Dwyer v The Commisioner of An Garda Siochana & Ors [2020] IESC 4 (24 February 2020)

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke, Chief Justice, delivered the 24th of February, 2020.

1.1 The extent to which it is permissible for public authorities both to require private

telephony service providers to retain certain data about communications and, potentially,

to disclose that information to investigating and prosecuting authorities, has been a

significant issue within the European Union for a number of years. In particular, a

directive dealing with such matters, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and

of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in

connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communication services or of

public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (“the 2006

Directive”), was found by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) to be in

(“the Charter”) and thus deemed invalid (see, Digital Rights Ireland Limited v. Minister for

Communications, Marine and Natural Resources & Ors and Kärntner Landesregierung and

Others (Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, (“Digital Rights”)).

1.2 Prior to the judgment in Digital Rights, Ireland had enacted the Communications

(Retention of Data) Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) which was intended to transpose the

obligations of Member States under the 2006 Directive into Irish law. The 2011 Act

governs the retention of metadata by service providers and access to such data by

national authorities in Ireland including, in particular, by An Garda Síochána.

1.3 Indeed, it is worth noting that Ireland was brought to the CJEU by the European

Commission arising out of its failure to transpose the 2006 Directive (see, Commission v.

Ireland (Case C-202/09) [2009] E.C.R. I-203, ECLI:EU:C:2009:736) and was held by the

Court to have failed to have fulfilled its obligations thereunder. The CJEU also

subsequently rejected Ireland’s challenge to the legal basis on which the 2006 Directive

was enacted, which challenge was maintained on the grounds that the European Union

did not enjoy competence in the area of criminal investigation and prosecution (see,

Ireland v. Parliament & Council (Case C‑301/06) ECLI:EU:C:2009:68).

1.4 Subsequent to the annulment of the 2006 Directive in Digital Rights, questions emerged

as to whether the 2011 Act was compatible with EU law. For the reasons set out in his

judgment in these proceedings (Dwyer v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & ors

[2018] IEHC 685), O’Connor J. granted a declaration that s. 6(1)(a) of the 2011 Act was

inconsistent with Article 15(1) of an earlier EU Directive, Directive 2002/58/EC of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of

personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (“the

2002 Directive”). The 2002 Directive had been purportedly amended by the 2006

Directive but, on the annulment of the 2006 Directive, the 2002 Directive reverted to its

1.5 The factual circumstances giving rise to these proceedings concerned the trial of the

plaintiff/respondent (“Mr. Dwyer”) in respect of the murder of a Ms. O’Hara. In the

course of that trial, reliance was placed by the prosecution on evidence which was said to

link Mr. Dwyer to certain phones, to link him to telephony data which was said to identify

the location at which those phones were on certain relevant occasions and, in respect of

certain phones which were physically put in evidence, to link him to the content of certain

communications which were found on those phones. As there is an appeal pending by Mr.

Dwyer against his conviction, it is important to exercise considerable restraint in

commenting on the facts of the case, save to the extent absolutely necessary to explain

the specific issues which arise on this appeal. However, it is clear that the reason why

Mr. Dwyer has maintained these proceedings is that it is intended that they will, if

successful, form part of a contention at his criminal appeal that the relevant telephony

data should not have been admitted in evidence and thus raise a question over the safety

1.6 As I understand it, no issue was raised at the criminal trial as to the manner in which the

relevant telephony data was accessed by the investigating and prosecuting authorities,

save to the extent that it is said that the entire legal basis on which that access was

granted is invalid as a matter of European Union law. It follows that the argument which

suggests that the relevant telephony data should not have been admitted in evidence and

that his conviction is therefore unsafe first requires the establishment of that

1.7 The defendants/appellants (“the State”) have appealed to this Court against the finding of

the High Court. The net issue for this Court is, therefore, confined to the question of the

validity or otherwise of the 2011 Act, having regard to the 2002 Directive properly

2.1 The State obtained leave to appeal as a result of a determination of this Court (Dwyer v.

The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & ors [2019] IESCDET 108). The reasons for

the grant of leave by this Court can be found in that determination.

2.2 In its application for leave, which was not opposed by Mr. Dwyer, the State suggested

that the proceedings raised complex and novel questions of constitutional and EU law and

would have significant implications for many others who are not parties to the case. The

Court accepted that the question of the consistency of the provisions of the 2011 Act with

EU law met the constitutional criteria for leave to appeal and leave was granted on the

grounds set out in the notice of appeal appended to the State’s application for leave.

2.3 On that basis, it is appropriate to turn in more detail to the issues which arise on this

3.1 As indicated earlier, the sole ultimate issue which this Court has to determine concerns

the validity of s. 6(1)(a) of the 2011 Act. That section provides as follows:-

“6.— (1) A member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent may

request a service provider to disclose to that member data retained by the service

provider in accordance with section 3 where that member is satisfied that the data

(a) the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a serious offence”

3.2 However, certain other provisions of the 2011 Act are also relevant to this appeal.

Section 6(1)(a) refers to “a serious offence”, which is defined in s. 1 of the Act as one

which is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more and also as those

other offences listed in Schedule 1 to the Act. Section 6(1)(a) also refers to “retained

data”. As the obligation on service providers to retain data also gives rise to an important

issue on this appeal, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the 2011 Act in that

regard. Section 3 sets out service providers’ obligation to retain data, and subs. (1)

“(1) A service provider shall retain data in the categories specified in Schedule 2, for a

period of 2 years in respect of the data referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2…”

3.3 The data referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 required to be retained is that “fixed network

telephony and mobile telephony data” which is at issue in these proceedings. This is data

which identifies the source, the destination, and the date and time of the start and end of

a communication, the type of communication involved, and the type of and geographic

location of the communications equipment used. Section 5 of the 2011 Act, regarding

“5.— A service provider shall not access data retained in accordance with section 3

(a) at the request and with the consent of a person to whom the data relate,

3.4 As also noted earlier, the effect of the annulment of the 2006 Directive was to provide

that the 2002 Directive should continue in force in its unamended form. In relevant part,

its provisions are set out as follows. Article 1 of the 2002 Directive, headed “Scope and

“1. This Directive harmonises the provisions of the Member States required to ensure

an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in

particular the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the

electronic communication sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and

of electronic communication equipment and services in the Community.

2. The provisions of this Directive particularise and complement Directive 95/46/EC for

the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1. Moreover, they provide for protection of

3. This Directive shall not apply to activities which fall outside the scope of the Treaty

establishing the European Community, such as those covered by Titles V and VI of

the Treaty on European Union, and in any case to activities concerning public

security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State

when the activities relate to State security matters) and the activities of the State

3.5 Article 3(1) provides that the 2002 Directive “shall apply to the processing of personal

data in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications

services in public communications networks in the Community”. Article 4 sets out service

providers’ obligations in respect of safeguarding the security of their services. Article 5,

“1. Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of communications and the related

traffic data by means of a public communications network and publicly available

electronic communications services, through national legislation. In particular, they

shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or

surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than

users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised

to do so in accordance with Article 15(1). This paragraph shall not prevent technical

storage which is necessary for the conveyance of a communication without

3. Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to

store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment

of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user

concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with

Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered

the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any

technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the

transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as

strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly

3.6 Article 6(1) of the 2002 Directive, in relation to traffic data, states:-

“Traffic data relating to subscribers and users processed and stored by the provider

of a public communications network or publicly available electronic communications

service must be erased or made anonymous when it is no longer needed for the

purpose of the transmission of a communication without prejudice to paragraphs 2,

