BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
High Court of Ireland Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Rafferty v. Bus Eireann [1996] IEHC 33; [1997] 2 IR 424 (21st November, 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1996/33.html Cite as: [1996] IEHC 33, [1997] 2 IR 424 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
1. The
Transport (Reorganisation of Coras Iompair Eireann) Act, 1986 (the Act) brought
about major changes in public transport in this country. Prior to it, Coras
Iompair Eireann (CIE) had been responsible for public transport both by road
and rail within the State. The Act required CIE to form three new companies to
be named respectively Iarnrod Eireann - Irish Rail; Bus Eireann - Irish Bus and
Bus Atha Cliath - Dublin Bus. As their names imply, Irish Rail was to be
responsible for the provision of a railway service within the State and between
the State and places outside it; Irish Bus was obliged to provide within the
State and between the State and places outside it a passenger service by road
except insofar as such a service was provided by the third company, namely,
Dublin Bus. It is with the second of these companies, Irish Bus, that this
application is concerned.
2. The
Act prescribed the principal objects of the bus company which had to be stated
in its Memorandum of Association and required that such memorandum be approved
by the Board of CIE with the consent of the Minister for Finance and, where
appropriate, the Minister for the Public Service. Similar statutory
requirements were prescribed in respect of the Articles of Association.
3. Section
18 of the Act provided for a statutory transfer to Irish Bus of all the rights
and liabilities of CIE arising by virtue of any contract or commitment (express
or implied) entered into by CIE before the vesting day in relation to functions
assigned to Irish Bus.
4. It
is with Section 14 of the Act that this application is principally concerned.
As various provisions of the Section will feature during the course of this
judgment, it is desirable that I should set it out in full. It reads as
follows:-
5. In
accordance with the terms of the Act the Respondent company was set up and the
Minister for Communications fixed the 2nd February, 1987 as the vesting day for
each of the three companies formed including the Respondent.
6. Irish
Bus has conducted its business since the vesting day. Its core commercial
businesses are provincial city services, stage carriage services and what are
called 'expressway/supa bus' services. Unfortunately, Irish Bus has not been
very successful, at least in recent times, from a fiscal point of view. The
provincial city services lose over two million pounds annually. Stage carriage
services fare no better. It is only the 'expressway/supa bus' which is
profitable; it makes in excess of two million pounds each year.
7. Irish
Bus is projected to incur losses of 26 million pounds up to 1999 before State
subvention. Furthermore, the traditional methods of covering losses by State
grants will have to be discontinued under European Union law. Because of this
unhappy situation, Irish Bus commissioned a firm called Somers & Associates
to carry out a review of the company's operations. That firm was asked to
identify areas where costs savings could be achieved. It carried out its
commission and produced a viability plan dated the 18th June, 1996. Somers
& Associates is of the view that Irish Bus will lose 1.7 million pounds
after State subvention in the current year and furthermore has indicated that
unless there are significant improvements in the companys' cost base, such
losses will increase substantially in the coming years.
8. The
Applicants accept the financial difficulty in which Irish Bus finds itself.
They acknowledge the need for change. But they take issue with certain of the
proposals contained in the viability plan, not because they are not justified
from an economic or commercial point of view but because they say they infringe
their legal rights.
9. This
Applicant is 56 years of age. He is employed as a driver by Irish Bus. Prior
to its formation, he was employed in the same capacity by CIE having taken up
his post in 1967. He resides in Monaghan town and he works a six-day week from
Monday to Saturday. His roster of duties is, like all other rosters involving
drivers, known as a "board". He has been working the same board for the last
17 years. It consists of the following.
10. He
begins work at 1.40 p.m. at the garage in Monaghan when he books on. He
collects his ticket machine and tickets and makes his way to his bus which he
inspects for roadworthiness. He then loads the passengers and luggage and
departs for Letterkenny at 2.00 p.m. He arrives there at 4 p.m. where the
passengers disembark. He then books off duty until 5.05 p.m. when he repeats
the process in reverse arriving back in Monaghan at 7.45 p.m. He then cashes
in his receipts, makes up his tickets and books off for the night at 9.00 p.m.
On a Friday night, upon return from Donegal, he undertakes a return trip to
Clones. On alternative weeks, from Monday to Friday, he also undertakes a
return trip to the Regional College in Dundalk departing from Monaghan at 7.50
a.m. and returning at 10 a.m.
