was written by another hand, though in the doquet or testing clause the notary uses the word *signavi*. 5thly, That the pursuer having purchased at a judicial sale, was secured by the act 1695. As to the first, the answers made were the same as in the case of 22d November 1742, Duke of Douglas against Creditors of Littlegill, (No. 11, *voce* WRIT.) As to the objections to the sasine, they quoted sundry decisions from Durie sustaining sasines, where the symbols were not specified, and said that in 1637 it was not usual to insert the notary's note in the register; 2dly, that patronages may be conveyed without sasine, although they have been once annexed to Baronies, as in this case, if they are afterwards dissolved, which this patronage was by the King's charter; that after so long a time, it was not necessary to produce the precept of sasine where the charter was produced, and quoted the act 1594; and that the act 1695 seeured only against the deeds and debts of the bankrupt's predecessors, but not against third parties. The Lords, as in the case of Duke of Douglas against Creditors of Littlegill, sustained the objection to the contract, that the witnesses are not designed, but found it yet suppliable by a condescendence, and instructing the same. Found that Sir Robert Innes was not divested of the patronage till the Bishop was duly infeft; but repelled the objections to the sasine. Repelled also the objection that the precept of sasine was not produced, and found that the Crown's right was not barred by the judicial sale. 18th December 1753 Adhered. *Renit.* Justice-Clerk and Strichen.

PAYMENT.

No. 1. 1736, Feb. 17. YORK-BUILDINGS COMPANY'S ANNUITANTS *against* GARDEN of Troup.

THE Lords sustained the defence of *bona fide* payment, in respect the payment was made without collusion after the legal terms, though before the conventional terms. *N. B.* The Lords in the interlocutor avoided using the words "legal terms," and used the words "the term of payment."

PENALTY.

No. 1. 1743, Jan. 25. M'Leod of Genzies *against* WIGHTS.

THE Lords seemed all to be of opinion, that a contract of victual, obliging the seller to deliver, under a small penalty for every boll undelivered, without adding by and attour

performance, the seller might notwithstanding, in case of not delivery, be liable in damages, but if by any fatality the seller be not able to deliver, as was generally the case in the year 1740, that in that case he ought only to be liable in the liquidate penalty. Arniston told us he had given such a judgment in a case before him; and Dun told us the same of a case before him; and I think at the same time, in February, affirmed an interlocutor of mine to that purpose betwixt Trades of Dundee and Earl Strathmore.

No. 2. 1743, July 20. DEMPSTER *against* FERGUSON of Kinmundy.

FIND Ferguson of Kinmundy is liable for the current prices of the undelivered bolls of all the victual actually paid to Kinmundy by his tenants, and for the remainder, that he is liable for the conventional penalty of one merk per boll, or in the buyer Dempster's option for the price paid to him, or promised to be paid to him by his tenants.

PERSONA STANDI.

No. 1. 1740, Jan. 6. CASE OF SIR ALEXANDER M'DONALD.

A pretty new question cast up in the process betwixt these parties, which had already been several times before the Court, but upon a petition in the name of Sir Alexander M'Donald, it was moved by Arniston, that the Court could give no judgment upon a petition bearing that title, in respect these honours were forfeited by the attainder of Sir Donald M'Donald, the petitioner's uncle; as to which it was observed by some of the Lords, that the honours in Sir Donald were certainly extinct; that if the petitioner could not have a title to the like honours of Baronet, otherwise than through Sir Donald, the Court could not receive a petition under that title; but as the petitioner (whose father also either had, or assumed the like title) might be entitled to the honours of Baronet, though Sir Donald had never been a Baronet, and that it was not the province of the Court to examine into or determine titles of honour incidentally in this way; yet by a majority it carried they could not give any judgment on the petition with that title. Accordingly the petition was reprinted, leaving out the title of honour, but complaining modestly of the judgment, and at the same time putting us in mind, that in the former interlocutor, we ourselves had given him those titles. There were several who differed from the interlocutor in the case of Knightship or title of Baronet, though in a title of Peerage we thought the case would have been otherwise, because only one Peer can have one title of Peerage, and none can claim it but in the right of the former Peers, and if it is forfeited by one, none other can take it without new creation, which does not apply to the honours of Baronet, *(inter quos dissent.* President *et ego.)* *N. B.* No judgment was given on this new bill, it having been observed that the preamble to it was unnecessary, because no interlocutor had been, or was intended to be put in writing upon the former