3.7 Article 9(1) of the Directive, which article was headed ‘Location data other than traffic

“Where location data other than traffic data, relating to users or subscribers of

public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications

services, can be processed, such data may only be processed when they are made

anonymous, or with the consent of the users or subscribers to the extent and for

the duration necessary for the provision of a value added service. The service

provider must inform the users or subscribers, prior to obtaining their consent, of

the type of location data other than traffic data which will be processed, of the

purposes and duration of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted

to a third party for the purpose of providing the value added service. …”

3.8 Finally, Article 15(1) of the 2002 Directive, which is particularly relevant for the purposes

“Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights

and obligations provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and

Article 9 of this Directive when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate

and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national

security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and the prevention,

investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use

of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 13(1) of Directive

95/46/EC. To this end, Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures

providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid

down in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in this paragraph shall be in

accordance with the general principles of Community law, including those referred

3.9 The CJEU, as already noted, determined in Digital Rights that the 2006 Directive was

inconsistent with EU law and, in particular, the Charter. The key passages from the

“24. It follows from Article 1 and recitals 4, 5, 7 to 11, 21 and 22 of Directive 2006/24

that the main objective of that directive is to harmonise Member States’ provisions

concerning the retention, by providers of publicly available electronic

communications services or of public communications networks, of certain data

which are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are

available for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution

of serious crime, such as organised crime and terrorism, in compliance with the

37. It must be stated that the interference caused by Directive 2006/24 with the

fundamental rights laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter is, as the Advocate

General has also pointed out, in particular, in paragraphs 77 and 80 of his Opinion,

wide-ranging, and it must be considered to be particularly serious. Furthermore, as

the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 52 and 72 of his Opinion, the

fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the subscriber or

registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the persons

concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant

3.10 Turning to assess the justification of this interference, the Court considered that such an

interference did not adversely affect the essence of those rights guaranteed by Articles 7

“41. As regards the question of whether that interference satisfies an objective of

general interest, it should be observed that, whilst Directive 2006/24 aims to

harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations of those providers

with respect to the retention of certain data which are generated or processed by

them, the material objective of that directive is, as follows from Article 1(1)

thereof, to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the investigation,

detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its

national law. The material objective of that directive is, therefore, to contribute to

the fight against serious crime and thus, ultimately, to public security.

44. It must… be held that the retention of data for the purpose of allowing the

competent national authorities to have possible access to those data, as required

by Directive 2006/24, genuinely satisfies an objective of general interest.”

3.11 The CJEU then considered the proportionality of the interference with these rights,

ultimately concluding that by adopting Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature has exceeded

the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of

Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter. Its reasoning in this regard is set out at paras. 51-

51. As regards the necessity for the retention of data required by Directive 2006/24, it

must be held that the fight against serious crime, in particular against organised

crime and terrorism, is indeed of the utmost importance in order to ensure public

security and its effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of modern

investigation techniques. However, such an objective of general interest, however

fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a retention measure such as that

established by Directive 2006/24 being considered to be necessary for the purpose

52. So far as concerns the right to respect for private life, the protection of that

fundamental right requires, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in any event,

that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must

apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (Case C‑473/12 IPI EU:C:2013:715 ,

53. In that regard, it should be noted that the protection of personal data resulting

from the explicit obligation laid down in Article 8(1) of the Charter is especially

important for the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 7 of the

54. Consequently, the EU legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules

governing the scope and application of the measure in question and imposing

minimum safeguards so that the persons whose data have been retained have

sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal data against the risk of

abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data (see, by analogy, as

regards Article 8 of the ECHR, Eur. Court H.R., Liberty and Others v. the United

Kingdom, 1 July 2008, no. 58243/00, [2008] ECHR 568, § 62 and 63;

Rotaru v. Romania, [2000] ECHR 192, § 57 to 59, and S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, [2008] ECHR 1581, § 99).

55. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where, as laid down in Directive

2006/24, personal data are subjected to automatic processing and where there is a

significant risk of unlawful access to those data (see, by analogy, as regards Article

8 of the ECHR, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, § 103, and M. K. v. France,

56. As for the question of whether the interference caused by Directive 2006/24 is

limited to what is strictly necessary, it should be observed that, in accordance with

Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 5(1) of that directive, the directive requires

the retention of all traffic data concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony,

Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet telephony. It therefore applies to all

means of electronic communication, the use of which is very widespread and of

growing importance in people’s everyday lives. Furthermore, in accordance with

Article 3 of Directive 2006/24, the directive covers all subscribers and registered

users. It therefore entails an interference with the fundamental rights of practically

57. In this respect, it must be noted, first, that Directive 2006/24 covers, in a

generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication as well

as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in

58. Directive 2006/24 affects, in a comprehensive manner, all persons using electronic

communications services, but without the persons whose data are retained being,

even indirectly, in a situation which is liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions. It

therefore applies even to persons for whom there is no evidence capable of

suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one,

with serious crime. Furthermore, it does not provide for any exception, with the

result that it applies even to persons whose communications are subject, according

to rules of national law, to the obligation of professional secrecy.

59. Moreover, whilst seeking to contribute to the fight against serious crime, Directive

2006/24 does not require any relationship between the data whose retention is

provided for and a threat to public security and, in particular, it is not restricted to

a retention in relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or a

particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons likely to be

involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons who could, for

other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention,

60. Secondly, not only is there a general absence of limits in Directive 2006/24 but

Directive 2006/24 also fails to lay down any objective criterion by which to

determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data

and their subsequent use for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal

prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the extent and seriousness of the

interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the

Charter, may be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such an interference.

On the contrary, Directive 2006/24 simply refers, in Article 1(1), in a general

manner to serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law.

61. Furthermore, Directive 2006/24 does not contain substantive and procedural

conditions relating to the access of the competent national authorities to the data

and to their subsequent use. Article 4 of the directive, which governs the access of

those authorities to the data retained, does not expressly provide that that access

and the subsequent use of the data in question must be strictly restricted to the

purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of

conducting criminal prosecutions relating thereto; it merely provides that each

Member State is to define the procedures to be followed and the conditions to be

fulfilled in order to gain access to the retained data in accordance with necessity

62. In particular, Directive 2006/24 does not lay down any objective criterion by which

the number of persons authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained

is limited to what is strictly necessary in the light of the objective pursued. Above

all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data retained is not

made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent

administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use

to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and

which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within

the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions. Nor

does it lay down a specific obligation on Member States designed to establish such

63. Thirdly, so far as concerns the data retention period, Article 6 of Directive 2006/24

requires that those data be retained for a period of at least six months, without any

distinction being made between the categories of data set out in Article 5 of that

directive on the basis of their possible usefulness for the purposes of the objective

64. Furthermore, that period is set at between a minimum of 6 months and a maximum

of 24 months, but it is not stated that the determination of the period of retention

must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is

65. It follows from the above that Directive 2006/24 does not lay down clear and

precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights

enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. It must therefore be held that Directive

2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those

fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such an interference being

precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is

66. Moreover, as far as concerns the rules relating to the security and protection of

data retained by providers of publicly available electronic communications services

or of public communications networks, it must be held that Directive 2006/24 does

not provide for sufficient safeguards, as required by Article 8 of the Charter, to

ensure effective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and

3.12 Obviously the validity or otherwise of various national measures which predated the

decision of the CJEU in Digital Rights came into question thereafter. In the first major

case on that topic, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for

the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others (Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-

698/15), ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (“Tele2 Sverige”), the CJEU approached the question of

the validity of national measures governing data retention in the light of the 2002

Directive, interpreted in accordance with the terms of the Charter, in the following

“102. Given the seriousness of the interference in the fundamental rights concerned

represented by national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime,

provides for the retention of traffic and location data, only the objective of fighting

serious crime is capable of justifying such a measure (see, by analogy, in relation

to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 60).

