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Jersey Unreported Judgments |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> De Figueiredo -v- Commonwealth of Australia [2010] JRC 226 (16 December 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2010/2010_226.html Cite as: [2010] JRC 226 |
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[2010]JRC226
royal court
(Samedi Division)
16th December 2010
Before : |
Sir Richard Tucker, Commissioner, sitting alone. |
Between |
Philip Eric De Figueiredo |
Appellant |
And |
Commonwealth of Australia |
Respondent |
Advocate M. St. J. O'Connell for the Appellant.
Advocate M. T. Jowitt for the Respondent.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. This application comes before me for clarification, of the order for costs which I made at the conclusion of the appeal proceedings. I start by looking at Article 50 of the Extradition (Jersey) Law 2004 which is in these terms, under the rubric costs on appeal to Royal Court, the Article provides:-
As is conceded, that Article gives me a wide and unfettered discretion.
2. This matter has been proceeding before me for many months. It has covered an appeal from the Magistrate in an extradition hearing and an appeal from the Attorney General against the making of his order for extradition. Every point has been taken on behalf of the appellant, some good, some not so good, but I have had to consider them all and have done so, I hope, patiently. It has taken a good deal of time to do so. I make no complaint about that; the appellant is entitled to have his case put fully before the Court. It is an extremely important matter from his point of view.
3. The question now arises as to what my order for costs meant. Basing myself on the Article, I conclude that the costs order I made should include all the Attorney General's costs, all the Commonwealth of Australia's costs, and it matters not which, in respect of the proceedings before me, that is to say, the two lengthy appeal proceedings, and also in respect of the extradition hearing, as I consider to be just and reasonable.
4. The point taken on behalf of the appellant is that it would not be just and reasonable and it would be disproportionate to visit the appellant with costs incurred by the Attorney General, who was not party to the proceedings, although he was represented at the conclusion of the appeal hearing. The fact is it is the Attorney General or his department who has borne the costs of these proceedings and of the extradition hearing. The appellant has failed in his submissions on the appeal; I have refused him leave to appeal and in my view it is just and reasonable that he should bear the costs of the proceedings, and I make it plain that I include in that order all costs incurred by the Attorney General in his own cause and also all costs incurred by the Attorney General in the cause of the Commonwealth of Australia in and about the conduct of the extradition hearings before the Magistrate and in the appeal to the Royal Court against the Magistrate's decision to send the case, and the appeal to the Royal Court against the extradition order. However, I do not include in that order, and it would not be right to require the appellant to pay, costs of the bail hearing or of the conveyancing matters which accompanied it. Those do not, in my view, form part of the costs in respect of the proceedings before the Royal Court or in respect of the extradition hearing and I expressly exclude those costs from my order.
5. That is the order which I make; that is the clarification which I give of the order which I originally made. I make it plain I am not revisiting my order. I make it equally plain that I consider I still have a function, I am not functus officio as was contended for by the appellant; I am still in charge of this case and I am still in charge of the interpretation of any order which I made in this case.