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1. On the 9th of May, 2000 the applicant made a complaint to the respondent that members of the Garda Siochana had hassled him on the 8th of May. He refused to sign the complaint. However on the 28th of July he sent in further material relating to this complaint and this time signed it.

2. On the 9th of October, 2000 he was sent a letter from the Garda Siochana Complaints Board stating that the Deputy Chief Executive had considered the complaint and a report into the incident which gave rise to it and stating that he was of opinion that the complaint was not admissible because it was, in particular, vexatious. He was also advised that if he wished to appeal he should do so within a month.

3. His solicitor wrote back on the 10th of November, 2000 expressing gratitude that an appeal would be heard notwithstanding that the month had gone by and seeking clarification of the statutory basis for the appeal and also seeking copies of the statements and other papers which were before the Deputy Chief Executive when he arrived at his decision, citing that fair procedures require that the Plaintiff be entitled to these.

4. He received a reply dated the 11th of December, 2000 stating that there was no specific provision in the Garda Siochana (Complaints) Act, 1986 which deals with appeals of inadmissibility decisions but that it was the Board’s policy to provide for and hear such appeals. In his reply the material requested was denied because it was stated that the Board regarded all documentation gathered in the course of an investigation of a complaint as confidential to it.

5. The appeal was not proceeded with but on the 12th of March, 2001 leave was given (time having been extended) to the applicant to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of the respondent deeming his complaint inadmissible on a number of grounds. The Applicant’s solicitor swore an affidavit grounding the application in which the foregoing facts are set out and the appropriate documents exhibited. The respondent filed a replying affidavit of Bryan O’Brien, Deputy Chief Executive of the respondent in which, inter alia, he says that

6. Mr. Frank Callanan S.C. submits on behalf of the applicant as follows:-

7. In his submissions before me Mr. Callanan accepted that the principles of procedural justice did not apply to the formation of the opinion in this case that the Applicant’s complaint is not admissible. It is not, therefore, necessary for me to refer to the several explicit passages in the Irish authorities on this Act establishing this proposition.

8. Mr. Shane Murphy S.C. for the respondent submitted as follows:

9. The Applicant’s case boiled down to two propositions namely

10. Mr. Murphy submitted :-

11. In the present case only the first two were relevant and each of them had been granted.

12. Mr. Murphy S.C. submits to the contrary. He submits that there is no logic in the proposition that just because a complaint is countered by an opposing statement it cannot be vexatious. If the essence of vexatiousness is the making of a complaint without sufficient grounds for the purpose of annoying or causing trouble to the respondent then the making of such a complaint is or is not vexatious on its own merits, so to speak, regardless of whether there is any statement to the contrary. The submission that a complaint must be non-vexatious if opposed means that the Deputy Chief Executive must exclude from his mind a consideration which he is obliged to take into account in the event that the complaint is met with opposing statements.

13. The evidence in the present case is simply that there were such opposing statements and the Deputy Chief Executive formed the opinion that the complaint was vexatious.

14. The test of irrationality in the Wednesbury sense was adopted and reiterated in O’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39) which made it clear that if there is any material upon the basis of which the deciding authority could come to the conclusion actually reached then the courts will not interfere on the grounds of alleged irrationality, notwithstanding the fact that the Court might itself have come to a different conclusion. There is no evidence as to what material was before the Deputy Chief Executive and it is not a ground for asserting irrationality, without more, merely to state that because there were opposing statements the complaint cannot have been vexatious within the statutory subparagraph. This is a case, on this point, on all fours with the decision of Laffoy J. In Stanley v. Garda Siochana Complaints Board (2002: I.L.R.M.:121) where the Court concluded (page 130)

15. The central point made by the applicant is that the decision that his complaint was vexatious was irrational. The main argument supporting this submission is that once a complaint is opposed by counter statements then it cannot be vexatious. I fail to see this. If a complaint is vexatious then it remains vexatious whether there is an opposing statement or not. The Act in my view casts upon the Deputy Chief Executive an obligation, upon receipt of a complaint, to consider whether it is admissible and this includes considering whether it is or is not vexatious. It is the Deputy Chief Executive and no one else who has to form the relevant opinion. It is accepted by the applicant, correctly in my view, that procedural principles do not apply to the formation of this opinion. I do not think that there is evidence that the opinion reached is irrational in the Wednesbury sense nor do I accept the proposition that just because there are statements to the contrary, the complaint cannot be vexatious within the meaning of the relevant subparagraph.

16. With regard to the submission that the applicant was entitled to reasons for the impugned decision, in the first place my view is that the applicant was given a reason for the decision and that the reason was sufficient for him to exercise the non statutory appeal procedure available. Secondly, in the context of making of an application for Judicial Review he has been able, in light of the reason given, to articulate his challenge to the validity of the decision with commendable clarity through his Senior Counsel. Thirdly, I see no difference in principle between the decision under attack in the present case and the decisions under attack in Flood and McCormack in each of which cases it was held by the High Court that the applicant was not entitled to reasons. If, contrary to my view, no reasons or no adequate reasons were in fact given, I would follow these decisions and hold that there was no entitlement to them.

17. Finally, I see no reason to construe sub-paragraph (vi) in the narrow manner contended for by the applicant as this would mean that all contested complaints cannot be inadmissible regardless of whether they are vexatious or not and I do not think that this is the correct interpretation of the Act.

18. In the circumstances, the Applicant’s case will be dismissed.