereby a supplier agrees to supply retailers on condition
that they sell the goods at a price specified by the supplier. Such
arrangements restrict the ability of retailers to determine their own prices.
They also eliminate price competition between retailers for the suppliers'
products when, as in this case, it applies to all retailers handling his
products. It is virtually unknown for newspapers to sell at other than the
cover price throughout the State. It is clear that the provision is designed
to prevent price competition in respect of Independent's newspaper titles and
that it has that effect. These account for a substantial proportion of Irish
daily, evening and Sunday newspaper sales. It is also relevant that the Irish
Times used also include provisions for RPM in its agreements with retailers,
but has withdrawn this provision following objections by the Authority
[20].
While not all other newspapers have not notified their agreements the
indications are that RPM is practised widely in the newspaper trade. Thus in
the Authority's view such arrangements have the object and the effect of
preventing, restricting or distorting competition. This provision therefore
offends against
section 4(1).
84. Economic
theory argues that RPM may inhibit competition in a number of ways. It can
inhibit the entry of discount outlets and thus prevent retailing innovations.
Manufacturers who have relied on RPM in order to encourage product promotion by
retailers and increase sales may be unwilling to dispense with such
arrangements long after the need to promote new products has ended. Where many
manufacturers engage in RPM it may be difficult for one to end the practice
since retailers may simply cease stocking the firm's products. While some
economic theories suggest that there may be circumstances in which RPM may
increase overall economic welfare, most goods and services do not appear to
satisfy the necessary conditions for such a result. Newspapers do not meet
such criteria. Consumers do not require detailed advice from retailers before
deciding to buy a newspaper. The evidence suggests that RPM is likely to
restrict competition and result in prices being higher and output lower than
would otherwise be the case.
85. RPM
may be operated as part of a cartel arrangement whether between suppliers or
retailers. In the case of a supplier cartel, RPM may be used as a means of
preventing cheating by cartel members. By preventing discounting among
retailers it reduces the incentives for suppliers to renege on the cartel
arrangement. A retail cartel may also put pressure on suppliers to operate a
system of RPM as a means of ensuring compliance by all retailers.
86. RPM
has been prohibited under the competition laws of most developed countries.
Legislation which permitted RPM in many individual states was repealed in the
United States in 1976 and the Supreme Court has regarded RPM as a per se
violation of the antitrust rules. Legislation prohibiting RPM was enacted in
Canada in 1951, in France in 1953 and in the UK in 1964.
87. The
Authority's view is in accord with that of the European Court of Justice in
Binon v AMP which was specifically concerned with the issue of RPM in the case
of newspapers which it found to be anti-competitive and contrary to Article
85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. In its judgment the Court stated that:
´The
requirement in the framework of a selective distribution system for newspapers
and periodicals which affects trade between Member States, that fixed prices
must be respected renders that system incompatible with Article 85(1) of the
Treaty.
[21]The
Court stated that it was a matter for the EU Commission to decide whether they
satisfied the requirements for an exemption under Article 85(3).
88. Clause
(j) further provides that the newspapers may not be sold to a third party for
re-sale except by prior agreement in writing. Furthermore any retailer
becoming aware that another retailer is re-selling supplies is required to
immediately inform INML. Clause (k) restricts the sale of the titles to the
address noted in INML records. The Authority considers that such restrictions
are designed to support the quantitative restrictions on the number of outlets
selling the newspaper titles which are a fundamental part of the arrangements.
The Authority believes that the object and the effect was to limit the number
of retailers selling the titles and that it therefore restricted competition in
the retailing of newspapers. It therefore offends against
section 4(1). INML
offered to withdraw these requirements and instead simply require retailers to
notify them of the locations where newspapers were sold. This would also
remove the anti-competitive effect of the selective distribution arrangements.
89. Clause
(q) provides that no application for a transfer of a newsagency will be
considered unless the previous newsagents account has been paid in full. INML
have argued that this provision is necessary. There have been complaints about
this provision. Where an individual or company purchases a newsagent business
from an incumbent they are purchasing the liabilities as well as the assets of
the business. If they do not wish to be liable for outstanding debts it is up
to them to take the appropriate steps to ensure that these have been discharged
as part of the purchase arrangements. It appears, however, that this provision
has also been used to force retailers acquiring a newsagency business which had
been in liquidation to pay monies owed by the liquidated entity. The Authority
believes that such a requirement amounts to making the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which by
their nature have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Consequently the Authority believes that this provision offends against
section
4(1). INML also proposed to remove this requirement.