103. Further, while the effectiveness of the fight against serious crime, in particular

organised crime and terrorism, may depend to a great extent on the use of modern

investigation techniques, such an objective of general interest, however

fundamental it may be, cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing for

the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data should be

considered to be necessary for the purposes of that fight (see, by analogy, in

relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 51).

104. In that regard, it must be observed, first, that the effect of such [national

legislation at issue in the underlying request for a preliminary ruling], in the light of

its characteristic features as described in paragraph 97 of the present judgment, is

that the retention of traffic and location data is the rule, whereas the system put in

place by Directive 2002/58 requires the retention of data to be the exception.

105. Second, national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which

covers, in a generalised manner, all subscribers and registered users and all means

of electronic communication as well as all traffic data, provides for no

differentiation, limitation or exception according to the objective pursued. It is

comprehensive in that it affects all persons using electronic communication

services, even though those persons are not, even indirectly, in a situation that is

liable to give rise to criminal proceedings. It therefore applies even to persons for

whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a

link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious criminal offences. Further, it does

not provide for any exception, and consequently it applies even to persons whose

communications are subject, according to rules of national law, to the obligation of

professional secrecy (see, by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital

106. Such legislation does not require there to be any relationship between the data

which must be retained and a threat to public security. In particular, it is not

restricted to retention in relation to (i) data pertaining to a particular time period

and/or geographical area and/or a group of persons likely to be involved, in one

way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) persons who could, for other reasons,

contribute, through their data being retained, to fighting crime (see, by analogy, in

relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 59).

107. National legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings therefore exceeds

the limits of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be justified,

within a democratic society, as required by Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read

in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter.

108. However, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11

and Article 52(1) of the Charter, does not prevent a Member State from adopting

legislation permitting, as a preventive measure, the targeted retention of traffic and

location data, for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that the retention

of data is limited, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means

of communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period

109. In order to satisfy the requirements set out in the preceding paragraph of the

present judgment, that national legislation must, first, lay down clear and precise

rules governing the scope and application of such a data retention measure and

imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data has been retained

have sufficient guarantees of the effective protection of their personal data against

the risk of misuse. That legislation must, in particular, indicate in what

circumstances and under which conditions a data retention measure may, as a

preventive measure, be adopted, thereby ensuring that such a measure is limited

to what is strictly necessary (see, by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the

110. Second, as regards the substantive conditions which must be satisfied by national

legislation that authorises, in the context of fighting crime, the retention, as a

preventive measure, of traffic and location data, if it is to be ensured that data

retention is limited to what is strictly necessary, it must be observed that, while

those conditions may vary according to the nature of the measures taken for the

purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime,

the retention of data must continue nonetheless to meet objective criteria, that

establish a connection between the data to be retained and the objective pursued.

In particular, such conditions must be shown to be such as actually to circumscribe,

in practice, the extent of that measure and, thus, the public affected.

111. As regard the setting of limits on such a measure with respect to the public and the

situations that may potentially be affected, the national legislation must be based

on objective evidence which makes it possible to identify a public whose data is

likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences, and to

contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a serious

risk to public security. Such limits may be set by using a geographical criterion

where the competent national authorities consider, on the basis of objective

evidence, that there exists, in one or more geographical areas, a high risk of

3.13 In response to a further question referred, the CJEU set out the correct approach to be

taken by national courts in determining whether national legislation satisfies the

requirements of Article 15(1) of the 2002 Directive, read in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and

52(1) of the Charter, with respect to the access of the competent national authorities to

“118. In order to ensure that access of the competent national authorities to retained

data is limited to what is strictly necessary, it is, indeed, for national law to

determine the conditions under which the providers of electronic communications

services must grant such access. However, the national legislation concerned

cannot be limited to requiring that access should be for one of the objectives

referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, even if that objective is to fight

serious crime. That national legislation must also lay down the substantive and

procedural conditions governing the access of the competent national authorities to

the retained data (see, by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital

119. Accordingly, and since general access to all retained data, regardless of whether

there is any link, at least indirect, with the intended purpose, cannot be regarded

as limited to what is strictly necessary, the national legislation concerned must be

based on objective criteria in order to define the circumstances and conditions

under which the competent national authorities are to be granted access to the

data of subscribers or registered users. In that regard, access can, as a general

rule, be granted, in relation to the objective of fighting crime, only to the data of

individuals suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime

or of being implicated in one way or another in such a crime (see, by analogy,

CE:ECHR:2015:1204JUD004714306, § 260). However, in particular situations,

where for example vital national security, defence or public security interests are

threatened by terrorist activities, access to the data of other persons might also be

granted where there is objective evidence from which it can be deduced that that

data might, in a specific case, make an effective contribution to combating such

120. In order to ensure, in practice, that those conditions are fully respected, it is

essential that access of the competent national authorities to retained data should,

as a general rule, except in cases of validly established urgency, be subject to a

prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body,

and that the decision of that court or body should be made following a reasoned

request by those authorities submitted, inter alia, within the framework of

procedures for the prevention, detection or prosecution of crime (see, by analogy,

in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 62; see

also, by analogy, in relation to Article 8 of the ECHR, ECtHR, 12 January 2016,

Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, CE:ECHR:2016:0112JUD003713814, §§ 77 and 80).

121. Likewise, the competent national authorities to whom access to the retained data

has been granted must notify the persons affected, under the applicable national

procedures, as soon as that notification is no longer liable to jeopardise the

investigations being undertaken by those authorities. That notification is, in fact,

necessary to enable the persons affected to exercise, inter alia, their right to a legal

remedy, expressly provided for in Article 15(2) of Directive 2002/58, read together

with Article 22 of Directive 95/46, where their rights have been infringed (see, by

analogy, judgments of 7 May 2009, Rijkeboer, C 553/07, EU:C:2009:293,

paragraph 52, and of 6 October 2015, Schrems, C 362/14, EU:C:2015:650,

122. With respect to the rules relating to the security and protection of data retained by

providers of electronic communications services, it must be noted that Article 15(1)

of Directive 2002/58 does not allow Member States to derogate from Article 4(1)

and Article 4(1a) of that directive. Those provisions require those providers to take

appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the effective

protection of retained data against risks of misuse and against any unlawful access

to that data. Given the quantity of retained data, the sensitivity of that data and

the risk of unlawful access to it, the providers of electronic communications services

must, in order to ensure the full integrity and confidentiality of that data, guarantee

a particularly high level of protection and security by means of appropriate

technical and organisational measures. In particular, the national legislation must

make provision for the data to be retained within the European Union and for the

irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period (see, by

analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraphs

123. In any event, the Member States must ensure review, by an independent authority,

of compliance with the level of protection guaranteed by EU law with respect to the

protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data, that control

being expressly required by Article 8(3) of the Charter and constituting, in

accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, an essential element of respect for

the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data. If that

were not so, persons whose personal data was retained would be deprived of the

right, guaranteed in Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter, to lodge with the national

supervisory authorities a claim seeking the protection of their data (see, to that

effect, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 68, and the judgment of 6 October

2015, Schrems, C 362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraphs 41 and 58).”

3.14 At least some aspects of the legal framework which now exists for assessing whether

national measures in this area comply with the law of the European Union are now clear.

The retention of and access to data engages the rights of those whose data is retained

and, in particular, accessed. Although it may not breach the essence of those rights so

that such interference with rights can be justified, nevertheless any justification must be

3.15 In particular, it would appear that the underlying justification for any relevant regime

must be the fight against serious crime, which would appear to include, but not be limited

to, organised crime and terrorism. Thus, retention and access schemes which are

designed to assist in the detection and prosecution of minor crime will not be justified.