11. On
the 23rd September, 1996, he was informed that his particular duty was being
abolished but that he could apply for other duties. These other duties would
have ensured that Monaghan could remain his base but he would be involved in
driving different routes than theretofore. He declined to take up this offer.
12. On
the 4th October of this year, he was advised of a new board in Monaghan
including a route to Dundalk together with additional driving duties which
would ensure that his driving day would start and finish in Monaghan. The
details of this new roster were issued on the 7th October and would involve
driving from Monaghan to Dundalk rather than to Letterkenny. This new board
would involve Mr. Rafferty commencing work at 7.50 a.m.. However, Irish Bus
contends that the duties to be undertaken would involve a definite commencement
and conclusion time and are appropriate to a bus driver in the Respondent's
service. The Applicant takes issue with this.
13. Mr.
Ward is 55 years of age. He has been a bus driver in the employment of Irish
Bus and its predecessor, CIE, for the last 27 years. He lives in Limerick.
For the first 17 years of his employment, he worked on the Limerick city
routes. Prior to the Act coming into operation, he applied for the board which
he has worked for the last 10 years. He works a six-day week. He begins duty
at 11.05 a.m. when he books on at the Limerick garage. He then goes to the
Limerick bus terminal where he takes over the bus which has arrived from Cork
and departs at 11.32 a.m. for Galway. He books off there at 2 p.m. and remains
so until 5.40 p.m. when he makes the return journey to Limerick, arriving home
at 8 p.m. At 8.15 p.m., he departs on a return trip to Ennis and arrives back
in Limerick at 10.15 p.m. The implementation of the viability plan will
involve the elimination of this board. In September 1996, Mr. Ward was given
the opportunity to apply for other boards in the Limerick area but did not do
so. He has been assigned a rotating duty ex Limerick which will require him to
drive a number of routes with Limerick as his starting and finishing point.
This will involve working a five-day week. He will also be able to drive on
Sundays and so avail himself of the premium remuneration rates which apply to
Sunday work. Irish Bus contends that he will continue to perform duties
appropriate to his position as a bus driver and that he was notified of his new
assignments on the 7th October, 1996.
14. This
Applicant (the Union) is a registered trade union and organises staff members
of Irish Bus. Of the full-time drivers employed by Irish Bus, approximately
600 are members of this union. The remainder are members of SIPTU. The union
presents this application in a representative capacity on behalf of all of its
members employed in Irish Bus to whom the provisions of Section 14 of the Act
apply. That is to say, this application is promoted by the union on behalf of
its bus driver members who were employed by CIE prior to the coming into
operation of Section 14 of the Act on the 2nd February, 1987.
15. The
union takes issue with the company on a number of aspects of the viability plan
which the company sought to implement in Irish Bus on the 14th October, 1996.
It contends that this viability plan will dramatically affect the terms and
working conditions not merely of Messrs. Rafferty and Ward but of all of the
drivers in Irish Bus who are members of the union. It says that the viability
plan, when implemented, will constitute a variation in the conditions of
service of such drivers and that this is impermissible having regard to Section
14 of the Act. It contends that certain provisions of the viability plan, to
which I will return in due course, are suggestive of these fundamental changes.
Now that the company has issued new boards and by so doing has in effect put
flesh upon the bones of the viability plan, the union contends that its fears
in this regard have been borne out.
16. I
have already alluded to the unhappy financial situation of Irish Bus which
brought about the commissioning of the viability plan. The Union, through its
General Secretary, has sworn that it has recognised for some considerable time
that there is a need for an extensive review of work practices within Irish
Bus. The need for such a plan is manifest, not merely from the point of view
of improving the commercial viability of the company, but also from
considerations of common sense efficiency. The present situation where bus
drivers, on average, spend only 72% of their time driving and are unoccupied
for the bulk of the remainder of their working time, whilst being fully
remunerated, speaks for itself.
17. The
viability plan intends to achieve a minimum target of 85% driving time from all
drivers. It seeks to do so in a number of ways. First, it speaks of full
flexibility and interchangeability between staff in various grades being
required. The existing network of depots, garages and administrative
facilities will be examined under the terms of the plan and reappraised.
