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Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Allen -v- Irish Holemasters [2007] IESC 33 (27 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2007/S33.html Cite as: [2007] IESC 33 |
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Judgment Title: Allen -v- Irish Holemasters Composition of Court: Murray C.J., Kearns J., Finnegan, P. Judgment by: Finnegan J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Outcome: Dismiss Notes on Memo: Extend time for delivery of a Reply to deal wtih the new issue | ||||||||||||||
THE SUPREME COURT Murray C.J.No. 301/2005 Kearns J. Finnegan J. BETWEEN CATHERINE ALLEN Plaintiff/Respondent and IRISH HOLEMASTERS LIMITED Defendant/Appellant Judgment delivered on the 27th day of July 2007 by Finnegan J. The plaintiff’s claim in this matter is brought pursuant to the Civil Liability Act 1961 Part 4 and arises out of the death of the plaintiff’s husband on the 8th May 1997. In the course of his employment he was driving a Nissan Vanette Cargo the property of the defendant his employer. The accident is described in the statement of claim as follows – “On or about the 8th May 1997 a Nissan Vanette Cargo owned by the Defendant and driven by Liam Allen in the course of his employment collided with a truck registration number 96C 10433 driven by Paddy O’Riordan and owned by Horgan Brothers of Macroom, County Cork. In the course of the collision the heavy load carried by the Defendant’s van which, which was unsecured, was propelled forward causing extensive personal injuries from which Liam Allen died.” While the particulars of negligence are in general terms they are directed to a plea that the defendant failed to ensure that the heavy load in the van was properly secured. The plaintiff furnished the following reply to a request for particulars – “All of the equipment carried in the cargo compartment moved forward at the pre-impact speed of the van. All of the equipment listed in the schedule attached hereto struck the driver and the passenger seats at a speed in the order of 40 miles per hour. Some of the items carried weighted in excess of 25 kilograms. This weight moving at speed killed the deceased.” The attached schedule gave in respect of each item of equipment either the actual or estimated weight. The defence delivered consisted largely of denials: it was specifically denied that the van contained a heavy load. It was pleaded that the injuries sustained by the deceased and which resulted in his death were caused by his sole negligence and in the alternative that he was guilty of contributory negligence with the following particulars – (a) Driving his vehicle at an excessive speed in the circumstances; (b) Failing to apply his brakes in sufficient time or at all; (c) Failing to have due regard to the nature of the roadway in question; (d) Taking a bend at an excessive speed; (e) Failing to have due regard to the prevailing road and weather conditions; (f) Driving on his incorrect side of the road; (g) Failing to keep any or any proper control over his vehicle; (h) Failing to observe the approach of a motor truck in the opposite direction. The plaintiff did not deliver a reply. Notice of trial was served on the 11th August 2004. On the 14th February 2005 the plaintiff furnished further and better particulars of negligence adding an additional plea as follows – “1. Overloaded the motor vehicle which the plaintiff was driving.” The defendant objected to this by letter dated 24th February 2005. By letter dated 23rd March 2005 the plaintiff sought consent to amendment of the statement of claim and by letter dated 31st March 2005 the defendant refused to consent. Accordingly a motion was issued returnable for the 20th June 2005 seeking leave to amend the statement of claim. The plaintiff sought to add to the paragraph on the statement of claim quoted above the following sentence –
In addition further particulars of negligence relating to the amendment were sought to be added. On the hearing of the motion the learned High Court judge granted leave to the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim as sought. The defendant appeals against that order. The plaintiff’s application was grounded on an affidavit of her solicitor, Michael Quirke, who deposes that he engaged the services of an engineer Mr Jack O’Reilly. Mr O’Reilly advised on information available to him, which was incorrect, that the vehicle was not overloaded. In January 2001 another engineer was engaged and a final report was received from him dated 26th February 2004 and this concluded that the load being carried caused the vehicles GVW to be exceeded and that this would have adversely affected its handling. Further as the vehicle’s load was not secured or restrained this would have led to a shifting of