BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

1. This is an application for leave to seek reliefs by way of Judicial Review and which in fact comprises two separate but related applications in that in some instances the application for leave is to be made ex parte and in others pursuant to the provisions of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 Section 5 on notice to the Respondents. When the matter first came before me however I directed that the application in its entirety should be on notice to the Respondents.

2. The reliefs sought and in respect of which the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 Section 5 does not apply are set out in the Statement grounding application for Judicial Review at paragraphs A 1 to 7 inclusive. As to the relief sought at A 1 an undertaking has been given by the Respondents and in the light of the same this relief is no longer relevant. As to the reliefs sought at A 2 to A 7 inclusive but excepting the relief sought at A 6 the date of each relevant notification, decision or recommendation is as follows:-

3. A.2 Notification under the Immigration Act 1999 Section 3 (3) (a) 9th June, 2000.

4. A.3 Decision of Minister 9th June, 2000.

5. A.4 Recommendation of James Nicholson 23rd May, 2000.

6. A.5 Decision of Minister 29th March, 2000.

7. A.7 Relate to decisions at A 3 and A 5 above.

8. All the said reliefs are in respect of matters whether notification, decisions or recommendation which occurred more than six months before the commencement of this application and accordingly the Rules of the Superior Courts Order 84 Rule 21 applies. Before I extend time I must consider that there is good reason for so doing. It appears from the affidavits before me that at all relevant times from February, 2000 the Applicant was a client of the Refugee Legal Service. I am informed and accept that the Applicant discussed with the Refugee Legal Service the decision at A 5 of 29th March, 2000 as to the possibility of the same being Judicially Reviewed: I also accept that as a matter of probability that there was no such discussion in relation to the decision at A 3 of the 9th June, 2000. The only ground for extending time pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 urged upon me is that there was a default on the part of the Applicant’s legal advisers in that they failed to advise her to pursue a remedy of Judicial Review in relation to the decision at A 5 and failed to consider the possibility of Judicial Review with her in relation to the decision at A 3. I do not see that this circumstance without more is a ground upon which time should be extended. To accept it as such would negative the clear policy of the Courts underlying Order 84 Rule 21 that applications for Judicial Review should be made promptly. In the circumstances of this case it is appropriate also that I should have regard to the origin of the Hope Hanlon letter and the manifestly unfounded procedure therein outlined. The origin is in a resolution of the E.U. Ministers at London on the 30th November and 1st December, 1992 where a resolution was passed arising out of the concern that a rising number of Applicants for asylum in Member States of the E.U. are not in genuine need of protection within the terms of the convention and a concern that such manifestly unfounded applications overload asylum determination procedures resulting in delay in the recognition of refugees in genuine need of protection. Having regard to the origin of the manifestly unfounded procedure I consider it appropriate that anyone challenging a step in the same should move promptly. It seems to me that underlying this application is a suggestion that the Refugee Legal Service was negligent or inefficient. However the general policy of the law, albeit with some exceptions, is that a litigant is vicariously liable for the default of his legal advisers: See Rainsford -v- Limerick Corporation [1995] 2 ILRM 561 at p 562. Having regard to the foregoing I am not satisfied that there is good reason for extending the periods within which these applications shall be made.

9. As to the relief at A 6 the relief sought is a declaration that the Immigration Act (1999) (Deportation) Regulations 1999 (S.I. no. 319 of 1999) are ultra vires and void. The grounds relied upon are that the prescribed form of Deportation Order contains no date as of which the deportation will be effected and no place is identified to which the deportation will be directed. The relief sought and these grounds are equally referable to reliefs sought and grounds on the application pursuant to the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 Section 5 and accordingly I propose to refuse relief here, but to deal with the same under the Section 5 application.

10. Accordingly I refuse leave to apply for the reliefs mentioned in paragraph A of the Statement grounding application for Judicial Review.

11. In paragraph C of the Statement grounding application for Judicial Review as amended the following reliefs as sought:-

12. As to this relief the Respondent is not relying on the notifications of the 15th November, 2000 or 9th February, 2001 and accordingly I refuse leave to apply for this relief.

13. I propose granting leave to apply for this relief but not on all of the grounds relied upon. I propose granting leave to apply on the grounds that the Deportation Order is irrational and void in that it does not specify the date by which the Applicant is required to leave the State or the country to which she is to be deported. I also grant that leave upon the grounds set out at E 16 in the Statement to ground application for Judicial Review.

14. The grounds in relation to this relief are set out in the notice of motion dated 19th February, 2001 and numbered 19 to 22 inclusive. With regard to ground 19 having regard to the opportunities given at an earlier stage of the procedures to make representations I do not see that there is a substantial ground for arguing that the Applicant was not allowed any adequate or informed opportunity to make submissions prior to the making of the Deportation Order and/or the notification of the making thereof. Such submissions were indeed made. With regard to ground 20 it is a fact that the Applicant was able to have access to the Court on more than one occasion. In these circumstances I do not think that a substantial ground can be shown on the grounds in paragraph 19 or paragraph 20.

15. With regard to ground 22 the position is as follows. Section 5 of the Refugee Act 1996 provides as follows:-