Facilities surplus to business requirements will be vacated and resources
reallocated to identified alternate locations. The route network and timetable
will be changed where needed in order to cater for customer needs and to meet
competitive threats and the demands of the market place. The plan envisages
five day basic working weeks spread over seven days for all drivers. They will
be required to report for duty at the book-on time at locations designated by
the company. Revised boards will be compiled for all depots so as to provide
for greater efficiency in operating services. The plan provides for basic
rates of pay for drivers who operate large buses, to remain as at present.
Shift allowances will also be paid, as will meal and lodging allowances and
there is a minimum gross weekly pay guaranteed of £215 for working a five
day, 39 hour week.
18. The
part of the plan to which particular exception is taken is contained at
paragraph 4.9. It reads as follows:-
19. In
addition, the number of spare/relief drivers is to be determined by the level
of activity and normal relief requirements. The days of work and times of
attendance are also to be based on these criteria. The viability plan, having
been published in June of 1996, was the subject of a number of meetings between
the Union and Irish Bus. The last of these meetings appears to have taken
place on the 19th September, 1996 but did not result in any agreement being
reached. At that meeting Irish Bus made it clear that unless the Union was
prepared to accept the viability plan, it would be implemented, in part at
least, as and from the 14th October, 1996. Such implementation was to take
effect without the agreement of the Union. As part of this implementation, new
boards were published. I have already referred to the boards which directly
affect the first two Applicants. However, a number of other boards have been
published by Irish Bus which are not as yet applicable to individual named bus
drivers but do, in my view, indicate quite clearly the company's intention to
implement these boards in respect of, as yet, unnamed bus drivers. A number of
these contain the following legend:-
20. More
explicit reference is made to what will be expected of drivers in a number of
boards. Two in particular have been highlighted. One of these involving the
Letterkenny to Ballybofey service, requires the driver to "assist office clerk
at Letterkenny with parcels and enquiries". Board No. 18 involving a Tralee
driver requires him to "clean offices on Sundays between 11.45 a.m. and 2.05
p.m. and again on Mondays and Fridays between 10.50 a.m. and 1.50 p.m.".
21. The
Applicants contend that Irish Bus has no entitlement to implement what are
alleged to be changes to the conditions of service of bus drivers in the manner
in which it has sought to do or at all, save with the agreement of the Union.
This contention brings into focus the statutory provisions of Section 14 of the
Act which are pivotal to the issues which have to be resolved in this Judicial
Review.
22. I
have already reproduced in full the provisions of the section. I turn now to
what I believe to be the true construction to be given to subsections (5) and
(6) thereof.
23. In
my view the true meaning of subsection (5) is that every person who was an
officer or servant of CIE before the 7th February, 1987 cannot receive a lesser
scale of pay or be brought to less beneficial conditions of service than those
to which he was entitled, prior to that date, unless a collective agreement has
been negotiated, permitting such alterations. This subsection has both
positive and negative effects from an individual employee's point of view. On
the one hand it means that in the absence of a collective agreement, negotiated
with a recognised Trade Union, an employee's scale of pay or conditions of
service may not be reduced or lessened. But on the other hand employees have
to accept less beneficial conditions of service or rates of pay than that to
which they were previously entitled, provided that such reductions are brought
about by a collective agreement. So a diminution in pay or worsening in
conditions of service can be brought about even against the wishes of an
individual employee, provided that they are brought about by collective
agreement.
24. In
construing that subsection, Blayney J. (with whom Finlay C.J. and Egan J.
concurred) said at p. 57:-
25. In
my view subsection (5) of the Act falls to be construed in precisely the same
manner as Section 45(2) of the Postal and Telecommunications Act, 1983 was
construed by the Supreme Court.
26. Furthermore,
I am of opinion that this subsection, unlike the next one which I shall
consider presently, has no temporal limitation but remains in force until such
time as the last pre-1987 CIE employee leaves the payroll.
27. This
subsection is clearly transitional in nature, unlike its immediate predecessor.
It remains in force only until such time as scales of pay and conditions of
service of officers or servants are varied. Once such variation takes place,
the section ceases to have any practical effect. Until that variation occurs,
however, the scales of pay and the conditions of service together with
restrictions, requirements and obligations to which officers and servants were
subject, before the vesting day, continue to apply to them. Not merely that,
but such scales of pay, conditions of service, restrictions and requirements
can be exercised or imposed by CIE or its Chief Executive or by the board or
Chief Executive of Irish Bus. But when the variation occurs, it may not worsen
the scales of pay or conditions of service, except in accordance with a
collective agreement.