Applicability
of Section 4(2)
90. Under
Section 4(2), the Competition Authority may grant a licence in the case of any
agreement or category of agreements which offends against
Section 4(1) but
which, ´having regard to all relevant market conditions, contributes to
improving the production of goods or provision of services or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit and which does not -
(i)
impose on the undertakings concerned terms which are not indispensable to the
attainment of those objectives;
(ii)
afford undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products or services in question.'
91. INML
have argued that it is necessary to limit the number of outlets which sell its
titles in order to maximise the efficiency of its nationwide distribution
system. The Authority accepts that were it to greatly expand the number of
retail outlets selling newspapers this could greatly increase the costs of
distribution without necessarily increasing sales of the titles to any
significant degree. Thus imposing limits on the number of retailers may
produce efficiency gains. In the absence of these distribution costs would be
higher and prices to consumers might well also be higher. As against this by
restricting entry the arrangements protect existing retailers. To some extent
therefore the arrangements will protect inefficient retailers from competition.
Thus greater distribution efficiencies will be offset by reduced efficiency at
retail level. Restrictions on entry will also involve some harm to consumers
since it restricts choice. Restricting entry by setting a quantatitive limit
on the number of retailers in any given area is not indispensable to the
efficient operation of the distribution system. Requiring new applicants to
take minimum supplies, again provided these are not out of line with the
average for outlets within the area would reduce the risk. Similarly new
outlets could be required to take supplies on a firm sale basis. The
arrangements as notified do not satisfy all the requirements for a licence.
92. INML
have claimed that, in the case of newspapers, RPM should be permitted. They
claimed that in the absence of RPM newspapers would be cheaper in the larger
urban areas but would be vastly more expensive in remote rural areas where the
costs of distribution were much higher. The Authority does not accept such
arguments. In fact it finds them rather misleading. It is undoubtedly true
that the cost of distributing newspapers is much higher in remote rural areas
than in urban ones. The costs of such distribution are borne by the publishers
not by the retailers. It is therefore wrong to argue that, in the absence of
RPM, higher distribution costs would mean that retailers in rural areas would
have to charge a much higher price than at present. INML sells to all
newsagents at the same price irrespective of their location. Provided that
this continues to be the case there appears to be no reason why consumers in
rural areas would face much higher prices for newspapers as a result of the
abolition of RPM. If INML believe that rural consumers should not be
disadvantaged or required to pay much higher prices for their newspapers then
it can help bring about this result if it does not differentiate between
retailers in its charges. The abolition of RPM would not require the INML to
charge different prices to different outlets.
93. INML
also claimed that retailers in remote areas could try and increase their
margins due to the absence of alternative outlets within the locality. The
Authority believes that this would meet strong consumer resistance and would
prompt other outlets to enter the market driving prices back down.
94. In
these circumstances the Authority does not believe that RPM in the case of
newspapers contributes to improving the production of goods or provision of
services or to promoting technical or economic progress. It follows therefore
that there is no resulting benefit to be shared with consumers. The
production, distribution and sale of newspapers through a wide range of outlets
is a benefit but the Authority believes that provisions for RPM are not
indispensable to the attainment of those objectives. As other Irish newspaper
publishers also operated a system of RPM the arrangements afforded undertakings
the possibility of eliminating price competition in respect of virtually all
newspapers. In the Authority's view none of the requirements for a licence
have been satisfied. As noted in para 85, RPM may facilitate collusive
behaviour at either the supplier or retail level and the Authority believes
that it would therefore allow undertakings the possibility of eliminating price
competition in respect of a substantial portion of the relevant products.
95. The
views of the European Court of Justice in Binon v. AMP are relevant in this
context. In its decision the Court stated that:
´If,
in so far as the distribution of newspapers and periodicals is concerned, the
fixing of the retail price by publishers constitutes the sole means of
supporting the financial burden resulting from the taking back of unsold copies
and if the latter practice constitutes the sole method by which a wide
selection of newspapers and periodicals can be made available to readers, the
Commission must take account of these factors when examining an agreement for
the purposes of Article 85(3).' (Para 46).
The
Court cannot grant an exemption under Article 85(3) since that power is
reserved to the Commission. Nevertheless the Authority interprets the Court's
view as implying that the Commission ought to grant an exemption provided it is
established that RPM ´constitutes the sole means' of supporting the sale
or return system. In the Authority's view RPM is not necessary for the
operation of sale and return and INML have not shown otherwise. Indeed the
abolition of RPM may well reduce the cost to newspapers of operating a sale or
return arrangement.
