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Jersey Unreported Judgments |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> 1999/85 - Young, en désastre [1999] UR 85 (19 May 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/1999/85.html Cite as: [1999] UR 85 |
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ROYAL COURT
(Samedi Division)
19 May 1999
Before: F C Hamon Esq Deputy Bailiff and
Jurats Myles and Bullen
IN THE MATTER OF the Désastre of the property of Frances Mary Young (née Cory).
Representation of the Viscount, applying to the Court for an Order discharging the debtor, pursuant to Article 41(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law, 1990.
Advocate FJ Benest for the Representor
The Debtor on her own behalf
JUDGMENT
THE DEPUTY BAILIFF: In the Act of Court dated 28 April 1995, the property of Mrs. Frances Mary Young (née Cory) "the debtor" was declared en désastre and the Viscount was charged to administer the proceedings. We know that during the course of the désastre Mrs. Young was sentenced and served a term of 1 year and 1 month’s imprisonment. The details of that are all set out in the judgment of this Court and in the judgment of the Court of Appeal where her appeal was dismissed.
Article 40(1) of the Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law, 1990 sets a period of four years from the date of the declaration of désastre at which time the Viscount shall apply to the Court for the order to be discharged. He may also apply for an order that the period be reduced or extended and in this case he applies for an extension of a further year.
The Court has wide discretionary powers under Article 41 of the Law. What that Article says is that:
"At the hearing of any application for an order under paragraph (1) of Article 40, the Court may -
(a)grant an immediate order;
(b)grant an order subject to such conditions as it thinks fit, or suspend an order for such time as it thinks fit;
(c)grant an order with or without such conditions as it thinks fit to take effect at a specified future date;
(d)refuse to make an order."
Mr. Benest has carefully trawled the authorities and we are very grateful to him. We have five cases which we have examined. Of those cases, namely, In the Matter of the Désastre of Delaney (1996) JLR 96; the Désastre of Jonathon Hay: (no judgment; Act of the Royal Court of 4 July 1997); and the Désastre of Nicholas Hanley: (no judgment; Act of the Royal Court of 21 February 1997) are not in point because they are so different in their facts. But even the case of the Désastre of Royston Evans: (no judgment; Act of the Royal Court of 7 November 1997) has distinguishing factors. Mr. Evans worked to repay and paid money in and in effect his discharge was ordered.
These cases are important in general terms because they establish - as Mr. Benest so rightly says - that discharge is not a right but a privilege. Both the Royal Court and the Court of Appeal remarked on Mrs. Young’s total lack of remorse. She has explained thatto us today by saying that her advocate appointed on legal aid did not put across her genuine contrition and as a basis for that submission she tells us - and we have no reason to doubt it - that she did express regret in her original statement which she made to the police.
Whilst the precedents are helpful, each case must be taken on its merits and this case, unusually in our view, is contested and it was because it was contested that we adjourned it last Friday to enable Mrs. Young to be heard.
We agree that there must be consistency in the cases but there are some unusual factors in this case which have only now become apparent. One of those is the correspondence which has passed between Mrs. Young, her then lawyer and Barclays Bank which makes for uneasy reading. As I have said, all the cases cited to us are distinguishable. In our view the Viscount has not to our satisfaction shown a case that would protect either the creditors or the public at large during the year that follows and there seems very little possibility that the creditors would have anything further added to their debt if the désastre were extended for a year and therefore in those particular circumstances - and without creating any precedent for the future - we are going to order an immediate discharge.
Authorities
Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law, 1990: Article 40(1).
In the Matter of the Désastre of Delaney (1996) JLR 96.