28. The
subsection appears to me to have little practical effect insofar as this case
is concerned. The Applicants base their complaint, fairly and squarely, upon
what they say is an attempt to introduce less beneficial conditions of service.
It follows that if subsection (6) is exhausted because a variation has taken
place already, the Applicants are still entitled to rely upon the provisions of
subsection (5). If, however, subsection (6) is still in force because a
variation has not taken place, it is clear that such a variation cannot operate
to worsen the conditions of service, save in accordance with a collective
agreement negotiated with a recognised Trade Union. Accordingly, in my view,
subsection (6) has little practical effect upon this case since, insofar as
conditions of service are concerned, it gives in effect the same protections as
are contained in subsection (5).
29. As
the case developed it became clear that, apart from the question of the
construction to be placed upon Sections 14(5) and (6) of the Act, the principal
matter which falls to be determined in this case is whether or not the matters
alluded to in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.9 of the viability plan, when carried into
effect, will amount to the imposition of less beneficial conditions of service
than were present prior to the vesting day. The Applicants contend that they
do. The Respondent says that they amount to no more than a change in work
practices which are to be distinguished from conditions of service. They say
that at all times Irish Bus was entitled to change the work practices of bus
drivers without the necessity of Trade Union agreement and that this did not
amount to a breach of the protections afforded by Section 14. Before I can
even consider that question, however, I must adjudicate on a number of
preliminary objections which were raised by Mr. Fitzsimons on behalf of Irish
Bus. One deals with the procedure which was followed in this case and the
other deals with the question of locus standi.
30. As
far as the procedure is concerned, he argues that this is not a case which
should have proceeded by way of Judicial Review. Insofar as locus standi is
concerned, he accepts that the first two Applicants can clearly come to Court
to make complaint of the matters ventilated by them. But he says that the
Union has no locus standi since it cannot be a beneficiary under the provisions
of Section 14 and acts as a mere agent on behalf of its members who are
principals. I will deal with each argument in turn.
31. Mr.
Fitzsimons argues, quite rightly, that Judicial Review is a public law remedy.
He contends that this is not a public law case. Rather, he says the relevant
provisions of Section 14 have been incorporated as a statutory term in the
contracts of employment of each pre-1987 employee of CIE now employed by Irish
Bus. If, therefore, they wish to seek redress in respect of such breach of
contract, they must do so, not by means of Judicial Review, but rather by
ordinary plenary proceedings.
32. In
a moment I will turn to a consideration of the validity of this submission from
a strictly legal point of view. From a practical point of view it has little
to recommend it. These proceedings were commenced on the 7th October, 1996 and
were heard as a full action over two days on the 15th and 16th October, 1996.
Had they been commenced as a private action by plenary summons, Mr. Fitzsimons
accepts there could have been no question of a full trial having taken place
within ten days of the proceedings being initiated. By adopting the Judicial
Review route, it was possible to have a full hearing of the action, something
that would have been impossible had the private law route been taken. The best
that might have been achieved would have been an interlocutory hearing for
injunctive relief. Indeed, it is significant that the possibility of having to
seek interlocutory relief was certainly in contemplation of the parties, having
regard to the documents which were exchanged and in particular the matter dealt
with at paragraph 9 of the Statement of Opposition. So, by approaching the
matter from a Judicial Review point of view, a speedy trial was ensured with
the examination of all issues to be determined in a final and binding way
rather than on an interlocutory basis. Of course, if Mr. Fitzsimons' argument
is well-founded as a matter of law, such practical common-sense considerations
count for little.
33. In
my view, his argument is not well-founded and I am glad to say that on one view
of the matter there is a convergence in this regard between the practical and
the legal.
34. If
that be the appropriate criterion to apply, this submission of Mr. Fitzsimons
can have no legal validity.
35. However,
I am by no means certain that that is the correct criterion and I note that
this topic, when discussed by the Supreme Court in Geoghegan's case, was dealt
with in all of the judgments as obiter dicta with the Chief Justice declining
to express any view on the topic.
36. The
matter is dealt with in some detail by Denham J. but again on an obiter basis.