96. The
Authority also notes that Independent Newspapers have engaged in selective
price discounting. On occasion consumers in certain outlets in South Dublin
City have been offered vouchers giving 50p off the cover price of the Irish
Independent. In addition consumers in certain parts of North Dublin have been
offered direct delivery of all three of the titles involved in this
notification at a discount on the cover price. Such actions are at odds with
the arguments advanced in support of having a uniform price throughout the
country. Independent Newspapers have used selective discounting to try and
increase their circulation. Such behaviour is perfectly acceptable provided it
is not predatory. However, it serves to undermine claims that uniform
adherence to the cover price is essential for the efficient distribution of
newspapers.
97. In
the UK there is no exemption for newspapers from the prohibition on RPM. The
absence of an exemption from the prohibition on RPM has not proved detrimental
to the distribution of newspapers in the UK and the Authority can see no reason
why it should prove so within the State.
98. Clauses
(j), (the publications must be sold at the cover price only and a ban on resale
to third parties) and (k) (the publications must be sold from designated
premises only) also serve to reinforce the system of preventing entry at retail
level. The Authority does not believe that they contribute in any way to
technical or economic progress. There is therefore no benefit to consumers and
such provisions cannot be regarded as indispensable.
99. The
Authority also believes that clause (q) (ban on assignment of agreement to a
third party) does not contribute to technical or economic progress, does not
benefit consumers and is therefore not indispensable.
The
Decision
100. Independent
Newspapers Marketing Limited and the retail newsagents are undertakings within
the meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act and the notified new
standard terms and conditions of sale of Independent Newspapers constitute an
agreement between undertakings. In the Authority's opinion the restrictions on
entry inherent in the distribution system restrict competition and therefore
offend against
Section 4(1). The Authority also believes that clause (j) of
the agreements prevents price competition among retailers while clauses (j),
(k), (q) and (s) of the agreements restrict competition and therefore offend
against
section 4(1). The agreement does not satisfy the requirements for a
licence under
section 4(2). The Authority has therefore refused to issue a
certificate or to grant a licence to the standard, new agency and transfer of
agency agreements (CA/375/92E, CA/376/92E and CA/1139/92EX) of Independent
Newspapers Marketing Limited, notified on 30 September 1992 under
Section 7 of
the
Competition Act, 1991.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
15
April 1997.
____________________
[1].
Competition Authority [1995],
Interim
Report of the Study of the Newspaper Industry,
Dublin,
Stationery Office.
[2].
Restrictive Practices Commission. Report of Enquiry into the supply and
distribution of daily and Sunday newspapers published in Ireland, and of
newspapers, periodicals and magazines distributed by wholesalers. prl 8380. May
1979, pp. 12-19.
[3].
Consumers
entering the outlets were offered vouchers giving 50p off the cover price.
[4].
Notice issued under Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 in Agence et Messageries de
la Presse (1987) OJ C 164/2.
5
. (1992) OJ L 236/11.
7
. L'Oreal v. de Nieuwe AMCk [1987] ECR 3775.
[8].
IBM Personal Computer,(1984) OJ L 118/24.
Metro
S.B Grossmarkte v. Commission[1977] ECR 1875 and Murat (1983) OJ L 348/20.
Demo-Studio
Schmidt v. Commission [1983] ECR 3045.
Parfums
Givenchy (1992) OJ L 236/11.
Villeroy
& Boch (1985) OJ L 376/15.
AMP
Notice.
[9]
. Report of Enquiry into the supply and distribution of Daily and Sunday
Newspapers, 1979,prl.8380.
10
. op cit.
[11]
. (1985) OJ L 369/1.
[13].
Givenchy, para 11 A(5) 8th indent, p. 16.
AMP para. 13-14.
[14].
Decision no. 25 of 1 July, 1993 - Motor Fuels Category Licence, Article 4(1)(b).
[15].
Newspaper Publishing, Case M423 of 14 March, 1994.
[16].
MMC Report of December, 1993. 'The Supply of national newspapers A Report on
the supply of national newspapers in England and Wales.' (UK) HMSO, Cm 2422.
17
“ Fair Trading” Consumer & Competition News from The OFT, issue
no. 12 Autumn 1995; issue no. 13 Spring 1996.
[18].
Decision
no. 477, 11/3/1997.
19.
Competition Authority decision no.336 of 10 June 1994, Para 70.
20
ibid.
21.
SA
Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et messageries de la presse.
© 1997 Irish Competition Authority
BAILII:
Copyright Policy |
Disclaimers |
Privacy Policy |
Feedback |
Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECompA/1997/482.html