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1. In these proceedings the Plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries, damage and loss sustained by her as a result of a fall on the allegedly slippy floor of a bathroom attached to her bedroom in a hotel in Lourdes operated by the second named Defendant where she was staying on holiday booked by the first named Defendant as travel agents on her behalf.

2. The first named Defendant is a company domiciled in Ireland; the second named Defendant is a company domiciled in France.

3. The second named Defendant has brought this motion for an Order setting aside the service upon the second Defendants of the notice of summons in this action. This motion relies on Order 26 Rule 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and Article 18 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial Matters (the Convention) as enacted by Section 3 of the Jurisdiction of Courts and Enforcement of Judgments (European Communities) Act, 1988.

4. The primary provision in relation to jurisdiction in the Convention is set out in Article 2 thereof which provides:-

5. Article 6 provides an exception to the foregoing general principle inter alia as follows:-

6. The second Defendant makes two broad submissions in support of its application as follows:-

7. With regard to the submission that the agreement between the Plaintiff and the first Defendant (if any) was not made within the jurisdiction, the position is as follows. The Plaintiff has sworn an affidavit saying that in response to an advertisement handed to her after Sunday Mass at Buncrana, Co Donegal on the 10th May, 1992 advertising the Derry Diocesan Pilgrimage to Lourdes she signed an application form for the pilgrimage on the 12th May, 1992 and as far as she is aware "... the actual group tour was booked through the offices of the first named Defendant in Baggot Street in Dublin" . The Solicitors for the first named Defendant, in the context of a query as to whether there was a written agreement covering the tour, wrote to the Solicitors for the second named Defendant stating inter alia "we understand from our principals that the contract was not evidenced in writing other than the enclosed". The reference to "the enclosed" appears to have been a reference to the application form.

8. I do not think that the Plaintiff's contract was with some individual or entity fronted by the "Derry Diocesan Pilgrimage to Lourdes 1992" pursuant to the signature on the application form for non-invalid as submitted by Counsel for the second Defendant. I consider that the Plaintiff had a contract with the first Defendant and this appears to be accepted by the Solicitors for that Defendant. Once the first Defendant is domiciled in this country, as appears to be the case, then in my view under Article 2 of the Convention this Defendant can be sued in this country regardless of where the contract was made. In fact I consider that the money tendered by the Plaintiff (Stg£318.00) was probably accepted by the first Defendant within this jurisdiction so that in fact the contract would have been made within this jurisdiction. I do not think that the fact that the money was paid in sterling rather than punts indicates that the contract was made outside the jurisdiction. In any event I consider that the first named Defendant is domiciled within the jurisdiction and accordingly may be sued in this jurisdiction.

9. The second basis for the application asserts that there is no plausible case against the first Defendant. In her statement of claim the Plaintiff alleges negligence, breach of duty and breach of contract against this Defendant.

10. The learned Chief Justice went on to indicate that it was not sufficient on such an enquiry merely to assert that the contract in question could contain implied obligations on the part of the shipping company (in that case) in relation to the choice and instruction of the driver and the coach in which the Plaintiff customer was travelling in England. That did not appear to him to end the enquiry where it was alleged that the Irish domiciled company was joined in the proceedings merely for the purpose of maintaining an action in this country against the two other non-Irish Defendants. In such a case the Court must conduct an enquiry

11. It is not sufficient merely to assert the possibility of a breach of an implied obligation but the Plaintiff must satisfy the Court on facts deposed to concerning the circumstances out of which the claims arise that there are in fact grounds for alleging a breach by the Irish domiciled company which could have contributed to the Plaintiff's injuries.

12. In relation to the specifics in the Gannon case the Chief Justice said (page 375):-

13. In the present case the Plaintiff's precise case appears to be that she slipped on a floor which was made slippy because the shower splashed onto it which would not have happened if there had been a shower curtain (which by inference there was not). Furthermore, the floor was not an anti-slip floor as it should have been. The first Defendant as travel agent, being aware in particular, that the group contained invalids and elderly persons (the Plaintiff gave her age as 55 years on the application form) was under a specific duty to ensure that the hotel booked was safe and suitable for such a group and in particular to ensure that any bathroom floors would have a non-slip surface and that showers would be equipped with shower curtains.

14. The affidavit filed on behalf of the Plaintiff on this aspect of the application was sworn by her Solicitor Kieran McLochlainn. Although he does not actually state that there was no shower curtain and no anti-slip floor, he does refer to the pleadings where these deficiencies are alleged and does say that the Plaintiff's case is that inter alia the wet floor caused her to fall and suffer the personal injuries detailed in the statement of claim. It is a fair inference from this affidavit that the Plaintiff's evidence will be that there was no anti-slip floor and no shower curtain in the hotel bathroom and that this caused or contributed to her fall.

15. Applying these decisions of the Supreme Court to the present case I ask the question are there any plausible prima facie grounds of any description for suggesting that the hotel was of such a kind or was in such a condition that it would be unsafe for the Plaintiffs? In my opinion, such prima facie grounds do exist and therefore having regard to the test indicated (particularly at page 375) by the Supreme Court in Gannon -v- B and I Steam Packet Company Limited, I hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain these proceedings against the first Defendant in this jurisdiction and that being the case under Article 6(1) of the Convention is also entitled to join the second Defendant as a co-Defendant in these proceedings.

16. In these circumstances I must refuse the application of the second Defendant for an Order setting aside the service upon the said Defendant of the notice of summons in this action.