3.16 In addition, it would appear that the regime which requires service providers to retain

data and which allows access to that data must be robust. In respect of the retention of

data, there is a dispute between the parties as to whether, properly interpreted, the

jurisprudence of the CJEU is such that retention can ever be permissible to allow a

requirement of what I might describe as the “universal” retention of data. I will shortly

return to what precisely I mean by that term. This question gives rise to the first issue

which arose on this appeal. The scheme which is to be found in the 2011 Act is limited in

two ways. First, the scheme only provides for the retention of so called telephony data

and does not provide for the retention of the content of communications transmitted by

means of fixed network or mobile telephony. In practical terms, this means that the data

retained can demonstrate when a communication occurred, the source of the

communication and to whom it was directed, the type of communication involved, the

type of communications equipment used and ordinarily can, at least to some extent,

identify the location where the relevant communications device was at the relevant time,

by reference to masts used in the communication system. That data does, therefore,

allow the identification of the location of a phone at many times and can also identify

communications which were transmitted and received by that phone. However, to repeat,

the data retention required under the 2011 Act specifically excludes, by virtue of s. 2

thereof, the retention of the communication itself (such as the content of a digital

message). In practical terms, this means that it is possible, to some reasonably accurate

extent, to trace the movements of a phone and the fact of communications made by and

with that phone, but not to determine the content of any such communications.

3.17 There is also a temporal restriction on the retention requirements of the 2011 Act.

Section 3(1) requires all service providers to retain the type of data, which is relevant for

the purposes of this appeal, as described in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the 2011 Act, for a

3.18 However, subject to the limitations just referred to as to the type of data retained and the

period for which it is retained, there are no other restrictions on the data required to be

retained by reference to the targeting of specific locations or groups of persons or the

like, which targeting is mentioned in the judgment of the CJEU in Tele2 Sverige. It is in

that sense that I use the term “universal” retention of data. The retention is limited as to

the type of data which is retained and is limited as to the time for which it can be

retained, but the data retained is not limited or targeted by reference to persons,

3.19 On that basis, there was a significant issue between the parties at the hearing before this

Court as to whether such universal (untargeted) retention was ever permissible,

notwithstanding that it is limited to telephony metadata only and is also temporally

limited, no matter how robustly the regime for access to such data might be safeguarded.

Counsel for Mr. Dwyer argued that a proper interpretation of the jurisprudence of the

CJEU leads to the conclusion that there can be no such universal retention requirement.

Counsel for the State argued to the contrary. Clearly, if the argument put forward on

behalf of Mr. Dwyer is correct, then the 2011 Act is inconsistent with EU law because it

does require universal retention, in the sense in which I have used that term.

3.20 The second main area of dispute concerns the manner in which access is obtained. If, as

the State argues, a broader approach to the retention regime has to be taken in order to

determine whether it protected privacy rights in a proportionate manner, counsel for Mr.

Dwyer submits that the access regime under the 2011 Act provides insufficient

independent protection against inappropriate access. It was argued on behalf of Mr.

Dwyer that safeguards provided for in the 2011 Act are minimal, and that the legislation

does not lay down clear and precise rules indicating in what circumstances and under

which conditions service providers must grant national authorities access to data

Counsel for the State maintained that the 2011 Act established a detailed framework

3.21 It is clear from the judgment of the CJEU in Tele2 Sverige that assuming that a particular

retention regime is permissible, then as a general rule, competent national authorities can

only be granted access to the data thus retained subject to a prior review carried out

either by a court or by an independent administrative body. The access regime which

applies under the 2011 Act does not involve any application to a court but rather an

internal application to a separate unit within the Security and Intelligence section of An

Garda Síochána, the Telecom Liaison Unit (“the TLU”). This unit processes the disclosure

requests sought by members of An Garda Síochána and acts as the single point of contact

for the administration of all requests for telecommunications data from An Garda

Síochána to communications service providers. The TLU supports the functions of the

Detective Chief Superintendent of the Security and Intelligence section, who is

responsible for the determination of all internal applications for the disclosure of retained

data and who ultimately decides whether to issue a request for disclosure to the

communication service providers under the provisions of the 2011 Act. The TLU and the

relevant Detective Chief Superintendent operate independently of the investigatory

3.22 At the times relevant to the investigation which is under consideration in Mr. Dwyer’s

case, all internal applications for disclosure had to be approved in the first instance by a

superintendent (or an inspector acting in that capacity) and were then sent to be

processed by the TLU. The TLU and the Detective Chief Superintendent are required to

ensure that the application complies with the requirements of the 2011 Act and further to

verify the legality, proportionality and necessity of the disclosure request sought.

Applications deemed not to comply with the requirements of the law or of internal garda

protocols were returned for clarification or additional information. Under a Memorandum

of Understanding issued in May 2011, it was determined that service providers would not

process requests for call related data that did not come through this process. An issue,

therefore, arises as to whether that regime provides a sufficiently independent process

prior to the disclosure of the relevant data, with Mr. Dwyer arguing that it fails to meet

3.23 In a similar context, the State draws attention to certain other provisions of the 2011 Act

which are said to provide further assurance that the scheme will not be abused. Section

10 of the 2011 Act sets out the complaints procedure which relates to the disclosure of

data. Persons who believe that their data has been accessed in contravention of s. 6 of

the Act may apply for an investigation into the matter. This investigation is carried out by

a person holding the office of Complaints Referee, currently a serving Circuit Court judge,

nominated under pre-existing legislation concerned with the interception of

communications, the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages

3.24 Pursuant to ss. 11 and 12 of the 2011 Act, a judge designated under s. 8 of the 1993 Act

is conferred with the power to review the operation of the provisions of the 2011 Act and

to ascertain whether An Garda Síochána is complying with its provisions. In carrying out

these duties, the designated judge has the power to investigate any disclosure request

made, and to access and inspect any relevant document or record relating thereto. The

judge may report on any matters concerning the operation of the 2011 Act to the

3.25 Further, under s. 4(2) of the 2011 Act, the Data Protection Commissioner is designated as

the national supervisory authority for the purposes of the Act. Under s. 9(1) of the 2011

Act, the Garda Commissioner must prepare and submit an annual report to the Minister

for Justice and Equality in respect of the data specified in Schedule 2 that were the

subject of all disclosure requests made by members of An Garda Síochána during the

relevant period. This report is intended to form part of the basis for a State report to the

3.26 On the basis of the State’s argument, it is said to be appropriate to look at the scheme

governing access as a whole and it is further argued that, not least having regard to the

additional oversight referred to, the scheme in its totality provides sufficient independent

3.27 The second issue which arises is, therefore, as to whether the Irish access regime is

consistent with the jurisprudence of the CJEU deriving from Tele2 Sverige.