the vehicle’s centre of gravity which would also have adverse handling implications for the vehicle. A copy of this report was sent to Mr O’Reilly who in turn prepared a further report dated 24th June 2004. The effect of both these last mentioned reports is that the extent to which the van was overloaded would produce dramatically abnormal driving characteristics. The defendant opposes the amendment on a number of grounds. The first is delay. It is clear from the pleadings that an inspection of the van containing the equipment was carried out on the 27th March 1999. A list of the equipment was prepared and indeed was annexed to the reply to particulars delivered dated 26th January 2000. In an affidavit filed on behalf of the defendant Susan O’Reilly solicitor deposes –
The next ground for objecting is set in her affidavit as follows –
The final ground of objection is that the new claim now sought to be made is statute barred. As to the first ground of objection delay it is noted that the schedule of equipment furnished with replies to particulars had weights for each item of equipment but that these are estimated in a number of cases. However for the plaintiff’s claim as originally pleaded this was sufficient to show that the load was indeed heavy and the weight was otherwise irrelevant. The second engineer was engaged on the 24th January 2001 on the advice of senior counsel and well in advance of notice of trial being served on the 11th August 2004. There was delay in obtaining the report the same only issuing on the 26th February 2004 following ongoing correspondence and discussions. Much of the delay was caused by difficulty in obtaining an identical vehicle upon which to carry out tests. In all the circumstances the court is satisfied that the delay of itself should not disentitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. The rules of the Superior Courts, Order 28, rule 1 provides as follows:
Wiley on the Judicature Acts on the identical rule in the 1905 rules has this to say:- “By this Rule a Court or Judge is bound to allow all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties upon such terms as may seem just”.
However a plaintiff will not be allowed to add fresh claims which have become statute barred. Again amendment will not be permitted if the effect is entirely to alter the nature of the case originally made – Nuby v Sharpe 8 Ch D 39. Weldon v Neal was considered by Keane J. in Krops v The Irish Forestry Board Limited and Ryan 1995 2 I.R. 113. In Wedldon v Neal, Lord Esher said – “We must act on the settled rule of practice, which is that amendments are not admissible when they prejudice the rights of the opposite party as existing at the date of such amendments. If an amendment were allowed setting up a cause of action which, if the Writ were issued in respect thereof at the date of the amendment, would be barred by statute of limitations, it would be allowing the Plaintiff to take advantage of her former Writ to defeat the Statute and take away an existing right from the Defendant, a proceeding which, as a general rule, would be, in my opinion, improper and unjust. Under very peculiar circumstances, the Court might perhaps have power to allow such an amendment, but certainly as a general rule it will not do so.” In England in 1982 the Rules of the Superior Courts were amended so that the court to provide for an amendment may be allowed notwithstanding that its effect would be to add or substitute a new cause of action if the new cause of action arises out of the same facts are substantially the same facts as the cause of sanction pleaded. Keane J. proceeded on the basis that the High Court is not bound by decisions of the English Court of Appeal prior to 1921 although it would not likely depart from a decision of that court which had been repeatedly acted on in the High Court. He went on to consider whether Weldon v Neal should be applied in Ireland. He held that where a plaintiff seeks to add a new cause of action arising out of the same facts are substantially the same facts pleaded. There is no reason why the court should be precluded from permitting such an amendment. In Croke v Waterford Crystal Limited [2005] 2 IR 383 the plaintiff sought to make a number of amendments to a statement of claim. As against the first defendant he sought an amendment the effect of which would be to claim that he discovered the alleged untruth of representations in or around 1999 whereas in its original form the statement of claim did not give any date. The first defendant had pleaded the statute of limitations and this amendment was relevant to that plea. Geoghegan J. at p.399 expressed the view that particulars of the date of knowledge ought properly to be inserted in a reply: however it is prima face necessary amendment for having the real issues