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1. The Plaintiffs seek to adduce at this stage, which as Mr. Brady has pointed out, is very late in the day, in evidence, An Blascaod Mor National Historic Park Bill, 1989 as it was introduced in the Oireachtas. The application is confined simply to producing the Bill under section 5 of the Documentary Evidence Act, 1925 and handing in the Bill and referring the Court to a particular section. The application is grounded on the basis that the Bill may be of assistance in dealing with a dispute in relation to the meaning of the words "lineal descendant" in section 4.4. of An Blascaod Mor National Historic Park Act, 1989.

2. The point is made by Mr. Brady SC for the Defendants that the application is made late in the day, but he also concedes that the Court is master and in charge of its own procedure. That is a point consistently made in Bennion, Statutory Interpretation 2nd edition, which notes that in certain circumstances the English Courts have looked at the parliamentary records. Here the Plaintiffs wish to refer to a specific provision of the Bill.

3. Mr. Brady SC has made the point that the Howard v Commissioners of Public Works 1994 1 IR 101 which deals with statutory interpretation is relevant. In the ruling I have already delivered in these proceedings on the 17th June, 1997 concerning the exceptional circumstances in which reference might be made to parliamentary debates, I refer to the above judgment of the Supreme Court at page 31 of the transcript as follows:-

4. That is a reminder that in this instance I am dealing with a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation, and the Defendants are entitled to rely on the presumption of constitutionality, but in considering the provisions, it may well be that the question of the double construction rule and the severability of provisions may come into play.

5. Mr. Brady SC referred to the judgment of Murphy J, in dealing with a motion for discovery in this very case. Murphy J. said, when he had reviewed and agreed with the observations of Lord Wilberforce in the Pickin v. British Railways Board 1974 AC 765, 796,

6. On the other hand, it seems to me that a Court in dealing with a case where constitutional considerations come into play, can lean or incline towards a preference for a system of informed interpretation. As Mr. Brady conceded the Court is the master of its own procedures.

7. In this instance there is an ambiguity alleged and conflicting constructions have been put forward in relation to the meaning of "lineal descendant".

8. It seems to be and I am clearly informed by Counsel for both sides that they are arguing for conflicting meanings of "lineal descendant", that the meaning of the words may not, at least at this stage, be as clear as one would wish and there is room for argument in favour of ambiguity. The meaning cannot ostensibly be clear.

9. I think that the Court is entitled to investigate and look at what is the policy of this Act and it is in this narrow context and in scrutinising what appears to be prima facie rather unusual provisions regarding pedigree that I think that the Court is entitled to look at what was the mischief sought to be addressed by the passing of An Blascaod Mor National Historic Park Act, 1989.

10. While I am very aware of the stringency of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Howard v. Commissioners of Public Works case, nevertheless it seems to me that there must be some leeway for the relaxation of the exclusionary rule in considering a case concerning a constitutional challenge involving as it does the double construction rule and other principles such as the rule about severability.

11. I think that the Bill also differs from the parliamentary records of debates. My conclusion from section 5 of the Documentary Evidence Act, 1925 is that a bill is published under the authority of the Stationery Office. It is the words of the Bill that are there to be read and considered and one can look and narrow one's focus to the relevant section of the Bill and one is not going on an excursion into the motives or the purposes of individual members of the legislature.

12. I distinguish the motives or purpose of the legislators from the policy to be gleaned on a reading of the extract itself. The wording of the Bill may assist the Court in framing a statement of the purpose of the Act.

13. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I think that the Court is entitled to look at the wording of the Bill relevant to this very section as the Court is concerned with constitutional litigation and the application of the double construction rule and severability principle and as it may assist in interpreting the Act and the section.

14. I want to make it clear that I will be assiduous to focus on the words of the Act as enacted. If the literal or common sense interpretation of the words are clear, I do not intend to get embroiled in seeking help from the wording of the Bill.

15. For the purpose of this application I propose to allow the Bill to be adduced subject to these limitations.