3.28 A third issue arises as to the potential temporal effect of a finding that aspects of the

2011 Act are inconsistent with EU law. That question centres on whether, as a matter of

European Union law, it is permissible for a national court which finds that a measure of

national law is inconsistent with EU law to determine that the effects of any such finding

should not be retrospective and indeed might, in particular circumstances, only come into

play at some defined point in time in the future. The question is as to whether such a

course of action is open to this Court in the event of a finding of inconsistency with EU law

being made, together, of course, with the question of whether it would be appropriate, in

the circumstances of this case, to reach a conclusion to defer the effect of such a

determination in the event that this Court has, as a matter of European Union law, the

3.29 The issue comes into particular focus in the context of this case, where Ireland had been

required by the CJEU itself in substance to enact the 2011 Act in order to transpose the

2006 Directive and had failed in its attempt to persuade the CJEU that no proper legal

basis existed for the 2006 Directive. The case, under this heading, made on behalf of the

State is to the effect that any determination should not be retrospective and might indeed

be prospective from a date in the future, not least precisely because Ireland had been

3.30 At least some of the issues earlier identified are to an extent dependent on the facts. The

key assessment of the validity of a measure which undoubtedly impacts on rights but

which may be justified in the pursuit of legitimate objectives comes down to a question of

proportionality. The jurisprudence of the CJEU in that regard can be found in, for

example, Schaible (Case C‑101/12) EU:C:2013:661, where the Court was asked to

assess the validity of provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004, which imposed

certain obligations on the keepers of sheep and goats in respect of their identification and

registration, in Union law, in light of the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed under

Article 16 of the Charter. In Schaible, it was recalled that the principle of proportionality

requires that measures adopted by European Union institutions do not exceed the limits

of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued

by the legislation in question. In addition, where there is a choice between several

appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages

caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. The Court held that the aim of

the measures, being to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, constituted a legitimate

objective in the public interest. Having considered the alternative means of identification

proposed by the applicant in the main proceedings, the CJEU concluded that the

measures implemented under Regulation No 21/2004 were appropriate for attaining that

objective, that the contested obligations were necessary to achieve that aim and that the

disadvantages resulting from those obligations were not disproportionate to that objective

3.31 That exercise clearly involves at least some factual questions concerning the extent to

which a legitimate objective can be achieved by particular means and, in the context of a

proportionality test, assessing the contribution which the measure concerned might make

towards achieving that objective and the degree of interference with protected rights. It

follows that it is necessary to say something about the evidence in this case which was

4.1 While the trial judge did not make many specific findings of fact in that regard, it was

accepted by counsel at the oral hearing that, save in a number of minor respects which

do not appear to me to be particularly relevant of this appeal, the evidence of the factual

situation on the ground, so far as telephony metadata evidence being deployed in criminal

investigation and prosecution is concerned, was uncontroverted. In those circumstances,

it seems to me that this Court is entitled to rely on that evidence for findings of fact.

4.2 The expert witnesses called on behalf of the State before the High Court emphasised the

importance of telephony and internet data in the prevention, investigation and

prosecution of serious crime. In the evidence of Mr. Anderson QC, former UK

Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, examples were provided of the utility of

retained data in the context of criminal investigations which have taken place in the

United Kingdom, noting its capacity to assist in the identification of suspects and of

premises of interest, in the tracing the movements of a suspect and in the indication of

associations between individuals or groups of individuals. This historical data was

acknowledged by the experts as being of particular significance in the investigation of

terrorism, organised crime, and serious sexual offences, as well as playing an important

role in the identification of the relevant elements of certain offences, such as

premeditation or conspiracy. Further, it was stated that historical location data can be

used to locate vulnerable individuals or those in emergency situations, or to support the

4.3 To illustrate the significance of this data, Mr. Anderson gave evidence that the

investigation and prosecution of crime was significantly impeded following the annulment

of legislation requiring mandatory data retention by the German Constitutional Court in

2010. Statistics provided by the German federal and state police forces to the European

Commission in 2013 were to the effect that in 44.5% of the cases involving requests for

retained traffic data, there were no other means of conducting the investigation.

4.4 The expert witnesses also gave evidence that they considered that there were no equally

effective alternatives to a universal regime of data retention. The “quick-freeze” system,

under which preservation orders relating to particular individuals can be served on service

providers after those individuals came under suspicion, would have limited efficacy in the

context of the investigation of crime, as the majority of data regarding the suspect’s

conduct prior to their identification would be unavailable. The evidence of Mr.

O’Callaghan, an expert radio engineer, was to the effect that the “look-back period” in

which investigating authorities could obtain the historical data of a suspect under the

quick-freeze system would extend at most to a week prior to the issuing of a preservation

order. Further, this system would be of no utility in identifying persons who are unknown

4.5 Further, the targeted retention of data was also said by experts to be of limited efficacy in

circumstances where the identity and location of a target are not always known at the

point when such data is generated. Such targeting would suffer from a lack of accuracy,

as was detailed in the evidence of Mr. Anderson, as the retained data would be of no

utility if a suspect is operating outside the targeted geographical area, for example, thus

depriving national authorities of important strategic options in investigating serious

crimes. The experts further doubted the operational feasibility of targeting groups or

geographical areas for data retention, citing the possibility that such targeting could well

be seen as unlawfully discriminatory while also being ineffective, given the agility of

4.6 The practical utility of retained telephony data was emphasised by the Detective Chief

Superintendent of the Special Detective Unit. This unit is the counter-terrorism section of

An Garda Síochána with the function of combatting threats to state security from unlawful

organisations such as the Irish Republican Army or hostile foreign intelligence agencies.

This witness confirmed that access to fixed network data and mobile telephony data by

members of An Garda Síochána has been and continues to be critical in the identification

of suspects as well as the elimination of persons of interest. He further described a

number of cases that could not have been resolved without the use of retained data. In

such cases, data was accessed for the purposes of proving contact between suspects,

tracking a route taken by a suspect, ensuring that CCTV footage was preserved,

challenging an account given by a suspect or identifying a person not previously known to

4.7 In the light of that evidence, I would propose that this Court make the following

5.1 I do note the repeated references in the jurisprudence of the CJEU to the object of

combating serious crime. While specific reference is frequently made to organised crime

and terrorism, I do not consider that the concept of serious crime is confined to those

categories, but also involves crimes such as the murder which is the subject of the

5.2 I am satisfied that the evidence established that the detection of, in particular, certain

categories of serious crime and the prosecution thereof is increasingly influenced by

evidence such as that which was tendered in the criminal proceedings against Mr. Dwyer.

5.3 While organised crime and terrorism may in some cases give rise to prior suspicion in

advance of the commission of any particular specific crime, the type of serious crime with

which these proceedings are concerned rarely involves any circumstances which could

reasonably be known to investigating authorities in advance and which could lead to prior

suspicion. It is, in my view, the experience of the members of the Irish courts dealing

with criminal matters that some such cases have only been solved because of the

5.4 It seems to me that cases of the type described, of which this case is a particular

example, frequently involve serious offences against women, children and other

vulnerable persons. In addition to the charge of murder of a vulnerable person, which is

the subject of the underlying criminal proceedings involving Mr. Dwyer, cases involving

the grooming of children can often require similar methods for investigation and

prosecution. As already noted, in a significant number of such cases, it would not be

possible to detect, let alone adequately prosecute, the perpetrator without access to

telephony data of the type with which this case is concerned. In other cases, the ability

5.5 It seems particularly important to emphasise, therefore, that it is not possible to access

that which has not been retained. If, on the basis of the argument put forward on behalf

of Mr. Dwyer, it is not permissible to have “universal” retention of data, notwithstanding

the robustness of any access regime, then it follows that many of these serious crimes

against women, children and other vulnerable persons will not be capable of detection or

successful prosecution. Against that background, I would suggest that the Court make

(i) Alternative forms of data retention, by means of geographical targeting or

otherwise, would be ineffective in achieving the objective of the prevention,

investigation, detection and prosecution of at least certain type of serious crime,

and further, could give rise to the potential violation of other rights of the

(ii) The objective of the retention of data by any lesser means than that of a general

data retention regime, subject to the necessary safeguards, is unworkable; and

(iii) The objective of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious

crime would be significantly compromised in the absence of a general data

retention regime. The Court accepts and agrees with the evidence described in

5.6 Against that legal and factual background, it is necessary to discuss the proper course of

6.1 While it is clear from Tele2 Sverige that it is for national courts to assess whether national

measures breach European Union law and, if so finding, to determine such measures

invalid, it is also necessary to consider whether there are questions of European Union

law which remain unclear but which require to be clarified in order that an answer can be

given to the validity issue with which this Court is concerned. In that context, it is

necessary to consider the interaction of privacy rights with the need to tackle serious

6.2 It is, of course, the case that the Irish Constitution, in common with the European

Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and the Charter, recognises significant

privacy rights encompassing a right of privacy in relation to personal data. It has not

been suggested to date (and, in my view, could not be suggested) that the separate

identification of a right to protection of personal data in Article 8 of the Charter should

lead to any divergent analysis of the issues involved when it is sought to challenge the

introduction of evidence obtained under a statutory regime permitting retention of data

generated by fixed and mobile telephony networks and internet usage.