tried and it would be sensible if other amendments were to be permitted that it should be included in the amended statement of claim. It is necessary then to consider three matters relied upon by the appellant as to why the court should not exercise its discretion and allow amendment. Firstly the defendant says that no good reason as to why the pleas ought to be made were not made in the first instance. There is an obligation on the party seeking to amend pleadings to give good reason for having to do so. Shepperton Investment Company Limited v Concast (1975) Ltd, (Unreported, High Court, Barron J., 21st December 1992), McFadden v Dundalk and Dowdallshill Coursing Club Limited (unreported, Supreme Court, 22nd April 1994 and Palamos Properties Ltd., v Brooks [1996] 3 I.R. 597. In the last mentioned Flood J. at p.605 said – “In my opinion these decisions amount to this. That within the facts underlined a claim before the courts there must be such evidence from which an inference can reasonably be withdrawn as to why the plea which is sought to be introduced by way of amendment was put in the original defence or express evidence given to explain the failure in a manner which renders the omission broadly excusable if not actually justifiable.” Geoghegan J. expressed doubt that the cases relied upon by Flood J. support such a broad proposition but rather that those cases turned on their own peculiar facts. If delay is not justifiable or excusable then that is a factor to be taken into consideration as part of the matters to be weighed in deciding whether or not the court will allow amendment. In this case the plaintiff on affidavit has justified and excused the delay. Secondly the defendant claims to be prejudiced in that the locus of the accident is not the same as it was at the time of the accident thereby making it impossible for the consulting engineer to investigate the matter properly in relation to the claim now being put forward by the plaintiff. The weight which was being carried in the vehicle on the date of the accident has now been calculated and does not appear to be in dispute. In these circumstances the court is satisfied that an engineer retained by the appellant notwithstanding the change in locus will be in a position to give evidence as the effect upon the vehicle in terms of handling and breaking and without reference to any particular locus. The court is not satisfied that any real or substantial prejudice to the appellant will arise. Thirdly the defendant relies upon the fact that its insurer went into liquidation on the 21st June 2001 twelve months after the defence had been delivered and that the defendant will now have to meet the case now made without the benefit of indemnity. The court is not satisfied having regard to the date on which the defence was delivered and the date on which the insurer went into liquidation is most unlikely that a hearing would have taken place in advance of the insurer going into liquidation. The court accordingly is not satisfied for any of the reasons relied upon by the appellant that leave to amend should not have been granted. The amendment sought raises a new issue in the action. However it is not an issue which is raised by the plaintiff but rather one raised by the defendant in its plea of negligence and contributory negligence against the plaintiff. The driving of the vehicle was not an issue raised by the statement of claim. The situation accordingly is identical to that dealt with by Geoghegan J. in Croke v Waterford Crystal Limited and Irish Pensions Trust 2005 2 IR 383. There the defendant raised the statute of limitations in its defence the plaintiff’s response being to seek to amend its statement of claim to plead date of knowledge. Geoghegan J. held that this was more appropriate to be done by way of reply. Here the driving of the vehicle became an issue arising out of the defence and it was open to the plaintiff to respond in a reply attributing the accident to the vehicle being overloaded rather than to any negligence on the part of the driver. It has not done so. As Geoghegan J. remarked in Croke v Waterford Crystal Limited “while it is true that there are time limits for the delivery of a reply there would have to be extraordinary circumstances in my view for a court to deprive a plaintiff of the right to adduce a perfectly good answer to a plea of the Statute of Limitations effectively on a time point.” He would have no difficulty in permitting the plaintiff to deliver a reply. It seems to me that that is the correct approach to adopt in the present case. The courts should extend the time for delivery of a reply which would deal in terms of the overloading of the vehicle with a plea of negligence and contributory negligence against the plaintiff. Allen v Irish Holemasters Limited | ||||||||||||||
