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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> DSG Retail Ltd. v. PC World Ltd. [1998] IEHC 3 (13th January, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/3.html Cite as: [1998] IEHC 3 |
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1. This
is the Plaintiff's application for Interlocutory Injunctions restraining the
Defendants in general terms from passing off or attempting to pass off their
goods and/or services as those of the Plaintiff and specifically from operating
a business or marketing their goods and/or services under and/or using the mark
or name PC WORLD.
2. The
Plaintiff is a limited liability company incorporated in the United Kingdom
where it operates a nation-wide chain of large retail outlets, which it
characterises as computer superstores and which trade under the name PC WORLD.
It opened its first PC WORLD superstore in Croydon in October 1991, its second
in Essex in June 1992 and by Christmas 1992 further stores had been opened in
London and in Brentford. Currently the Plaintiff operates a total of thirty
five PC WORLD superstores throughout the United Kingdom, one of which, located
at Sprucefield, Lisburn in Northern Ireland, was opened in August 1994. From
these outlets the Plaintiff retails a vast range of computer hardware and
software and computer accessories and books and printed matter relating to
computers. In the main the products retailed are manufactured by manufacturers
such as Compaq, Packard Bell, Microsoft and such like. The name PC WORLD
appears on the facade of these outlets. The Plaintiff produces a publication
entitled "PC WORLD Buyer's Guide" at periodical intervals, every five to six
weeks, to promote and advertise the products it stocks in its PC WORLD
superstores and frequently distributes this publication by means of "door
dropping" in a targeted area. It also produces and distributes vast quantities
of printed material which bears the mark PC WORLD in connection with the
business carried on in the superstores, for example, instructional leaflets.
It advertises its PC WORLD business in the print and broadcast media and in the
period from May 1993 to June 1996 it expended sums in excess of £10
million sterling on press, radio and television advertising. It claims that
during that period it advertised in tabloid and broadsheet newspapers published
in the United Kingdom which have extensive circulation in this jurisdiction, on
radio stations, including radio stations in Northern Ireland, and on British
television channels, such as Ulster Television, whose broadcasts and
transmissions are received in this jurisdiction. In August and September 1994
it advertised in an Irish newspaper, The Irish Times.
3. The
turnover generated by the Plaintiff's PC WORLD superstores for the period from
1st May, 1992 to 30th April, 1996 exceeded £480 million sterling. The
turnover generated by the superstore in Sprucefield, Lisburn in Northern
Ireland from August 1994 to August 1997 exceeded £20 million sterling and
the Plaintiff estimates that at least 4% of its annual sales through that
outlet are to customers who are resident in this jurisdiction.
4. The
Plaintiff's first PC WORLD superstore in this jurisdiction, which is located at
the Blancharstown Centre in Dublin, was opened on 7th November, 1997, the
decision to open it having been made in January 1997 following the success of
another retail operation of the Plaintiff, which trades under the name Dixons
and which was opened at the Jervis Centre in Dublin in December 1996.
5. The
basis of the Plaintiff's claim in these proceedings is that even before it
opened the superstore in the Blanchardstown Centre it had established a
substantial and extensive goodwill and reputation in this jurisdiction in the
name and mark PC WORLD having regard to the number of customers from this
jurisdiction it attracted to its superstores in the United Kingdom and the
extent of its advertising which reached the public in this jurisdiction.
6. On
10th October, 1996 the Plaintiff filed an application, to which the Defendants
intend to object, to register the name PC WORLD as a trademark in this
jurisdiction in respect of computer hardware and software and computer
accessories and printed material. It has already procured similar registration
in the Trademarks Registry of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as of 10th
June, 1996.
7. The
first Defendant is a company which was incorporated in this jurisdiction under
the Companies Acts, 1963-1990 on 2nd January, 1997. The second and third
Defendants are directors of the first Defendant. The second Defendant is a
qualified computer network engineer who provides computer consultancy services
to businesses in this jurisdiction through the medium of a company called
Network Systems Management Limited. Having perceived a market opening for the
supply of computer hardware and software in the course of his consultancy work,
in August 1996 the second Defendant decided to incorporate a company to be
called PC World Limited to supply such products and to provide services
including network management and training. Since its incorporation the first
Defendant has been trading, initially from the Enterprise Centre in Terenure in
Dublin and currently from a unit in The Maltings Business Park at Marrowbone
Lane in the City of Dublin. The first Defendant has advertised its business by
means of the circulation of leaflets, and by advertising in "free sheets"
circulating in Dublin City, in national newspapers and in a computer magazine.
