Jersey Unreported Judgments

"(i)details, including copies of all relevant documentation, of all accounts maintained by them in the names of or for the benefit of the First and/or Second and/or Third and/or Fourth and/or Fifth and/or Sixth and/or Seventh Defendant(s) or in the names of or for the benefit of the First and/or Second and/or Third and/or Fourth and/or Fifth and/or Sixth and/or Seventh Defendant(s) and any third party/parties;

(ii)full details, including copies, of all relevant documentation, surrounding the opening of the accounts including details concerning the date(s) when any such accounts were opened and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the identity of the person(s) who introduced the account, the references obtained, the signatories to the mandate, together with full details of their addresses;

(iii)full details including copies of all relevant documentation, of all payments received in the accounts in question, together with information to identify the provenance of such payments; and all payments made from the accounts in question, together with information to identify the addresses and recipients of any such payments; and

(iv)all current balances on all relevant accounts."

At p.108 of that judgment the Court said this:

Then there is a further reference to this problem that we have to deal with today in Gee on Mareva Injunctions (4^th Ed’n): Chapter 19: p.384:

The reason behind the urgency of the application, according to the plaintiffs, is set out in the fourth and fifth affidavits of Steven Robert Fishbein. Mr. Fishbein states that he is a member of the Bar of the State of New York and a partner in the firm of Shearman & Sterling, US counsel for the plaintiffs. He says that he has been a partner at that firm since 1997 and he goes on to say this:

He amplifies that in his fifth affidavit made on 25^th March and he states at paragraphs 23 to 26 of that latest affidavit:

"At a regularly conducted status conference, all counsel present or on notice of the conference, held before the undersigned on March 16, 1999, the following pre-trial schedule for this action was adopted by the Court:

The parties are instructed pursuant to Rule 16, F.R.Civ.P., to meet and pursue settlement discussions, and plaintiff’s counsel is directed to advise Chambers.

The aforesaid schedule is final and binding upon the parties except, if for good cause shown in strict compliance with Rule II of the Judge’s individual Rules, an extension with respect to one or all dates is granted. Counsel have acknowledged receipt of the Judge’s individual Rules.

All requests for modifications of this and subsequent orders shall recite with specificity all prior leave granted to extend scheduling dates in this matter.

SO ORDERED.

"The plaintiffs have stated from the outset of the Jersey proceedings that they are ancillary to and in support of the US proceedings which is where the plaintiffs intend to proceed substantively. I confirm that the contents of my first affidavit sworn herein regarding the RICO action are still true and correct to the best of my information and belief."

"Thank you for your letter of 9 March 1999. In fact, we would refer you to our earlier letter, confirming that our clients are content to rest on the wisdom of the Court in connection with the American proceedings referred to in the summons."

"Of course, there is a risk that courts in the United States may decline jurisdiction in the proceedings already commenced by the plaintiffs. But I do not know how great is the risk. Until such time as indeed courts in the United States have struck out the proceedings, I think one should act on the basis that there are pending actions for the purposes of which the documents and information in question may be relevant. Moreover, even on the question of want of jurisdiction, I am convinced that evidence tending to show the whereabouts of the assets and how they have been moved might well assist courts in the United States to decide whether they should be seized with the main actions.

The second defendant may be labouring under an illusion that his application in London for an anti-suit injunction would assist him on the narrow issue before me in this summons. An anti-suit injunction, if granted, would enjoin all antagonists from resolving their disputes in any forum non conveniens. However, this court does not even pretend that it is the natural forum to try the plaintiffs’ substantive causes. I have already approved an order by consent that prevents the parties from proceeding further in Hong Kong on the main causes of action. All the steps taken by this court in this case so far are designed to aid the processes of the natural forum, wherever it may be. In my view, it is highly unlikely that an anti-suit injunction would restrict the plaintiffs’ right to seek interlocutory, ancillary or consequential relief in Hong Kong

Accordingly, I gave leave to the plaintiffs to use the relevant documents and information for the purposes of specified proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court and the United States District Court."

"An order staying the US action was entered by the Hon. Tina L. Brozman, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York, on January 22, 1999, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion filed on December 15, 1998. The Court granted the motion for a stay of the US action on the basis of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stay was to expire on April 15, 1999. A copy of the Court’s Order is annexed hereto as Exhibit A."

"As a result of the Court’s Order to date, there has been no substantive discovery conducted in the US action.

By way of letter dated March 4, 1999, from Assistant United States Attorney, Richard F. Albert, to the Hon. Allen G. Schwartz, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York advised the Court that the investigation into certain facts underlying the US action "had now been terminated without the filing of any criminal charges". A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit B.

Based upon this representation to the Court and relying on the representation made by the US Attorney’s Office, the above-named defendants have consented to the lifting of the stay imposed by the Order of the Bankruptcy Court dated January 22, 1999. An Order lifting the stay is to be filed with the Court.

On Tuesday, March 16, 1999, I appeared on behalf of the above-named defendants before the Hon. Allen G. Schwartz to request permission to file a motion for a Protective Order staying all discovery in the US proceedings pending a determination of the motion filed by the above-named defendants to dismiss the US action on the grounds of improper forum and forum non conveniens. At that time, the Court permitted the above-named defendants to file their motion by Monday, March 22, 1999. The plaintiffs have until Monday, March 29, 1999, to oppose the motion. After the above-named defendants’ reply, the Court will consider the application.

In the application, the above-named defendants will seek a stay of all discovery in the US action based upon United States Supreme Court precedent in Piper Aircraft -v- Reyno 454 US 235, 267, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981). In that case, the Court explained that "requiring extensive investigation prior to a hearing on the forum non conveniens motion would defeat the purpose of the motion."

At the conference before Judge Schwartz on March 16, 1999, plaintiffs requested to serve limited discovery with respect to the issue of whether the New York Court has personal jurisdiction over the above-named defendants (none of which are residents of New York). The Court permitted the plaintiffs to serve the limited discovery on this issue only but stated that the Court would decide the motion for a Protective Order before a response to the discovery would be required. A copy of the limited discovery with respect to personal jurisdiction served by plaintiffs is attached hereto as Exhibit C."

"My Lords, although I have, for my part, found the appellants’ arguments less than convincing, they can and do fairly say that it is not for them to advance reasons why the implied undertaking should not be released but rather for the respondents to demonstrate cogent and persuasive reasons why it should be released. To that I now turn. Mr. Henderson, on behalf of the respondents, whilst accepting the importance, as a matter of general policy, of preserving the integrity of undertakings given to the court as the price of discovery, submits that there is an equally important countervailing consideration of public policy that orders of the court should be obeyed. I accept that, but if what was in issue here was the revelation of a civil contempt in some wholly unrelated proceeding I would not for my part consider that the importance of ensuring obedience to the court’s orders outweighed that of ensuring the continued observance of an undertaking given to the court by the party obtaining discovery. Your Lordships have been referred to a number of reported cases in which application has been made for the use of documents obtained under Anton Piller orders or on general discovery for the purpose of proceedings other than those in which the order was made. I do not, for my part, think that it would be helpful to review these authorities for they are no more than examples and they illustrate no general principle beyond this, that the court will not release or modify the implied undertaking given on discovery save in special circumstances and where the release or modification will not occasion injustice to the person giving discovery."

"(b)for the purpose of proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court and the United States District Court entitled Armco Inc., et al -v- North Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd., et al,

98-8931-A (TLB) (U.S.B.C; S.D.N.Y.)

98 Civ. 6804 (AGS) (U.S.D.C; S.D.N.Y.)".

"Held, allowing the appeal and granting the order sought against the D bank, that though the court would not lightly use its powers to order disclosure of full information touching the confidential relationship of banker and customer, such an order was justified even at the early interlocutory stages of an action where plaintiffs sought to trace funds which in equity belonged to them and of which there was strong evidence that they had been fraudulently deprived and delay might result in the dissipation of the funds before the action came to trial; and that in the new and developing jurisdiction where neutral and innocent persons were under a duty to assist plaintiffs who were the victims of wrongdoing, the court would not hesitate to make strong orders to ascertain the whereabouts and prevent the disposal of such property; but that the plaintiffs should be correspondingly bound to undertake that such information be used only for the purposes of the action to trace the funds and not for any other purpose."