6.3 The Charter itself recognises the possibility of processing of such data on a legitimate

basis laid down by law. The analysis, whether under the Charter, the Convention or the

Constitution, of any measure provided for by law permitting retention and access to such

data is essentially similar. First, it is necessary to consider whether the measure affects a

protected right. If so, it is necessary to determine whether any such interference pursues

a legitimate objective. Next, and again if so, it must be determined whether the

interference is no greater than is necessary to achieve the lawful object and is

6.4 It is also the case that the Irish courts have very considerable experience, within the

national legal order, of balancing important privacy rights with the requirement for the

investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution of criminal offences. In so doing, the courts

have subjected measures which might interfere with privacy rights to rigorous scrutiny.

In that context, Irish courts dealing with criminal matters have also recognised that the

rights of victims of crime form an important part of any overall assessment. In so doing,

the Irish courts have drawn on Irish constitutional jurisprudence but also have had

significant regard to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“the

6.5 However, the issue on this appeal concerns only the question of the validity of an Irish

statute, the 2011 Act, having regard to Union law. The obligation of sincere cooperation

between national courts and the CJEU, the differences of function and capacity in relation

to obtaining evidence and making findings of fact, the allocation of competences and the

principle of subsidiarity, all suggest that this Court should first consider whether the

issues arising can be determined without the requirement to clarify any questions of

Union law by means of a reference under Article 267 of the TEEU. In addition, even if

persuaded that such a reference is required, this Court may take the course suggested by

the CJEU, by setting out the reasons why it was considered necessary to make such a

reference and also giving its own views on the issues to be considered in any reference.

It is on that basis that I propose to consider the issues of Union law arising.

6.6 The analysis of the data protection regime implemented in Ireland under the provisions of

the 2006 Directive has tended to treat the questions of retention and access as separate

issues. It may be open to some doubt as to whether this is necessarily helpful or indeed

truly possible. It is clear that the objective of retention is to permit access. It has no

function otherwise. On the evidence adduced in this case, it is clear that the data

retained in bulk is not itself related to any individual person holding rights under the

Constitution, the Charter or the Convention. It is only when access is sought and

obtained that it is possible to connect an individual to any specific retained data.

6.7 If it were possible to conceive of a situation in which it was simply impossible to ever

access the data, then the argument that there would nevertheless be a serious breach of

the individual’s rights would be necessarily attenuated. It has been suggested that the

fact of retention of universal data may give rise to vague feelings on the part of the

individual that they are subject to surveillance even though individual surveillance would

not be possible without access to the data. In addition, any individual concerned must

necessarily be aware of the fact both that data is generated and may be retained by

operators for their own commercial purposes and may be available for lawful access

during such period. If, however, that normal retention by service providers was the only

interference with the right of protection of personal data then it would appear that any

such intrusion would be capable of justification in the interests of investigation of serious

crime. Such investigation, however, can only occur if access to the data is allowed. It is

apparent, therefore, that a significant part of the proper concern with the retention of

bulk undifferentiated data is the possibility of access (and identification), whether

permitted (and if so, the terms of such permitted access) or unauthorised (and if so, the

likelihood of such access and the range and extent of data to which access might be

obtained). For these reasons, it may indeed be preferable to view retention and access

6.8 The consideration of these issues has, however, to date proceeded on a separate

consideration of the question of universal retention as an interference with the right of

data privacy followed by an analysis of the access regime. I, therefore, propose to adopt

that course of action. It is clear that the retention of such data, even without the

possibility of access or where any such access is on extremely restrictive terms, is an

interference with a right to privacy in personal data. It is also clear that the objective of

such retention is the investigation of serious crime. Such an objective is a lawful and

permissible objective of considerable weight in any society governed by the rule of law.

6.9 In those circumstances, I will turn first to the position in Irish constitutional law. The

State’s obligation to vindicate, in the case of injustice done, the “life, person and good

name” of a victim as a result of Article 40.3.2° of the Constitution was referred to by

Hardiman J. in A v. Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45, [2006] 4 IR 88 at

paras. 256 and 257, in the context of an application for relief under Article 40.4.2° of the

Constitution, where the applicant had been convicted on a plea of guilty to a charge of a

serious sexual offence against a minor under a legislative provision which had

subsequently been declared unconstitutional. This obligation to vindicate victims’ rights,

Hardiman J. held, was a matter of high public policy which may be considered as a factor

in favour of permitting “force and effect” to be given to orders made under a void statute.

6.10 In The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. J.C. [2015] IESC 31, [2017] 1 IR 417,

this Court held that the determination of the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained

evidence was an exercise which required the balancing of the rights of the accused and

the public interest in the lawful operation of our policing authorities against society’s

entitlement to secure the proper and legitimate conviction of those guilty of crime and the

rights of victims to ensure that those who commit crimes against them are brought to

justice where there is sufficient probative evidence to establish the guilt of the person

concerned to the criminal standard (see, further, my judgment in that case at paras. 824-

841). Similarly, in Nash v. The Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] IESC 32, this Court

held that, in the assessment of prohibition of trial applications, the rights of the accused

to a fair trial must be considered alongside the right of a victim of crime to have the

wrong done to them appropriately scrutinised in the context of a criminal trial. This

balancing process was acknowledged in my judgment in those proceedings at para. 2.3,

and by Charleton J. at para. 14 of his judgment, in which the entitlement of victims to “a

6.11 As mentioned, the Irish courts have also drawn on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this

regard. That case law has recognised the need to provide significant protection to the

rights of victims in the criminal process. It is well established that Member States are

subject to certain positive obligations to secure for individuals the effective enjoyment of

their Convention rights. Under the doctrine of positive obligations, the ECtHR has

recognised that States owe certain procedural obligations to victims of crime who have

suffered an infringement of their Convention rights. Under Article 8, which guarantees

the right to respect for private and family life, it has been held that a State’s criminal law

provisions in respect of grave acts, such as rape and sexual abuse of children, where

fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, must provide

practical and effective protection of a victim’s rights (see, X and Y v. the Netherlands

(App. No. 8978/80) (1985) 8 E.H.R.R. 235, at paras. 23-24, 27 and 30).

6.12 In K.U. v. Finland (App. No. 2872/02) (2009) 48 EHRR 52, the ECtHR held there had

been a violation of Article 8 in circumstances where the applicant, a minor, was the

subject of an advertisement of a sexual nature on an internet dating site and where the

identity of the person who had placed the advertisement could not, however, be obtained

from the Internet service provider due to the legislation in place at the time. It was held

that practical and effective protection of the applicant required that effective steps be

taken to identify and prosecute the perpetrator. In respect of a State’s positive

obligations under Article 8 in respect of victims of crime, and vulnerable victims in

“46. … [T]he Court notes that the existence of an offence has limited deterrent effects if

there is no means to identify the actual offender and to bring him to justice. Here,

the Court notes that it has not excluded the possibility that the State’s positive

obligations under Article 8 to safeguard the individual’s physical or moral integrity

may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation

even where the criminal liability of agents of the State is not at issue (see Osman v.

the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 128, Reports of Judgments and Decisions

1998-VIII). For the Court, States have a positive obligation inherent in Article 8 of

the Convention to criminalise offences against the person, including attempted

offences, and to reinforce the deterrent effect of criminalisation by applying criminal

law provisions in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (see,

mutatis mutandis, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 153). Where the physical and

moral welfare of a child is threatened, such injunction assumes even greater

importance. The Court notes in this connection that sexual abuse is unquestionably

an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its victims. Children

and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in the form of

effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with essential aspects of

their private lives (see Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, [1996] ECHR 44, 22 October

47. … It is plain that both the public interest and the protection of the interests of

victims of crimes committed against their physical or psychological well-being

require the availability of a remedy enabling the actual offender to be identified and

brought to justice… and the victim to obtain financial reparation from him.”

