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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Mollison v. Noltie [1889] ScotLR 26_240 (24 January 1889) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1889/26SLR0240.html Cite as: [1889] SLR 26_240, [1889] ScotLR 26_240 |
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On the joint employment of two persons a broker sold a certain amount of railway stock. Neither of the parties possessed the stock at the time. The stock was continued for some months, when it was closed at a loss, and the sum due to the broker for commission and differences was paid by one of the principals.
In an action at his instance against the other adventurer for repayment of one-half of this sum, the defender pleaded that the action should be dismissed in respect that the transaction was of a gambling nature. Held that as the stocks had been sold to a real purchaser, and the transaction between the principals was a joint-adventure in stocks, and not a joint-adventure in gaming, the pursuer was entitled to recover from the defender the amount sued for.
Upon 16th January 1888 Hugh Mollison, late farmer, Burnside, Ruthrieston, Aberdeen, and James Noltie, grocer and spirit merchant, Aberdeen, agreed to enter into a joint-adventure in the sale and purchase of Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada First Preference Stock. They accordingly on said date instructed Mr Alexander S. Sutherland, stock and share broker, Aberdeen, to sell for them 500 said Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada First Preference Stock at 54
1 1 per cent. Mr Sutherland made said sale. No such stock was in the hands of the parties at the time. The stock was continued till, on the 11th day of June 1886, the said quantity of stock was purchased through Mr Sutherland at 63 1 6 ; per cent., in order to close the adventure. The sum which thus fell due to the broker for commission and differences amounted to £49, 15s. 11., which sum was paid by Mollison, who in October 1887 brought this action against Noltie for £24, 17s. lid., being the half of the above-named sum. 3 2 The defender averred, inter alia—“In the beginning of March 1886 the defender called on Mr Sutherland and instructed him to close the 500 Trunks, and to let the pursuer know this. Mr Sutherland agreed to do so. From that time till 9th August 1886, two months after the stock had been purchased, the defender was not aware that said account had been closed. He believes and avers that if said stock was continued it was so continued in the name of the pursuer alone. The defender has no knowledge with whom the pursuer was dealing, and never received any sale notes, nor was he otherwise informed that a sale had been effected.”
The pursuer pleaded—“(1) The defender having agreed to enter into said joint-adventure with the pursuer, and having done so, defender is bound to bear his share of the loss arising therefrom.”
The defender pleaded—“(2) The defender having instructed his broker to close his account at a time when no loss would have been incurred, the defender is in the circumstances not liable to pursuer. (5) The transaction being of the nature of gambling transactions, the action should be dismissed.”
After a proof, which was mainly directed to the question whether the defender had instructed Mr Sutherland to close the account in March 1886, the Sheriff-Substitute ( Brown) upon 30th June 1888 sustained the defender's 5th plea-in-law, and dismissed the action.
On appeal the Sheriff ( Guthrie Smith) on 25th September 1888 issued this interlocutor:—“Recals the interlocutor: Finds it proved that on their joint employment Mr A. S. Sutherland, stockbrocker, sold on their account certain railway stock, with the result that they became indebted to him in the sum of £49, 15s. 11d. for commission and differences: Finds in law that the pursuer having paid this sum to the said A. S. Sutherland, is entitled to recover from the defender his share thereof, being the sum sued for: Therefore repels the defences; decerns in terms of the conclusions of the summons; finds the defender liable in expenses, &c.
“Note.—On the 16th January 1886 the pursuer
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and defender gave joint instructions to Mr Sutherland to sell on their account 500 Grand Trunks. Neither of them had the stock to deliver; it was in fact a ‘bearing’ transaction belonging to a class of dealings on the Stock Exchange which have frequently been denounced by eminent Judges as immoral and pernicious. There is no doubt also that, as between buyer and seller, a contract that the one shall receive and the other shall pay ‘differences’ is a wagering contract, which by Statute 8 and 9 Vict. c. 109, is null and void. But it is equally well settled that the statute only affects the contract which makes the bet or wager, and that the stockbroker employed by the seller to find for him a purchaser of the stock incurs obligations on his principal's behalf, which by the rules of the Stock Exchange are enforceable against him, and of which he has relief against his employers. In this case Mr Sutherland executed his commission by selling through a London broker, and the stock was continued till the month of June, when it was closed at a loss. In these circumstances if an action had been brought against the parties by Mr Sutherland it could not have been defended, and on general principles it is too clear for argument that if one of the two parties discharges a contract debt in which they are jointly interested, the other is liable in contribution. A more revelant defence to the action is that if the broker had closed the account when he was told to do so there would have been no loss. But this fails in fact. Mr Sutherland affirms that he acted on his instructions to close as soon as he received them; pursuer says the same, and the defender's statement to the contrary is unsupported.” The defender appealed, and argued — This was a gambling debt, and therefore the pursuer could not recover. In these circumstances the Court would not look at the agreement at all, and one of the wrongdoers could not recover from another any sum which he paid for purpose of gaming— Risk v. Auld and Guild, May 27, 1881, 8 R. 729: O'Connell v. Russell, November 25, 1864, 3 Macph. 89; Calder v. Stevens, July 20, 1871, 9 Macph. 1074; Higginson v. Simpson, January 12, 1877, L.R., 2 C.P.D. 76; M'Kinnell v. Robinson, Easter Term 1838, 3 M. & W. 434; Bell's Prin., secs. 36, 37, 550; Don v. Richardson, June 16, 1858, 20 D. 1138; Ainslie v. Sutton, December 14, 1851, 14 D. 184; Gillies v. M'Lean, October 16, 1885, 13 R. 12; Newton v. Cribbes, February 9, 1884, 11 R. 554. Secondly, the proof showed that the defender was not liable for any loss incurred after March 1886, when he had given orders to the broker to close the account.