Since February 1997 the Plaintiff has had a website on the Internet and its
website is registered on the Irish Register of Domain Names administered by
University College Dublin.
8. The
first Defendant retails products similar to the products retailed by the
Plaintiff - computer equipment, software and accessories manufactured by
manufacturers such as Hewlett Packard, Microsoft and such like - from its
Marrowbone Lane premises and provides services such as Internet web page
design, software development services and virus management. The Marrowbone
Lane premises are more in the nature of an office unit than a retail outlet or
showroom. In reality the Plaintiff does not have a "passing trade" as such but
attracts customers through its advertisements, its presence on the Internet or
in consequence of an introduction from Network Systems Management Limited. The
Defendants contend that by reason of the scale, personal nature and method of
marketing of its business, there is no likelihood of confusion with the
Plaintiff's business.
9. The
turnover of the first Defendant has not been disclosed on affidavit other than
to acknowledge that it is "modest", although the business is now sustaining
four full time employees and is providing work to ten self-employed contractors.
10. The
Plaintiff became aware of the existence of the first Defendant in mid-September
1997. By letter dated 29th October, 1997 to the first Defendant, the
Plaintiff's agents in this jurisdiction, MacLachlan and Donaldson, alleged that
the first Defendant was passing off its goods and services as those of the
Plaintiff and demanded that the first Defendant immediately refrain from making
any further use of the name and trademark PC WORLD in connection with its
business. The response of the first Defendant's solicitors was a denial that
the first Defendant had ever represented that it had any connection whatsoever
with the Plaintiff or its business or that there was any confusion between the
Plaintiff's business and the business of the first Defendant and an assertion
that the first Defendant had at all times traded lawfully and intended to
continue to trade under its company name. These proceedings were initiated by
a Plenary Summons issued on 12th November, 1997.
11. Lest
it appear otherwise, I should say that the facts outlined above in relation to
the Plaintiff and its business, which are derived from affidavits sworn on
behalf of the Plaintiff by its company secretary, Geoffrey David Budd, are not
entirely free of controversy. The Defendants, in the affidavits filed on their
behalf and through their Counsel, have been critical of the quality of the
evidence adduced by the Plaintiff. Similarly, the facts in relation to the
first Defendant and its business outlined above, which are largely gleaned from
affidavits sworn on behalf of the Defendants by the second named Defendant, are
not entirely free of controversy either. In an affidavit sworn by him on 1st
December, 1997 the second Defendant averred as follows:-
12. The
second Defendant went on to aver that in adopting the name "PC World Limited",
there was no attempt to trade on the Plaintiff's alleged goodwill and
reputation in this jurisdiction. Predictably, the Plaintiff questions the
credibility of the Defendants' explanation of the genesis of the first
Defendant's corporate name.
13. The
evidential conflicts to which I have alluded cannot be resolved on this
application. Neither can the evidential conflicts surrounding the Defendants'
assertion that, as a matter of fact, apart from the Plaintiff, the first
Defendant is not the only business in the State operating under the name "PC
WORLD". The Plaintiff has sought to dispute the significance of the following
matters relied on by the Defendants in support of their contention that the
name "PC WORLD" is not distinctive of the Plaintiff's business in this
jurisdiction:
14. It
is not in dispute that during the first seventeen days it was trading in the PC
WORLD superstore in the Blanchardstown Centre, the Plaintiff achieved sales in
excess of £860,000.
15. Against
the foregoing factual background it was submitted by Mr. McDonald on behalf of
the Defendants that the Plaintiff's application should be considered on the
basis that what the Plaintiff is seeking against the Defendants is, in effect,
mandatory relief - an order directing the first Defendant to change its name.
It is true that if the relief sought by the Plaintiff is granted and if the
first Defendant wishes to continue to trade pending the trial of the action, it
will have to change its name and effect a considerable number of consequential
changes, for example, its VAT registration, its telephone directory listing,
etc. However, any such changes effected would flow from the Defendants' desire
to obviate the consequences of the grant of the relief sought by the Plaintiff,
which, in my view, is prohibitory in substance as well as form. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's entitlement to the relief it claims falls to be determined by
the application of the principles set out by the House of Lords in
American
Cynanamid Company -v- Ethicon Limited
(1975) AC 396, as adopted by the Supreme Court in
Campus
Oil Limited -v- Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2)
(1983) I.R. 88.