6.13 The ECtHR has also held that States have an obligation to conduct an effective

investigation into alleged wrongdoing committed against victims of crime who have

suffered infringements under Article 2, which protects the right to life (Centre for Legal

Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania (App. No. 47848/08) (Unreported,

European Court of Human Rights, 17 July 2014) at para. 147); Article 3, which prohibits

torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (App. No.

26692/05) (Unreported, European Court of Human Rights, 20 March 2012) at paras. 69-

70); and Article 4, which prohibits slavery and forced labour, (S.M. v. Croatia (App. No.

60561/14) (Unreported, European Court of Human Rights, 19 July 2018) at paras. 59-

60); even if the wrongdoing concerned has been inflicted by private individuals. The

ECtHR has held that the investigation must be effective in the sense that it should, in

principle, be capable of leading the establishment of the facts of the case and to the

identification and punishment of those responsible. It has been held that, while the result

of the investigation is not compulsory, the means employed are (Eremia v. The Republic

of Moldova (App. No. 3564/11) (Unreported, European Court of Human Rights, [2013] ECHR 453, 28 May

6.14 The issue in this case therefore becomes one as to whether that permissible objective (or,

indeed, on one view the mandated objective) may be achieved by measures less intrusive

of the right of privacy than a regime of universal retention of bulk undifferentiated data,

subject to the possibility of subsequent access. It is contended that the universal

retention permitted by the 2011 Act fails such a test because it is possible to achieve the

permitted objective by less intrusive means and in particular by targeted retention in

advance, whether by reference to individuals, groups, or geographic areas

6.15 This contention is troubling from the perspective of Irish constitutional law and the

analysis which an Irish court would apply under the Constitution, the Convention and the

Charter. First, it appears to be based on a hypothesis which is not supported by any

evidence and is indeed contradicted by such evidence as has been adduced in these

proceedings. Second, it is apparent that any question of retention of data in advance by

reference to geographical criteria would itself involve questions of profiling and differential

treatment of individuals on the basis of location and/or their association with others.

Assuming, however, that such a course of action would be permissible, it would in

principle be something quite different to the regime established by the 2011 Act and

would be more intrusive of the rights of the individuals concerned, who themselves may

have no necessary connection to any suspected or anticipated crime. Such measures,

described as targeted retention, would almost inevitably involve not merely retention but

also access to relevant data, identification of the individual and normally access to the

6.16 Most significantly, it is apparent, both as a matter of logic and as established by the

evidence in this case, that any such measure cannot achieve the objective of permitting

the investigation of serious crimes such as the subject matter of these proceedings,

where there is no reason to suspect a particular individual or group in advance. The

conclusion therefore that a regime of universal data retention in bulk is per se

impermissible, irrespective of the terms of such retention or the conditions of access,

would appear not to be a conclusion that the legitimate and important objective of

investigating serious crime could be achieved by methods less intrusive of the rights of

individuals, but rather a conclusion that the objective of investigating serious crime

cannot justify the universal retention of bulk communications data however regulated or

controlled. This is a value judgment but one not apparent from the Charter nor, it would

appear, one which would be made either under the Convention or the Irish Constitution.

In circumstances where the Charter refers to and embodies the common constitutional

traditions of the Member States, it is arguable that it should not be interpreted in such a

way as to impose such a value judgment on Member States at odds with their

constitutional traditions, particularly in circumstances where Article 15(1) of 2002

Directive is permissive and does not require Member States to adopt any system of

retention. Thus, a Member State whose traditions would lean against any system of

6.17 I would make one further comment on the observations in the jurisprudence of the CJEU

already referred to above, to the effect that the retention of data without the registered

user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the persons concerned the

feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance, thus impacting on

the rights of those citizens to privacy. I do not disagree with those observations or seek

to discount them in any way. However, the precise extent to which such matters may

have such an effect on citizens may well vary from Member State to Member State, not

least because of the different experiences within Member States of pervasive scrutiny on

the part of police authorities. The question, however, is as to the weight to be attached

to such matters and, in particular, the extent to which retention alone can give rise to a

significant interference with the right to privacy (no matter how robust an access regime

may be). I appreciate that, subject to such discretion as European legislation may confer

on Member States (and having regard to the principle of subsidiarity now expressly

provided for in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union), Union law cannot have a

different meaning in different Member States. However, it is at least open to significant

argument that, when attempting to assess the weight to be attached to particular factors

where that weight is not expressly determined either in the treaties or in European

legislation, it may not be appropriate to look to those States which attach the highest or,

indeed, the lowest weight to such matters, but rather that it is appropriate to take a

broad view of the potentially differing positions that may pertain across the Member

States. This is particularly so when it remains open to member States to choose a higher

standard of protection of the privacy rights involved and a correspondingly less effective

6.18 In assessing the extent to which a system of universal retention may be compatible with

Union law, I would, of course, afford all due weight to the general interference with

privacy which is involved in such a system. I would fully accept that such a system could

not be justified by reference to the pursuit of objects which fall short of the prevention,

detection and prosecution of serious crime, as identified in the jurisprudence of the CJEU

as constituting objectives of general interest. However, in the light of the evidence

tendered in these proceedings and of the findings of fact which I propose that this Court

should make, it seems to me that significant regard would have to be attributed to the

fact that many serious crimes against vulnerable people are most unlikely, on the

undisputed evidence, to be capable of successful prosecution in the absence of a system

of universal retention. In that context, I would consider that considerable weight must be

attached to the undoubted rights of the victims of such crime, which rights will be

impaired to a very significant degree indeed if it should prove impossible to detect or

6.19 I would suggest that the rights of such persons need to be kept very much in mind in

determining any appropriate balance. If, therefore, I were called on to resolve the issue

of Union law concerning whether a universal system of retention is, at least at the level of

principle, permissible, I would hold that it is. To consider otherwise is to say that the very

significant rights of the victims of serious crime, including many vulnerable victims, have

to be set at nought to protect a privacy right which does not extend, in itself, to the

revelation of any information concerning any citizen but rather only the retention of some

limited information so that it may possibly be disclosed if truly required. However, the

first issue which needs to be addressed concerns whether, as Charleton J. proposes in his

dissenting judgment, this issue can finally be determined by this Court without making a

6.20 I consider the views of Charleton J. on the facts to attract particular weight in this area, in

light both of his very considerable experience as a criminal lawyer at the Bar who was

involved in many significant cases and also in light of his very broad experience as a

senior judge in this area. I would not necessarily disagree with any of the factual

observations in relation to criminal investigation and prosecution which are to be found in

his judgment. However, the question for this Court, it seems to me, is as to whether this

issue can be resolved without determining a potentially unclear issue of Union law.

6.21 So far as the second aspect of this case is concerned, being the question of the access

regime to be found in the 2011 Act, I would, were I deciding this matter myself, be

inclined to conclude that the Irish regime does not provide adequate safeguards to meet

the requirements of Union law in the light of the jurisprudence of the CJEU. There may

well be some merit in decisions concerning the appropriateness or otherwise of access to

retained data being made by persons with real experience in criminal investigation and

prosecution. There is also the point that, in the Irish context, any investigating senior

member of An Garda Síochána will know that questions about the admissibility of

evidence very regularly feature as significant issues in trials on charges of serious

criminality. Such matters are robustly analysed. Thus, any member of An Garda

Síochána who has a quasi-independent role in permitting access to retained data will

know that his/her actions may come under intense scrutiny in the context of a criminal

trial. In addition, it is necessary to at least pay some regard to the features of ex post

facto scrutiny, both judicial and otherwise, which is contained in the Irish legislative

6.22 However, notwithstanding those factors, it does not seem to me that the access system

which is to be found in the 2011 Act is sufficiently robust to meet the standards identified

by the CJEU in its jurisprudence. But again, a question remains as to whether it would be

appropriate to make such a final determination without referring questions to the CJEU in

respect of the proper approach to the assessment of the access regime. Furthermore, in

the particular context in which the issue arises here, it may in any event be important to

6.23 Finally, there are those questions concerning the temporal effect of any finding of

invalidity. I would be inclined to the view that, in the light of the jurisprudence of the

CJEU, there may well be a jurisdiction for this Court to determine that any finding of

invalidity should not apply to events which occurred prior to that finding being made.

6.24 I would also be of the view that, should such a jurisdiction exist, it would be appropriate

to exercise it in favour of thus limiting the temporal effect of any declaration of invalidity

in all the circumstances of this case. I would do so not least because of the fact that it

had appeared that Ireland was required, as a matter of Union law as determined by the

CJEU in Commission v. Ireland, to introduce measures along the lines of the 2011 Act

and, in substance, had actually introduced that legislation as a result of the determination

6.25 However, again, the first issue is as to whether it is possible to make such a finding

without an Article 267 reference. It follows that, under each of the three headings which

I have sought to analyse, an initial question arises as to whether it is open to this Court,

at this stage, to make a final determination on those matters without a reference.

6.26 However, in the context of that analysis, it seems to me to be impossible to say that

Union law in certain relevant respects is clear. First, there is the debate between the

parties as to whether the universal retention of metadata for a limited period of time is

impermissible, irrespective of the robustness of any access regime. As noted earlier, if

the arguments put forward on behalf of Mr. Dwyer in that regard are correct, then it

follows that the regime set out in the 2011 Act must necessarily be found to be in breach

of European Union law. On the other hand, if the arguments put forward on behalf of the

State are correct, then wider considerations come into play. That question must be

answered in order to make a final determination on the validity of the 2011 Act. It does

6.27 Second, there are issues concerning the nature of the Irish access regime. These

questions include the extent to which it can be permissible for a separate body within a

police force to provide the form of independent prior review which the CJEU has indicated

is necessary for a valid access scheme. Second, there are questions as to the extent to

which it is permissible, in the overall assessment, to have regard to the sort of measures

of oversight on which the State places reliance. Assuming that the answer to the first

question is such that this Court must then go on to consider the compatibility of the Irish

access scheme with Union law, then those questions will have to be answered in order to

reach a final determination on the validity of the 2011 Act. It again seems to me that the

6.28 Third, there is the question, set out in some detail earlier in this judgment, as to whether

this Court has the competence, in accordance with European Union law, to determine that

the effects of any determination of invalidity of the 2011 Act should not be retrospective

or might, indeed, only come into play at some defined stage in the future. Assuming that

this Court comes to the conclusion that the 2011 Act is invalid by virtue of its

inconsistency with European Union law, then it follows that this question too will have to

be answered in order that a final decision be made as to the order which this Court should

make. The answer to that question is not, in my view, acte clair.

6.29 It seems to me to follow from that analysis that each of those matters are questions of

the law of the European Union which are not acte clair in the sense in which that term is

used in the jurisprudence of the CJEU (see, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v.

Ministry of Health (Case 283/81), [1982] ECR 3415, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335). Each of

those questions potentially arise in order that this Court can make a final decision on this

appeal. I use the term “potentially” only in the limited sense that the second set of

questions, concerning the nature of the Irish access regime, would solely arise in the

event that the first question is answered in a manner which permits universal retention of

6.30 It follows that, in my view, these proceedings cannot be determined without a reference

to the Court of Justice under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

Union. This Court is a court of final appeal and is obliged to make such a reference unless

any relevant issues of European Union law which are necessary to the final determination

of the appeal before it are acte clair. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am not

satisfied that the issues identified are acte clair and it seems to me to follow that a

6.31 The final question which arises concerns timing. At the oral hearing, counsel for the State

mentioned that there were a number of Article 267 TFEU references currently before the

Court of Justice in circumstances where additional clarity might be brought to some of the

issues with which this Court is concerned. The cases are as follows: Privacy International

(Case C-623/17) ECLI:EU:C:2020:5; La Quadrature du Net and Others and French Data

Network and Others (Joined Cases C-511/18 and C-512/18) ECLI:EU:C:2020:6; Ordre

des barreaux francophones and germanophone and Others (Case C-520/18)

ECLI:EU:C:2020:7; and Prokuratuur (Conditions d’accès aux données relatives aux

communications électroniques) (Case C-746/18) ECLI:EU:C:2020:18.

6.32 However, while the opinion of the Advocate General has been delivered in each of those

cases, the judgments of the Court are still awaited, and this Court further understands

that there may be other references at an earlier stage of their progress through the

procedures of the CJEU. On the other hand, this Court has to take into account the fact

that Mr. Dwyer is currently in prison and that his appeal to the Court of Appeal against his

conviction cannot properly be progressed until finality is brought to these issues. In those

circumstances, it does not seem to me that it would be appropriate to wait until the CJEU

has delivered judgment in the cases currently before it. It may be that greater clarity will

be brought to some of the issues which this Court has to consider by the judgments which

the CJEU will deliver in the cases referred to. It is even possible that clarity may be

brought to all of the issues, such that the answers to the questions raised in the reference

would no longer be required. However, there remains a significant possibility that at least

some of the questions will nonetheless require to be answered in one form or another.

6.33 Having regard to the fact that Mr. Dwyer will remain in prison until his criminal appeal can

progress, it seems to me to be appropriate to make a reference at this stage and to invite

the CJEU to progress the reference through the expedited procedure, subject to a review

being carried out after the CJEU has delivered judgment in those cases in respect of which

the opinions of the Advocates General were delivered in January 2020, so as to ascertain

7.1 For the reasons set out in this judgment, I consider that there are three key areas of

European Union law where the law is not acte clair but where clarification of that law is

(a) Whether a system of universal retention of certain types of metadata for a fixed

period of time is never permissible irrespective of how robust any regime for

(b) The criteria whereby an assessment can be made as to whether any access regime

to such data can be found to be sufficiently independent and robust; and

legislation is inconsistent with European Union law, can decide that the national law

in question should not be regarded as having been invalid at all times but rather

7.3 In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is necessary that this Court refers

questions to the CJEU under the provisions of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning

of the European Union. I propose that the Court should make such a reference in the

terms set out in a separate document which I will circulate along with the delivery of this

judgment. I would propose that the parties be given a period of seven days to make

observations on the text of that document. In that context, I would emphasise that the

decision which I propose should be made by this Court today would definitively determine

that there should be a reference and would also definitively determine the broad issues

which require to be addressed in that reference. The observations which I propose that

the parties should be permitted to make should, therefore, be confined to matters of

detail or issues concerning the precise wording of the reference document. I would

propose that the Court, having considered such observations as may be received within

that timeframe, should then finalise the reference document and arrange for its

transmission to the CJEU.

Result: Other

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Dwyer v The Commisioner of An Garda Siochana & Ors [2020] IESC 4 (24 February 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2020/2020IESC4_0.html Cite as: [2020] IESC 4

Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions