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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Bolger v. O'Toole [2000] IEHC 125 (8th June, 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/125.html Cite as: [2000] IEHC 125 |
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1. These
Judicial Review proceedings arise out of the arrest of the Applicant in the
early hours of Tuesday, 20th October, 1998 on fourteen extradition warrants
obtained on the 25th June, 1998 in Bow Street Magistrates Court, London by
Detective Constable Malcolm Jennings. These warrants were endorsed by the
First named Respondent, an Assistant Commissioner of the Garda Siochana on the
19th October, 1998. The warrants state that on the 3rd April, 1995 during the
course of the trial of the Applicant on certain charges at Southwark Crown
Court, London, the Applicant failed to surrender as required to the custody of
the said Court. On the 6th and 7th April, 1995 the Applicant was convicted in
his absence at Southwark Crown Court of fourteen offences, namely, ten offences
of theft, three offences of forgery and one offence of fraudulent trading. In
respect of the ten offences of theft and the offence of fraudulent trading the
Applicant was sentenced in his absence by the Court to a term of imprisonment
for two years upon each, to run concurrently with each other. In respect of
the three offences of forgery the Applicant was sentenced in his absence to a
term of imprisonment of twelve months upon each to run concurrently with each
other, but to run consecutively to the aforementioned concurrent terms of two
years imprisonment.
4. On
the 21st December, 1995 Detective Constable Jennings obtained arrest warrants
from Bow Street’s Magistrates Court with a view to securing the
Applicant’s extradition to England. The warrants were endorsed by an
Assistant Commissioner of the Garda Siochana on the 15th February, 1996 and the
Applicant was arrested under them and brought before the Dublin Metropolitan
District Court with a view to his extradition being ordered under Part 3 of the
Extradition Act, 1965.
5. The
attempt to extradite the Applicant on foot of the warrants obtained by
Detective Constable Jennings on the 25th June, 1998 has provoked much
litigation on the part of the Applicant. The present matters come before the
Court as results of the Order of O’Higgins J dated 2nd November, 1998
whereby he granted leave to the Applicant to apply for Judicial Review on one
ground, that of
res
judicata
and
refused it on another ground, namely, that the attempted extradition was
unlawful and/or an abuse of process being the result of a conspiracy of
officers of the Second named Respondent (Criminal Assets Bureau) and Detective
Constable Jennings, inter alia, to frustrate and impede his ability to defend
himself in certain proceedings between the Applicant and the Criminal Assets
Bureau.
6. The
operative part of the Order of O’Higgins J. granting leave to apply for
Judicial Review was in the following terms:-
7. Following
upon the making of the said Order on 2nd November, 1998 the Applicant appealed
against that part of the Judgment and Order of O’Higgins J which refused
leave to the Applicant to apply for Judicial Review on the aforesaid ground of
engaging in a conspiracy constituting an abuse of the process of the Court. On
the 8th July, 1999 Barrington J in an ex tempore judgment with which the other
members of the Supreme Court agreed, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
Order of O’Higgins J.
8. Following
upon same, the Applicant served a Notice of Motion seeking the relief in
respect of which O’Higgins J gave leave, but curiously the Notice of
Motion, notwithstanding that a variety of ancillary reliefs are sought in it,
does not expressly or in any specific way set out the main relief in respect of
which leave was obtained. I do not propose to attach any significance to this
procedural deficiency.
9. Paragraphs
1, 6, 8 and 9 of the Applicant's Statement of Grounds appear to bear directly
and peripherally on the matter in respect of which leave was granted.
11. The
Applicant swore on the 2nd November, 1998 a lengthy Affidavit in support of his
application which does not contain the usual averment verifying the contents of
the Statement of Grounds. Out of an Affidavit of some 24 paragraphs, only
paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 21 have any relevance to the present
application.
13. In
the Statement of Opposition of the Sixth named Respondent the following inter
alia is said at paragraphs 2 and 5:-
14. An
Affidavit was sworn by one Liam Mulholland on the 5th of March, 1999 for the
purposes of verifying the facts relied upon in the Statement of Opposition.
Mr. Mulholland as is deposed to in paragraph 5 of that Affidavit was the
Solicitor acting on behalf of the Garda Siochana and the Attorney General in
the application for extradition in this matter which came before Judge Windle
in the District Court on the 23rd May, 1996.
16. Mr.
Mulholland was cross-examined before me on foot of a notice to that effect. I
accept Mr. Mulholland’s evidence of what transpired in the District Court
on the 23rd May, 1996, 23rd July, 1996 and on the 10th October, 1996.
17. It
would appear to me that the dispute which arose and was litigated in the
District Court concerned the lawfulness of the arrest of the Applicant and was
based on the assertion by the Applicant that the warrants on foot of which he
was arrested were defective in two respects and as a consequence his arrest was
unlawful and hence in the words of McCarthy J in
McMahon
-v- Leahy
,
(1984) IR 525 at 547 “
essentially
the extradition application was never properly launched
”.