She, however, sets out a number of factors she considers relevant when a
question of the availability of Judicial Review is raised. In this regard I
bear in mind, not merely that her statements are obiter, but that they do not
appear to be in accord with the views of O'Flaherty J. and Blayney J..
However, Egan J. agreed with her. The factors which she identifies are as
follows at page 130. She said:-
37. Whilst
Geoghegan's case was dealing with matters entirely different to what I am
dealing with in this action, nonetheless, I believe that a number of those
factors identified by Denham J. are of relevance here. They are as follows:-
38. These
five considerations mirror, to a great extent, the matters identified by Denham
J. in Geoghegan's case. In my view, they amply support the entitlement of
these Applicants to seek redress from this Court by means of Judicial Review
rather than by plenary proceedings. This case does involve, in my opinion, a
sufficient public law element to justify Judicial Review.
39. Curiously
enough, none of the judgments in the Supreme Court in Geoghegan's case refer to
an earlier decision of that Court (nor was I referred to it in these
proceedings) in which the question of the reach of Judicial Review was decided
in a definitive way. It is
Beirne
-v- Commissioner of An Garda Siochana
(1993) I.L.R.M. 1. The views expressed by the majority of the Court in that
case cannot be regarded as mere obiter dicta. The Court, through Finlay C.J.,
approved of the decision of Barr J. in
Murphy
-v- Turf Club
(1989) I.R. 171. Two passages from the judgment of Finlay C.J. merit
reproduction. He said at p. 2:-
40. In
this case, I think there can be little doubt but that Irish Bus operates in the
public rather than the private domain. Whilst the contracts of employment
which form the subject of this action may originally have been private ones
between employee and employer (albeit a public employer), they have been
altered by statute and are given an express statutory protection which is not
the case in an ordinary private contract. I am of the view that the
relationship between the parties here is not derived solely from a private law
contract.
41. In
rejecting Mr. Fitzsimons' contention, I have not omitted consideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeal in England in
R.
-v- East Berkshire Health Authority Ex-Parte Walsh
,
(1984) 3 All E.R. 425. Beirne's case is binding on me and, even if it were
not, I would prefer it and the, admittedly obiter, statements made by members
of the Supreme Court in Geoghegan's case to the views expressed by the Master
of the Rolls.
42. The
second preliminary objection raised by the Respondent concerns the entitlement
of the Union to bring these proceedings at all. The argument runs as follows.
The first two Applicants are entitled to bring these proceedings because it is
their contracts of employment which they say are being interfered with in an
unlawful way. But the Union has no contract of employment with Irish Bus. All
it has is the statutory entitlement which is given to it in Section 14 of the
Act to enter into a collective agreement with Irish Bus which may alter scales
of pay or the conditions of service of employees, even in a detrimental
fashion. But in such event, it is the employees who are either benefited or
damnified and not the Union. It is therefore contended that the Union is
nothing more than an agent of known and ascertained or ascertainable
principals. Such being the case, it could have no locus standi to bring these
proceedings.
43. I
am by no means sure that the comparison which is made between the relationship
of the Union to its members and that of principal and agent, is an accurate
one. But even if one assumes that it is, this argument, in my view, ignores
the fact that the Union brings these proceedings in a representative capacity
as representing all of its members who are in the employment of Irish Bus and
to whom the provisions of Section 14 of the Act are applicable. It is
perfectly entitled to bring an action in such capacity and leave was given to
it so to do by Smyth J. on the 7th October, 1996. Bringing the action in that
form rendered unnecessary the naming as individual applicants of all of the
Union's 600 members. I am, therefore, satisfied that this argument has no
substance and I reject it.
44. Even
if the Union was not suing in a representative capacity, I would be very slow
to conclude that it could not maintain proceedings seeking to enjoin activities
which it considered to be in breach of a statutory provision which prevented
such activities taking place, save with its agreement. However, it is not
necessary for me to decide this question since I am satisfied that the
proceedings brought by the Union in a representative capacity give it
sufficient locus standi to maintain this action.
45. I
turn now to consider a topic which promoted a good deal of debate during the
course of the hearing and in respect of which there does not appear to be any
Irish decision to date. Is there a difference in law between conditions of
service and work practices?
47. That
quotation appears to me to make it quite clear that in the totality of the
relationship between employer and employee, certain aspects of it may truly be
described as conditions of service whereas other aspects are not. Even though
these other aspects may have important implications for both employer and
employee, they are nonetheless not to be regarded as conditions of service and
in the present case would not fall to be protected under Section 14(5).
Accordingly there is a difference in law between conditions of service and work
practices.
48. It
is also clear from the quotation that when Blayney J. describes what are
conditions of employment by reference to the rate of pay, hours of work, length
of holidays, sick leave and pension rights, he is not setting forth an
exhaustive list of what may be regarded as conditions of service. I would not
wish to do so in the course of this judgment either. But I do think that there
may be added to that list one other item which can be regarded as a condition
of service. It is the basic job description applicable to a post. At common
law an employee is not required to do a fundamentally different job from that
contracted for.
49. An
English decision is of assistance in illustrating the difference between
conditions of service and work practices.
50. I
have already decided that the basic job description constitutes a condition of
service. In order to decide whether that condition of service has or is likely
to be altered in an unlawful fashion by Irish Bus I formulate the same test as
was applied by Walton J. in Cresswell's case and so I ask myself this
question:- "Is the effect of the changes promulgated by Irish Bus such as to
result in the bus driver doing a different job or is it merely to bring about a
situation where they will be doing recognisably the same job in a different
way"? If it is the former and is less beneficial to the employee it is
unlawful without the consent of the Trade Unions pursuant to Section 14(5). If
the latter, it is merely a change in work practice, does not attract the
statutory protection and is lawful.
51. All
parties to the proceedings accept that the essential conditions of service of
drivers employed by Irish Bus are to be found in what is called the Road
Passenger Agreement. That Agreement was entered into as far back as 1947 but
has been extensively modified and amended from time to time. I am satisfied
that that agreement is not exhaustive. Two elements of it are, in my view,
relevant to this case. The first is that under clause 26 thereof the agreement
is terminable by three months notice on either side. No such notice has been
served nor indeed does Irish Bus intend to terminate the agreement.
53. Mr.
Bunting's affidavit and pertains to the provisions of Clause 2 of the
agreement. I am satisfied that there was an amendment to that clause which
envisages the furnishing of six days notice to the Trade Union of any proposed
changes in a duty schedule. Under the terms of the amended Clause 2 the Trade
Union officials are to be given facilities to examine such changes. However
there is no requirement that agreement must be obtained from the Union or its
members in respect of such changes of schedule. The existence of such a
provision seems to suggest that scheduling arrangements, at least as far as
city services were concerned, were matters in respect of which the company
could make unilateral alterations. This amendment to Clause 2 long antedated
the Act and suggests to me that conditions of service which existed when the
Act came into force included one whereby the company could alter schedules
without consent on the part of the Union or the employees. In any event even
if there was not such provision it appears to me that the scheduling of drivers
per se can only be regarded as a question of work practice rather than a
condition of service.
54. I
turn now to consider each of the Applicants by reference to the alterations
which are sought to be brought about.
55. I
have already set out in some detail the board or roster which Mr. Rafferty
worked for the past seventeen years and the new one which is proposed for him.
It is to be noted that his new roster or board does not contain what was
referred to as the standard phrase identified by paragraph 11 of Mr. Bunting's
first affidavit.
56. In
my view the alterations which Irish Bus seeks to effect to Mr. Rafferty's board
amount to a change in work practice rather than a change in conditions of
service. He continues to be a Bus driver. The duties which he will do are
broadly the same as those undertaken heretofore. He will continue to operate
from his original base. It does not appear to me that the alterations which
Irish Bus wished to make in his case constitute a breach of the provisions of
Section 14 of the Act and consequently the application in respect of
58. Again
in the case of this Applicant it appears to me that the new board which will
govern his working week constitutes a change in work practice rather than a
change in his conditions of service. He still continues to carry out the
duties of a bus driver who will be working a five day week. There is no
complaint concerning any drop in his basic remuneration. In these
circumstances it appears to me that although the new board will bring about
alterations to his work, they do not approach anything like the form of
alteration which would be required in order to amount to a change of his basic
job description and therefore a change of a condition of his service.
Accordingly in his case also this application will be dismissed.
59. The
Union has put in evidence the viability plan and has drawn my attention to the
particular part of it to which it takes exception. That is Clause 4.9. I have
already reproduced that in this judgment. The Union has also demonstrated the
way in which Irish Bus has sought to implement that Clause by reference to the
standard phrase which has been incorporated into most of the new boards. I
have also reproduced that earlier in this judgment. A number of specific
boards have then been called to my attention.
60. So,
for example (as already pointed out), on the Letterkenny/Ballybofey service
(Board No. 29A) a driver will be required to "assist office clerk at
Letterkenny with parcels and enquiries". Board No. 18 dealing with Tralee
requires the driver to "clean offices on Sundays between specified times and to
do likewise on Mondays between specified times".
61. In
his supplemental affidavit Mr. Bunting exhibits some further boards which
require drivers on occasions to "sweep and clean yard or any other duties as
are required by inspector". Another roster requires a driver to "sweep main
hall and empty bins". In that particular roster it is said that it is
contemplated that the driver concerned will have to undertake these duties for
an hour and twenty-five minutes of each of five working days. In a further
roster which is exhibited it is contemplated that the driver will assist the
traffic inspector regulating buses etc.
62. Whilst
these rosters have not yet been applied to any specific individual I think it
likely that were it not for this judicial review application Irish Bus would
have attempted to do so. These boards go a good deal further in the alterations
which they propose than those which are applicable in the case of the first two
applicants. They require the drivers concerned to undertake duties which were
not formerly done by them. Indeed in the case of the sweeping duties involving
yard cleaning, Mr. Paul Keely in the supplemental affidavit which he swore on
behalf of Irish Bus accepted that these duties were new. But he went on to
point out that they would only be done at a time when the drivers involved
would otherwise be idle.
63. Other
elements involved in the new boards are less clear on the question of novelty.
For example it appears to be the case that bus drivers were always involved in
a certain amount of duties involving the checking and loading of passengers or
the giving of information or work involving luggage and parcels. However, most
of this work appears to have been referable to passengers and luggage
travelling on the particular bus which was the responsibility of the individual
driver. Under the new regime, work of this nature may have to be carried out
in respect of other buses.
64. I
readily accept that under the Road Transport Rule Book which has been exhibited
before me drivers are required to perform a considerable range of duties apart
from actual driving. For example, they are responsible to ensure the safety of
passengers; they have heretofore been involved in the provision of information;
they have also been involved in keeping the interior of their own buses clean
where passenger safety or comfort could be compromised by the accumulation of
debris. All of these tasks appear to be consistent with the role of a bus
driver. The extension of these tasks to buses other than the one for which the
individual driver is responsible appears to me to be permissible and not amount
to other than a change in work practice. That is so provided of course that
the principal occupation of the driver remains that of driving. Both under the
viability plan (Clause 4.9) and the new boards this is so.
65. The
position therefore is that in my view Irish Bus is correct in saying that the
changes which it seeks to bring about are ones which involve work practices
rather than changes in conditions of service. These alterations do not affect
the rate of pay, hours of work, length of holidays, sick leave or pension
rights. Neither do they in my view alter the basic or core work of a bus
driver. These altered duties will only fall to be executed at times where
drivers would otherwise be idle and yet remunerated. In each case these duties
will constitute a small part of the overall work which will remain bus driving.
66. I
therefore conclude that the proposed alterations relate to work practices
rather than conditions of service. Such alterations are not protected by
Section 14.
67. If
I am wrong in this conclusion and the proposed alterations amount to a change
in conditions of service that of itself does not trigger Section 14(5). That
provision does not prohibit an alteration or change in conditions of service
unless it brings about a worsening in the employee's position. The change must
be less beneficial to the employee before Section 14 applies.
68. What
worsening is brought about here? Can an employee complain that his conditions
of service are worsened when his employer re-orders his working arrangements so
as to ensure that the employee is not idle whilst being paid. That is what
these changes hope to achieve in an ailing company.
69. I
do not believe that any such complaint would be legitimate. The position would
of course be different if Irish Bus sought to require the drivers to receive a
lesser scale of pay or to carry out work during times when they would not be
paid. But merely to require them to work during a time when they are being
paid cannot give rise to a legitimate claim under Section 14 on the grounds
that formerly they did not have to work during such times.
70. It
follows that even if the proposed changes are ones which alter conditions of
service rather than work practices, they do not give rise to a complaint under
Section 14 since they do not worsen the drivers' conditions of service.
71. Indeed
on one view these changes will enhance the driver' s position since, if
implemented, they ought to improve the company's viability and therefore the
prospects of continued employment.