16. The
first question to be determined is whether the Plaintiff has established that
there is a serious issue to be tried that the first Defendant is passing off
its business as that of the Plaintiff. The Defendant strongly urged that it
has not.
17. Before
summarising the arguments advanced on behalf of the Defendants, I thing it
would be useful to set out the essential elements of passing off and I propose
to do so by adopting the following passage from the judgment of Lord Oliver in
Reckitt
and Colman Products Limited -v- Borden
(1990) 1 All ER 873:
18. The
Defendants disputed that there is a serious issue to be tried that the
Plaintiff had established a goodwill or repudiation in the mark or name PC
WORLD in this jurisdiction prior to the commencement of trading by the first
Defendant under that name. The Plaintiff's response was that it is not
necessary that the Plaintiff should have a place of business in this
jurisdiction in order to sustain an action for passing off and cited the
decision of the Supreme Court in
C.
& A. Modes -v-C. & A. (Waterford) Limited
(1976) I.R. 198 and, in particular, on the following passage from the judgment
of Henchy J. at page 212:
19. I
am satisfied that at this interlocutory stage there is sufficient evidence
before the Court of sales to customers resident in this jurisdiction and
advertising which was in circulation and capable of being received in this
jurisdiction by the Plaintiff trading as
20. PC
WORLD prior to January 1997 to conclude that there is a serious issue to be
tried that the Plaintiff had established a goodwill or repudiation in
connection with the mark or name
21. The
Defendants further contended that the Plaintiff had not adduced any evidence
that persons in this jurisdiction associated the name PC WORLD with the
Plaintiff's business and with no other business and that, having failed to
prove the distinctiveness of the mark or name in relation to the Plaintiff's
business, its action must fail in limine. The Defendants adopted the
explanation of the concept of distinctiveness in passing off to be found in
Wadlow on
The
Law of Passing Off
,
2nd Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) in the following terms at paragraph
6.02:
22. In
the absence of evidence from persons residing in this jurisdiction
that
prior to January 1997 they associated the name PC WORLD with the Plaintiff's
business and with the Plaintiff's business alone, it was contended by the
Defendants, the Plaintiff's claim must fail in limine. The Plaintiff's
response was that the court is entitled to infer from the evidence adduced as
to the volume of sale transactions with residents of this jurisdiction and the
advertising which was in circulation and capable of being received in this
jurisdiction that the public would have exclusively associated the mark and
name "PC WORLD" with the Plaintiff's business. On the basis of the evidence
adduced by the Plaintiff I consider it is appropriate to draw such inference at
this interlocutory stage and I consider that the absence of affidavit evidence
from members of the public expressly establishing exclusive association is not
fatal to the Plaintiff's claim.
23. The
Defendants further contended that the public in this jurisdiction, prior to
January 1997, in any event, could not have exclusively associated the mark "PC
WORLD" with the Plaintiff's business because of the existence of the businesses
trading under the same name in Dundalk and Waterford and the availability of
the magazine PC WORLD. All that has to be determined at this interlocutory
stage is whether, in the light of the controversy as to the significance of
these matters, there is a serious issue to be tried that the name PC WORLD was
exclusively associated with the Plaintiff's business in this jurisdiction prior
to January 1997. In my view, there is.
24. It
was further argued by the Defendants that the term "PC WORLD" is a descriptive
term, the initials "PC" being synonymous with personal computer, and that the
Plaintiff had not established that it had acquired a secondary meaning as
denoting its business. In this connection the Defendants referred to
Wadlow
at paragraph 6.28 where it is stated that a trader who chooses to use a name or
mark which is prima facie descriptive of goods, services or business must prove
the mark has acquired a secondary meaning as denoting his goods, and the burden
of doing so is higher in proportion to the descriptive quality of the mark.
The Plaintiff's response was that the term "PC WORLD" is not entirely
descriptive and that there is a metaphorical element in the use of the word
'WORLD' in the term and that, by analogy to the decision of the English High
Court in
Jian
Tools for Sale Inc. v. Roderick Manhattan Group Limited
(1995) FSR 924, this Court should hold that the descriptive content of the term
PC WORLD does not prevent there being a seriously arguable issue as to
misrepresentation. In the
Jian
Tools
case, it was contended that the name "BizPlan Builder" in relation to computer
software templates for existing and emerging businesses was entirely
descriptive and that it followed that there was no basis for the claim of
likely confusion advanced on behalf of the plaintiff. In his judgment Knox J.
said at page 938:
25. At
this interlocutory stage the question to be considered is whether,
notwithstanding the undoubted descriptive element in the term "PC WORLD" - the
initials 'PC' - there is a serious issue to be tried on the issue of
misrepresentation and likelihood of confusion. Adopting the conclusion reached
by Knox J. in the
Jian
Tools
case, I think there is. In my view, it is well arguable that the term "PC
WORLD" is not exclusively descriptive and, on the basis of the evidence adduced
by the Plaintiff of confusion since the opening of the superstore in the
Blanchardstown Centre, which I am not prepared to infer is entirely
attributable to errors made by the telephone directory enquiry service, that
there is a likelihood of confusion.
26. Despite
the evidence adduced by the Defendants and the arguments advanced on their
behalf, in my view, there is a serious issue to be tried as to whether the use
by the first Defendant of the name PC WORLD for its business amounts to passing
off.
27. I
must now consider whether, if interlocutory relief is refused and it
subsequently transpires at the trial of the action that the Plaintiff is
entitled to injunctive relief, damages would adequately compensate the
Plaintiff for any loss suffered between the hearing of the interlocutory
injunction and the trial of the action and whether it can be assumed that the
Defendants would be in a position to meet an award of damages. Delivering his
judgment in
Mitchelstown
Co-operative Agricultural Society Limited -v- Golden Vale Products Limited
on
12th December, 1985, Costello J., as he then was, said that it is axiomatic
that in most passing off actions damages are an inadequate remedy for a
successful plaintiff. Although in the instant case it should be possible to
quantify the loss to the Plaintiff of any business of which the Plaintiff
should be found to have been wrongfully deprived by the first Defendant pending
the trial of the action and there is no reason for surmising that such loss
would be other than "modest" and that the Defendants would be able to meet it,
that is not the end of the matter. In the instant case, as in any alleged
passing off situation where the Plaintiff has no control over the activity of
the Defendant, there would be a potential for unquantifiable damage to the
Plaintiff's goodwill and reputation and for the dilution of the value of the
mark to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, I must conclude that the normal axiom in
passing off actions, that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the
Plaintiff, applies here.
28. This
leads to consideration of the question whether, if interlocutory relief is
granted, the Plaintiff's undertaking as to damages would adequately compensate
the Defendants should they be successful at the trial in respect of loss
suffered by reason of the injunction being in force pending the trial, it being
clear that the Plaintiff would be able to meet any award made on foot of its
undertaking as to damages. In his affidavit sworn on
29. Accordingly,
it is necessary to consider whether there are any other relevant matters which
indicate that the balance of convenience (which is a matter of weighing the
respective risks of injustice in deciding one way or the other) favours the
granting or the refusal of interlocutory relief. In his submissions, Mr.
McDonald intimated that his clients, the Defendants, perceive the contest
between the Plaintiff and themselves as a contest between Goliath and a flea, a
perception which, in my view, is justified having regard to their respective
economic "muscle". In commercial terms the capacity of the Plaintiff to
overcome the consequences of a refusal to grant interlocutory relief, even
given that damages would not be an adequate remedy in the event of the
Plaintiff being successful at the action, is hugely disproportionate to the
capacity of the Defendants to overcome the consequences of the grant of an
injunction. Given this disparity, it seems to me that, if the Plaintiff can be
afforded a measure of protection pending the trial of the action without
putting the first Defendant in the position of having to change its name and to
effect the other consequential changes already referred to, justice does not
require that the injunctive relief sought should be granted.
30. The
Defendants contend that they have acted openly, properly, in accordance with
good commercial practice and bona fide at all times. It will be for the trial
judge to decide whether this contention stands up. For present purposes,
suffice it to say that there is no evidence before the Court which would lead
to a contrary conclusion. Given that and, having regard to the nature of the
first Defendant's business operation, I consider that the requirements of
justice can be met by undertakings from the Defendants. It was intimated that
the Defendants are prepared to give an undertaking not to open any new outlet
for their business pending the trial of the action. Subject to the second and
third Defendants giving such undertaking on behalf of the first Defendant and
themselves and also giving undertakings in the following terms: