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Jersey Unreported Judgments |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> IN the matter of D [2011] JRC 039 (14 February 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2011/2011_039.html Cite as: [2011] JRC 39, [2011] JRC 039 |
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[2011]JRC039
royal court
(Samedi Division)
14th February 2011
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Before : |
M. C. St. J. Birt, Esq., Bailiff, and Jurats de Veulle and Liddiard. |
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Between |
Minister of Health and Social Services |
Applicant |
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And |
A |
First Respondent |
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And |
B |
Second Respondent |
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And |
D (acting by his Guardian Leonora Green) |
Third Respondent |
IN THE MATTER OF D
Advocate D. C. Robinson for the Minister.
Advocate C. Hall for A.
Advocate C. V. E. Benest for B.
Advocate B. J. Corbett for D.
judgment
the bailiff:
1. This is an application by the Minister for a full care order in respect of D.
Background
2. D is the youngest of the 7 children of the father and his late wife ("the mother") who died a few years ago. From that point onwards the father was the sole carer of the children. The family has been well known to the Children's Service since the birth of B, who is the eldest child. As at September 2008, there had been some nineteen referrals to the Children's Service including five relating to domestic violence against the mother, two relating to the children being left home alone, three relating to sexual issues, two relating to physical chastisement of the children by the father and one relating to the state of the home conditions.
3. In 2005, H alleged that H had been sexually abused by the father but subsequently withdrew the allegation. In September 2008 J alleged that J had also been sexually abused by the father. Following that allegation, the father was remanded in custody. On 3rd September, 2008, the Minister obtained an emergency protection order in respect of the three youngest children, namely C, E and D. The other children were all over 17.
4. On 23rd September the Court granted interim care orders in favour of the Minister in respect of C, E and D. Ms Leonora Green of the NSPCC was appointed as Guardian of the three children. E and D were each placed in foster care with separate foster carers. On 14th May, 2009, the Court granted a full care order in respect of C.
5. Subsequently, the father was sentenced for five offences to which he had pleaded guilty, namely indecent assault on J, procuring an act of gross indecency by J, indecent assault on a 15 year old female friend of J and two counts of neglect of a child under 16 relating to E and D. The father was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment and is due to be released in May of this year.
6. On 30th October, 2009, the Court sat to hear the Minister's applications for final care orders in respect of E and D. In respect of E, E was well settled with foster carers and the Court made a final care order. In respect of D, there were outstanding issues and the matter was adjourned. Since then, there have been a number of further adjournments because of difficulties with the placements of D and a concern on each occasion that the position was insufficiently clear to invite the Court to make a final order.
7. The first placement with foster carers broke down in February 2010, at which point D moved to a second family of foster carers. D moved from D's primary school to the first secondary school ("the first school") in September 2009 but never really settled there and in March 2010 D moved to D's present school. The new foster placement worked well for a while and the family did all it could to assist. However, it became clear that looking after D, who can present with challenging behaviour, was taking its toll upon the new family and, despite a respite placement in Heathfield in August 2010, the placement finally broke down in September 2010 at which point D was placed in Heathfield. D has remained there since then although, because of concerns over D's interaction with the other children in Heathfied, D lives in a separate part from most of the other children.
8. However, the placement at Heathfield has not proved satisfactory. D has presented very challenging behaviour on a number of occasions as set out in the reports and it is clear that D's separation from the main body of residents is a continuing source of difficulty for D.
The Care Plan
9. Following the placement at Heathfield, a thorough review was undertaken of all the options for D's future care. The results of that review are set out in the latest report of Mrs Jayne Isaac, the social worker who took over responsibility for D in October 2010. In essence, foster care was ruled out on the basis that no foster carers could be identified and in any event Dr Bryn Williams considered that foster care was not in D's best interests as D's needs were too overwhelming for a family placement to meet. Heathfield was considered unsatisfactory because it was not practical to integrate D into the main unit and D's continued placement in the separate part of Heathfield was causing D distress. A placement in the UK was considered but D was strongly against this and those advising the Minister do not consider it to be in D's interests.
10. What has been resolved upon is the creation of a small specialist residential unit in the Island. A four bedroomed house is to be leased for two years and D will move there together with a rota of six carers. Two of them will be staff from Heathfield who are well known to D and with whom D gets on well, two will come from elsewhere within the Social Services Department and two new members of staff have been appointed in respect of whom final police checks are awaited. Therapeutic support will be available and it is anticipated that additional children may reside there as appropriate in due course.