The respondent argued—This was not a gambling transaction; the pursuer ordered the broker to sell so much stock. No doubt it was a speculation. The parties expected the stock to fall. But it was no gaming transaction. The parties simply agreed to await the result of an expected fall. Moreover, the stock was sold to a real purchaser. It was a bona fide transaction. There was no element of sponsio ludicra here— Foulds v. Thomson, June 10, 1857, 19 D. 803; Addison on Contracts, 1157. The defender was resting-owing to the pursuer in the amount sued for. The pursuer simply paid the whole loss for the sake of convenience, and that mainly on the defender's part, who by repaying the half of the loss, would only repay a loan. There was no proof that the defender had instructed the broker to close the account in March.
At advising—
The other question is the important one as to the law. It is the question whether the defender is justified in resisting payment of his share of the sum paid to the broker by the pursuer, on the ground that the transaction was a gambling transaction, and that the Court will not listen to a party who comes forward asking powers to enforce an alleged right arising out of such a gaming transaction. Now, having given the subject the best consideration I can, I think that the Sheriff is right on this point also. The broker Sutherland was instructed to sell a certain number of shares for both Mollison and Noltie. It is not disputed that at that time neither Mollison nor Noltie possessed the scrip, and that the transaction was a speculation. They both hoped that the market would fall, and that they would therefore make money by purchasing the stock at a lower price before it required to be delivered. In this they were unfortunate, for the market rose. Now, I think this transaction was an ordinary and bona fide one on the Stock Exchange, whereby a broker was instructed to sell, and did sell, the shares to a third party. Mollison and Noltie were bound to deliver the stock, and did, after the transaction had been continued over, procure and deliver it. I cannot hold that that is a transaction struck at as a gaming contract. These were not two parties wagering, and a wager requires two parties. It cannot be said that the two speculators Mollison and Noltie were wagering with the purchaser, for he was an ordinary purchaser offering to buy stock, and intending to obtain it, and not in any way engaged in a wager. Was the broker, then, engaged in wagering about the stock? He was not, for his whole interest in the matter was to obtain his commission, and to be kept by his employers free from personal liability to the purchaser.
We have, then, only Mollison and Noltie left, and they could not be wagering with each other, because under no circumstances could the one be better or worse off by the event than the other. I think the transaction comes within the rule of the case of Foulds, and a passage in the opinion of Lord Wood in that case is entirely applicable to this one. Lord Wood says—“To wagering or gaming there must be two parties” (and of course he means two opposing parties). “The provisions of the statute are all framed on that footing. The parties must come together directly or through their brokers. In contracts within the statute there must be opposite parties,
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On the question of fact as to the broker's instructions to carry over, I agree that the Sheriff's judgment should not be altered.
The Court pronounced this interlocutor:—“Find in fact (1) that on the joint employment of the pursuer and defender Mr A. J. Sutherland, stock-broker, on 16th January 1886 sold on their account 500 shares of the Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada First Preference Stock, and that the said stock was subsequently purchased in order to implement said contract of sale, and was delivered and paid for by the purchaser; (2) that in respect of said transaction the pursuer and defender became indebted to the said A. J. Sutherland in the sum of £49, 15s. 11d. for commission and differences in said contract of sale: Find in law that the pursuer having paid the said sum to the said A. J. Sutherland is entitled to recover from the defender his share thereof, being the sum sued for: Therefore dismiss the appeal and affirm the interlocutor of the Sheriff appealed against; of new repel the defences, and decern in terms of the conclusions of the petition,” &c.
Counsel for the Appellant— Guthrie. Agent— Robt. C. Gray, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondent— Comrie Thomson— Orr. Agents— Stuart & Stuart, W.S.