18. It
is common case that arising from this, Judge Windle made an Order under Section
47, subsection (3) discharging the Applicant.
19. I
further accept that the two matters which were litigated before Judge Windle
were as is deposed to at paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of Mr. Mulholland,
namely, that the warrants did not specify the location of the offence and that
the recitals in all of the warrants said that Peter Bolger was “an
offender unlawfully at large from Her Majesty's Prison, Brixton” and that
this was contradicted by the evidence from the police constable from England to
the effect that Mr. Bolger had absconded whilst on bail in the course of his
trial, a fact which has never been in dispute.
20. Thus,
Judge Windle being satisfied as he must have been, that the warrants as is
clear from them did not specify the location of the offence and as it was
equally clear that the evidence of the police constable contradicted another
material content of the warrant, he was necessarily driven to the conclusion
that the warrants were bad and hence the arrest unlawful and consequentially
that the Applicant must be discharged.
21. As
is apparent from the new warrants, that is to say the warrants obtained from
Bow Street Magistrates Court on the 25th June, 1998, both of these two issues
are addressed in that in respect of the location of the offence the words
“within the jurisdiction of the said Crown Court” are added to each
of the warrants thereby establishing the location of the offence, and the
following is substituted in the new warrants for paragraph 6 of the old
warrants “the said Peter Edward Bolger also known as Peter Bolger having
been convicted of and sentenced for the said offence is required to be detained
in a prison to which the Prison Act, 1952 applies and therefore is an offender
unlawfully at large from such prison” thereby correcting the
contradiction between the undoubted facts and the contents of paragraph 6 of
the warrants which were the subject matter of the hearings in the District
Court in 1996.
22. Thus
the issue for determination in this hearing is whether the issues which are
sought to be tried and determined before the District Court in the intended
extradition proceedings on foot of the warrants obtained on the 25th June, 1998
are the same issues which were heard and determined by Judge Windle finally on
the 10th October, 1996.
23. In
approaching the resolution of this issue I note initially that on behalf of the
Respondents, Mr. Charlton conceded that the jurisdiction exercised by a
District Judge under Section 47 of the Extradition Act, 1965 involved a
function which was judicial rather than administrative in nature. Thus an
estoppel either of the cause of action type or issue estoppel could arise as
between one proceeding and another taken under Section 47 of this Act.
24. On
behalf of the Applicant it was conceded in reply by Mr. Humphries that a lawful
arrest could be made after an invalid arrest and indeed this proposition is
amply illustrated in the authorities and in particular in the cases of
Hegarty
-v- The Governor of Limerick Prison
,
(1998) IR Vol. 1 412,
Duncan
-v- The Governor of Portlaoise Prison (No. 2),
(1998) IR Vol. 1 at 433,
Collie
-v- The Governor of Portlaoise Prison
,
(1998) IR Vol. 1 443 and finally
Quinlivan
-v- The Governor of Portlaoise Prison
,
(1998) IR Vol. 1 at 456.
25. It
necessarily follows from the fact that there can be a lawful re-arrest
following an unlawful one, that the indorsing by the First named Respondent of
the warrants obtained from Bow Street Magistrates Court on the 25th June, 1998
and the subsequent arrest of the Applicant on foot of those warrants was
permissible. That then necessarily precipitated the bringing before the
District Court of the Applicant pursuant to Section 45(2) of the Extradition
Act, 1965.
26. Upon
being brought before the District Court it would be open to the Applicant to
raise any matter which might impinge on the lawfulness of his arrest and upon
so doing it would be necessary for the District Judge pursuant to his
obligation to vindicate the constitutional rights of the Applicant, to hear and
determine such issues as were raised by the Applicant which would necessarily
impinge on his right to liberty.
27. Having
regard to the fact that the two matters which were raised in the District Court
proceedings in 1996 and led to the Applicant’s discharge at that time,
have been corrected in the warrants which were issued on the 26th June, 1998,
it would seem unlikely that these issues would arise for determination again.
28. It
may very well be that the Applicant may discover other defects in the process
not hitherto raised and if that be the case there can be no doubt that these
would be issues which had not heretofore been heard or determined and no
question of res judicata could arise.
29. It
would seem to me that if it is accepted that there can be a lawful subsequent
arrest with the necessary consequence of initiating the procedure under Section
45(2) of the Extradition Act, 1965, the Applicant’s primary submission to
the effect that there is an estoppel which prevents the re-initiation of failed
extradition proceedings, must be rejected.
30. It
then remains to be decided, whether in the course of the proceedings which
follow upon the Applicant being taken before the District Court pursuant to
Section 45(2), there will arise an issue in respect of which issue estoppel
could arise, namely, whether that issue had been determined between the same
parties in the previous proceedings. As it is not yet apparent what issues
will arise in the District Court proceedings now initiated, it is manifestly
premature to say whether any issue estoppel will arise.