11. As to education, D's primary school had provided a point of stability amongst all the upheaval in D's life, but D moved to the first school in September 2009. It has to be said that this was not a success and had been questioned by the Guardian at the time. Following preparation of an educational report by Jasmine Murray and further consideration, D moved to the present school in March 2010. Considerable additional teaching support has been given to D in the form of one to one teaching. Half of this has been provided out of the resources of the present school but the other half has been provided for by additional funding from the Education Department specifically for this purpose.
12. The results of D's move to the present school have been extremely encouraging. D was very weak in terms of basic literacy and numeracy but D has made enormous advances. Furthermore, in other areas, particularly those with a practical aspect, D has shown to have real talent. The Court has been shown a plan for a business enterprise scheme proposed by the school in respect of D and this is extremely innovative and exciting. D and the staff at the present school are to be congratulated upon the progress, which shows that D has real talent if it can be suitably tapped. The Care Plan envisages that the current level of support at the present school will continue.
13. The other area dealt with in the Care Plan is the question of contact with D's siblings and father but we will revert to that later in this judgment.
The Law
14. Article 24(2) of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 ("the 2002 Law") provides as follows:-
15. The applicable principles on the making of a care order were authoritively stated in this jurisdiction by Beloff JA in the Court of Appeal in Re F and G (No2) [2010] JCA 051 at paras 5 - 8. The Court was somewhat surprised that the skeleton arguments in this case referred only to English authorities and not to the Jersey authority. In summary:-
(i) The Court must first consider whether the threshold criteria set out in Article 24(2) are satisfied. Helpful guidance on a number of aspects of this part of the Court's role are to be found at paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment of Beloff JA. If the threshold criteria are not satisfied, no care order may be made.
(ii) If they are satisfied, the Court then goes on to consider whether a care order should be made. In that respect, the applicable principles are set out at paragraph 8 of the judgment of Beloff JA as follows:-
16. We turn therefore to consider whether the threshold criteria are satisfied in this case. The Minister has prepared a threshold document setting out the respects in which D has suffered significant harm as of the date at which the interim care order was sought and why D is at risk of significant harm if an order is not made. All the parties to these proceedings, including the father and the Guardian, agree that the threshold criteria are met as set out in the threshold document. We have read the evidence contained in the many reports produced to us and we agree. In view of the parties' agreement, we do not think it necessary to lengthen this judgment by setting out the threshold document in detail. Suffice it to say that there was a chaotic lifestyle in the family before the father's imprisonment in which there were no boundaries; the father was unwilling and lacked the capacity to understand and manage D's behaviour and diabetes; D was exposed to sexual behaviour in the family including the father's abuse of H and J, for the latter of which he was convicted as well as indecent assault of a female friend of J; the father has been convicted of neglect of D; D has been subject to excessive chastisement by the father; and the father also failed to protect D, as the youngest child, from being physically abused by other members of the family. In summary, it was clear that, at the time of the interim care order, D was a deeply troubled young child who had suffered significant emotional and physical harm as well as neglect and was at risk of suffering further physical and emotional harm.
17. We turn therefore to consider the question of whether a care order should be made. We should record at the outset that the Guardian agreed that in principle the care order needed to be made and the father and B (who is convened because at one stage B was considered as a possible carer) did not oppose the making of a care order.
18. The Court heard oral evidence from Mrs Isaac, from the Guardian and from Mr Paul Griffin of the Property Holdings Department, who has had responsibility for negotiating the lease of the new unit. The Court also saw D privately and a note of that meeting was provided to the parties. D expressed the view that D wished to remain at Heathfield until May and then to live with the father. D also said that D wished to begin seeing the father before he was released from prison.
19. The Court has considered the matters set out in the welfare checklist, including of course the ascertainable wishes and feelings of D taking into account D's age and understanding. However, we are in no doubt that a final care order is in D's best interests. If no order is made, D will remain in the sole care of the father. The father is at present in prison for serious offences, including sexual offences against one of D's siblings and neglect of D and one of D's siblings. He has not seen D for some two and a half years and prior to that he caused D significant harm as described in the threshold document. Moreover, the risk assessment by the psychologist Dr David Briggs makes it clear that the Court cannot be reassured that the father is equipped to provide effective and safe full time care of D. There is no alternative carer put forward. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Minister and the Guardian that the proposed placement set out in the care plan is the best course of action available for D. In short, the Court agrees with the Minister and the Guardian for the reasons set out in their helpful reports that a full care order is in D's best interests.
20. The sole issue which arises is whether the Court should make a full care order at this stage or whether it should adjourn the matter for a short while in order that certain aspects of the care plan may be investigated further and/or changed.
21. In her skeleton argument filed before the hearing, the Guardian raised concerns about three areas of the care plan. First, she was concerned that the plans in relation to the lease of the new unit and the staffing of it were not sufficiently firm and clear cut. Secondly, she was concerned that there was no certainty that the special educational requirements of D would continue to be met by the provision of the additional teaching. Thirdly, she was concerned over the uncertainty concerning the proposals for contact with the father following his release from prison in May. For these reasons she suggested an adjournment with the interim care order remaining in place.
22. The points raised by the Guardian in relation to the new unit were, we find, met by the additional evidence provided at the hearing. The lease was to be signed on 1st February and the Minister could take possession. We are also satisfied with the staffing arrangements pending receipt of police clearance in relation to the two new members of staff. Whilst the lease is only for two years and an extension cannot be guaranteed, there is no reason to think the lease cannot be extended if the owners remain out of the Island as part of their employment, which is the current position. In any event, there is nothing that can be done to improve the position at present. All in all, we are satisfied that the arrangements for the new unit will go ahead and we are satisfied with the arrangements the Minister has made for that unit. We understood the Guardian to be similarly satisfied following the production of the further information given at the hearing.
23. In relation to D's educational needs, it is clear that the school will continue to provide those additional resources which it funds from within its own budget, but we have to accept that the provision of that proportion of the resources funded by the Education Department cannot be guaranteed in these times of budgetary cuts. However, it is clear from the evidence that the Children's Service and the school itself will lobby extremely hard to keep those additional resources and we do not think that the lack of a guarantee that the Education Department will continue to provide the necessary funds would be a valid reason for not approving the care plan. Again, we understood the Guardian to accept the position by the end of the hearing.
24. However, we would wish to say this. We entirely agree with the views expressed by the Children's Service, the school and the Guardian that D's progress in the educational field has been a joy to behold and is a great credit to D as well as those who have assisted D. This progress would not have been possible without the additional resources. In our judgment, if the Education Department were to withdraw the funding for the additional one to one teaching or were not to provide any support necessary for the proposed business enterprise scheme, this would be a betrayal of the best interests of a child who has suffered much during their young life for reasons entirely outside their control and whose care has now been entrusted to the Minister. We would urge all those concerned to take full note not only of the long term interests of D but also the long term interests of society in assisting D to make the best of D's life.
Contact
25. That brings us to the issue of contact which, in the end, was the only point at issue between the Minister on the one hand and the Guardian and the father on the other. The Guardian and the father argued that we should adjourn the making of a final care order until after the first occasion of contact between the father and D, which would take place in May following the father's release from prison. This would enable the Court to satisfy itself that the future arrangements for contact were in D's best interests. Conversely, the Minister argued that any uncertainties over contact were not a sufficient reason to delay making a full care order. That requires us to consider the principles applicable when the Court is of the view that a final care order should be made but is not satisfied or disagrees with a particular aspect of the Minister's care plan.
26. The care plan envisages contact between D and D's siblings. D sees H (who now has two children) occasionally, the last occasion being on Christmas Day. J lives in the United Kingdom and D last saw J in September when J came to Jersey. An issue may arise as to the funding of any trips by J to Jersey in future should D express a wish to see J but Mrs Isaac indicated that she would seek to procure funding or partial funding by the Children's Service should D express such a wish. D sees C on a weekly basis although there are occasional difficulties when C is late or forgets. Such contact is considered to be beneficial. There has been little contact with E or with the elder siblings but the Children's Service is willing to facilitate such contact if desired by all parties. In essence, no real issue arises in relation to contact with the siblings and the care plan deals with the position adequately.
27. The real issue relates to the question of contact with the father. Contact cannot take place while he is in prison and the Minister and Guardian agreed that such an important occasion of contact should not take place by telephone given that D has not seen the father since September 2008. Thus the first contact will take place following the father's release in May.
28. The care plan is fairly brief on this topic although certain further information was given in the addendum care plan file on 21st January. D has expressed a strong desire to see the father and has stated that D will visit the father upon his release with or without the consent of D's carers. D has gone as far as to say that D would like to live with the father. These views were reiterated to the members of the Court when they saw D during the course of the hearing. In the care plan and addendum the Children's Service indicated that it would be taking note of the conclusions of the Jersey Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (JMAPPA), which was a multi-agency meeting under Article 28 of the Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010 and would give consideration to issues of public safety. It would identify the offender category into which the father would be placed and seek to determine the level of risk that he presents to both his immediate family (if any) and the wider community. The Children's Service would be represented at such meetings and the conclusions would assist the Children's Service in deciding what, if any, contact should be allowed between D and the father.
29. When she gave evidence, Mrs Isaac confirmed that the question of contact with the father was complex and difficult bearing in mind the history of this matter, his convictions for sexual offences and the contents of the risk assessment prepared by Dr Briggs. Their primary concern had to be D's safety. On the other hand, they had to take account of D's strongly expressed wishes and the risk that, if D felt thwarted in D's wish to see the father, this might adversely impact on the success of the placement. It would require careful consideration following the outcome of the JMAPPA process. The Children's Service was also arranging for D to begin work with Dr Emma House, a psychologist at CAMHS, pertaining to D's feelings and understanding about D's relationship with the father. This was to prepare D for the first meeting with the father. This work had just begun and the results would inform decisions about contact. However, she then went on to say that the starting point of the Children's Service was for supervised contact twice a year although she emphasised that this would be flexible depending on the outcome of the initial contact.
30. In her evidence, the Guardian felt that this approach was unduly restrictive. She did not think the JMAPPA process was likely to add much to what was already known, particularly from the report of Dr Briggs. She agreed that the issue of contact in this case was particularly complex and difficult and that safety was of paramount importance, but believed this could be dealt with by appropriate supervised contact. She thought that there was a real risk that the placement would break down if D felt that D was being prevented from seeing the father. She felt that D would build up an 'idealised' picture of the father and would then seek unilaterally to achieve D's objective of meeting with the father. This might well involve unauthorised meetings with the father. Furthermore, if these were to take place and D were to take other youngsters with D, they could be exposed to risk from the father. It would, in her opinion, be better to work alongside D on the question of contact so that it could be managed and supervised appropriately. In her opinion, the risk of emotional harm to D resulting from contact - e.g. disappointment in the father or in the nature of such contact - was less significant than the risk of the placement breaking down because of a refusal to take D's wishes into account. D was a stubborn child and would go to great lengths to achieve what D wanted if D felt that D was being unfairly prevented from seeing the father. She was particularly disappointed to hear the figure of twice a year being mentioned as she felt that this was likely to be wholly insufficient and disclosed an inappropriately restrictive approach on the part of the Children's Service.
31. When the Court explored this matter further with Mrs Isaac, following her recall to give further evidence on the point, she emphasised that the Children's Service was entirely flexible and the decision would depend on how the initial contact went. However, the effect of this flexibility was somewhat undone when, in his closing submissions, Advocate Robinson said that he was now authorised to say that the Children's Service envisaged a starting point of four times a year rather than twice a year. That still seemed a very restrictive approach.
32. In our judgment the approach of the Guardian is to be preferred in this respect. We fully accept that the issue of contact with the father is extremely difficult. D has not seen the father for over two years. D knows he has been sent to prison but it is not clear whether D knows exactly what the father has been sent to prison for. Everyone agrees that D is bound to have many questions to ask the father when they first meet and that these questions may take a little while to resolve; much will depend upon the father's response. It is clear that important work needs to be done with D by Dr House in order to prepare D for the contact. The Children's Service also need to meet with the father. Everyone also agrees that there should be a supervised occasion of contact not long after the father's release from prison and that this may need to be followed by one or two further occasions of contact within a reasonably short period depending on how the first visit goes, on the basis that many of D's questions may not be resolved at the first meeting.
33. In our judgment, the correct approach to the question of contact at this stage is to have a completely open mind and to review what is best for D in the light of how the first meeting or meetings go. It is impossible to know at this stage whether D's welfare would best be served by no or very little contact or by more frequent meetings such as once a fortnight or once a month. Much will depend upon how D reacts to the initial meetings and what D's wishes are at that stage. The willingness or otherwise of the father to work with the Children's Service will also be important. However, we are at one with the Guardian in thinking that, if D remains strongly of the view that D wishes to see the father, this is something which must weigh very heavily in the balance. We agree that there is a real risk, given everyone's experience of D to date, that, if D is thwarted in D's desire to see the father, D will idealise him and will take steps to achieve D's objective. As D gets older it will be hard to prevent this. There is then a risk of the placement breaking down and this would be disastrous from the point of view of D's long term interests. We are concerned that a frame of mind which considers at this stage that contact twice a year or even four times a year would be appropriate displays an over-restrictive approach. We appreciate that the Children's Service has indicated that it would be flexible but we are concerned about the starting point from which any review will take place. When she gave her supplementary evidence on the final occasion, Mrs Isaac emphasised her commitment to complete flexibility and we hope that our observations in this respect will be of assistance.
34. The difference between the Minister and the Guardian raises the question of what course the Court should adopt when it is not satisfied about some aspects of the care plan or there are uncertainties about the plan which are unresolved. Advocate Robinson, on behalf of the Minister argued that it is not the duty of the Court to supervise such matters and that, provided it is satisfied with the care plan as a whole and that a final care order is necessary, the Court should make such an order. Conversely, Advocate Corbett on behalf of the Guardian argued that, where a care plan is inchoate or there are aspects which the Court cannot approve, the Court has power to adjourn the proceedings and maintain an interim care order, even where it is satisfied that a final care order is ultimately the only appropriate course.
35. Although there are significant differences between the two statutes, the 2002 Law was based upon the Children Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act") and therefore English authorities in relation to the interpretation of that Act are of assistance. The issue which has been raised in this case has been considered by the English courts on a number of occasions.
36. The position under the 1989 Act was authoritively established in Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] 1 FLR 815. In that case the House of Lords rejected the attempt of the Court of Appeal to introduce a measure of post care order supervision of the local authority by the Court by means of the starred milestone system i.e. certain starred items in the care plan which would need to be referred back to the Court. The House of Lords made it clear that, upon the making of a care order, responsibility for the child's care thereafter lay with the local authority, not with the Court. The position is conveniently set out at paragraph 1 of the headnote as follows:-
37. The House of Lords also considered the question of when it was appropriate for a court to adjourn a final application and continue an interim care order if it was not satisfied with certain aspects of the care plan. The position is dealt with at paragraphs 89 - 102 of the speech of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, which we have considered carefully, and which are summarised at paragraph 4 of the headnote as follows:-
38. In this respect the House of Lords approved the observation of Wall J in Re J (Minors) (Care: Care plan) [1994] 1 FLR 253 at 265:-
39. The one exception to the principle that the court has no continuing role to supervise the implementation of the care plan relates to the question of contact. This is because section 34 of the 1989 Act specifically confers power upon the court to make orders for contact in respect of children in care.
40. This aspect was considered by Munby J in Re K (Care proceedings: Care plan) [2008] 1 FLR 1. In that case the justices, even though they were of the opinion that the making of a final care order was in the best interests of the child, refused to make such an order because they did not approve of the proposals for contact contained in the care plan. The local authority, supported by the child's guardian, appealed and Munby J allowed the appeal. At paras 13 - 22 of his judgment he summarised very helpfully the approach of the court to the issue discussed at paras 35 - 38 above, namely when to continue an interim order when the Court is not satisfied with some aspect of the care plan. However, he went on (at paras 23 - 26 of his judgment) to make clear that, because of the terms of section 34 of the 1989 Act, the position is different in relation to issues of contact. There the court does have a continuing role. He went on at para 39 to say that what the justices should have done was to approve the authority's care plan except in relation to contact. However that was no reason not to make a care order because the justices could have gone on to deal with the question of contact, either by making an order then and there, or by giving directions for the future determination of the issue, or by leaving it to the mother or the child's guardian to make an appropriate application under section 34 in due course.
41. Advocate Corbett submitted that the effect of the 2002 Law was not the same as the 1989 Act. She said that the jurisdiction of this Court was not ousted following the making of a final care order and that this Court should introduce a system of starred milestones along the lines of that rejected by the House of Lords in Re S. When pressed by the Court as to the material differences which would enable the Court to construe the 2002 Law in such a different manner, she pointed to the fact that Article 76 of the 2002 Law, which restricted the Court's inherent jurisdiction, was not in identical terms to section 100 of the 1989 Act. She referred to the fact that Article 76 does not contain the equivalent of section 100(2)(c) (which states that the High Court cannot make a child who is a subject of a care order a ward of court) or section 100(3) (which provides that a local authority can only apply to the court for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in relation to a child if the authority has previously obtained the leave of the court). We cannot see that these two particular differences lead to a difference in the interpretation of the statute as a whole. It is quite clear to us that, like the 1989 Act, the 2002 Law envisages that, once a final care order is made, the Court has no continuing role save where the 2002 Law specifically provides. There is such specific provision in Article 27 (which is the equivalent of section 34 of the 1989 Act) which enables the Court to make orders for contact in relation to children who are in care. The court may do this of its own volition or on application by, inter alia, the child.
42. Because of this continuing jurisdiction, it would not normally be appropriate to defer making a final care order where the Court believes that to be in the best interests of the child simply because the Court does not agree with the Minister's proposals in relation to contact. As Munby J said in the passage referred to above, if the Court is of that opinion, it may make an order for contact on the making of the final care order or it may give directions for the future determination of the issue or it may leave it to the parent or the child (acting through his or her guardian) to make an appropriate application under Article 27.
43. We have carefully considered the Guardian's submission in this case that we should defer making a final care order until after the first occasion of contact between D and the father. However, we do not think that would be appropriate. We would summarise our reasons as follows:-
(i) We are satisfied with every other aspect of the care plan. All parties, including the Guardian, agree that the making of a final care order is in D's best interests and that the proposed placement in the new unit is the best course of action.
(ii) Article 2(2) of the 2002 Law requires the Court to have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining a question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child concerned. These proceedings have been going on since September 2008, which is far longer than one would wish care proceedings to take. There have been valid reasons for the various delays because of the changing position on the ground but, now that the way forward is clear, it is time for there to be finality.
(iii) As the cases make clear, the Court should not use the continuation of an interim order as a means of exercising supervision over the implementation of a care plan. Furthermore, where the only outstanding or uncertain aspect relates to contact, there is no need for the Court to use this mechanism as it retains jurisdiction to deal with any problems over contact under Article 27.
(iv) Whilst we have indicated that we do not agree with the Minister's starting point of twice or four times a year, Mrs Isaac was at pains to emphasise that the Children's Service will adopt a flexible approach over contact. We are content to take the Children's Service at its word in this respect. We hope that the Service takes on board the observations of the Guardian in her evidence and the endorsement of those observations in this judgment.
(v) We are not entirely sure what an adjournment would achieve. The case would have to be deferred until after the first occasion of contact. It is by no means clear what would happen then. We would hope that the most likely outcome is that the Children's Service and the Guardian would at that stage agree on the way forward in terms of contact, in which event the adjournment would have been for no purpose. Conversely, it may be that there would be disagreement in which event the Court would have to rule upon that disagreement. However, it has jurisdiction to do that under Article 27 and again therefore no purpose would have been served by the adjournment. On the contrary , there would simply have been continued uncertainty in circumstances where the Court is quite satisfied that in all other respects the care plan is appropriate and that the best interests of D are served by making a final care order.
(vi) Should, contrary to our expectations, any difficulties over contact arise, the father and/or D can bring an application for contact under Article 27. The Court would then be able to intervene.
44. Whilst the appointment of the Guardian will come to an end in relation to these proceedings upon the making of the final care order, we see no reason why the Court should not at this stage appoint Ms Green under Article 75(1)(b) for the limited purpose of assisting D in relation to questions of contact with the father. The 2002 Law in this respect is in very different terms from the equivalent position under the 1989 Act. The power to make such an appointment under Article 75(1)(b) is not limited to proceedings for a care order. Thus Ms Green will be able to keep herself informed as to how contact is proceeding and will be able to initiate proceedings under Article 27 on behalf of D should she think this necessary. We emphasise however that henceforth her role will be limited to issues of contact. She will have no continuing role in relation to the implementation of the care plan in other respects.
45. For the reasons given, we accordingly make a final care order in favour of the Minister. We make no order for contact at this stage as we are satisfied from the care plan and the evidence before us that the Minister will arrange for direct supervised contact following the father's release from prison and thereafter there is too much uncertainty to be able to make an order for future contact. However, we emphasise the point made earlier, namely that, assuming D remains of the view that D wishes to have contact with the father, the Minister must give full weight to this desire and the risk of the placement breaking down should D be thwarted when balancing that against the other matters relevant on the question of contact. Subject to her consent, we appoint Ms Green under Article 75(1)(b) for the limited purpose described in paragraph 44.
46. We also reiterate the importance which we attach to the continued provision of the extra teaching resources that have been made available to the present school. To withdraw these or to refuse to fund the proposed business enterprise scheme would, in our judgment, be a very unfortunate step which would be quite contrary to D's best interests in circumstances where D has already suffered very considerably.
47. Finally, we would wish to repeat some observations that we made at the time of the hearing. This has been a far from straightforward case with many twists and turns on the way. We wish to commend the Guardian for the substantial contribution which she has made towards trying to achieve the best for D. Similarly, we would wish to express our appreciation of the work which Mrs Isaac has undertaken since assuming responsibility for D in October. She has worked hard and pro-actively on D's behalf with beneficial results.
