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1. The same net issues arise in both of these appeals, the facts being essentially the same in each. The applicants are owners of large retail stores in the centre of Dublin. In March, 1992 both suffered substantial fire damage caused by exploding incendiary devices which were planted in the stores by a person or persons who at the time was acting for a Loyalist terrorist organisation in Northern Ireland. Claims for malicious damage done to the respective premises and contents were brought against the respondent, Dublin Corporation. Notices of claim were duly served on the latter on behalf of each applicant within the time prescribed by statute. Proceedings under the Malicious Injuries code were brought against the respondent by each applicant and were heard together in the Circuit Court and on appeal to the High Court.

2. A preliminary issue arose as to whether the claims were within the restricted scope of the Malicious Injuries Act, 1986 which drastically narrowed the range of malicious injury claims which previously had been within the code. It was ultimately decided by Barron J. in the High Court that the claims were within the ambit of the 1986 Act and that the applicants were entitled to compensation from the respondent under the Act. The parties then negotiated settlement of their damage claims with the Corporation and there remained only their claims for interest on the settlement amounts which are now before the court on appeal from the judgment of Carroll J. in the Circuit Court delivered on 3rd May, 1996 in which he disallowed interest. It is argued on behalf of the applicants that they are entitled to interest at the appropriate court rate on the amounts of the respective settlements; that the court should exercise its statutory discretion in that regard and allow interest from the dates of service of the original notices of claim on the respondent up to the actual dates of payment of the awards in question or, alternatively, from the date of the awards up to payment of the agreed amounts by the respondent.

3. It seems to me that the issue in this case turns upon the true construction of Section 5(4) of the Malicious Injuries Act, 1981 (the 1981 Act). This statute, in its long title, is described as being:-

4. Although essentially it re-states the basic features of the then existing Malicious Injuries code, it also comprises new provisions which were not previously contained in the statutes which are the basis of the original code. One of these is contained in Section 5(4) of the 1981 Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 provides that:-

5. Sub-section (4), insofar as it is relevant, is in the following terms:-

6. Interest in the context of a malicious injuries claim is compensation for not having the benefit for a given time of the compensation awarded by the court, or agreed between the parties, for maliciously caused damage to the claimant's property, measured as a percentage per annum of the award or settlement. It is a claim which arises out of delay in payment of an applicant's claim for compensation for the malicious injury to property which he has suffered. It is, therefore, a claim which is consequential on the malicious damage award or settlement obtained by the claimant. It follows that, being a consequential claim, and not a claim in monitory terms as to actual malicious damage, it is, in my opinion, excluded by Section 5(4) of the 1981 Act. Although interest was recoverable on malicious injury awards prior to the Act, I am satisfied that that right has been extinguished by the sub-section. It is also pertinent to refer to the opening part of the sub-section which is a provision expressed in positive terms:-

7. Interest is not "compensation for the actual damage caused" and all other claims which may arise out of the malicious injury complained of are excluded.

8. Mr. McGovern, for the applicants, has sought to rely on the provisions of Section 22 of the Courts Act, 1981 which provides, inter alia, as follows:-

9. This provision was considered by the Supreme Court in Navan Carpets Limited -v- Ó Culachain (Inspector of Taxes) , [1988] I.R. 164. It was held that a case stated was a proceeding to which a state authority was a party and in which a court ordered the payment by a person of a sum of money, within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act of 1981. Accordingly, the High Court was entitled to order the payment of interest pursuant to Section 22 of the Act. However, a crucial distinction between the latter case and that under review is that Section 5(4) of the Malicious Injuries Act, 1981 specifically limits the claim for compensation which may be made by a person who suffers damage through malicious injury to an assessment of the actual damage done. No other species of claim is maintainable under the Act and, therefore, the question of interest on a malicious injuries award or settlement cannot arise.

10. It follows, therefore, that the applicants' claims for interest fail.